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SUMMARY
The Mouvement pour la Défense de L'Exploitation Familial (MODEF) was 
created in 1959 by a group of dissident and former members of the main 
farmers union, the Federation Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitants 
Agricoles (FNSEA). Discontent with the apparent inability of the FNSEA to 
protect the interests of the family farm was the motive behind such a 
step.
Chapter 1 examines the existing literature on French agriculture and 
agricultural politics in general in order to isolate concepts of 
explanatory value for the existence of MODEF. Chapter 2 relates these 
theoretical questions to the historical evidence of French agricultural 
politics and the emergence of MODEF. It also deals with the development 
of support for MODEF over the period 1959-79. Chapter 3 consists of 
two case studies of the pattern of MODEF support in the two departments 
of the Charente and Vaucluse.
Chapter 4 deals with the internal organization of MODEF and the purposes 
to which the organization has been put. Chapter 5 deals with the 
ideological aspects of the organization and their effect on the 
operation of the organization. Chapter 6 deals with MODEF's role in the 
web of agricultural organizations and institutions and identifies the 
limitations imposed by its oppositional stance.
Chapters 7 and 8 analyse the overtly political aspects of MODEF. Given 
the frequent portrayal of MODEF as a satellite of the Parti Communiste 
Français (PCF), the connection between MODEF and the PCF is considered 
in detail. Relations with other political parties are also examined. 
Finally, Chapter 8 deals with the relations between MODEF and the state.
The period covered is 1959 to February 1982 and the main source material 
consists of data gathered in interviews conducted in 1980-1981. A 
thematic approach has been adopted in order to facilitate the effort to 
avoid the limitations of the case study. Where necessary, the 
implications of the MODEF case for certain theoretical debates, such as 
that on corporatism, are considered.
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îPREFACE
The Mouvement pour la Défense de l'Exploitation Familial (MODEF) was 
created by a group of dissident and former members of the Federation 
Nationale des Syndicats d'Exploitation Familial (FNSEA), the official 
voice of agricultural trade unionism, in 1959.
For the first twenty-two of the twenty-three years covered in this 
thesis, MODEF was officially boycotted, excluded from participation in 
the agricultural decision-making process and constantly denounced as a 
stooge of the Parti Communiste Français (PCF). During these years in 
the wilderness, handicapped by the semi-clandestine status imposed on 
MODEF by agricultural officialdom and the agricultural media, by its own 
pathetically inadequate resources and by its alleged political 
associations, MODEF, by energy, self-sacrfice and conviction, managed to 
survive. Indeed the word survival is an understatement as MODEF went 
from strength to strength, obtaining around twenty-five per cent of the 
vote in professional elections in the departments where it presented 
candidates. By the time its term of penal servitude expired in 1981, 
ended by the parole accorded by the new socialist government, MODEF had 
created departmental Federations in approximately eighty per cent of the 
departments in which it could have potentially operated. Only the Region 
Parisienne and Alsace Lorraine remained impenetrable for MODEF.
The following chapters are concerned with this remarkable achievement 
and the way in which this dedicated group of activists and leaders set 
out to reverse the course of Fifth Republican agricultural policy. 
Amongst the issues considered are the reasons for this. What motivated 
these men (and a handful of women) and why did they achieve a response 
where their predecessors had failed? Given the accusations concerning
the connection between MODEF and the PCF, one is inevitably obliged to 
deal with this question in considerable depth.
A thematic rather them a chronological approach has been adopted in 
order to answer these questions. This decision was partly motivated by 
practical considerations. One of the unfortunate consequences of 
MODEF's poverty has been the virtual non-existence of archives, an 
absence which also reflects an absence of documents to place in such 
archives. MODEF is an organization which is deeply rooted in a 
personalized oral culture and therefore has not accumulated the 
extensive files to be found in more bureaucratized organizations. As a 
result, the main primary source for this research has been a series of 
interviews, conversations and various exchanges with MODEF activists and 
leaders. Such sources obviously present a problem for chronological 
exactitude. More importantly, however, there are less technical reasons 
supporting the thematic approach.
On the one hand, the thematic approach provides clearer answers to the 
questions raised above. On the other, it facilitates the attempt to 
place this limited case study of MODEF into a theoretical framework 
which may prove to be of more general relevance. This attempt is made 
in the belief that political science and history are distinct 
disciplines with distinct purposes.
The interviews referred to above were conducted between November 1980 
and November 1981. Ninety semi-directed interviews lasting anything 
between thirty minutes and seven hours were carried out. Most of the 
interviews were with MODEF leaders and activists in the departments of 
the Charente and the Vaucluse. A smaller group of interviews was 
conducted with MODEF officials from the departments of Alpes de Haute
Provence, Bouches-du-Rhône, Calvados, Charente-Maritime, Côtes-du-Nord, 
Drôme, Finistère, Landes,and Vienne. Other interviews were held with 
civil servants, Chamber of Agriculture officials, FNSEA officials in the 
Charente, Landes and Vaucluse, Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) 
officials from the Federation Agro-Alimentaire and with former MODEF 
members. On many occasions these interviews were supplemented by 
further meetings which allowed points of interest to be amplified, 
clarified and contradicted in a more informal atmosphere than that of 
the interview. Attendance at the 1982 MODEF Conference, both in the 
gallery and in the corridors, also provided an insight into the workings 
of the organization as did invitations to departmental Committee 
meetings in the Vaucluse and in the Bouches-du-Rhône.
Fortunately, these interviews could be supplemented by certain 
documentary sources. The most valuable of these proved to be the MODEF 
press, particularly the MODEF journal, L'Exploitant Familial. To a 
large extent it is effectively MODEF's archive since most of the 
documents produced by MODEF eventually materialize in its pages. La 
Marseillaise also proved to be an useful source.
The time at which this field research was conducted presented both an 
opportunity and an added complication. On the positive side, being in 
France at this time provided the possibility of studying MODEF under 
both the Giscard and the Mitterrand regimes. Unfortunately, the changes 
brought about by the 1981 elections had not yet proceeded far enough to 
make a full analysis of MODEF under a socialist President. Certain 
obvious changes became apparent as official recognition changed MODEF's 
status whilst other spects of its ideology and practice continued as 
before. Where such changes were apparent, the pre-1981 period is 
referred to in the past tense whilst when then is no reason to believe
that significant changes have taken place, the present tense is used.
The 1982 Conference, held in Montreuil in February 1982 marks the end of 
the period covered in this thesis.
Finally, thanks are due to those who consented to be interviewed and to 
those helped in other ways. Thanks are also due to family, friends and 
passers-by without whose assistance this research would have ground to a 
halt. X am also indebted to the proof-reading skills of Michael Lyne, 
Paul McCutcheon, Geraldine Sheridan and John Coakley without which this 
thesis would never have become readable. The encouragement and abuse 
provided by the latter two was indispensable.
CHAPTER 1 AGRICULTURE :THE THEORY OF POLITICS AND THE
POLITICS OF THEORY
1. INTRODUCTION
The starting point of this thesis is that it is necessary to explain the 
existence of MODEF rather than take it for granted. It is therefore 
necessary to establish a theoretical framework which will permit such an 
explanation.
There are two reasons for doing so. On the one hand, there is a need 
to avoid the limitations of the case study, an approach which has, 
despite a few brilliant exceptions, led to a plethora of narrowly 
conceived and unenlightening monographs.(1)
Secondly, one of the major hindrances which political science has faced 
is the tendency of political scientists to talk past one another. This 
has been encouraged by the cult of originality which insists that each 
new researcher regards the work of his predecessors as an obstacle 
rather than as a springboard to further progress. Though inadequacies 
in the existing literature will be confronted in this chapter, the 
primary purpose is to extricate the useful rather than to denounce the 
useless.
It will become clear that there is no monocausal explanation for the 
existence of HODEF. The latter half of the chapter deals with potential
ecological, historical, psychological and political theories which would 
enable us to account for MODEF. The emphasis, however, is on the need 
for political explanations of political behaviour.
The next few pages deal with explanations of agricultural politics 
couched in socio-economic terms, particularly the relationship between 
agriculture and the rest of economy and society and the nature of the 
class structure within agriculture. Obviously, to begin in such a way 
implies some a priori assumptions about their relevance to the 
explanation of agricultural politics. In fact, without pre-empting the 
discussion which follows, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that 
farmers are a distinct class in society and that this distinctiveness is 
of political relevance. For example, a random selection of opinion poll 
data shows that farmers have hugely divergent opinions on many issues 
compared to other social classes.
The result of a series of separate opinion polls published in Sondages 
between 1975 and 1978 are presented in Table 1.1. This shows that 
farmers deviate most from the norm, and are therefore the most 
distinctive class. This conclusion is reinforced when one calculates 
the difference indices between each class. These are presented in Table 
1.2. On this evidence,farmer's opinions show more variation than those 
of any other group. No other class has a difference index (DI) between 
it and any other class higher than those between farmers and the other 
classes. If the average of the three DIs for each of the four classes 
is then calculated, one finds an average of 29.2 per cent for senior 
executives and proprietors, 33.2 per cent for middle-ranking executives 
and white-collar workers, 29.2 per cent for the working class and 52.8 
per cent for the farmers(2)

TABLE 1:2 DIFFERENCE INDICES BETWEEN CLASSES
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CLASS Owners/Senior
Managers
Middle Managers/ 
White Collar
Manual
Workers
Farmers
Owners/Senior
Managers — 20 19 48
Middle Managers/ 
Vhite Collar
20.5 — 18.5 60.5
Manual Workers 19 18.5 — 50
Farmers 48 60.5 50 __
Percentages calculated on the basis of Table 1:1
This would suggest that it is worth analyzing in detail the literature 
on agriculture and class. But before describing the relevance of class 
in the explanation of MODEF's existence, a more general examination of 
the problem is required.
52. FRENCH VIEWS OF CLASS IN AGRICULTURE
The literature on the French case shares something in common with the 
vast literature on farmers throughout the world. This is the extreme
lack of exactitude in definitions of class and in the use of terms such
as peasant or capitalist farmers. Students of agricultural politics 
have been bedevilled, or, to the more cynical, assisted by the lack of 
clarity and agreement.
This confusion has two sources. The first is the extreme diversity of
circumstances, not only visible on a worldwide level, but also in France
itself. Indeed this diversity is the only matter on which a consensus 
exists.(3) But to this practical problem is added the divergent 
political perspectives of the major writers. Academic detachment has 
been limited since many of the academic experts have been led into 
governmental or parliamentary positions. For instance, a leading 
theoretician of the 1930s, Pierre Casiot, became a Vichy Minister of 
Agriculture whilst, in the 1980s, one of the leading writers on 
agricultural politics became the Rapporteur for the Agriculture Budget 
in the National Assembly after the Socialist victory of 1981.
Given this situation French writers have either refused to employ the 
concept of class at all, or have used it in very imprecise and 
opportunist ways. However, discussions of the existence or otherwise of 
class reveal that two separate questions are often raised. On the one 
hand, there is the problem of the distinctiveness of agriculture from 
the rest of the economy and of farmers from the rest of society. In 
other words, is agriculture a separate mode of production and are 
farmers a separate class? On the other hand, there is the problem of
6internal differentiation within agriculture, i.e. are farmers themselves 
divided by class? The answers to these questions have usually been 
dictated by partisan considerations. The agrarian Right has tended to 
answer yes to the first question and no to the second. Their left-wing 
rivals have usually, on the contrary, answered no to the first and yes 
to the second.
The first case was put by the eminent agricultural economist, Roland 
Maspètiol, in his 1946 work, L'Ordre Eternel des Champs. He began by 
idealizing the farmer:
La paysannerie établit ses qualités comme productrice et comme 
réserve de ce potentiel humain, sans lequel les autres secteurs 
sociaux n'auraient même pas d'existence. Elle implique un 
dynamisme formateur d'énergies durables assurant la pérennité des 
nations grâce auquel se forgent des forces solides au physique et 
au moral, des races de granit qui sont l'appui de l'histoire plus 
que ne le sont les superstructures grandioses ou brillantes 
construites artificiellement par la fantaisie arbitraire et 
ambitieuse des hommes.(4)
Given the elemental nature of the farmers, it was necessary to defend 
them against the encroachments of capitalism. Agriculture had an 
economic logic of its own:
L'ordre eternel des champs est une résistance et une reproche pour 
tous ceux qui, pénétrés d'une passion logicienne et 
simplificatrice, rêvent de réduire la vie sociale à un mécanisme 
livré à la seule puissance du rationnel et de l'organisation.(S)
n7
In consequence: "On ne saurait les sacrifier légitimement à 
l'impérialisme du marché."(6) At most, the only distinction between 
farmers which Maspètiol was prepared to make was that between the mass 
of farmers and the elite minority required to organize the defence of 
their common interests.(7)
Such views are rarely stated explicitly now but the same ideology 
underpins the work of many contemporary writers. In a recent work,
Joseph Klatzmann, one of France's leading agricultural statisticians, 
emphasizes the gap between agriculture and industry and the respective 
lifestyles of those engaged in each sector. "Ils occupent, 
indiscutablement, une place à part”.(8) Klatzmann, however, is not 
blind to the substantial inequalities which exist within agriculture but 
he does not see them as indicators or consequences of class divisions. 
The main inequality on which he focuses is that between regions.(9)
With this sociological blindness, Klatzmann's influence on agricultural 
statistics helps to explain why official agricultural statistics are of 
restricted value in analyzing sociological differentiation within 
agriculture.
Similarly, the typology of agriculture devised by the Centre National 
des Jeunes Agriculteurs (CNJA) in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and 
given academic legitimacy by the authors of Une France Sans Paysans, 
challenges the myth of "l'unité paysanne" but does so in moral terms 
rather than in the sociological one of class. The concept of dynamism 
was introduced to explain (or disguise) the tripartite division of 
agriculture between the profitable, the potentially profitable and the 
marginal agricultural enterprise.(10)
A more subtle way in which the concept of class has been avoided is the 
method which consists of identifying as many differences between farmers 
as possible. For example, Maho and Cristner discovered 120 types of 
ideological division within one village in the Creuse.(ll) Similarly, 
Mendras' analysis of the sociology of rural France insists primarily on 
the great diversity of the 600 agricultural regions (12). This is taken 
to its absurd limits by Lenco who isolates 90 separate classes of 
farm.(13) Such a proliferation of divisions effectively prevents the 
emergence of any concept of class.
If it is still possible to deny the existence of class within 
agriculture, the changed connection between agriculture and the rest of 
the economy, and the consequent change in the nature of the farm itself, 
make it extremely difficult to sustain the traditional agrarian 
exclusiveness epitomized by Maspetiol. Mendras' analysis of the future 
of French agriculture is, perhaps, the most interesting effort to come 
to terms with the changed situation and to provide the basis for a 
modernized agrarianism.(14) According to Mendras, although agriculture 
had been distinct from the rest of the economy, farmers as a whole never 
formed a coherent class. This was due to the diversity of their 
circumstances, their competitive nature and the high degree of social 
mobility within agriculture. But post-war modernization and the greater 
integration of agriculture into the national economy meant that 
agriculture was no longer distinct. Farmers could no longer be 
considered a class at all since even their common interest in opposing 
the rest of society was no longer operative. Farmers had become an 
occupational category:
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9Ils seront sans doute assez proche des groupes que certaines 
statistiques dénomment intermédiaires - classes moyennes qui 
rassemblent les cadres salariés, les professions libérales et 
certains commerçants.(15)
This reflects the diminished importance and influence of agriculture in 
the political system. Though inter-war agrarianism had formed links 
with the petite bourgeoisie of the towns and cities, the agrarians were 
effectively self-sufficient and able to rely on themselves alone. In 
the changed climate of the 1960s and 1970s, the defence of agricultural 
interests was believed to depend on the formation of an alliance with 
the urban petite bourgeoisie against the emerging alliance of the Left. 
In this light La Fin des Paysans appears as a precursor of the 
Giscardian Démocratie Française.
This refusal to make use of the concept of class is a testimony to the 
power of the agrarian myth of unity. Even more impressive is its impact 
on those who do believe that class is a useful explanatory concept in 
the analysis of French agriculture. Some of these writers, whilst 
recognizing the existence of class, regard it as of secondary 
importance. For instance, Burguière's summary of the vast research 
project conducted in Plozévet describes the class divisions within 
Bigouden agriculture but attributes less importance to them than to 
political and generational cleavages.(16) This is, perhaps, the 
clearest example but in the views of class decribed below the pattern
emerges.
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Given the genuine complexity and diversity of French agriculture, there 
is no doubt that those who wish to adopt class-based theories encounter 
severe practical problems in distinguishing types of agriculture and 
agriculturalist. How does one decide which features determine the 
category into which a particular form should be placed? Which are the 
fundamental and incidental features of the farm? These difficulties are 
clearly in evidence in the theories discussed below. The farmer faces a 
similar difficulty in deciding his own class identification. The two 
problems are connected by Sokoloff.(17) "The traditional difficulty 
experienced by Marxists and others in defining the class of peasants and 
farmers is reflected by the hesitancy of the farmers themselves".(18)
These problems have been "resolved" in practice by writers on the French 
Left by a combination of classical Marxist orthodoxy and political 
opportunism. To a large extent, the cynical calculation of the early 
French socialist movement that the non-capitalist farm was doomed to 
disappearance but that, in the meantime, it would be profitable to pose 
as the defender of the small farmers' interest, has inspired the concern 
with the problems of agriculture demonstrated by the modern Left.(19)
Before dealing with contemporary analyses, it is necessary to make a few 
remarks on the nature of Marxist orthodoxy referred to above. As is 
well known, the introduction of Marxism into France was hindered from 
the start by the distorting effects of the Guesdist prism. The theory 
that emerged was particularly schematic and conservative. Marx's 
analysis of the British Road to Capitalism and his view that the 
development of capitalism depended on "the expropriation of the 
agricultural producer, of the peasants from the soil.." attained 
Scripture status.(20)
The problems involved in generalizing from a theory based on British 
experience are evident. The most important for present purposes is the 
failure to recognize the importance of the difference between a country 
where the peasantry was eliminated before the establishment of 
democratic politics and one where democratic politics and the existence 
of the peasantry were considered co-terminous. Due to Guesdist 
economism, such a distinction was considered irrelevant long after it 
became clear exactly how important it was.
The simplistic Marxism of the Guesdists and the later fossilization of 
theory during the Stalinist period prevented the Left from producing the 
kind of complex analyses which were required, and for which Marx himself 
had laid the trail. Instead, random rationalizations were produced for 
measures of political expediency. The result was a distinct lack of 
interest in the Left on the part of farmers and the almost total lack of 
confidence amongst the activists of the urban Left in the possibility of 
securing support in the countryside.(21)
The major failing was the inability to take the ideological aspects of 
class into consideration. By this it is not meant that a class must 
adopt a certain ideology in order to be a class, simply that it has to 
have a certain awareness of itself as a class. The more rigorous 
definitions of class in the works of certain Marxists can be traced back 
to Marx's original distinction between class-in-itself and 
class-for-itself. The former is defined in terms of relations to the 
means of production, i.e. the definition of class in terms of economic 
relationships. The latter is a political definition, being determined 
by the extent to which the class is aware of of its existence and its 
interests. This latter formulation has been taken to mean, by writers 
such as Lukács, that the working class is only genuinely the working
11
class when It Is pursuing a strategy of socialist revolution.(22) 
However, it is not necessary to adopt such a constricting view in order 
to see the possibilities which the class-in-itself and class-for-itself 
distinction opens up in the analysis of agrarian class structures. 
Paradoxically, this opportunity has been ignored on the Left until 
recently but has been used in mainstream rural sociology since the 1920s 
under the influence of the emigre menshevik Sorokin.(23)
Such neglect would not have been so stultifying if the definition of 
class-in-itself had been as simple as certain Marxists presumed. Though 
class-in-itself is supposed to be open to empirical observation, in the 
case of the farmer the problems raised above make this extremely 
problematical.(24)
Marxist debates on the class status of farmers have revolved around a 
dispute over whether the formal ownership of the land is significant or 
not.(25) On the one hand, it is argued that the ownership of the land 
is purely formal and that, effectively, the small farmer is nothing more 
than a proletarian with land.(26) On the other, farmers are considered 
as a separate class because of their status as property owners, a class 
considered to be on the side of the exploiters, if not exploiters 
themselves.(27)
Behind these confused arguments lies yet another problem. In order to 
determine the position of farmers vis-a-vis the bourgeoisie and the 
working class, it is necessary to have some conception of what 
capitalism is supposed to be. It is precisely at this point that there 
is a total lack of agreement. For some, capitalism is merely commodity 
production, and for such writers it is much easier to place farmers on 
the side of capitalism. Those employing more rigorous concepts of
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capitalism involving the separation of capital and labour, the division 
of labour, the extraction of surplus value, and the permanent drive 
towards capital accumulation are in a much better position to understand 
the differences between farmers, capitalists and workers.(28)
With a more sophisticated view of capitalism, it becomes possible to 
argue that farmers are in fact exploited by capitalism but in different 
ways to the working class. It is possible to understand the 
implications of the greater degree of control over work exercised by the 
farmer. But, at the same time, these possibilities inherent in the 
contradictory propertied but exploited status of the farmer provide a 
potential for confusion, as the modes of production debate shows.(29)
To deal with the modes of production debate here would lead too far from 
the French writings with which we are primarily concerned. It is, 
however, necessary to see that more complex theories are required in 
order to make some sense of the reality of French rural society and 
agriculture. It is precisely this failing which the Parti Communiste 
Français (PCF) vision of class in agriculture exemplifies.
In this respect, the PCF has made little progress beyond the Guesdist 
tradition. In Les Communistes et les Paysans, the party leader, Georges 
Marchais, and his leading specialist on agricultural affairs, Fernand 
Clavaud, attempt to analyze the class structure of contemporary French 
agriculture. Basically, the major division within agriculture is 
considered to be that between the limited number of "les gros agrariens" 
(i.e. the capitalist farmers) and the vast mass of "la paysannerie 
laborieuse" (i.e. the working farmers). The latter group is subdivided 
into four categories.
1. Farm labourers.
2. Semi-proletarian farmers. These supplement their 
income from their farms by working part-time on other 
farms or in industry in order to make ends meet.
3. Small-scale farmers. "...c'est-à-dire ceux qui 
produisent juste de quoi vivre."
4. Medium-scale farmers. Their farms "leur donne, en plus du 
modeste entretien de leur famille, la possibilité d'avoir un 
excédent susceptible, du moins dans les meilleures années, de se 
transformer en capital."(30)
These four categories share a common interest in opposing both the 
encroachments of urban and agrarian capitalism. At the same time, 
whilst the working farmers and the capitalist farmers will find 
themselves in conflict over issues internal to agriculture, they still 
have a common interest in opposing their mutual exploitation by urban 
capital.
The most obvious criticism of this typology is its attempt to base the 
hierarchy of class on income. Though there is a certain implicit 
assumption about the ownership or otherwise of capital, in the end the 
divisions identified by the PCF boil down to differences in standards of 
living. The inadequacy of income as a measure of class status has been 
repeatedly pointed out in the literature on class.(31) By using such an 
approach, Marchais and Clavaud avoid a lot of complicated questions 
concerning the degree to which the management of the farm is influenced
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by the logic of the market, the needs of capital accumulation, and the 
nature of the labour process on the farm.
Furthermore, the influence of the agrarian tradition is clearly visible 
in the dubious assumption that the common interest of all these types of 
farmers in opposing the development of urban capital outweighs the 
importance of their grievances against each other. Not only does such a 
view neglect the threat which capitalist and non-capitalist farmers pose 
to each other's existence, it also ignores the conflicts over the 
acquisition of land between small and medium-scale farmers as well as 
issues such as conflicts over pay and conditions between workers and 
medium-scale farmers. All the evidence suggests that, having dared to 
brave the taboo on discussion of the agricultural class structure, the 
PCF, astounded by its own audacity, rushed to limit the damage.
More satisfactory but still inadequate analyses of the class structure 
of agriculture have emerged from those to the left of the PCF, 
particularly from the Parti Socialiste Unifié (PSU) and its orbit. The 
former Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) deputy, Bernard Lambert, 
now a PSU leader and Paysan Travailleur ideologue, has made a more 
systematic analysis of the different types of farm. In his analysis he 
addresses himself to some of the problems which Marchais and Clavaud 
chose to avoid. With the enthusiasm of the convert, he is much less 
inhibited in expressing his belief in the importance and the reality of 
class divisions.(32)
Lambert's typology is, at the same time, more simplified in terms of the 
numbers of classes present, and more complex in terms of the nature of 
these classes, than that of the PCF. Lambert isolates two types of farm:
16
1. Capitalist farms involved in crop production, using industrial 
techniques and hired labour. Such farms "font partie intégrante du 
capitalisme" , since they permit the accumulation of capital.
2. Small and medium-sized farms making intensive use of family 
labour. Investment is jsut profitable enough to cover interest 
payments. Capital and labour power are reproduced but not 
accumulated. "Leur situation s'apparente étroitement aux 
conditions de vie du proletariat."(33)
Contrary to the PCF, Lambert places much greater stress on the conflict 
within agriculture, a view which helps to explain the history of 
post-war agricultural unionism. Again unlike the PCF, he stresses the 
direct intervention of industrial capitalism into agriculture, rather 
than the indirect exploitation through the terms of trade which the PCF 
emphasizes.
This direct intervention and the consequent proletarianization of the 
farmer is the most distinctive and questionable aspect of the Lambert 
theory. It has the advantage of introducing a dynamic element absent in 
other perspectives, reflecting the fact that substantial changes created 
by economic developments since 1945 have created a constant insecurity 
and fear of proletarianization in the minds of many farmers. (These 
economic and social changes are described in detail in the following 
chapter.) However, proletarianization of the farmer has taken the form 
of exclusion from the profession and departure for urban occupations to 
a far larger extent than the transformation of the farmer into an 
employee of industrial capitalists.
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The major flaw in the Lambert analysis is his confusion of the effective 
subordination of agriculture to industry with the formal and effective 
subordination of the individual farmer to a particular capitalist 
enterprise. There are two problems here. On the one hand, there is the 
question of the extent to which the subordination of agriculture to 
industry has direct consequences on the operation of the farm. With the 
multiplicity of state controls and agricultural organizations explicitly 
concerned with the economics of farming, the impact of decisions taken 
in the industrial sector may be heavily mediated.(34) Secondly, and 
more importantly, there is the problem of effective and formal 
subordination. Even if the subordinate status of the farmer is visible 
to the observer, this provides no information on the way in which the 
farmer perceives himself and his relations with the firm. In fact, he 
may well combine the conviction that he is being exploited with the 
belief in his independence. Given the socio-legal status of the farmer 
as an independent producer and his role as the organizer of his working 
life, such feelings of independence may outweigh the impact of 
exploitation.
Lambert, however, argues that this independence is purely illusory and 
claims that the the non-capitalist farmer is in a similar position to 
that of the industrial worker. (Hence the name of his group 
Paysan-Travailleur.) In effect Lambert denies that there is anything 
specific about agriculture which separates it from the rest of the 
economy, except perhaps its geographical isolation. Given the existence 
of the complex of agricultural organizations and the persistent findings 
of opinion polls that there are significant divergences between the 
views of farmers and other sections of the population, this would appear 
to be misleading. Quite simply, Lambert has ignored the ideological
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dimension of class, overcoming the dilemma posed by the contradictory 
position of the farmer by reducing the concept to its economic aspects. 
Paradoxically, Catholic Marxism has generated an extremely economistic 
concept of class.
In both the Lambert and the PCF cases, the political desires of the 
writers impinge heavily upon the theory put forward. In the case of the 
PCF, the implications of the theory for the strategy of the Common 
Programme and the Union of the Left are clear. Similarly, the hopes of 
the PSU and Paysan-Travailleur for an alliance between farmers and the 
working class are implicit in Lambert's work. They also share a common 
opportunism. Both share a belief in the inevitability of the capitalist 
transformation of agriculture but, at the same time, base themselves on 
the continuing existence of large numbers of non-capitalist farmers.
But no explanation is given for the present or continued existence of 
these farmers who, according to the original Guesdist vision, should 
have disappeared long ago. In order to provide some explanation for the 
existence and future of the non-capitalist farmers, these three 
opportunists, Marchais, Clavaud and Lambert, would have had to go in 
search of a philosopher. Only with the Althusserian paradigm of 
co-existing modes of production within the same social formation, and of 
distinct political, ideological and economic instances, did it become 
possible to elaborate theories corresponding to the complexity of the 
agricultural class structure.
Despite the Althusserian epidemic, none of his devotees appears to have 
attempted to practice the theory in connection with contemporary French 
agriculture.(35) However, the modes of production concept has been used 
to some effect by one of the repentant authors of Une France Sans 
Paysans. Abandoning the moralizing concept of dynamism, Servolin
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divides agriculture into two modes of production, the Capitalist Mode of 
Production (CMP) and Petty Commodity Production (PCP).(36) The CMP 
includes those farmers whose aim is the accumulation of capital through 
the use of hired labour and technology. The PCP includes those who 
produce for the market in order to meet their family needs and to 
reproduce the amount of capital necessary to maintain the farm in 
existence. The former is the major motive, the second a means to an end.
Both sectors are able to exist side-by-side for several reasons. In the 
first place, the CMP is not, by industrial standards, very advanced and 
still enjoys sufficient space for expansion without threatening the PCP. 
Secondly, there is an effective division of labour between the two modes 
of production with the CMP concentrating on crops whilst the PCP 
occupies itself with animal farming. Thirdly, the PCP does not treat 
labour as a commodity or seek a profit on capital invested. This allows 
it to operate when the return on capital and labour is below that 
necessary to sustain the capitalist farm. Fourthly, many sectors of 
agricultural production, particularly those involving animals, enjoy 
very limited economies of scale. Finally, Servolin argues, to the 
extent that the PCP is endangered,this is due to the activities of 
industry and finance rather than agricultural capital. Servolin 
therefore concludes that though there is a major class division between 
those involved in the CMP and the PCP, this is secondary to the division 
between agriculture and urban capital:
Les deux catégories d'exploitant sont profondément différentes par 
leur statut économique, par la place qu'ils occupent dans les 
rapports de production du mode de production capitaliste. Mais en 
tant qu'exploitants agricoles, leurs intérêts, quoique distincts, 
ne sont pas directement antagonistes.(37)
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This theory is a synthesis of the traditional responses of the Left and 
Right to the questions concerning the distinctiveness of agriculture and 
its homogeneity. Servolin concludes that agriculture is part of the 
overall economy but that it is also fairly insulated from the pressures 
to which that economy is subject. Similarly, he argues that there are 
class divisions within agriculture but that these are of secondary 
importance. There are certain dangers in such a theory. Firstly, it 
provides a theoretical basis for a leftist agrarianism. Indeed such a 
political orientation is made explicit in the article when Servolin 
points to the success of the FNSEA in maintaining the unity of its 
disparate membership. Servolin attributes this to the lack of basic 
contradictory interests amongst the membership. Such a view involves 
ignoring the factionalism of the FNSEA and the administrative methods 
which it has used to enrol members and control dissidents. (These are 
described in Chapter 6 .) It also ignores the presence of dissident 
organizations such as MODEF, the Federation Française de l'Agriculture 
(FFA) and Paysan Travailleur.
Furthermore, Servolin's description of the relationship between the CMP 
and the PCP is not one of co-existing modes of production but of 
completely isolated ones. The CMP seems to have little or no impact on 
the PCP and vice versa. This would appear to be at odds with the 
assumption that the two modes of production are complementary since such 
a relationship also implies one of interdependence. Since there is no 
basis for analyzing the consequences of each mode on the other, it is 
also a very static theory. The forces encouraging and discouraging 
collective and individual transitions from one mode of production to the 
other are not considered.
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However, such criticisms are secondary compared to the advance which 
Servolin's work has made possible, particularly when compared with the 
work of his contemporaries described above. In opposition to the PCF, 
he takes up the question of the nature of the labour process on the 
farm and the purpose for which the farm exists - i.e. accumulation or 
reproduction.
Secondly, unlike Lambert and the PCF, Servolin does away with the 
Marxist catastrophe theory of the eventual disappearance of the 
non-capitalist farmer. Not only is the inevitability of the capitalist 
transformation of agriculture contested, serious reasons are given why 
this should be so.
Again, unlike Lambert, Servolin is able to explain how agriculture is 
subordinated to industry and finance and the way in which this 
subordination is mediated. The gap between formal and effective 
subordination is recognized along with the ideological consequences 
which ensue. Servolin is the only one of these writers who affords the 
possibility of analyzing class in terms of the relationship between 
agriculture and the rest of the economy, in terms of the nature of the 
farm and in terms of the perceptions of the farmer.
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3. POLITICS AND CLASS
Up to this point, the present chapter has been concerned simply with the 
delineation of the social classes to be found in agriculture. It is now 
time to examine the importance of class as an influence upon the 
political behaviour of the farmers. The political consequences of the 
distinctiveness of agriculture (or, in other words, the extent of the 
penetration of capitalism into the countryside) will be analyzed. It 
will then be possible to examine the political effects of the internal 
class differentiation of agriculture.
Once again it will prove useful to begin with a consideration of the 
existing literature on the subject. The penetration of capitalism into 
agriculture has all too often been assumed to have drastic effects on 
the political behaviour of the farmers subject to such change. Many 
writers have simply assumed that there is a mechanistic link between 
political and socio-economic change. In this way, they have been able 
to avoid the need to explain how socio-economic change is translated 
into political change.
This failure is apparent both in the Marxist and modernization 
perspectives. Given the similarities between these two perspectives, 
such a convergence is hardly surprising. Both share a common concern, 
political and economic development, and often differ mainly in 
evaluative and terminological questions.(38)
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The main problem which emerges from the literature is the tendency to 
neglect to explain what exactly the process of capitalist development 
entails in terms of levels of political consciousness. Either no 
explanation at all is given or one is confronted by a proliferation of 
economic and sociological explanations for political phenomena. Several 
writers have pointed to the greater integration into the market brought 
about by capitalism as a cause of rural radicalism. Loubere has argued 
that the map of agricultural radicalism in France coincides precisely 
with the location of the most market-oriented regions - those producing 
wine.(39) Similarly, Gratton has attempted to demonstrate that 
monoculture, which implies the existence of the market, is an indicator 
of a willingness to protest.(40) These examples can be dismissed simply 
on grounds of empirical evidence alone. Many wine regions have been 
politically docile whilst polycultural regions have been up in arms.
This factual failure masks another more theoretical one -the 
identification of capitalism with the market. It should be clear by now 
that such a concept of capitalism is inadequate and that such writers 
have inverted reality. "To see the market as the motive force (of 
capitalism) is rather like seeing the dial on a boiler as the cause of 
the pressure building up within it."(41) Such explanations fail because 
of their monocausality. Too many other variables are artificially 
subsumed.
Others argue that the rural de-industrialization consequent upon the 
development of capitalism has severe disruptive effects upon the 
agricultural economy. The most systematic analysis of rural 
de-industrialization is that by Judt. He argues that the disruption 
caused by this process facilitated political radicalism. His study of 
the department of the Var demonstrates the way in which the grievances
ocassioned by rural de-industrialization led to the adoption of 
socialist ideas. Judt is virtually alone in focussing on the way in 
which these grievances became politicized. In the Var case, he argues 
that rural de-industrialization meant the creation of an increasingly 
homogeneous rural community whose collective life facilitated 
collectivist ideas.(42) But it is precisely this "natural" reaction 
which needs to be explained.
Other attempts to explain the consequences of the penetration of 
capitalism into the countryside have been less aware of the problem of 
the gap between economic grievances and political reactions. Marx 
himself suggests that the rise of capitalism and the modern state 
assisted in the politicization of grievances because of the behaviour of 
state officials:
When the French peasant paints the devil on the wall, he paints him 
in the guise of the tax collector. From the moment Montalembert 
elevated taxation to a god, the peasant became godless, atheist 
and threw himself into he arms of the devil, socialism.(43)
This is an anticipation, to say the least. But despite its deficiencies 
as history or prophesy, Marx demonstrates an awareness that political 
events are needed to transform latent antagonisms into political action. 
Unfortunately, Marx himself did not bother to amplify his remarks and 
his successors have been reluctant to do so. For example, Pierre 
Georges provides a classic account of the subjugation of agriculture to 
industry and the ways in which industry profits from the relationship 
but than goes on to simply assume that this leads to an anti-capitalist 
or anti-urban feeling which in turn generates political protest.(44)
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Nevertheless, certain insights provided by the discussion on the 
penetration of capitalism must be borne in mind. Firstly, there is a 
clear connection between political change, generally in a radical 
direction, and the socio-economic transformations brought about by the 
development of capitalism. Eric Wolf, one of the leading theorists of 
peasant and farmer politics, describes the situation in the following 
words:
Perhaps it is precisely when the peasant can no longer rely on his 
accustomed institutional context to reduce his risks, but when 
alternative institutions are either too chaotic or too restrictive 
to guarantee a commitment to new ways that the psychological, 
economic, social and political tensions mount towards peasant 
rebellion.(45)
Though the history of France has been marked by a chain of peasant 
rebellions right down to the twentieth century, post-war French 
agriculture represents a less extreme case. Nevertheless, the general 
point is valid. Rapid change leads to political radicalism. Wolf's 
remark also suggests that it is necessary to search for multiple causes 
for outbreaks of protest, such as that which involved the emergence and 
growth of HODEF.
Secondly, it is quite clear that the penetration of capitalism into the 
countryside has serious political consequences. To deny the validity 
and to complain about the absence of explanations is not to deny the 
accuracy of the descriptions of the political reponses examined by the
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writers mentioned above. In the French case, it is safe to assume, for 
the moment, that the changing relationship between agriculture and 
industry since the War, the impact of modernization on the labour 
process, the rural exodus, etc, have had a decisive impact on political 
consciousness and behaviour.(46) But it cannot be simply assumed that 
such developments are in themselves explanations for political change. 
This is even more the case for the analysis of specific political 
changes such as the emergence of an oppositional force like MODEF. In 
fact, the increasingly capitalist nature of French agriculture since 
1945 should be regarded as a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition 
for the creation of MODEF.
A similar situation prevails when one looks at the impact of class 
differentiation within agriculture on the political behaviour of 
farmers. Analysis of such class differentiation has been largely 
inspired by Stinchcombe's seminal paper, 'Agricultural Enterprise and 
Rural Class Relations'.(47) Stinchcombe proceeds from a concept of 
class which depends on differences in legal status, life style and 
income. There are also differentials in access to technical knowledge 
and in access to political knowledge and power. He then elaborates a 
typology of five types of agriculture, the manorial/hacienda system, 
family tenancy, family smallholding, plantations and large-scale 
capitalist agriculture. Each system has certain types of characteristic 
political behaviour.
Following in Stinchcombe's furrow, Linz has produced a similar analysis 
specific to Europe. He isolates thirteen categories to be found in 
European agriculture consisting of the proprietors of latifundium, 
proprietors of smaller capitalist enterprises, managers of large
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capitalist enterprises, proprietors of farmer-capitalist enterprises, 
proprietors of farmer-agricultural enterprises, tenants of 
capitalist-agricultural enterprises, tenants of farmer-capitalist 
enterprises, higher employees of capitalist and farmer-capitalist 
enterprises, proprietors of peasant-consumptive farms, tenants of 
peasant-consumptive farms, proletarianizing proprietors and hired 
labourers. Linz then details the political characteristics of each 
category.(48) The bulk of French farmers fit into the category of 
proprietors of farmer-capitalist enterprises. According to Linz, this 
group is characterized by centrism, conservative nationalism, 
anti-clericalism, peasantism, Bonapartism, fascism and is definitely 
anti-urban. Simply to spell out this list reveals the problem with 
Linz's theory. It can be used to predict almost anything and is 
therefore unable to predict anything specific. Linz represents an 
advance on Stinchcombe in so far as he does not necessarily locate the 
source of agricultural protest within the agricultural community. But 
both suffer from the effort to reconcile the assumption that class 
status is an indicator of political behaviour with an inadequate 
explanation of the process by which grievances arising from differential 
positions in the class structure are translated into politically 
operative demands.
Nevertheless, such theories are valuable in so far as they suggest a 
connection between different types of political behaviour and different 
positions in the agricultural class structure. It is also reasonable to 
assume that such class differentiation is a prerequisite for the 
existence of M0DEF.(49) Once again a necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for the establishment of MODEF has been isolated.
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4. A PARTIAL RECONSTRUCTED MODEL OF POLITICS AND CLASS
The discussion above began with two questions; how distinct is 
agriculture (or how far has capitalism penetrated into the countryside) 
and to what extent are those involved in agriculture divided by class?
In response to the first question, the most convincing argument is that 
given by Servolin. Agriculture is most definitely subordinated to 
capitalism but capitalist pressures have been inhibited by two types of 
limitation. On the one hand, there are the limitations imposed on the 
growth of capitalist agriculture by the nature of agricultural 
production processes. On the other, there has been a conscious effort 
by farmers to create organizations and impose policies which limit the 
extent to which the farmer is subjected to the pressures symptomized by 
the market. This means that though the farmer may be increasingly 
subjected to the operation of the market and the drive to accumulate 
which it indicates, this may not be apparent to the farmer. As Eric 
Wolf has pointed out, simply because the produce of the farmer is 
destined for the market, it is not acceptable to assume that there is a 
direct relation between the farmer and the market. Wolf stresses the 
importance of intermediaries in determining the view of the market held 
by the farmer.(50) We are dealing with a mediated form of capitalist 
penetration.
To the second question, the answer which imposes itself is that there is 
an effective class divide between two types of agriculture and two types 
of farmer. Again Servolin provides the most useful categorization, the 
distinction between the CMP and the PCP. By distinguishing between the 
farm operated for the purpose of capital accumulation and the farm 
designed to reproduce itself, one has a clear yardstick for measuring
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the objective class position of a particular farmer.
Nevertheless, it is also essential to examine the extent to which 
farmers are aware of what they are doing. If it is apparent to the 
external observer that a farmer is merely reproducing capital and labour 
invested, his subjective appreciation may well be different. He may be 
engaged in the effort to accumulate capital. As will be seen later, 
this is a common occurrence. Less frequent are the cases of farmers who 
think that they are merely reproducing when they are in fact 
accumulating.
Finally, there is a further problem. This is the extent to which the 
class divisions in agriculture are given priority over the conflicts 
between agriculture as a whole and urban capitalism. If the former are 
given primacy, the possibility exists that agricultural defence 
organizations will fracture along class lines. If the latter are 
perceived to be more important, there will be a premium on agricultural 
uni ty.
This leaves us with four propositions which will be employed to explain 
the emergence of MODEF.
1. Capitalism has made substantial inroads into French agriculture 
but still co-exists with a large non-capitalist sector.
2. Farmers are divided by class. This division is between 
capitalist accumulators and non-capitalist reproducers.
3. Farmers are aware of such a division.
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4. This division is perceived to be more important than the 
conflict between agriculture and urban capital.
This series of propositions implies an acceptance of the traditional 
left-wing view on the existence of class divisions within agriculture. 
Without such an awareness on the part of farmers, the degree of support 
obtained by an organization, which, like MODEF, insists upon such 
divisions, would be inconceivable.
As to the first part of the equation, the distinctiveness of agriculture 
compared to the rest of economy and society, the answer is less 
clear-cut. Whilst recognizing that the agricultural economy in post-war 
France has demonstrated an increasing trend towards integration into the 
capitalist economy, it is essential to remember that this provides 
little information about the status of individual farmers. They are 
divided between those who fully accept the logic of such integration and 
those whose efforts are devoted to resisting the process.
These propositions are confronted with the historical evidence in the 
next chapter. It must be realized that these are necessary rather than 
sufficient conditions. Indeed, it should be clear by now that there are 
no sufficient conditions. A combination of necessary conditions must be 
the goal which this preliminary analysis seeks to attain. The latter 
half of this chapter is devoted to examining the hypotheses on the 
additional factors required for a complete understanding of the
existence of MODEF.
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5. THEORIES OF RESISTANCE
If it is accepted that these propositions provide a basis for an 
understanding of the politics of agriculture, one is still left with the 
problem of explaining the connection between socio-economic conditions 
and political behaviour. A recent work includes a succinct summing up of 
the problem.
It should be clear, though to many writers it apparently is not, 
that 'struggle' does not follow logically from the concept of the 
relations of production, from the definition of classes as 
occupying the places of producers and approriators of surplus 
labour. 'Exploitation' does not per se imply resistance to 
exploitation, the exploiters resistance to the resistance of the 
exploited, or even a struggle over exploitation as such.(51)
Several types of theory have been put forward to explain such 
resistance. But before going any further, the meaning of the term 
resistance must be clarified. By resistance is meant all activity 
designed to end or restrain exploitation. This includes many forms of 
activity ranging from voting for a political party which is considered 
to be pursuing policies aimed at ending or limiting exploitation through 
acts of individual terrorism to participation in an armed insurrection.
The major advantage of this definition is that it avoids the false 
dichotomy betwen conventional political behaviour and political protest 
which dominates the literature. Such a distinction is polemical, 
legalistic and formalistic. The notion of conventional politics is 
polemical in so far as it positively evaluates certain forms of 
political behaviour and considers the excluded types as disreputable or
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illegitimate.(52) This conception has given rise to two equally 
misleading schools of thought. The first argues that protest is the 
result of the breakdown of democratic politics whilst the second claims 
that the effective functioning of democracy is a prerequisite for 
protest.(53)
The former is based on a specifically Anglo-American conception of 
democracy as a system of consensual incrementalist bargaining. This 
simply ignores the differences between the various industrial 
democracies and the fact that certain democratic systems are 
characterized by greater authoritarianism and lesser willingness to 
compromise - e.g. France. Stanley Hoffmann's study of the Poujadists 
concludes with the breakdown thesis.(54) Hoffmann argues that the 
Poujadist movement was the result of the failure of the Fourth 
Republican regime to represent the interests of its small town 
provincial base. The flaw in such an argument is the liberal-pluralist 
fallacy that there is something abnormal about such a state of affairs. 
Each democratic polity is so constructed as to limit or facilitate the 
access of specific groups to the process of political decision-making. 
This means that to equate a disjunction between the state and a 
particular group with the breakdown of democracy is misleading. In 
fact, such a disjunction could well mean an increase in democracy - if 
such things could be quantified. In this light, the Poujadist movement 
appears, not as an indicator of degeneration but of renewal, not as a 
sign of despair but of the vitality of the normal political competition 
for access to power. Protest must be considered as an integral part of 
politics, not as its negation.(55)
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This is not to accept the second argument that protest depends on 
democracy. This conception again separates protest and politics. It 
also completely ignores the purposes of protest and the motivations of 
protestors. Protest is limited to a form of militant collective 
bargaining designed to secure concessions from those in power. It also 
disguises the fact that conventional forms of politics may be used for 
purposes other than their formal ones. For example, why do people vote? 
Is it in order to choose a representative, to elect a government, or to 
express their dissatisfaction? Wylie has provided a classic account of 
such a strategy of protest through conventional politics in the France 
of the 1950s: "The individual's vote is no more than an empty legal 
gesture. Offered to the individual as a gesture, the vote is used as a 
gesture - a gesture of defiance."(56)
On the other hand, the possibility that protest may be part of a global 
political strategy designed to overthrow the political system without 
expecting any immediate benefit from the act of protest itself is 
ignored. It also rules out the possibility of purely expressive 
protest, protest carried out without any hope at all.
Formalism, legalism and Anglo-Americentrism are closely related. To 
consider an act in terms of its form rather than its purpose is to fall 
into a legalistic trap, and an Anglo-American legalism at that. Unlike 
the Anglo-American tradition, French jurisprudence is much more aware of 
the consequences of such a distinction. The existence of the State 
Security Court with its recognition of political crime and of political 
prisoner status is a classic example. The absence of such a distinction 
between form and content underpins the polemical distinction between 
conventional politics and protest. Given the tradition of political
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instability in France and the politicization of protest movements, this 
paradigm is particularly unhelpful. Indeed, it is a policeman's 
paradigm, constituting the intellectual rationale for the 
criminalization of political activity.
Bearing this in mind, the form of politics classified as protest should 
no longer be seen as somehow inferior to "conventional politics". This 
is the advantage of the resistance perspective. It is devoid of the 
moralizing overtones of both the conventional politics/protest model and 
Marxist teleology. Since it is the aim of the protestors, rather than 
the implications of their behaviour for the political system or 
themselves, which is emphasized, the blindspots of other perspectives 
are eliminated. For example, though extremely different movements, both 
MODEF and Poujadism can be seen as responses to perceived exploitation. 
There is no bias built into the terms of the definition and thus avoids 
the polemical aspects of the convergence-of-opposite-extremes thesis or 
explanations of the false consciousness variety, explanations whose 
normative attractions outweigh their empirical validity.
Because of this emphasis on studying political behaviour from the point 
of view of the people whose behaviour one is studying, rather than from 
that of the state, political parties or the administration, the 
resistance perspective has much greater explanatory value than the 
conventional politics/protest model. This is particularly true when one 
is attempting to answer the question posed here - why do people resist 
what they see as exploitation? Only from this micro-political angle is 
it possible to take full account of the complexity of factors 
determining political behaviour. The perspective is not itself an 
explanation.
31*
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It is important that this approach should not be mistaken for a 
methodological individualist analysis. As will become clear in later 
chapters, the motives of those involved in resistance cannot be analysed 
in terms of individual attitudes and psychological make-up. Political 
behaviour must be considered in political and collective terms. Neither 
must the responsibility of the state be ignored. Its operations must be 
considered if the perceptions of its opponents are to be understood.
Apart from the attempted explanation of the types of political behaviour 
covered by the term resistance described in previous pages, there are 
four other broad categories of explanation. These are the ecological, 
the historical, the psychological and the political.
The most influential ecological explanation of rural politics in France 
has been the contrast between the political conservatism of regions of 
dispersed habitat and the political radicalism of the regions of 
grouped residence. The cases of the Midi and Brittany are usually 
cited as the best evidence for this theory.(57) But as Judt points out 
in his study of the Var, the pattern of settlememt is not something 
which is given. It is a reflection of factors such as the availability 
of land, the nature of the land, the degree of security and the 
climate.(58) Nevertheless, Judt finds a high degree of correlation 
between the strength of the socialist movement in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries and villages of grouped habitat.(59) 
Similar evidence is presented by Tarrow in his study of Mezzogiorno 
communism.(60)
Judt's refusal to indulge in monocausal explanation prevents him from 
mistaking correlation for explanation. In a chapter dealing with 
"Provencal Sociability", he shows how grouped habitat led to a more
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developed public and collective life. But he also shows that there is 
no necessary connection between political radicalism and social 
collectivism. Such collectivism could have given rise to conservative 
politics, as in fact it did during the Restoration and July Monarchy.
At most, the grouped village facilitated political organization and 
activity. It did not dictate which form this activity would take.
There is also a great deal of evidence which contradicts the pattern of 
settlement argument, some of which is discussed by Judt.(61) The 
evidence presented for the Vaucluse and the Charente in Chapter 3 and 
the pattern of MODEF support in these departments does not lend any 
support for the grouped habitat theory.
There are two main reasons why this should be so. On the more 
historical and theoretical level, Blok argues that the pattern of 
settlement is dictated as much by social relations as by the geography 
of the area. If so, far from being an explanation of political 
behaviour, the pattern of settlement is merely one of the side effects 
of social structure.(62) Secondly, even if one were to concede that the 
grouped village facilitated political organization in the nineteenth and 
the first half of the twentieth centuries, the technological revolution 
in communications of the 1950s and 1960s has rendered such physical 
constraints ineffective. With the telephone and the motor car, it is 
almost as simple to organize the dispersed villages as the grouped 
villages.
One of the commonplaces of French history and political science is that 
certain departments have a tradition of protest and political radicalism 
dating back to at least 1849. Since then, the citizens of these 
departments have continued the pattern of voting and political activity
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established by their ancestors. Having observed this phenomenon, many 
writers have been content to use it as an explanation of more recent 
political behaviour. In such a way, the past has come to dominate the 
present through the mechanism of History, a mechanism which provides a 
convenient deus ex machina to absolve one from the responsibility of 
seeking an explanation.
The most ambitious attempt to explain the historically correlated 
pattern of voting behaviour remains an article published in 1957. The 
demographer, Berthier de Sauvigny, attempted to explain the stability of 
political non-conformism through such factors as the birth rate, the 
death rate and the impact of rural exodus.(63) Sauvigny's argument 
boils down to the claim that that as the birth rate declined, as the 
death rate stabilized and as rural migration to the towns increased, the 
rural population became increasingly aged. This meant that the rapid 
de-population of the countryside in the nineteenth century left the 
least imaginative and most inertia-stricken members of the community 
behind. These continued to maintain the traditions, including the 
political traditions, of the village.
There are several flaws in such an argument. Firstly, the assumption 
that migrants are the most dynamic members of the community is plausible 
but unverifiable. But evidence from another country at this time, 
Ireland, and from the France of another epoch, the 1950s, suggests that 
those who leave for the cities are simply the poorest who are unable to 
survive in a changed economic climate.(64) Furthermore, since 
de-population is a dynamic process, one would expect it to lead to 
political change rather than promote stability. In fact Sauvigny 
himself points out that Aquitaine passed directly from royalism to 
radicalism as de-population became too severe. His solution to this
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contradictory evidence is to leap to another plane of explanation, the 
psychological, by arguing that excessive de-population lead to 
alienation and political change.
Nevertheless, Sauvigny's theory included a significant innovation. This 
was the attempt to explain political behaviour in terms of the social 
structure as it exists rather than as it existed previously. One has 
to look at the changes which give rise to radical politics and 
resistance in the first place and how, and if, these conditions and 
political practices are reproduced.
This is precisely the great strength of Judt's work on the Var. His 
micro-political analysis by commune not only contests the theoretical 
foundations of the History-type explanation but also its empirical 
value. By analyzing the election results of the nineteenth century Var, 
he shows that although the Var as a whole followed the 1849 pattern of 
voting until recently, this is not true within the department. The 
radical areas of 1849-1852 were not those which came over to the early 
socialists and which consistently supported the SFIO in the twentieth 
century.(65) Rather than being a product of habit, the support given to 
the socialist movement was a deliberate innovation in the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century, a conscious choice made by the 
peasantry. However, Judt undermines his argument in the most amazing way 
by explaining the continuing electoral strength of the SFIO in the 
department during the twentieth century as being the result of habits 
formed in the previous period.(6 6)
Much of the literature which seeks to explain political resistance, or, 
as its authors would say, protest has been written by social 
psychologists or those heavily influenced by their work. If nothing
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else, this suggests that political scientists have regarded such forms 
of political behaviour as being unfit subjects for polite society. This 
is especially true in the United States and, to a significant extent, in 
France through the medium of Michel Crozier. Psychological theories 
have taken two main forms, relative deprivation theory and alienation 
theory.
Theories of relative deprivation have become much more sophisticated 
since the crude behaviouralist theories of the 1920s and the 
simple-minded frustration-agression model.(67) Relative deprivation 
theory was born out of the realization that protests and revolutions 
coincided not with maximum economic deprivation but rather with periods 
of rapid decline or expansion. In order to cope with such complexity, 
more sophisticated theories were necessary. But the price paid for 
sophistication has been confusion. Relative deprivation explanations 
include: rising expectations which meet with disappointment leading to 
political disturbance; deprivation relative to one's past position; 
deprivation relative to other groups; and deprivation resulting from the 
gap between what one estimates one's position could or should be in the 
future ana what one estimates it will be. This rabbit-like 
proliferation has damaged the credibility of relative deprivation theory 
as has the consistent failure of its proponents to provide any evidence 
that anyone has ever felt themselves to be relatively deprived.
This lack of confidence is increased when one realizes that some 
instances of relative deprivation are actually examples of absolute 
deprivation. For example, to be deprived relative to one's past 
position is to be absolutely deprived and to suffer a genuine material 
loss. From the psychological point of view, there is an extremely 
telling criticism which has been put forward by Scott.(6 8) He argues
that those whose expectations are frustrated are just as likely to 
revise their expectations downwards to accommodate to changed 
circumstances than they are to feel relatively deprived. From the point 
of view of the political scientist, the most fundamental criticism of 
relative deprivation theory is one which has been noted even by some of 
its advocates. For instance, one of the leading proponents of relative 
deprivation theory, Edward Muller, has this to say:
Only when deprivation-induced frustration is accompanied by 
attribution of responsibility for the condition to socio-political 
arrangements will men become sufficiently motivated to protest.(69)
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This means that even if one suspended disbelief in dealing with 
relative deprivation theory, it would still provide no clue which might 
explain why people adopt particular forms of political organization and 
activity. It is, therefore, of no use in explaining the existence of 
MODEF.
Alienation theory has a longer history and is somewhat more convincing 
than relative deprivation theory. The protestor is seen as someone who 
is alienated from the political system and therefore engages in 
political activity which is not sanctioned by the system. From Lawrence 
Wylie to Henri Mendras, a wide range of authors have resorted to the 
concept of alienation. From Wright's "pervasive sense of injustice" to 
Guillamin's complaint - "Ils avaient toujours peur, ils ne savaient pas 
exactement de quoi, mais ils avaient toujours peur de quelque chose" - 
lie the parameters of alienation theory.(70)
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Once again the value of alienation theory has been called into question 
by other social psychologists. The most exact attempt to define what is 
meant by alienation is the Seman model.(71) Alienation is characterized 
by four stages; estrangement, poverlessness, normlessness and social 
isolation. As Marsh points out, only the estrangement stage is 
conducive to any form of political activity.(72) Anyone suffering from 
poverlessness, normlessness and social isolation is unlikely to see the 
need for, nor the usefulness of, involving themselves in political 
activity. Neither will they find much opportunity to do so.
The other main problem with alienation theory is that it reposes on the 
conventional politics/protest dichotomy. It cannot explain why people 
may be involved in both these types of politics. As will be seen in 
later chapters, many MODEF activists fall into such a category. Many of 
them are elected public representatives as well as union activists 
engaged in a wide range of more or less "reputable" political 
activities. These activists combine a very positive attitude to the 
elected bodies of the state with a bitter hostility to the 
administrative agencies from which they are excluded.
Yet another failing of alienation theory is that it ignores 
this exclusion. Alienates are attributed responsibility for their own 
alienation. But, in practice, rather than resulting from psychological 
or intellectual inadequacy, a negative attitude towards the state may 
well be a reasoned political judgement based on a great deal of 
knowledge and experience of the political system. (Witness the cynicism 
about politics of the average political journalist or political 
scientist.) The institutions of the state, rather than individuals, may
well be at fault.
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Crozier's analysis of bureaucracy, styles of authority and resistance to 
authority is undermined by its roots in this alienation theory. Crozier 
attempts to explain the importance of bureaucracy and authoritarianism 
in France and the periodic upheavals it promotes in terms of individual 
psychology. It is the suspicion with which the individual treats the 
state and other individuals which gives rise to this pattern of 
political organization. Crozier lists the factors responsible for this 
state of affairs:
individual isolation and lack of constructive co-operation 
activities... strata isolation and lack of communication between 
people of different rank... Direct face-to-face authority 
relationships are avoided as much as possible... Authority is 
converted, as much as possible, into impersonal rules.(73)
Such impersonal authority is considered to protect the autonomy of the 
individual. In Crozier's terms, even those most overtly opposed to 
bureaucracy and authority secretly depend on them to protect their 
interests:
Workers... have a still more vicarious kind of bon plaisir, 
inasmuch as they can enjoy it only in fantasy, by indulging in the 
radical philosophy of revolution. But they prefer this solution.
It gives them a kind of negative independence, while safeguarding 
their material interests and protecting them against the emotional 
difficulties of the face-to-face relationship with their own 
employer.(74)
Crozier has substituted a sub-Freudian theory of the bureaucratic 
unconscious for the political analysis of political conflict. The
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theory is self-fulfilling since expressing hostility to bureaucracy is 
merely to underline one's own dependence on it. It is one of the 
ironies of the social sciences that those who lay so much stress on 
empirical evidence to criticize concepts which they find ideologically 
unacceptable are those who most readily resort to the use of 
unverifiable psychological theories to defend their own concepts.
As in other examples of alienation theory, Crozier relies on 
psychological inadequacies for an explanation. Like other such 
theories, this merely begs the question - what creates psychological 
inadequacy? In fact, as Crozier admits, though only as an historical 
explanation, individual isolation resulted from the repressive policies 
of successive regimes designed to prevent collective organization which 
could threaten their position. However, one has only to look at 
post-war town planning or the obstacles placed in the way of 
agricultural co-operatives to see that more subtle techniques have been 
used to achieve the same end. Similarly, the concepts of strata 
isolation and lack of communication can be seen, not as the results of 
mutual suspicion, but as the consequences of class stratification and 
the conflicting interests of different classes.
As for personal and impersonal styles of authority, Crozier confuses two 
things. On the one hand, he confuses formal rules and behaviour within 
the bureaucracy with the effective distribution of power and authority. 
More importantly, even if one accepts that impersonality rules within 
the bureaucracy, it is mistaken to equate this with the way in which 
bureaucracy imposes itself on the administered. The bureaucracy may 
consider itself to be acting impersonally, but the administered are 
affected personally and will therefore have a different view. Their
perception of bureaucratic authority is not one of impersonality but of 
arbitrariness. For instance, the man who took his pet jaguar to the 
Prefecture was not protesting about rules but against officials.(75)
Having disposed of these non-explanations, it is time to turn our 
attention towards political explanations. Surprisingly, the resistance 
to attempts to explain political behaviour in other than political terms 
has been led by the historian and sociologist, Charles Tilly, who argues:
Despite the recent attempts to psychologize the study of revolution 
by introducing concepts such as anxiety, alienation, rising 
expectations and the like, and to sociologize it by employing 
notions of disequilibrium, role conflict, structural strain and so 
on, the factors which continue to hold up under close scrutiny are, 
on the whole, political ones. The structure of power, alternative 
conceptions of justice, the organization of coercion, the conduct 
of war, the formation of coalitions, the legitimacy of the state - 
these traditional concerns of political thought provide the main 
guides to the explanation of revolution.(76)
The first kind of political explanation for agricultural resistance is 
important, not so much for its intellectual value, but for the frequency 
with which it is used by the opponents of MODEF. This is the conspiracy 
theory of the outside agitator. In such a perspective, any 
anti-capitalist movement in the countryside is the result of outside 
agitators stirring up unrest with demagogic demands. So, for example, 
HODEF is the result of a Communist plot to manipulate simple-minded 
farmers. Henry Ehrmann bears the responsibility for having given some 
academic legitimacy to such a polemical view.(77) Ehrmann claimed that 
PCF support in rural areas stemmed from the party's cynical manipulation
of the most politically and economically backward sections of the 
peasantry. It is no accident that Ehrmann begins with a quote from 
Malraux's La Condition Humaine. "Le paysan suit toujours. Ou 
l'ouvrier, ou le bourgeois. Mais il suit."(78) In the final analysis, 
this is simply a right-wing variant of the Marxist sack of potatoes 
theory. Peasants are so disorganized and ignorant that they are 
political idiots who must place themselves in the hands of a "sauveur 
supreme". Louis Napoleon Bonaparte is simply replaced by the "Modern 
Prince" in the shape of Maurice Thorez.
A more serious attempt to explain the political behaviour of farmers is 
the effort to analyze it in terms of changes in the organization of the 
state. There are two basic approaches to this. On the one hand, 
resistance takes place when political institutions fail to adapt to 
social change. This approach has been marginal in terms of agricultural 
politics since small-scale agriculture is generally regarded as falling 
into decline as result of social change. Therefore, farmers are usually 
considered to be protesting against, rather than for, change. 
"Progressive" forms of resistance, such as those aiming to bring new 
political institutions into being, have usually been limited to Third 
World countries and have taken on a revolutionary aspect (e.g. Algeria, 
Vietnam). The only contemporary example of this type of "progressive" 
protest in France has been the 1962 demonstrations in favour of 
legislative reform. (7<y)
The second approach, which has been more influential, argues that 
resistance arises from attempts to impose new political institutions on 
societies which are not prepared for them. Such explanations have been 
put forward by several writers such as Barrington Moore, Hobsbawm, 
Tarrow and Tilly. (9 0) These new institutions disrupt traditional
political arrangements at a local level, interfere with traditional 
patterns of authority and limit certain types of behaviour previously 
regarded as legitimate.(81) However, at this level of generalization, 
this is merely to note the historical correlation between political 
upheaval in rural areas and major changes in the political system. A 
more micro-political approach has been found to be necessary.
As far as rural politics are concerned, the two aspects of modernization 
which have received most attention are the nature of the relationship 
between local non-farmer elites and the farmers and the degree to which 
farmers are integrated into the national political system.
Elite-farmer relations and the nature of the authority which the former 
exercises over the latter have been isolated as the key variables by 
several writers. Geneletti argues that the political orientation of 
each class in agricultural society is a function of two variables - 
relative independence and subordination. The more independent are more 
likely to engage in political activity beyond the limits laid down by 
the local elite. Of course, the two variables are really only one, 
being at different ends of the same scale. Geneletti's argument simply 
boils down to saying that those who resist are who are most able to 
resist, which implies that farmers are permanently straining at the 
leash waiting for an opportunity to throw off the shackles of elite 
domination. It also implies that farmers are only opposed to the local 
elites. Opposition to central government, other elites or other groups 
of outsiders is simply ignored.(8 2)
Henri Mendras and the Groupe de Sociologie Rurale have also devoted much 
attention to the elite-farmer relationship. Eizner and Cristin argue
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that the political behaviour of farmers in each region of France has 
been heavily influenced by the presence or otherwise of non-farming 
elites in the past. In Brittany, farmer conservatism can be explained 
by the leading role in local politics played by notables whereas the 
leftism of Provence can be seen as the consequence of their 
absence. (83) Mendras himself analyses political behaviour in terms of 
the type of notable which predominated in each region. The three types 
of notable, the apathetic and indifferent but less exploitative 
landlord, the paternalist and protective dominant type and the crudely 
exploitative correspond to three types of political behaviour, political 
indifference, extreme conservatism and radicalism. (8it)
As an explanation of political behaviour in the second half of the 
twentieth century, such explanations fall into the trap of the 
historical tradition argument. There is also an added weakness in that 
there is a one-way view of the relationship between elites and farmers 
implicit in this theory. The farmer simply reacts to the treatment 
received from a particular notable. There is no recognition of the need 
to explain why notables in one region behaved differently from those in 
another. There is no suggestion at all that this could have something 
to do with the degree of co-operation or resistance afforded by the 
farmer. Similarly, though the Eizner-Cristin hypothesis may have 
something to say about conservatism, the connection between the absence 
of notables and political radicalism is demonstrated only by negative 
implication, not by positive evidence.
Despite the strictures presented above on ahistorical historical 
arguments, the most useful and rigorous attempts to explain agricultural 
resistance are to be found in two historical works by Barrington Moore
and Tilly. As historians they are less ahistorical and present evidence 
in such a way that it is much easier to distinguish that which is of 
secular relevance from that which is only of historical value.
Both works concentrate on the connection between elites and farmers in 
the context of political revolution and the commercialization of the 
economy. (85) Moore is particularly interested in the relations of 
exploitation between the notables and the peasants and the political 
alliances on which the transition to capitalism was based. In 
revolutionary France, except in the Vendee, bourgeois and peasant allied 
to smash a parasitic aristocracy. In this view the French Revolution 
stemmed from the change in the role of the aristocracy from 
ideological, social and political leaders of the village community into 
parasitic aliens. In the Vendee, however, peasants and aristocrats 
joined in an anti-capitalist alliance. The attempt of an elite, not yet 
accepted as legitimate, to take the place of the aristocracy was 
resisted by both the aristocrats themselves and the farmers who regarded 
them as the legitimate leaders.
Tilly puts forward a similar view. The Vendee resulted from the attempt 
of the urban bourgeoisie to take power in a society where it had not yet 
demonstrated its right to rule. The aristocracy were still regarded as 
the legitimate rulers.
This approach has a great deal of value, permitting the analysis of more 
recent events in similar terms. For instance, the rapid replacement of 
the socialist and Christian Democratic elites, who dominated the 
agricultural organizations of the immediate post-war period, by those of 
the Right is a similar case of resistance to the imposition of new 
elites before they had established their hegemony over the farmers they
were supposed to represent. Furthermore, many of the concepts used by 
Moore and Tilly are useful for explaining the emergence of MODEF. As we 
have already seen, the relationship between the farmer and the rest of 
the economy is one such example. The question of the competition 
between classes and elites is another.
However, there are certain weaknesses in this emphasis on the role of 
elites. Both Moore and Tilly are dealing with "reactionary" resistance 
to capitalism in which non-farmer elites no doubt have a much greater 
role to play since such resistance is much less damaging to them than 
more "progressive" forms of resistance.(8 6) Indeed, much of the 
evidence presented, especially by Tilly, demonstrates that the Vendeen 
peasants fought as much for themselves and their interests as they did 
out of a sense of loyalty to aristocratic notables. The contrast 
between the initiative and heroism of the Vendeen peasantry and the 
attitude of the royalist leaders is another sign pointing towards such a 
conclusion. (8 7)
When one examines a "progressive" form of anti-capitalist resistance, 
such as MODEF, one would expect to find much less of a non-farmer elite 
presence. Since such movements are hostile to both agricultural and 
industrial capitalism, there is little incentive for the economically 
privileged parts of the agricultural population to participate. The 
multi-purpose elites of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries have been affected by the division of the labour. Farmers 
have taken on the tasks of leadership themselves, even in the regions 
where political representation is still delegated to old-style 
non-farmer notables. It is precisely because new lay elites have 
emerged from the ranks of the farmers themselves that the creation of an 
organization such as MODEF has proved possible.
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How this replacement of the non-farmer notable by the lay elite has come 
about will become apparent after the change in the relationship between 
farmers and the nation-state has been examined. The degree to which 
farmers are integrated into the nation-state has also received a great 
deal of attention. These issues are closely related since the 
relationship between the farmer and the nation-state depends to a large 
extent on his relationship to local elites.
The most systematic exploration of this issue is Suzanne Berger's 
analysis of farmer conservatism in the Finistère during the Third and 
Fourth Republics.(8 8) Describing the operation of the famous Landerneau 
co-operative and the political role of its aristocratic leaders, she 
shows how a barrier was erected between the farmer on the one hand, and 
central government and regional administration on the other. Landerneau 
and its leaders dealt with government on behalf of the farmer and with 
the farmer on behalf of government. This form of partial political 
integration was responsible for the political conservatism and stability 
of the department. The case is strengthened by developments in the late 
1950s and early 1960s when the breakdown of aristocratic domination 
coincided with the growth of participatory democracy in the CNJA, the 
end of the Fourth Republic and the position of the Parliamentary 
agricultural lobby, and the mass protests of 1959-1962.
Tarrow describes another form of partial integration which had 
diametrically opposed consequences. Unlike the position in the 
Finistère, the southern Italian local elites were marginal to the 
national political system and were therefore less able to exercise 
hegemony over the rural masses. At the same time, they had sufficient 
regional strength to prevent effective central direction of the state 
but not enough to force the state to accept them as mediators between it
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and the people. This situation created a high degree of political 
awareness on the part of farmers and a similarly high degree of 
scepticism about the ability of either state or local elites to protect 
their interests. Into this vacuum came the new elites of the Partito 
Communista Italiano (PCI), who were thus able to secure support for 
their land reform policies.(8 9)
There are, therefore, three available scenarios. We have the Landerneau 
model of efficient partial integration, the Mezzogiorno model of 
inefficient partial integration and the Fifth Republican model of full 
integration. Of these, only the latter two are able to explain farmer 
resistance. In the case of MODEF, the full integration model seems most 
suited to the facts. The power of the Fourth Republican agricultural 
lobby, the influence this gave to the deputy in his constituency and the 
ability of parliamentarians to render election results meaningless gave 
way to the executive-centred regime, the increased power of the 
administration and a more efficient link between election results and 
the composition of governments. Referenda, mass communications and the 
increasing penetration of capitalism in agriculture all suggest that 
farmers had been brought into a full and direct role in the national 
political system.
The question which has to be answered is why full integration should 
have been the occasion of mass resistance on the part of the farmers, 
the creation of MODEF merely being one manifestation among many of this 
resistance. Once again the gap between external observation and 
subjective perception has to be confronted. Contrary to the 
expectations of early modernization theory, there is no necessary 
connection between full integration into the national political system
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and increasing popular participation in political life. To assume this 
is to confuse political participation with representative democracy and 
to ignore the perpetual debate on the nature of democracy. Tilly has 
shown that one of the consequences of the Revolution was the reduction 
in political participation at the local level when traditional forms of 
decision-making were replaced by representative institutions.(9 0 ) 
Similarly, Tarrow argues that clientelistic forms of political 
arrangements imply a more direct and personal involvement in political 
life than do the impersonal party politics of the modern 
nation-state.• (9 1 )
In this light, it would appear that the creation of MODEF was the act, 
not of people protesting about changes which they could not understand, 
but of those who understood only too well. Rather than an attempt to 
resist the intervention of the state, the creation of MODEF should be 
seen as an attempt to resist exclusion from the centres of political
life.
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6 . CONCLUSION
As with the discussion of capitalism and class in the first half of this 
chapter, we are left with a series of propositions which help to explain 
the presence of MODEF in the politics of French agriculture.
1. The political behaviour of farmers is dependent on the nature of 
the relationship between them and leadership elites.
2. The emergence of a lay elite drawn from the ranks of the 
farmers themselves is more likely where farmers are fully 
integrated into the nation-state.
3. The presence of farmer elites in the leadership of agricultural 
organizations is more conducive to 'progressive' forms of 
anti-capitalist resistance, such as that implied by the existence 
of MODEF.
The following chapter combines these hypotheses with those concerning 
the socio-economic situation of agriculture. These concepts are employed 
to explain the evolution of French agriculture and agricultural politics 
since 1945. Further evidence in their support will be found in chapter 3 
which deals with the basis of support for MODEF in two departments, the 
Charente and the Vaucluse.
S'*
CHAPTER 2 MODERNIZATION, CLASS AND POLITICAL CHANGE: THE ORIGINS AND 
GROWTH OF MODEF
1. INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter, the key variables which determine the 
political behaviour of farmers have been identified as:
i) the connection between agriculture and the rest of the 
economy and its implications for agriculture;
ii) the consequent class differentiation within the agricultural 
community;
iii) the nature of elite control over the political behaviour of 
farmers;
iv) the degree of integration of farmers into the political 
system.
In order to understand the emergence of MODEF and its continued 
existence, it is necessary to examine these variables in the French 
context. The chapter begins with a description of post-war economic 
developments in French agriculture with an emphasis on the role of the 
state in subordinating agriculture to industry. The pattern of class 
relations established by these economic changes is then examined.
Ihe latter part of the chapter deals with the political pre-conditions 
which made the creation of MODEF possible. Particular attention is 
given to the Confederation Générale des Paysans Travailleurs (CGPT), an 
organization of the 1930s generally regarded as the forerunner of MODEF. 
The contrast between its failure and the success of MODEF is extremely 
revealing on the importance of direct farmer involvement in political 
life and the nature of the dominant elites in rural society.
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Finally, after considering the role of the PCF in launching MODEF, the 
chapter concludes with an account of the growth of support for MODEF 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
2. AGRICULTURE AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY SINCE 1945
In 1945 Europe lay in ruins. French farmers had been widely suspected 
of profiteering from war-time food shortages. Though there was 
certainly an element of truth in such accusations, it was a partial 
view. The subordination of the French economy to German war aims meant 
that the level of investment in agriculture was drastically reduced, not 
through choice but by necessity.(1) This meant that, even without 
profiteering, farmers accumulated a surplus whose existence both 
demonstrated the necessity for, and permitted, heavy investment after 
the war. The result, together with economic aid from the United States 
was the rapid mechanization of French agriculture. In 1950, there were
137,000 tractors in use. By 1954, this number had increased to 249,651. 
By 1980, the figure had increased to 1,485,000. Similarly,the number of 
combine harvesters rose from 5,000 in 1950 to 14,116 by 1954 and 
eventually to 134,000 by 1980.(2)
However attractive a picture these statistics present to the apologists 
of modernization and progress, they conceal a reality of debt, exodus, 
and the intensification of labour. As the Luddites grasped, 
technological innovation is not independent of social relations. The 
extent to which new technology is adopted depends on the economic, 
sociological and political context into which it is introduced. At the 
same time, their introduction changes this context more or less 
drastically. In the optimistic Tomorrow's World perspective, such
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changes are ignored or simply assumed to be beneficial to everybody. A 
more pessimistic approach is required in the analysis of French 
agriculture, an analysis which confirms Marx's adage: "the instrument of 
labour strikes down the labourer."(3 )
These figures also provide a rough guide to the extent of capital 
accumulation. To remain efficient, the farmer has to invest more and 
more. For example, with the introduction of the grape harvesting 
machine, it becomes possible and, eventually, necessary to do away with 
hired labour. In order to compete, the farmer must purchase a machine. 
In order to buy the machine, he must find the necessary capital.
Those who cannot find this initial investment will gradually be 
eliminated. Furthermore, new entrants to the profession will find 
their route barred because the necessary capital investment is so high. 
The consequence of this permanent drive to invest is the increasing 
indebtedness of farmers. The Credit Agricole is the main, but by no 
means only, source of agricultural finance. Using the crude measure 
of dividing the total amount of loans granted by the Credit Agricole 
to farmers by the number of farmers, we find that, from an average of 
1,600 frames per head in December 1954, the average debt had 
increased to 172,000 new francs in December 1978.(4) These loans must 
be repaid and repaid in cash. Therefore the farmer is forced to 
dedicate himself to production for the market, producing more and more 
in order to obtain the higher level of gross income required to repay 
his loans. This, in turn, demands more investment. It is a vicious
circle.
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TABLE 2:1 RURAL EXODUS IN FRANCE 1954-1980
CATEGORY_________________________________ YEAR 1954 1980
Farmers 1,918,000 1,262,000
Family Labour 2,063,000 730,000
Permanent Hired Labourers 720,000 233,000
Temporary Hired Labourers 431,000 (a)
Total 5,132,000 2,225,000
Source: Statistique Agricole Annuelle 1954, SCEES, p. vii.
Recensement General de l'Agriculture:France Entière 1979-1980, SCEES, p 
4
(a) a distinction is no longer made between permanent and temporary 
hired labour. The Personne-Annee de Travail concept is used. This is 
calculated by dividing the total number of man hours by the product of 
40 (hours per week) and 275 (working days per year).
Faced with these pressures, the result is predictable: bankruptcies; 
failure of young fanners to enter the profession; elimination of 
agricultural labourers; farmers extricating themselves before going 
bankrupt,etc. In 1946, the estimated active agricultural population 
totalled 7,400,000. Since then the decline has been permanent.
unlike other cases of exodus, such as the Highland Clearances, there 
was a positive side to this. The attractions of the city cannot be 
denied. Advantages included lighter work, shorter hours, higher pay, 
better living conditions and more ways to spend one's leisure. The 
last two have become progressively less important with the 
modernization of rural housing and the growth of car ownership.
EVen for those who remained on the land, the exodus had some 
advantages, such as the extra land made available for expansion. 
Nevertheless, it is mistaken to assume an identity of perception between 
those who left the land and those who remained. Though the 'refugees' 
may have departed for positive rather them negative reasons, they may 
well have appeared to be negative reasons to those left behind. For 
the parents of the young fleeing the countryside, there may well have 
been resentment at their inability to provide a sufficiently 
attractive way of life to prevent the exodus. For farmers watching the 
departure of their colleagues, there was the insecurity of waiting to 
see which of them would be next at the "Bus Stop to Paris".(5)
Finally, for those who continued to work the land, the working day 
became more intensive. A farm with high capital investment, which 
must be used to the full, is necessarily operated on the principle that 
"time is money". Gone are the stops at the end of the furrow to 
gossip with neighbours. Instead one spends all day isolated in the cab
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of a noisy tractor. The socially distinctive aspects of farm work 
disappeared. Though the most demanding physical labour was abolished 
and the working day shortened, each minute had to be productively 
used.(6 )
The intensification of labour is reflected by the growth in the size of 
the farm. The average size of the farm has not increased as drastically 
as the number of farmers has declined. This would suggest that the 
small-scale farmer has been most affected by the exodus. In 1955, the 
average farm size was 14.1 hectares. By 1970, this had increased to 
18.8 hectares. By the end of the decade, the average size was 23.4 
hectares.(7) However, this masks an increase in the number of farms 
over 35 hectares and a fall in the number of farms below 35 hectares.(8 ) 
Furthermore, whereas half the total agricultural land in France was 
occupied by farms of over 25 hectares in 1955, the corresponding figure 
for 1970 was 35 hectares, increasing to 44 hectares in 1979.(9)
Although no figures are available for 1955, over 500,000 hectares have 
been taken out of cultivation since 1970. It appears that, on the one 
hand, the larger farmers and non-agricultural interests have been able 
to increase the size of their holdings whilst, on the other, small and 
mediunv-sized farms indulged in a ferocious competition with each other 
for land. This competition has pushed up the price of land in many 
areas beyond the limits set by the normal return on capital which could 
be expected from agricultural use of the land.(10) This involves a 
greater intensity of labour for those who are able to survive. The role 
of the much-hoped for Sociétés d'Amenagement Foncier et d'Etablissement 
Rural (SAFERs) in regulating the land market has been limited by 
extremely conservative judicial supervision (or indeed sabotage) of 
their activities and the less than rigorous management of the SAFERs.(11)
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The rewards promised to farmers for their efforts have not been 
forthcoming. The goal of parity between urban and agricultural incomes 
set by the Gaullist regime in the early 1960s has not been achieved, and 
only ever looked like being achieved in the early 1970s. Indeed, after 
1974, agricultural income declined in real terms, thus widening the 
gap. It is true that incomes did rise until 1974 but they did not do so 
as fast as productivity. Due to the decline in the labour force and 
increasing investment, productivity rose sharply. However, despite the 
promises and encouragement of a latter-day Guizot such as Pisani, and 
much to the disappointment of the farmers, this increased productivity 
could not be matched by corresponding rises in income. There were three 
reasons for this. Production did not rise as fast as productivity.
Though yields per man were much higher, the number of producers had 
declined. Secondly, the elasticity of demand for agricultural products 
is limited. An increase in supply often provokes a more than 
proportionate fall in price and therefore a fall, or a less than 
proportionate rise in income.(12) Finally, the costs of production rise 
as farmers require more materials purchased from industry, e.g. 
fertilizers. This was particularly true in the early years of Gaullist 
modernization when enthusiasm for technical innovation blinded farmers 
to its economic consequences.
Until the late 1960s when Ministry of Agriculture statisticians set up 
the Réseau d'information Comptable Agricole (RICA), calculations of 
agricultural incomes were unreliable. This is why the figures below for 
the 1960s in Table 2:2 should be taken only as indications of trends 
rather than completely accurate records. With the introduction of RICA 
in the late 1960s the figures for the later years, though still flawed, 
are much more reliable.(13)
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TABLE 2:2 ANNUAL CHANGES IN FARM INCOMES 1960-1980
YEAR PERCENTAGE CHANGE
1960/1959 +14
1961/1960 +4
1962/1961 +9
1963/1962 + 1 2
1964/1963 -4
1965/1964 +5
1966/1965 +4
1971/1970 +6.3
1972/1971 +13.7
1973/1972 +4.9
1974/1973 -5.1
1975/1974 -1 . 1
1976/1975 -1.4
1977/1976 -0.3
1978/1977 -3.1
1979/1978 +0 . 8
1980/1979 -6.4
Source: Resultats d'Ensemble des Comptes 1959-1966, INSEE, Serie C, No
7, p. 230 for 1960s figures. Comptes de l'Agriculture en 1980, INSEE,
Sérié C, No. 98, p.18 for 1970s.
It must be remembered that method of calculating agricultural incomes on 
the basis of Revenu Brut d'Exploitant (RBE) does not include the cost of 
repaying investment loans. Whilst income rose to 1974 and fell during 
the rest of the decade, the burden of loans has been constantly 
increasing, as we have already seen.
As for the illusory parity of agricultural and urban incomes, the 
failure being officially admitted by its inclusion as one of the goals 
of the Giscardian Loi d'Orientation of 1980, Joseph Klatzmann, a pioneer 
in the field, presents the following figures:
TABLE 2:3 URBAN-AGRICULTURAL INCOME DIFFERENTIALS 1954-1975 
YEAR PER CAPITA FARM INCOMES PER CAPITA WAGES
1954-1956 104 107
1957-1959 114 1 2 0
1960-1962 129 136
1963-1965 148 160
1966-1968 166 177
1969-1971 187 2 0 1
1972-1974 234 231
1975 2 2 2 249
indices with base 100-1954. Klatzmann, L'Agriculture Française, p. 90
The farmer has also been confronted by another problem, that of the 
increasing influence of agro-industry in the agro—alimentary complex. 
This has helped to limit the return on investment by farmers.
Agro—business consists of two types,those supplying agriculture with the 
industrial products necessary for modern farming and those purchasing 
agricultural produce, the food and drink processing industries. In the
case of the latter, the farmer is in a contradictory position, it is in 
his interests that the food processing industry is sufficiently dynamic 
and efficient for it to be able to market agricultural produce. At the 
same time, it is also in his interests that he is paid the highest rate 
possible for his produce - which obviously has implications for the 
competitiveness of the food processing industry. The potential of 
French agriculture is severely limited in European and world markets by 
the nature of the French food processing industry.(14) It is an 
industry which has been traditionally dominated by small firms drawing 
their supplies from limited areas and concentrating on a regional or, at 
best, the national market.(15) France has a relatively weak position 
amongst the multinational giants which dominate world food markets.
Only BSN has any international inpact. In order to market France's 
surplus produce Gaullist and Giscardian governments have attempted to 
rationalize the structure of companies in the industry and to encourage 
am export orientation.(16) This, of course, requires finance. Food 
processing companies (like any large company dealing with small 
suppliers) have an incentive to squeeze their suppliers. In other 
words, the attempt to expand export markets was to be financed by those 
who would only indirectly benefit (if at all) for the immediate profit 
of those who would directly benefit.
These factors have resulted in a growing tendency towards the 
integration of farmers into industrial structures. This is most 
advanced in the field of pig production but some of the large dairy 
farms and co-operatives are well advanced on a similar path, e.g. Union 
Laitière Normande.(17) In such systems of vertical integration the 
farmer remains owner of the farm and the fixed capital whilst the 
variable capital (animals, foodstuffs, etc.) is provided by the
industrialist along with strict surveillance of production by 
technicians in the employ of the firm.
This growing subordination of agriculture to agro-business is reflected 
by statistics. Whereas, between 1960 and 1977, the agricultural share 
of Gross National Product (GNP) fell from 11.2 per cent to 5.3 per cent, 
agro-business held its share constant at 4.7 per cent. This, of course, 
means that the relative importance of business in the 
agricultural-agro-business sector has increased. In 1960, agriculture 
was responsible for 70.6 per cent of the total value added by the 
sector. By 1977, this figure had fallen to 53.0 per cent.(18) As far as 
the industries which supply goods to agriculture are concerned the 
picture is somewhat different. There is no ambiguity for the farmer. 
Industrial suppliers are enemies who exploit farmers. Some of these 
suppliers are among the giants of French and international industry, 
e.g, Renault. An examination of the relative evolution of the price 
index for industrial products necessary to agriculture (PINEA), 
agricultural prices at production and the general cost of living index 
is instructive. Over the period 1970-1979, the PINEA index rose from 
100 to 245.7. During this time, the index of agricultural prices at 
production rose from 100 to 198 whilst the cost of living index rose 
from 100 to 221.3. The result has been a rise in the share of the costs 
of production as a proportion of the value of total output from 2 2 . 1  per 
cent in 1960 to 43.1 per cent in 1980. In plain language, this means 
that: "...every hundred francs of agricultural produce costs 43 francs 
before wages, interest or rent is paid."(19) This is a result of the 
power of large-scale firms to exploit their clients when the latter are 
fragmented into hundreds of thousands of individual enterprises.
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However, this does not imply an acceptance of the kind of monopoly 
capital thesis put forward by the PCF. It is not only the capacity of 
agro-business to exploit its clients and suppliers, or the state's 
backing for such forms of exploitation, which is responsible for the 
increasingly subordinate role of agriculture. It is also due to the 
fact that, despite spectacular improvements, agricultural productivity 
has been outstripped by industrial productivity. As its share of the 
GNP has declined, so has its share of national income. Nevertheless, 
the farmer who sees his efforts to produce more with greater efficiency 
undermined by mysterious market forces and the more overt activities of 
agro-business and the state is not usually in a position to distinguish 
between the two and their respective degrees of responsibility for his 
problems.
3. THE ROLE OF THE STATE
These economic developments were not a result of spontaneous generation. 
The state has played a major role in promoting them, particularly since 
1958. During the Fourth Republic, agricultural policy was essentially 
geared towards the subordination of agriculture to the needs of economic 
(particularly industrial) reconstruction. Agriculture was seen both as 
a market for industrial goods and a gigantic reservoir of labour. But 
the role of the state remained much more limited them it was to become 
under the Fifth Republic. Governments encouraged modernization and 
mechemization but without paying attention to the social and economic 
consequences. The belief of one of the Plemning Commissioners of this 
period that his major achievement was the elimination of excess labor in 
agriculture is revealing in this respect.(20) Positive intervention in
agricultural affairs did occur , such as the short-lived indexation of 
agricultural prices by the government of Felix Gaillard and the 
creation of the SIBEV to organize meat markets. But these were more 
responses to serious agitation by farmers than policies to which 
governments had a genuine commitment. Governments, of course, were 
limited in what they could do by instability and the well-organized 
agricultural lobby in Parliament.
After the return to power of De Gaulle in 1958, it quickly became 
apparent that the influence of the Parliamentary agrarians, 
characteristic of the Third and Fourth Republics had been drastically 
curtailed. Gaillard's indexation scheme was one of the first victims of 
technocracy. However, there was no specifically Gaullist agricultural 
policy. The Ministry of Agriculture was left in the hands of an 
old-style notable from the Vendée, Henri Rochereau. Economic 
developments were left to take their course. Only the panic inspired by 
the revolts of 1959-1962 forced the Debré and Pompidou governemnts to 
take action. Fears that the Algérie Française and agricultural 
oppositions would join forces led Debré to take personal charge of the 
preparation of the new Loi d'Orientation. (21) At the same time, by 
excluding the Ministry of Agriculture from effective participation in 
its preparation, the traditional style and content of agricultural 
policy was abandoned. The Ministry was not considered fit to draw up a 
modern agricultural policy, being regarded more as an institution for 
the political control of rural areas rather than as an economic and 
technical ministry. (22) By confiding the task to his own office, Debre 
took a decisive step towards subordinating agricultural policy to 
technical and industrial requirements rather than to political 
considerations. Later Pisani, as Minister of Agriculture, was able to
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re-establish the Ministry's role in the preparation of the 1962 Loi 
Complementaire à la Loi d'Orientation, but only after he had purged and 
reorganized the Ministry itself.
The philosophy which informed the 1960 Debré Act and the 1962 Pisani Act 
was more or less identical. Indeed, the latter contains little more 
(except for the articles concerning the SAFERs) than the decrees and 
ministerial orders necessary for the implementation of the former. 
Therefore they can be analyzed together. (23) Both Acts were based on a 
typology first elaborated by the CNJA. Briefly, there were three kinds 
of farm, the profitable, the potentially profitable and the 
uneconomic. (24) State aid was to be concentrated on the the potentially 
profitable, assisting them to expand and modernize. The uneconomic were 
to be assisted out of agriculture. In Pisani's words, his Act was 
designed to: "....rendre humaines les evolutions nécessaires."(25) Those 
remaining in agriculture were to achieve parity of income with the urban 
population. These Acts remained the guiding principles of agricultural 
policy throughout the Fifth Republic in its period of Gaullist and 
Giscardian control.
In 1980, a new Loi d'Orientation was adopted. This Act was partly an 
updating of the various articles of the 1960-1962 legislation and as 
such accepted their logic. The only real innovation was the emphasis 
given to the development of agro-business. Article One of the Act set 
out its objectives. Apart from the traditional litany on the 
development of agriculture, improvement of agricultural standards of 
living, assistance for young farmers to enter the profession and the 
contribution of France to the fight against hunger in the world, it also 
included the goal of: "increasing the competitiveness of agriculture and
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its contribution to national economic growth by strengthening its export 
potential. This was to be achieved by:
increasing the productivity and competitiveness of agriculture, 
energy sources and food processing industries, through better 
organization of production and through greater competition in 
production, processing and marketing.(26)
What this really meant, as critics of the Act pointed out, was that 
agriculture was to be subordinated to agro-business.(27) It was 
designed to encourage vertical integration where the farmer would more 
or less become an employee of the firm who eventually marketed his 
produce.
Vertical integration and contract farming are more of these concepts 
which appear rational and progressive but which have serious drawbacks 
in practice. In theory, a bargain is struck between farmer and firm in 
which each gains, the farmer a guaranteed market, price and technical 
assistance, the firm a guaranteed supply of a consistent quality. But 
from the farmer's point of view, such developments represent a threat.
In the first place, it undermines their independence, one of the main 
reasons they are in the business at all. Secondly, the prospects of 
negotiating a fair deal are reduced by the imbalance in power between 
the farmer and the firm, particularly if the firm is a multinational 
giant. Finally, the record of vertical integration is extremely 
disturbing to farmers. Though contentious incidents may be few in 
number, these have been sufficiently general to create deep suspicion. 
Indeed the overall thrust of agricultural policy in which industrial 
needs have taken precedence over those of farmers does not inspire 
confidence in the sense of fair play of industrialists.
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Ttie 1960-1962 Acts were an attempt to shift the emphasis of agricultural 
policy away from price support to structural reform. As certain members 
of the reactionary Parliamentary opposition to the proposals pointed out 
during the debates, the policy of structural reform alone could not 
achieve parity without an adequate pricing policy.(28) This remains a 
major problem in agricultural policy-making. If pricing policy was 
seriously concerned with the establishment of parity, one would assume 
that official prices, or at least the initial proposed prices, would 
bear some relation to rises in the cost of production. In fact, farm 
prices are political prices, a trade-off between what consumers will 
accept (or rather the repercussions of food prices on the cost of living 
index and hence on wage negotiations), what farmers will accept after 
ritual protests and what the other states of the EEC will accept. There 
are far too many variables involved for strictly technical 
considerations to play a serious role in the determination of prices.
The eventual prices do not permit parity but have three different 
effects on three different categories of farmer. The large farmers make 
super-profits, the more financially secure small and medium-scale 
farmers manage to hold on whilst those in the most marginal financial 
situations are forced out.(29) The logical consequence of this 
superficially incoherent method of price-fixing is the gradual but sure 
reduction of the agricultural labour force and of the number of farms.
It is precisely this apparent incoherence which leads some observers to 
believe that there has been no coherent policy.(30) For example, one 
writer, after a rigorous examination of the 1960-1962 Acts and their 
implementation, argues that "les Lois d'Orientation ne contiennent 
néanmoins aucune ligne directrice autour de laquelle ordonner leur 
contenu." He goes on to claim that the implementation of the Acts was
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characterized by "un perpétuel balancement, une hésitation sans cesse 
renouvellée.." and concludes that the Acts failed because of the 
inclusion of contradictory objectives.
This analysis suffers from a disease prevalent in French political 
science - legalism. Any self-respecting law in France contains 
contradictory aims. But there are objectives and objectives. One must 
make a distinction between the sections of a law designed to be 
operative and those designed to be serve as window dressing.(31) 
Furthermore, one cannot analyze the actions and intentions of 
politicians and officials simply by looking at the text of laws and 
decrees. One must examine all the available evidence, such as specific 
decisions, party ideology, etc. Finally, there is the possibility that 
it is precisely the incoherence and contradictions of a law which permit 
the attainment of its real objective.
At the risk of launching a "procès d'intention" against Debre and 
Pisani, it is clear that if their legislation was designed to expand 
capitalist agriculture and eliminate as many of the non-capitalist 
farmers as possible at low political cost, it cannot be regarded as a 
failure. It was the contradictions in the legislation and the illusions 
which they created which permitted such fundamental changes to proceed, 
after the replacement of Pisani by the Fifth Republic's "fireman", Edgar 
Faure, without serious danger to the state in general or to the parties 
of the Right in particular.
Similarly, the practical effects of the 1980 Loi d'Orientation itself 
were limited since its promoters spent less them a year in office after 
its promulgation. Nevertheless, the Act can be seen as a resume of the 
agricultural policy of Giscardianism. By assisting private enterprise 
to compete more effectively with the co-operatives and by appointing 
Michel Debatisse as junior minister with responsibility for 
agro-industry, the Giscardian government removed more of the barriers 
between the farmers and the logic of the market.
4. THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (EEC)
Agricultural policy is not, of course, solely decided in the national 
context. The Fifth Republic coincided with a completely new development 
in the politics of agriculture. The Treaty of Rome created a European 
dimension to agriculture which not even the most isolated and xenophobic 
farmer could ignore. Not only did the European Economic Community (EEC) 
create European markets for agricultural produce, it also created a 
greater link between economic and political issues. The classic example 
has been the annual price negotiations in the Council of Ministers and 
the surrounding agitation which has accompanied them. (32)
It is an irony that the EEC, an institution whose ideology is so heavily 
marked by the idea of competition, has come to be responsible for one of 
the most interventionist agricultural policies in the world. As in 
other fields, such as steel, the ideology has had to be jettisoned in 
order to maintain the existence of the Community.(33) At the same time, 
the official ideology retains enough force to prevent the adoption of 
certain types of policies. This contradiction between ideology and
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practice is a result of the different roles of the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers. The more ideologically motivated proposals of the 
Commission (where formerly pragmatic politicians become incurable 
romantics) are modified by ministers whose freedom of action is more 
limited by political and electoral constraints.
The Mansholt Report, adopted by the Commisssion in December 1968, was 
greeted with protests from the Atlantic to the Adriatic. Aiming to 
reduce the cost of price support, Mansholt proposed the elimination of 
five million hectares and people from agriculture during the 1970s.
Price policy was to be used for structural objectives whilst farmers 
were to be encouraged to leave the industry through financial 
incentives.(34) Reaction to the report was so strong that governments 
were obliged to deny that it was the basis for future policy. Perhaps 
their main objection was Mansholt's indiscretion. Though the series of 
EEC Directives issued in April 1972 on structure, social policy and 
investment were obviously imbued with Mansholt's perspectives, price 
policy did not become an instrument of structural policy. Neither was 
structural policy given the primacy advocated by Mansholt.
Since then the EEC has continued to grapple with the problem of the 
increasing cost of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) whilst refusing 
to consider changes which clash too openly with its liberal principles 
and which would involve it in a more direct interventionist role in the 
structures of production. Quotas or planning have been ruled out as 
solutions, since this would freeze the structure of European agriculture 
and therefore prevent the continued rise of large-scale capitalist 
agriculture. In a preliminary report on the reform of the CAP published 
in 1980, the Commission continued to reject socialist-inspired proposals
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and opted for an extension of the idea of corresponsibility. In other 
words, the producers themselves were to participate in financing the 
disposal of surpluses. This form of taxation was introduced for milk 
and sugar producers. It is a tax in the EEC tradition. Like Value 
Added Tax (VAT), everyone pays. The effectiveness of corresponsibility 
taxes in achieving their objectives - improved marketing and reduced 
production - is doubtful. The distribution of the proceeds of the taxes 
is also open to question since the EEC only publishes figures referring 
to the uses of such monies, not the recipients.(35)
Despite the competitive nature of the EEC, it has not been wholly 
negative for French farmers. Those involved in producing produce for 
which the market is relatively organized (e.g. wheat, sugar) have gained 
from higher EEC prices. Others have found much-needed export markets 
within the Community. On the other hand, certain producers have had to 
face more intense competition both in Europe and on the domestic market 
(e.g. non-Appelation d'Origine Contrôlée, or AOC, wines). EEC-related 
prosperity has not, therefore, been shared equally by all sectors of 
French agriculturre. It is the most capitalist sectors which have been 
the prime benficiaries.(36)
French farmers have also had to face the consequences of monetary crises 
and diplomatic initiatives which have resulted in the more or less 
temporary non-application of the Treaty of Rome. The Monetary 
Compensation Amounts (MCA), introduced to allow France to overcome the 
consequences of the 1969 devaluation, became a normal feature of the 
Community. The use of MCAs to maintain unity of food prices within the 
Community led to distortions in favour of those countries with strong 
currencies.(37) EEC diplomacy, in the shape of the Lomé Convention, no
matter what its motives may be (aid to the Third World or securing cheap 
food), also posed a threat to many French farmers, particularly in the 
south. Similarly, the temporary exemptions accorded to the UK to allow 
it to continue to inport New Zealand produce led to increased British 
competition on European markets without a corresponding extension of the 
British market. In general, one can safely conclude, that for the 
majority of French farmers, the EEC has not lived up to its early 
promise.
In practice, twenty years of right-wing agricultural policy, whatever 
its stated objectives, has encouraged the development of capitalist 
agriculture. The uneconomic farms, as defined in the 1960s, have been 
more or less eliminated. But in the process of capital accumulation (or 
economic growth), farmers cannot stand still. They must constantly 
increase their capital investment and, where possible, extend the size 
of their farm. As a result, the viable miminimum has been constantly 
rising. Those who considered themselves to be medium-scale farmers in 
the 1960s are the small producers of the 1970s and 1980s.(38) The 
consequence has been that a very much smaller number of farmers than the 
number which believed in the advantages of modernization have been able 
to pass definitively into the modern profitable and stable sector. The 
majority continued to linger in a no—mans—land between stability and 
bankruptcy.
7*t
75
5. CLASS DIFFERENTIATION
These economic developments have brought about serious changes in the 
social structure of agricultural communities. The myth of "peasant 
unity" has obscured the fact that these changes are perhaps less drastic 
than one might have expected. The unity myth reposed on another - the 
homogeneity of the agricultural community. Yet historical accounts show 
that complex class structures existed in farming communities,and to an 
even greater extent, in rural society. In his study of the Var, Agulhon 
identified landowners, large tenant farmers, small tenant farmers, small 
owner-occupiers, sharecroppers and labourers, all graded in a complex 
hierarchy.(39) Weber has also pointed out the existence of signs of 
class conflict in the nineteenth century, such as the sentiments 
revealed by the popular Lauragais proverb - "It's raining insolence". 
Summer rain helped the small farmer's corn and damaged the large 
farmer's wheat, which inspired and permitted the insults of the 
small-scale producers directed against their richer neighbours.(40)
The real transformation brought about by the modernization of 
agriculture in the post-war period was not so much that of the class 
structure itself but of the position of the individual in that 
structure. Modernization brought rigidity in its train. Upward social 
mobility became much more problematic and outward geographical mobility 
increased. Before agriculture began to require heavy capital 
investment, farmers could reasonably hope that, through hard work and 
restriction of consumption, they would be able to improve their status 
by acquiring more and more land as their careers progressed. (41) 
Similarly, the agricultural labourer could hope to acquire a farm of his 
own at some stage. But when it became necessary to make heavy
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investments on top of the purchase of land, it became increasingly 
difficult for the small farmer to improve his situation. For the 
labourer, his prospects of upward mobility became virtually negligible, 
except by leaving for the towns, which most did.
On the other hand, before the advent of capital-intensive farming, the 
members of agricultural communities could be reasonably sure that they 
had a place in that community, barring major natural or economic 
disasters, for as long as they wished to remain. But the decline of the 
agricultural labour force throughout the 1940s and 1950s demonstrated 
that this was no longer the case. One no longer had the choice of 
keeping to one's station in life, one had to move out into the towns.
The exodus and concentration of land were the clearest signs of 
inequality and class differentiation. The threat of a forced departure 
from agriculture remained a permanent sign of distinction between the 
large and small-scale farmer. The transition from property owner to 
proletarian marked an increasing degree of inequality.
To what extent has economic development brought about inequalities 
between those remaining in agriculture? This is a very difficult 
subject to analyze for two reasons. In the first place, the available 
statistics on agricultural income are unsatisfactory until the 1960s. 
Secondly, Ministry of Agriculture and INSEE statisticians have not 
shown themselves, in general, to be particularly interested in the 
collection of data which reveals the class structure of agriculture. In 
fact, both agricultural economists and rural sociologists in general 
have neglected this question. Tavernier and his colleagues in Histoire 
de la France Rurale are exceptional in drawing so much attention to
inequality in agriculture. The evidence which they present suggests
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thdt income inequality is extensive. For example, they provicie figures 
for the period 1969-1973 concerning the proportion of farmers in various 
income brackets. There was some fluctuation, as one would expect with 
agricultural incomes, but in each year between two—thirds and 
four-fifths of farmers earned less than twice the minimum legal wage. 
Within this group, the majority earned less than the legal minimum. At 
the same time, the number of farmers earning three times the legal 
minimum or over remained less than six per cent (except for the boom 
year of 1972) (42). They carry on to analyze other indicators of income 
and wealth such as housing, consumer durables, holidays, etc. In every 
case the evidence reveals great inequalities. For example, the children 
of operators of large farms are four times more likely to acquire the 
baccalaureat than the offspring of small-scale farmers.(43)
However, no evidence is presented which demonstrates increasing 
inequality over time. But it is likely that certain forms of inequality 
are much more visible than others (e.g. between the mein with a Mercedes 
eind his neighbour with a patched-up 2CV) and hence lead farmers to a 
subjective appreciation that inequality has increased. Furthermore, the 
conclusion drawn by Tavernier and his fellow authors supports the 
argument that the class structure has become more rigid:
En somme, l'énorme effort de transformation technique accompli 
depuis trente ans a juste permis aux agriculteurs, qui ont pu 
rester à la terre, de conserver leur place relative dans une 
économie et une société en évolution constante.(44)
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6. AGRICULTURAL UNIONISM
The economic and social context in which MODEF was created and has grown 
has been described above. It should be clear that the creation of MODEF 
in 1959 was not simply a voluntaristic attempt on the part of the PCF to 
set up a satellite organization in the countryside, as the more paranoid 
right-wing commentators have argued.(45) As the MODEF leader, Raymond 
Mineau, put it: "Le MODEF n'est pas sorti comme ga du cerveau de 
Jupiter."(46) One must examine both the historical tradition from which 
MODEF emerged and the economic, political, and sociological changes 
which agriculture has undergone since the War.
An interest in agricultural problems was one of the more original 
features of the labour movement which began its reconstruction in the 
1880s. After the defeat and massacre of the Paris Commune by a largely 
peasant army, the importance of winning over or neutralizing the 
peasantry could not be ignored - even by the most schematic Guesdist.
As early as 1884, the Federation des Travailleurs Socialistes de France 
(FTSF) adopted an agricultural policy based on primitive Marxism. This 
was opposed by a Guesdist policy which allied revolutionary rhetoric to 
reformist proposals, which was promptly condemned by Engels as as an 
excessive concession to peasant conservatism. (47) Though the early 
socialist movement scored some political successes in rural areas, their 
efforts to set up agricultural unions to compete with the 
aristocratic-conservative and bourgeois-radical ones were ineffective. 
Peasant protest movements continued to be limited in time, such as the 
1907 revolt in Southern France, or in space, as in the battles in the 
Adour Basin of the 1920s.
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Only in the 1920s did the non-radical Left succeed in implanting its 
satellite organizations in the countryside. The Section Française de 
l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO)-dominated Conseil National Paysan 
(CNP) competed with the PCF-dominated Confederation Générale des Paysans 
Travailleurs (CGPT). In practice, both remained of limited importance. 
The former effectively existed in only twenty-two departments (seventeen 
south of the Loire and three in Brittany) whilst the latter was 
represented in a similar number of departments, though with slightly 
more influence north of the Loire.(48)
The CGPT has been regarded as the forerunner of MODEF. As one party 
historian argues: "Le MODEF reprenait, en l'actualisant, la tradition 
mais aussi l'expérience acquise de la Confederation Générale des Paysans 
Travailleurs."(49) This view is confirmed by the fact that MODEF 
explicitly refers to the CGPT as one of its ancestors.(50) Much of the 
leadership of the two organizations came from the same political 
background. Both organizations agitated around similar themes. The 
resemblance between the CGPT "Charte Revendicative" of 1939 and the 
MODEF Declaration of 1959 is striking.(51) The need to increase 
agricultural prices is the common principal concern. Both documents 
emphasize the idea of preferential treatment for small and medium-scale 
farmers as well as the need to control imports, from the colonies in the 
case of the CGPT and from the EEC in the case of MODEF. Similarly, both 
organizations protest against the rising cost of industrial goods 
required by fanners and against taxes placed on the consumption of 
agricultural produce, especially wine. Finally, both condemn the rural 
exodus and stress the need for economic organizations under the control 
of farmers themselves in order to defend their material interests.
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However, unlike the CGPT, MODEF has succeeded in extending its audience 
beyond the activists and the electorate of the PCF. The lessons of the 
tslative failure of the CGPT were learnt to a large extent. Tavernier 
gives three reasons for this failure.(52) In the first place, union and 
party were too closely linked. Leading members of the CGPT also 
occupied important positions in the PCF apparatus and were even elected 
as PCF MPs. This was the case of Waldeck Rochet, Renaud Jean (elected 
in the Lot-et-Garonne and President of the Chamber of Deputies 
Agricultural Committee under the Popular Front) and Marius Vazeilles 
(elected in the Corrèze). This excessive politicization of the union 
limited its ability to appeal to farmers on purely professional grounds. 
As will be seen in Chapter 7, MODEF has been much more discreet.(53)
Secondly, the CGPT failed to recruit and train enough farmers to assume 
the tasks of organization. To a certain extent it had to rely on 
non-farmers, whose presence could not fail to arouse the suspicions of a 
still relatively autarchic (in political and sociological terms) 
peasantry. This weakness was all the more serious since Renaud Jean 
fought a never-ending battle to overcome the apathy of both the PCF 
leadership and rank and file concerning agriculture. This latter problem 
is one which remains unsolved.(54) However, it is mistaken to look at 
the problem in this way. The failure of the CGPT was not simply one of 
incorrect political approaches. The fact is that farmer activists were 
just not to be found. Given the conditions which allowed conservative 
elites to maintain their hold over the mass of the peasantry, no amount 
of cleverness would have allowed the CGPT to achieve more than the 
limited success that it did obtain. To the extent that MODEF has 
overcome this difficulty, the reason lies more in the changes in 
agriculture since 1945 than in its own efforts.
The final reason put forward by Tavernier to explain the failure of the 
CGPT is its inability to compete with the right-wing unions in providing 
services to fanners (e.g. bulk purchasing of fertilizers and feedstuff 
at reduced prices, legal advice, etc.), services which were, and remain, 
one of the major attractions of agricultural unionism. In the inter-war 
period both the clerical right-wing Union Centrale des Syndicats des 
Agriculteurs de France, "le syndicalisme des ducs", and its radical 
rival, the Federation Nationale de la Mutalité et de la Cooperation 
Agricole, concentrated on the service role. The priorities of these 
organizations were the provision of cheap goods to farmers through bulk 
buying, a limited amount of technical education and, last and least, a 
circumspect engagement in political lobbying.(55) Indeed as well as the 
CGPT the less radical attempts at self-organization on the part of 
farmers came to grief on this point. Both the Breton 'syndicats des 
cultivateurs-cultivants' led by Sillonist priests and the Entente 
Paysanne perished through financial as well as political weaknesses.(56) 
This inability, or unwillingness, to fulfil the service role has also 
been one of the greatest weaknesses of MODEF.
The service role depended on the existence of people able and willing to 
take on complex and time-consuming tasks. These were mainly non-farming 
members of the rural community. The CGPT remained an activist 
organization whose members rarely attained the kind of notoriety which 
placed them on an equal level with the non-farming rural elites. To the 
extent that MODEF has succeeded, this has largely been due to the 
ability of its leaders to break through this barrier. Before 1945, there 
were several factors preventing the emergence of such farmer notables.
The ideology of "l'unité paysanne" blocked the emergence of class-based 
ideologies. This ideology promoted the belief that the agricultural
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sector was not simply part of the economy but an entirely separate 
society. Internal conflicts between the members of this society were 
only family quarrels which should not be allowed to obscure the fact 
that the outside world, particularly in the shape of the industrial 
working class, was the real enemy. Those members of the elites, 
particularly amongst the Catholic aristocracy, who were aware of the 
effective stratification which existed in rural society made conscious 
and determined efforts to prevent differences in social status turning 
into political conflict. In 1913, one of the leading Catholic 
ideologists, Clermont-Tonnerre, stressed the need for the larger farmers 
and proprietors to involve themselves in professional organizations, 
even if it brought them no material benefit.
L'association professionnelle est un devoir pour les riches, qui 
pouvaient sans doute se passer de son concours, mais qui demeurent 
moralement obligés de mettre tous les biens qu'ils détiennent au 
service de leurs frères, les pauvres.(57)
This ideology and the physical presence of the elites in agricultural 
organizations was sufficient to maintain the mass of farmers in their 
place. Suzanne Berger's account of the domination of the Landerneau 
co-operative by the Catholic aristocrat, Hervé de Guébriant, provides a 
classic example of this process of elite control. (58) In general this 
system of domination remained effective until World War Two - though, as 
the existence of the CGPT shows, the cracks were beginning to show.
The end of this myth and the development of agricultural unionism 
divided by class rather than by religion was finally accomplished by the 
post-war economic miracle. Nevertheless, social and economic
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transformation was merely a necessary rather than a sufficient condition 
for the creation of farm unions controlled by the farmers themselves.
The establishment of an organization such as MODEF, which rejected the 
dominance of agricultural as well as rural elites, was only possible 
because the elites were already in a position of weakness. This 
breakdown of hegemony was due to the strategic failures of the rural 
elites faced with economic crisis in the 1930s and modernization in the 
1940s and 1950s. The 1930s economic depression disrupted the traditional 
political division of labour between radicals and reactionaries and 
their relations with their respective clienteles. The competitive 
consensus between the Catholic Right and Radical Centre born with the 
"ralliement" of the late nineteenth century and consecrated with the 
"Union Sacree" of 1914 broke down. This competitive consensus was based 
on am implicit agreement to compete for political dominance in Paris and 
in the provinces but within certain pareimeters. Both sides were agreed 
on the essentials of opposition to social reform, the defence of 
property, acceptance of the form of regime and the continued 
subordination of the peasantry. The issue at stake was simply who was 
to control the peasamtry.
But in the 1930s this consensus was abandoned by the Right. The Right 
adopted unprecedented forms of action. Faced with world crisis, the 
agricultural presence in Parliament was no protection. Direct action 
and Dorgeres took the place of Parliament and Poincare. But since there 
was no serious competition for the support of the peasantry from the 
Left, the reason behind the mobilization of the peasantry can only tie 
seen as a way of intimidating the industrial working class rather than 
as a necessity forced upon the elites to maintain their troops in
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o r d e r .(59)
The irony is that those who made the greatest efforts in the 1930s to 
preserve the rural monolith were those who did most damage to their own 
cause. The radical agrarian stance of the Right did more to undermine 
the idea of peasant unity than the strenuous but more or less 
ineffective efforts of left-wing propagandists. The activities of 
Dorgeres and other agrarians violated the principle of partial political 
integration of the peasantry upon which rested elite domination. By 
mobilizing the peasantry for mass action they brought the farmers into 
politics. More or less violent demonstrations and various 
otherunconventional activities led farmers to both think and organize 
for themselves. In the words of Tavernier: "Les meetings, les 
manifestations, les opérations de commando surviennent de révélateur à 
beaucoup de paysans qui prennent alors conscience qu’ils constituent une 
force sociale. (60) For the farmers, the confrontation with the Republic 
revealed that agriculture was divided by political interests which might 
override immediate financial concerns. Similarly, the elites realized 
that their political dominance and economic interests were not 
necessarily mutually compatible. As in the Second Republic, some came 
to the conclusion that the only way to protect the latter was to 
surrender the former to a dictator. In the absence of a home-grown 
product, Hitler had to be imported.
The decline of the traditional rural elites was completed under the 
Vichyite Corporation Paysanne. Despite the dominant position held in 
the Corporation by the pre-war agrarians, they failed in their 
objectives. The presence of such leaders resulted in little benefit for 
the mass of farmers. The Corporation Paysanne proved more a means of 
controlling farmers than a system of over-representing farmers in 
political and economic decision-making.(61) Whilst the elites were
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being discredited by collaboration, many ex-Dorgerist storm troopers 
were becoming the rank and file of the Resistance, following in Dorgeres 
own footsteps. The Resistance and Liberation completed the political 
training of sufficient numbers of farmers to permit the total exclusion 
of non-farming elites from the new agricultural organizations. These 
men formed the backbone of the Confederation Générale de l'Agriculture 
(CGA) and its dominant constituent part, the FNSEA.
In this way the FNSEA came under left-wing control, a control as 
fleeting as the the governmental alliance which promoted it. Once the 
initial enthusiasm of the Liberation had worn off, it became apparent 
that, contrary to left-wing mythology, the Resistance was not synonymous 
with the Left. Activists whose sympathies lay with de Gaulle rather 
than with his temporary allies had also undergone their political 
training during the occupation. At the same time, as popular anger 
against the collaborators dissipated, the ex-Vichyites gradually began 
to emerge from obscurity. With the split in the Left after 1947, the 
unholy alliance of Gaullists and Vichyites was able to regain control of 
the apparatus of agricultural organization.(62) Whilst all sections of 
the Left were purged from positions of responsibility within the FNSEA, 
the Cold War provided the impetus for the expulsion of the 
PCF-controlled Federations. One after another, the Federations of the 
Haute-Garonne, Ariège, Charente, Tarn-et-Garonne, Haute-Loire, Lozère, 
Landes and Haute-Pyrénées followed each other into the wilderness 
between 1950 and 1952.(63)
The marginal position of the Left within the reconstructed FNSEA was not 
an accurate reflection of the political composition of agriculture, as 
the decline in membership in left-wing regions revealed. The connection 
between the FNSEA and the Agrarians in Parliament meant that the FNSEA 
leadership was to the right of its membership. The Left was now too 
strong to be completely ignored. At the same time, the nature of 
political control in agriculture had changed from a system based on 
the ascriptive pre-eminence of rural non-farming elites to one based on 
the functional leadership of the activist members of the farming 
community. Given this system where explicit consent and demonstration of 
competence became vital, artificial unanimity and the use of 
administrative methods to deal with political undesirables could not be 
pursued forever.
Reaction was not long in coming. In September 1953, the Comité de 
Guerêt met for the first time.(64) Eighteen Federations in and around 
the Massif Central and Poitou-Charentes met to organize protests over 
the catastrophic situation on meat markets. Faced with such a 
widespread display of disaffection, even the right-wing national 
leadership of the FNSEA was obliged to embarrass its friends in 
government by verbally supporting the protests. On October 12, road 
blocks went up in fourteeen departments - paralyzing most of Central 
France. This mass protest, directed against both the government and the 
leadership of the FNSEA is regarded as the beginning of the modern 
farmers movement. According to Gratton: "En 1953, le mythe de l'unité 
paysanne a vécu."(65)
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Although 12 October 1953 represents a landmark in agricultural politics, 
there was as yet no alternative organization to the FNSEA. Despite the 
fact that the preconditions for the eventual creation of MODEF now 
existed, it was to take another six years before the new organization 
was born. There were two reasons for this failure. In the first place, 
"the owl of Minerva only spreads its wings with the coming of the dusk.” 
Despite the fact that small and medium-scale farmers were now acting as 
if they had rejected the idea of unity with capitalist agriculture, they 
were not yet aware of the implications of the Comité de Guerêt protests. 
For example, one of the future leaders of MODEF, Marcel Sintas, stood on 
a joint list with FNSEA candidates for election to the Landes Chamber of 
Agriculture throughout the 1950s.(66)
Secondly, the opposition to the right-wing leadership of the FNSEA was 
itself extremely divided between socialists and communists. The attempt 
by Philippe Lamour (general secretary of the CGA) and Roland Viel 
(leading light in the Comité de Guerêt) to set up the Comité Générale 
d'Action Paysanne (CGAP) in December 1953 foundered on the rocks of the 
Cold War. This committee, designed to coordinate the actions of the 
dissident and expelled Federations, was thought of as a faction within 
the FNSEA rather than as an alternative union.(67) This attempt failed 
because of political and personal conflicts. The hostility between the 
SFIO and the PCF, together with the wheeler-dealer reputation of Lamour, 
led the PCF's agricultural activists to keep their distance.(68)
However, the impetus of the Comité de Guerêt protests, especially since 
they succeeded in forcing the government to take action to regulate meat 
markets, tended towards the creation of some kind of focus for the 
opposition. In 1955, the Comité Nationale de Défense de l'Exploitation
Familial was set up. Described as "une ébauche du MODEF", this 
organization brought together the men who were to lead MODEF from its 
foundation until 1978, Alfred Nègre and Raymond Mineau. Its programme 
became the basis of MODEF's proposals. Working in obscurity for four 
years it prepared the way and built up the contacts which permitted the 
creation of MODEF in 1959.(69)
But why did a tendency crystallize into an organization at this 
particular time? This can largely be explained by the political 
situation in 1959. Indexation of agricultural prices had been abolished 
by the Debré government without any serious opposition from the FNSEA. 
Furthermore, the official leadership of the FNSEA was being challenged 
by dissidents whose views represented an even greater threat to small 
farmers than the FNSEA itself - the apostles of modernization of the 
CNJA. At the same time, the wider political situation was conducive to 
such a step since the degeneration of Guy Mollet and the SFIO majority 
had left a residue of dissident socialists prepared to work with 
communists. Finally, the example of Poujadism posed both a threat and 
an opportunity. Tavernier argues that the creation of MODEF was 
inspired by PCF fears that the discontent of farmers would be exploited 
by the extreme Right, if they were not pre-empted.(70) Since 350,000 
fanners are estimated to have voted for Poujadist candidates in the 1956 
elections, this argument is plausible.(71) The problem with such a view 
is that it begs the question, why wait so long before attempting to 
pre-empt Poujade, who had all the time in the world to pre-empt MODEF? 
Though it is true that PCF activists were involved with Poujade, this 
collaboration had come to an end in mid—1955. In fact the evidence 
would suggest that,rather than inspiring the creation of MODEF, the 
Poujadist movement hindered it. Only when the bankruptcy of Poujadism
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had become apparent was there hope of involving farmers in organizations 
which were more integrated into party political networks. Tavernier's 
article implies that MODEF represents a form of left-wing Poujadism, 
something which will be seen to be clearly untrue in the following 
chapters. This is not to deny the influence of Poujadism on the 
founders of MODEF. Poujade's major achievement was to prove that 
hitherto disorganized and apathetic groups could be mobilized without 
state patronage and could be attracted to an anti-capitalist platform. 
These were the material and ideological cornerstones on which MODEF was 
to be built.
Finally, the role of the PCF in the creation of MODEF must be examined.
The right-wing allegation that MODEF was the pure product of Waldeck 
Rochet's imagination and Stalinist discipline can be discounted. As we 
have seen, an organization along the lines of MODEF had been in 
gestation for several years and would probably have eventually come into 
being without the intervention of the PCF. Tavernier’s conclusion, that 
MODEF resulted from a PCF initiative is correct, in so far as it goes, 
but he does not deal with the background which made such a step a 
possible. (72) Nor does he deal with the way in which the party operated 
in the creation of MODEF.
Tello, on the other hand, correct in his emphasis on the concrete 
conditions which gave rise to MODEF, goes to the opposite extreme. He 
denies that the PCF played any role whatsoever in the creation of MODEF.
He points out that out of the forty delegates who attended the founding 
conference, only ten were PCF members. These were vastly outnumbered by 
members of the SFIO and non-aligned individuals.(73) Apart from Tello's 
evidence, an examination of La Terre also suggests that the party's
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involvement in MODEF was low-key. For example, there was no reference 
to MODEF at all in La Terre before the founding conference. Only a 
week later did an easily overlooked article appear asking organizations 
to join MODEF. The following week MODEF received more prominent 
coverage but it was not until July 1959 that MODEF hit the headlines 
(which it shared with the Comité de Guerêt).(74) One cannot accuse the 
PCF of an all-out mobilization on behalf of MODEF.
This is not to argue that the creation of MODEF had nothing at all to do 
with the PCF. Tello poses the question: "Pourquoi, en avril 1959, le 
MODEF a-t-il été crée? Pour être la courroie de transmission du Parti 
Communiste dans les campagnes ou bien pour répondre à un besoin profond 
de la petite et moyenne paysannerie? His conclusion is untenable.
C'est avant tout pour combler le vide syndical existant face à une 
politique liquidatrice de l'exploitation familial.(75) Disciplined 
party activists would not have taken such an important step without the 
approval of the party leadership. Furthermore, MODEF was helped by the 
fact that its backers and activists could rely on party connections to 
build up a network of contacts in various departments in the early years 
of its existence. For example, Jean-Baptiste Doumeng was a member of 
the first National Council of MODEF and, though his active participation 
was limited, his business contacts were used to good effect. For 
example, the Vaucluse Federation of MODEF was launched by officials of 
the local co-operative in Pernes-les-Fontaines with whom Doumeng had 
dealings and whom he encouraged to set up MODEF in the department.(76) 
There is no doubt that PCF members played an important, though not 
exclusive, role in the creation of MODEF.
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Tello's argument has wide ranging implications. It is one more example 
of the PCF's constant tendency towards self-denigration - denying its 
involvement in various activities. Denying that the PCF had anything to 
do with the creation of MODEF involves an implicit acceptance of the 
idea that there is something wrong with the party. Tello is, in fact, 
accepting the right-wing view that the involvement of the PCF makes an 
organization disreputable per se. Furthermore, he devalues the role of 
the political party. If the party did not play any role in the creation 
of MODEF, its usefulness is limited to echoing the demands of MODEF.
This is not only factually incorrect but involves a conception of 
union-party relations which nothing in the theory or practice of the 
PCF justifies. Fortunately for the party, not all its activsts are so 
inhibited.
7. MODEF since 1959
The founding conference of MODEF in April 1959 involved forty delegates 
from twenty departments meeting in a room in Toulouse. At the 1982 
Conference, 350 delegates from seventy-seven departments filled 
Montreuil town hall in the suburbs of Paris.(77) Given the fact tha. 
MODEF had come this far without financial assitance from central 
government, very limited support from local government, and indeed had 
to overcome the hostility of successive governments, MODEF's success was 
remarkable. Not only had it continued to maintain a hand-to-mouth 
existence, it had become more and more organized in an ever-increasing 
number of departments. From inauspicious beginnings MODEF had become an 
established and officially recognized organization. How this was done 
will be dealt with in the succeeding chapters. Before this, however, the
growth of support for MODEF must be described. There are two ways in 
which this can be done - in terms of membership or in terms of success 
in the Chamber of Agriculture elections. But there are too many 
practical and theoretical problems to permit the number of members to be 
used as an indicator of MODEF success.
In the first place, the concept of membership is, in this context, 
extremely nebulous. MODEF has not overly concerned itself with formal 
distinctions between paid-up members and sympthathizers (except for 
financial reasons), preferring rather to influence end mobilize farmers. 
The intensification of the working day makes greater and greater demands 
on the time of farmers, so fewer and fewer are available for activities 
off the farm. The constant appeals in L'Exploitant Familial for the 
return of membership registration forms and subscriptions suggest that 
the activists themselves have not been particularly motivated by the 
concern of signing up members. Action is more important than membership 
forms in their eyes. The problem is to mobilize rather than to organize 
farmers.(78)
This tendency is reinforced by the nature of union and professional 
organization generally in France. Just as the industrial unions have 
been described as "syndicats d'animation" as opposed to "syndicats de 
masse", MODEF is essentially an organization of militants who seek to 
mobilize the unorganized.(79) Furthermore, total membership as an 
indicator of influence is misleading, particularly since the 
agricultural population is in constant decline. Two potential 
situations may arise. A rise in membership may mask a decline in 
influence. For example, in a period of intense polarization, some 
sympathizers could be drawn into the organization whilst even more are
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discouraged by the activities of the organization. More importantly, a 
fall in membership may hide an extension of influence. As more people 
have left agriculture, MODEF membership has declined in absolute 
terms.(80) At the same time, its percentage of the vote in professional 
elections increased until the 1979 elections. This is why MODEF itself 
judges its success in terms of electoral strength rather than 
recruitment figures. Given the imbalance between its resources and those 
of the FNSEA, and the costs which activism therefore imposes on the 
militants in terms of time and money, it believes that it is more valid 
for it to be judged in terms of popular support rather than 
organizational strength.
Finally, there is the practical difficulty of evaluating the accuracy of 
claims put forward by MODEF. Indeed given the attitude of the militants 
described above, the MODEF leadership has almost as much difficulty as 
anyone else in compiling figuers. Tavernier fails to make any estimate 
whilst Tello's figure of 200,000 in 1979 is either a gross exaggeration 
(since MODEF claimed 75,000 in 1980) or a gross miscalculation.(81)
There is a plausible explanation for such a miscalculation. Tello has 
been guilty of double counting. MODEF is not simply a confederation of 
departmental Federations but also of specialized organizations for 
particular groups of farmers, e.g. young farmers, cereals producers, the 
Comité de Défense de la Viticulture Charentaise covering the cognac 
producers of the Charente-Maritime, etc. Therefore members may have 
double or indeed multiple membership. Such a mistake could account for 
this enormous over-estimate.
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MODEF's own claim of 75,000 members in 1980 is, of course, difficult to 
assess. However, it seems plausible. Given the low degree of 
participation in most voluntary organizations, such a figure is 
reasonable. This would represent six per cent of the 1.25 million 
farmers identified in the 1980 agricultural census. In a department 
such as the Charente with an unusually strong MODEF Federation and where 
a highly competitive situation exists between MODEF and the FNSEA 
Federation, agricultural officialdom estimates that twenty per cent of 
the farmers are paid-up members of MODEF with a similar number belonging 
to the FNSEA.(82) Therefore, one can reasonably assume that the degree 
of unionization is much lower in more normal departments. Furthermore, 
since MODEF won around twenty-five per cent of the vote in professional 
elections in the 1970s, six per cent does not seem an excessive 
membership claim - approximately one member to every four voters. 
However, an examination of the Chamber of Agriculture results will 
prove more rewarding them indulgence in a sterile and ultimately 
unverifiable investigation of membership figures.
Unfortunately, the professional election results themselves involve a 
practical problem. In theory, election results provide a precise and 
simple way of measuring the rise of MODEF. But in this case, the 
Ministry of Agriculture and the Assemblée Permanente des Presidents des 
Chambres d'Agriculture (APPCA) have extended the idea of the secret 
ballot to mean that the results should also be kept secret. Since the 
national results remain classified information, one has to rely on MODEF 
statistics. This is obviously not ideal but it remains the only 
possibility. Even if it was possible to visit every department, the 
cavalier attitude of most Chambers of Agriculture to old documents means 
that the results have often disappeared to the local rubbish dump rather
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than to the Archives Departmentales. However, the MODEF figures are 
indirectly confirmed by the FNSEA-imposed blackout on the official 
returns - since publication would undermine their claim to the monopoly 
of fanning representation. Where the possibility of checking MODEF 
figures with official electoral returns existed, as in the Charente , no 
significant divergences have been noted. The following outline of 
MODEF's electoral fortunes is therefore derived from the work of 
Tavernier and Tello as well as from L'Exploitant Familial.
Before examining the results of these elections, it is necessary to make 
a few preliminary remarks. Each department was divided into a certain 
number of constituencies, depending on the size of, and the number of 
farmers in, the department. For instance,there were six constituencies 
in the Charente - Angoulême-Nord, Angoulême-Sud, Barbezieux, Cognac, 
Confolens and Ruffec. The Vaucluse, by contrast, had only four - Apt, 
Avignon, Carpentras and Orange. These constituencies cut across 
Parliamentary constituency boundaries and corresponded roughly to the 
pre-1914 arrondissements. Each constituency elected four 
representatives. Candidates had to present themselves in slates of 
four. Farmers, their wives and relatives over eighteen years of age 
working on the farm, provided they were French or EEC citizens, had the 
right to vote. During the 1964-1979 period each voter had four votes, 
cast for individual candidates rather than slates. In general, there was 
not usually more than a thirty to fifty-vote gap between the most and 
the least popular candidate on each slate. To secure election, a 
relative majority was sufficient provided twenty-five per cent of the 
electorate turned out. The four candidates with the highest number of 
votes were elected. In closely fought elections, the gap between 
candidates on the same slate could mean that candidates from different
slates were elected, which explains the cases below where MODEF won less 
than four seats in a constituency.
In the majority of constituencies where MODEF contested elections, it 
was a simply a straight fight between MODEF and the FNSEA. Therefore, 
the FNSEA vote was what remained after the MODEF vote was substracted.
The FNSEA majority in terms of votes has always been much less than its 
overwhelming majority in terms of seats. In certain constituencies, 
particularly in Normandy and the Loire Valley since 1970, MODEF found 
itself in three-cornered contests with FNSEA and the Federation 
Française de l'Agriculture (FFA). These constituencies have been 
identified below where necessary. Appendix A gives the results in map 
form.
Finally, given the fact that results have been published in percentage 
rather than absolute terms for each constituency,it is impossible to 
calculate averages for each department due to variations in constituency 
size and turnout. Given the constituency-based nature of the elections 
and the importance of personal leadership, such constituency figures are 
more revealing of the pattern of MODEF support. It should therefore be 
remembered that references to departments where MODEF has been 
successful refer to the performance of individual constituency slates, 
not to that of the Federation as a whole.
Tables 2:4 to 2:9 give details of MODEF's electoral performance over 
the period 1964-1979.
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TABLE 2:4 MODEF PERFORMANCE CHAMBER OF AGRICULTURE RESULTS 1964
No.of Lists No.of Departments Seats %Votes
with MODEF Lists AllDepartments
71 21 38 4.2
Seats Won
4 Dax, Mont-de-Marsan I, Mont-de-Marsan II, St.
Sever (Landes). Angoulême-Nord,Barbezieux,
Ruffec (Cha rente)
3 Blois (Loir-et-Cher)
2 Orange (Vaucluse). La Châtre (Indre)
1 Cognac (Charente). St Jean d'Angély, Marennes
(Charente-Maritime)
Seats won in alliance with other groups 
4 Langon, Libourne (Gironde). Lavaur (Tarn)
Departments with at least one MODEF list scoring 30% or more
Ain, Bouches-du-Rhône, Charente, 
Charente-Maritime, Corrèze, Finistère, Indre, 
Landes, Loir-et-Cher, Tarn, Vaucluse, Vienne, 
Yonne.
Source: L'Exploitant Familial February 1964, F.Tello, 'Données sur 
l'Origine et l'Implantation du MODEF', Cahiers de l'Institut Maurice 
Thorez 28 (1978) 39-80 p.76
Though several of its leaders were old campaigners, 1964 was the first 
occasion upon which MODEF contested Chanber of Agriculture elections as 
an organization. Much to its surprise, MODEF was relatively successful, 
holding twenty-nine seats which its leaders had previously won and 
gaining a further nine. In alliance with other dissidents, another 
twelve seats in three constituencies were gained. This distinction is 
necessary since it is impossible to gauge the extent of MODEF support 
when it contested elections in such alliances. It is not clear which 
organization the electorate supported. Furthermore, there is also the 
problem of distinguishing MODEF candidates in joint slates since they 
may also have been members of the other organization in the alliance.(83)
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The most significant aspect of this election was the concentration of 
MODEF successes in the south-west and in the Rhone Valley. Of the 
departments in which at least one MODEF list obtained thirty per cent of 
the vote, only three were north of the Loire. This, however, 
corresponded to the distribution of MODEF organization since only two 
other northern federations (Aube and Nord) were able to present 
candidates at all.
Table 2:5 shows the progress made by 1967. The 1967 elections marked a 
significant step forward for MODEF. Unlike 1964 when all the seats were 
up for election,only half the seats were renewable in 1967. Because of 
the reduced number of lists, MODEF was able to make an impact in a wider 
range of departments.
TABLE 2:5 MODEF PERFORMANCE CHAMBER OF AGRICULTURE RESULTS 1967
No.of Lists No.of Departments Seats % Vote All 
With MODEF Lists Departments
63 38 24 13.1
Seats won
4 St Jean d'Angély (Charente-Maritime). La Châtre
(Indre). Dax (Landes). Bagnères-de-Bigorre 
(Haute-Pyrénées). Orange (Vaucluse). Montmorillon 
(Vienne).
Seats won in alliance with other groups
4 Sisteron (Alpes de Haute Provence). Lavaur (Tarn).
Langon (Gironde)
Departments with at least one MODEF list scoring 25% or more
Ain, Ardèche, Aude, Aveyron, Bouches-du-Rhône, Charente, 
Charente-Maritime, Cher, Corrèze, Côtes-du-Nord,
Finistère, Gard, Gironde, Ile-et-Vilaine, Indre, 
Indre-et-Loire, Isère, Jura, Landes, Loir-et-Cher,
Morbihan, Nièvre, Orne, Pyrénées-Atlantique, Haute 
Pyrénées, Tarn, Vaucluse, Vienne,Yonne.
Source: Tello. op cit p.76. Y.Tavernier 'Le MODEF',Revue Française de 
Science PolitiqueT 18 (1968) 542-563 p. 547
Looking at the most successful campaigns, the imbalance between the 
south-west anf the south-east was corrected to some extent by advances 
in the Provence-CÔte d'Azur region and in the Alpine departments. Even 
more promising for MODEF was its successes north of the Loire, 
particularly in Brittany, and the confirmation of the 1964 showing in 
departments such as the Yonne and the Loir-et-Cher.(84)
Table 2:6 demonstrates the continued progression of MODEF support. The 
1970 elections showed that MODEF had established itself as a permanent 
opposition to the FNSEA. In the sixty-four departments where it 
presented candidates, it achieved a total of 32.8 per cent of the votes 
cast. Once again the south-west was revealed as the dominant area in the 
MODEF electorate. From the Indre to the Landes and from the 
Pyrénées-Orientales to the Loire-Atlantique stretched a continous band 
of territory where MODEF had performed extremely well. But the 
south-western base was fortified by the knowledge that MODEF had made 
great strides in Brittany, Normandy, Pays de la Loire and in the 
peripheral western and southern departments of the Paris basin.
Similarly, of the ten departments of the Loire valley where MODEF 
presented candidates ( the only exception being the Allier), MODEF lists 
obtained more than thirty per cent of the vote in eight. From the 
Loire-Atlantique to the Nièvre MODEF had a chain of relatively 
successful slates. Only in the north-east (with the exception of the 
Vosges) did MODEF fail to make an impact.
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No.of Lists No.of Departments Seats % Vote All 
With MODEF Lists Departments
126 64 35 21
TABLE 2:6 MODEF PERFORMANCE CHAMBER OF AGRICULTURE RESULTS 1970
Seats won
4 Arles II (Bouches-du-Rhône). Angoulême-Nord,
Barbezieux, Ruffec (Charente). Guingamp 
(Côtes-du-Nord). Mont-de-Marsan I, St.Sever 
(Landes) St. Calais (Sarthe).
2 Les Andelys (Eure).
1 Corte (Corsica).
Seats won in alliance in alliance with other groups
4 Castellane, Digne (Alpes de Haute Provence).
Gap (Haute Alpes).
Departments with at least one MODEF list scoring 30% or more
Ain, Ardèche, Aveyron, Bouches-du-Rhône, Cantal, Charente, 
Charente-Maritime, Cher, Corrèze, Corsica, Côte d'Or, 
Côtes-du-Nord, Drôme, Eure, Finistère, Gers, Gironde, 
Hérault, Indre, Indre-et-Loire, Loiret, Loir-et-Cher, 
Maine-et-Loire, Manche, Nièvre, Pyrénées-Orientales, 
Saône-et-Loire, Sarthe, Savoie, Tarn, Tarn-et-Garonne, 
Vaucluse, Vienne, Vendée, Vosges, Yonne.
Source: L'Exploitant Familial May 1970. Y.Tavernier Le MODEF in 
Tavernier et al l'Univers Politique des Paysans dans la France- 
Contemporaine. p. 477
Table 2:7 deals with MODEF's performance in 1974.
101
TABLE 2:7 MODEF PERFORMANCE CHAMBER OF AGRICULTURE RESULTS 1974
No.of Lists No.of Departments 
With MODEF Lists
Seats % Vote All 
Departments
135 65 26 23
Seats won
4 Nyons (Drôme). La Châtre (Indre) Dax (Landes)
Chateau-Chinon (Nievre). Apt, Orange 
(Vaucluse).
1 Brignolles (Var). Montmorillon (Var)
Seats won in alliance with other groups
4 Barcellonette, Fourcalquier (Alpes de Haute
Provence). Carcassonne, Limoux (Aude). Brive 
(Correze). Bastia, Corte (Corsica). Alès 
(Gard).
Departments with at least one MODEF list scoring 30% or more
Ain, Ardèche, Aube, Aveyron, Bouches-du-Rhône, Charente, 
Charente-Maritime, Cher, Corrèze, 7ôtes-du-Nord, Drôme,
Eure, Eure-et-Loire, Finistère, Gard, Gers, Gironde, 
Ile-et-Vilaine, Indre, Landes, Loir-et-Cher, Loiret, Haute 
Loire, Lot, Lozère, Maine-et-Loire, Nièvre, 
Pyrénées-Orientales, Saône-et-Loire, Haute-Saône, Sarthe, 
Savoie, Haute Savoie, Deux Sèvres, Tarn, Tarn-et-Garonne, 
Var, Vaucluse, Vienne, Yonne.
SourcerL'Exploitant Familial March 1974, Tello. op cit p.76.
The 1974 election confirmed that MODEF's success in 1970 was not a 
freak. Once again in the departments where it presented candidates, it 
secured thirty per cent of the vote. Given the fact that in 
approximately half the departments where it did not present candidates 
it did not do so because the local FNSEA Federation shared MODEF's 
policies, it would appear that between a third and a quarter of farmers 
endorsed the MODEF platform. (85) The south-west yet again accounted for 
a large part of the MODEF vote. Once more the west outweighed the east. 
North-east of the Loire only Burgundy offered any hospitality to MODEF 
though a freak result gave it forty per cent of the vote in the
Haute-Saone constituency of Lure. Similarly in the south-east, Provence 
Cdte d'Azur remained MODEF's main source of strength. Like the Midi 
itself, it appeared that MODEF stopped at Montelimar.
Nevertheless, the result presented some worrying signs for MODEF.
Though its position in Britanny was confirmed, MODEF suffered serious 
setbacks in Normandy, Pays de la Loire and in the Loire valley itself, 
largely thanks to the presence of a new right-wing opposition, the 
Federation Frangaise de l'Agriculture (FFA). (Its role vis-a-vis MODEF 
is analyzed in detail in Chapter 6).
Table 2:8 shows the pattern of MODEF support in the 1976 elections. 
Overall, MODEF secured twenty-seven per cent of the votes cast in the 
departments in which it presented candidates.
TABLE 2:8 MODEF PERFORMANCE CHAMBER OF AGRICULTURE RESULTS 1976
No.of Lists No.of Departments Seats % Vote All 
With MODEF Lists Departments
140 71 21 24
Seats won
4 Angoulême-Nord, Barbezieux (Charente) Gap 
(Haute Alpes). St.Sever (Landes) Gourdon (Lot)
1 Montauban (Tarn-et-Garonne)
Seats won in alliance
4 Castellane, Digne, Sisteron (Alpes de Haute 
Provence). Carcassonne, Narbonne (Aude).
Departments with at least one MODEF list scoring 30% or more 
Haute Alpes,Ardèche, Charente, Charente-Maritime, Cher, 
Corrèze, Côtes-du-Nord, Drôme, Eure-et-Loir, Finistère.
Gard, Gers, Gironde, Hérault, Landes, Loir-et-Cher, 
Haute-Loire, Lot, Nièvre, Haute-Saône, Sarthe, Savoie,
Tarn, Tarn-et-Garonne, Vaucluse, vienne, Yonne
Source: L'Exploitant Familial February 1976
This increase in MODEF's percentage of the total vote cast in the entire 
country resulted mainly from presenting more lists rather than from 
increased support in constituencies which it had previously contested. 
This is shown clearly by the fact that the slates reaching the thirty 
per cent barrier were more concentrated in the southern half of the 
country than in the elections of 1970 and 1974. Only in eight 
departments north of the Loire did MODEF reach this level compared to 
nineteeen departments to the south. These elections also confirmed the 
FFA threat, particularly in the Loire valley where MODEF's early 
successes could no longer be repeated.
Finally, Table 2:9 shows the relative setback suffered by MODEF in 1979. 
For the first time MODEF failed to progress. Largely as a result of the 
political repercussions of the end of the Union of the Left, MODEF's 
vote fell by four per cent. The most dramatic manifestation of the 
defeat occurred in the Vaucluse where MODEF, having had a constant 
presence since 1964 and a near overall majority in 1974, was totally 
eliminated from the Chamber of Agriculture. However, despite the 
overall setback, there were more lists in the thirty per cent-plus 
bracket than in 1976. Brittany and Burgundy maintained their place as 
MODEF's bridgeheads in the north although a good result was obtained for 
the first time in the Pas-de-Calais at Arras. The south-west once again 
retained its pre-eminence with Provence-Côte d'Azur as the south-eastern 
base. Finally, it appears that certain Federations which seemed to be 
in decline were given a new lease of life by sectarian politics - e.g. 
the Rhône and Haute-Pyrénées.
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No.of Lists No.of Departments Seats % Vote All 
With MODEF Lists Departments
140 68 12 20
TABLE 2:9 MODEF PERFORMANCE CHAMBER OF AGRICULTURE RESULTS 1979
Seats won
4 Nyons (Drôme). Dax (Landes) Chateau-Chinon
(Nievre).
Seats won in alliance with other groups 
4 Limoux (Aude). Sète (Hérault).
Departments with at least one MODEF list scoring 30% or more
Ain, Alpes de Haute Provence, Ardèche, Aude, 
Bouches-du-Rhône, Charente, Charente-Maritime, Corrèze, 
CÔtes-du-Nord, Drôme, Eure-et-Loir, Finistère, Gers,
Gironde, Hérault, Ile-et-Vilaine, Indre, Landes, Loire,
Lot, Lozère, Pas-de-Calais, Haute-Pyrénées, Nièvre, Rhône, 
Saône-et-Loire, Savoie, Tarn, Tarn-et-Garonne, Var,
Vaucluse, Yonne.
Source;L'Exploitant Familial February 1979
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8. CONCLUSION
Some trends in MODEF's electoral fortunes can be identified. Its 
electorate is characterized by the co-existence of a hard core and a 
highly unstable body of supporters. The extent of hard core support has 
been measured by isolating the departments in which MODEF slates have 
obtained thirty per cent of the vote in every election since 1970. The 
thirty per cent figure has been chosen since this has been the average 
level of support in the departments contested by MODEF during the 
1970-1979 period. 1970 has been chosen as the base date since virtually 
all the MODEF Federations had been created and were in a position to 
present candidates by that date.
MODEF's hard core has been located in the south-west (Poitou-Charentes, 
Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées) and to a lesser extent in Provence Côte 
d'Azur, Brittany and Burgundy. Seventeen departments have been 
identified in this category - Ardèche, Charente, Charente-Maritime, 
Côtes-du-Nord, Drôme, Eure-et-Loir, Finistère, Gers, Gironde, Landes, 
Lot, Nièvre, Savoie, Tarn, Tarn-et-Garonne, Vaucluse and Yonne. Even 
when one adds the nine departments in which MODEF passed the thirty per 
cent barrier on three occasions out of four (Ain, Bouches-du-Rhône,
Cher, Hérault, Loir-et-Cher, Loiret, Saône-et-Loire, Haute-Savoie and 
Vienne), it is clear that MODEF has never quite transcended its original 
geographical limitations. Such a view is reinforced by the fact that 
the three most electorally successful Federations all date from the 
earliest days of the organization, the Landes and Charente Federations 
being founder members whilst that of the Vaucluse was established in 
1960. Similarly, of the top seventeen Federations identified above, 
MODEF was sufficiently well organized in eleven of them to be able to 
contest the 1964 elections.
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These twenty-six departments, nevertheless, only account for about half 
the fifty-one departments where one or more MODEF lists have obtained 
thirty per cent of the vote in at least one election. Outside the core 
areas, MODEF success has tended to be fleeting. This instability 
becomes even more apparent when one considers the difficulties which 
MODEF has experienced in holding the seats which it has won. In its own 
right MODEF has won a total of 156 seats in twenty-five constituencies 
in nineteen departments since 1964. With its allies, it has won 104 
seats in eighteen constituencies in ten departments. In fact over the 
period 1964-1979, MODEF only held four constituencies on a permanent 
basis - Angoulême-Nord, Barbezieux, Dax and St.Sever. Even with the 
addition of the constituencies in which it won seats at least twice (St. 
Jean d'Angély, Mont-de-Marsan, Orange, La Châtre, Nyons, Chateau-Chinon 
and Montmorillon), there were only eleven constituencies upon which 
MODEF managed to maintain more than a fleeting grip. This is less than 
half the number of constituencies in which it won seats. As for the 
eighteen constituencies where seats were won in alliance with other 
groups, only seven were won more than once. (Alès, Castellane, Digne, 
Langon, Lavaur, Limoux and Sisteron)
The reasons for this electoral volatility will emerge in each of the 
following chapters. Chapter 3 deals with the bases of support for MODEF 
with reference to detailed case studies of the Charente and the 
Vaucluse. Apart from the factors isolated in Chapters 1 and 2 the 
importance of the rivalry between the local leaderships of MODEF and the 
FNSEA is examined. This is followed by Chapter 4 in which MODEF's 
organizational weakness and the lack of institutionalization within the 
organization is considered. As a consequence MODEF depends more on the 
loyalty of its activists and the personal loyalty of supporters to the
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activists rather than on material incentives to retain its electoral 
strength. Similarly Chapter 5 is an analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of MODEF's ideology and the implications of the ideology for 
the operation of MODEF.
The final three chapters are concerned with the external factors 
governing MODEF influence. In Chapter 6, MODEF's conflict with the 
FNSEA, and with other groups such as the FFA, and its limited role 
within the agri-complex are considered. Chapter 7 is a study of the 
relationship of MODEF to the party system and the impact of political 
parties on MODEF. In particular, the connection between the setback of 
1979 and the end of the Union of the Left is made. Finally, Chapter 8 
deals with MODEF and the state with particular reference to the state's 
inhibiting effect on the growth of MODEF.
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CHAPTER 3 COMPARATIVE MICRO-POLITICS: TWO CASE STUDIES
1. Introduction
This chapter is concerned with the effects of agricultural modernization 
upon the departments of the Charente and the Vaucluse. After shoving 
the similarities and contrasts between the two departments and the 
extent to which national developments have been reflected in these 
departments, a more concrete picture of the factors which provide MODEF 
with its raison d'être will emerge.
The next step is to take the micro-political analysis one step further 
and look at the variations within each department. The economic, 
sociological and political variations between and within the two 
departments are examined in order to explain variations in MODEF 
strength. Particular attention is paid to the role of the PCF. Once 
this has been done, it becomes possible to assess whether MODEF exists 
because farmers in very different parts of the country face similar 
problems or whether MODEF is simply a flag of convenience for disparate 
groups and grievances.
There are several reasons for the choice of the Charente and the 
Vaucluse as the subjects of this in-depth study. In the first place, 
any study conducted with limited resources makes the choice of the 
Charente inevitable since the national headquarters of MODEF are located 
in Angoulême. This permitted the analysis of the national organization 
to proceed in tandem with a departmental study. Secondly, both 
departments concerned are amongst those with the largest Federations, 
thus permitting the collection of a wider range of information whilst 
avoiding the danger of concentrating on the largest and completely
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untypical Federation, that of the Landes.
There are also a series of reasons for this choice which are related to 
the degree of difference between and within the departments. Not only 
do both departments differ from each other in terms of the type of 
agriculture practised but there are substantial variations within each 
one. The Charente, in particular, is a microcosm of French agriculture, 
containing vineyards, cereal farming, dairy farming, cattle raising and 
polycultural farming. Furthermore, the Vaucluse and the Charente have 
very different political traditions. The Charente's centre-right 
tradition of accommodation with the occupants of central government 
provides a clear contrast with the leftism of the Vaucluse and its acute 
inter-left rivalry. Finally, the MODEF Federations differ in that the 
Charente Federation was one of the FNSEA Federations expelled in the 
1950s whilst the Vaucluse Federation was constructed from scratch by 
dissidents who broke away from the FDSEA in 1960.
One other methodological issue must be settled at the outset. It has 
become standard practice to preface sub-national studies with a dispute 
about the unit of analysis, i.e. departments, traditional regions, 
cantons, communes, etc.(l) Although a supporter of the departmentalist 
approach, Judt has warned against its dangers:
The organization of historical evidence of all kinds into 
departmental categories can easily lead to a departmental 
reading of the local experience which may ignore or even distract 
from more 'real' or 'natural' parameters.(2)
This is the basis on which this chapter proceeds. Rather than quarrel 
about the ideal unit, the unit of analysis must depend on the subject of 
analysis. Three types of real parameters are employed. Chamber of 
Agriculture constituencies are used in the analysis of the distribution 
of MODEF support whilst agricultural economies are examined from the 
perspective of the officially delimited agricultural regions. Political 
considerations are dealt with by Parliamentary constituency. 
Sub-divisions such as the commune and canton are utilized where 
necessary to refine the analysis.
2. AGRICULTURAL MODERNIZATION IN THE CHARENTE AND THE VAUCLUSE
As in the rest of France, the farmers of the Charente and the Vaucluse 
have been faced with the triple pressures of the state, agro-industry 
and the EEC. These pressures, as elsewhere in the country, have led to 
greater investment and mechanization combined with reductions in the 
labour force and intensification of labour for those who remain on the 
land.
In the Charente, the peak period of mechanization was the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, a period which coincides with the formative years of MODEF. 
Between 1955 and 1970, the number of tractors employed for agricultural 
purposes in the department increased from approximately 7,500 to 19,538. 
Similarly, between 1963 and 1970, the number of combine harvesters in 
use in the department increased from 910 to 1812. Though the pace of 
modernization slackened in the 1970s, it still continued as witnessed by 
the rise in the number of tractors to 22,894 by 1979 and by the 
introduction of the grape harvesting machine, of which 120 were to be 
found in use in 1979.(3)
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Parallel developments took place in the Vaucluse. The number of 
tractors in use rose from 6,050 in 1955 to 14,140 by 1970. Progress was 
less rapid in the 1970s as the figure rose slightly to 16,984 by 1979. 
Investment in fixed capital also rose dramatically in this period.
Whilst cold stores and greenhouses were almost unknown in 1955, there 
was a storage capacity of 160,000 cubic metres by 1970, rising to
235,000 by 1979. Italian competition provided the impetus for the rapid 
spread of the use of greenhouses in the 1970s, the acreage under cover 
rising from thirty-three hectares to 311 hectares between 1970 and 
1980.(4)
The number of tractors provides the most convenient indicator for 
comparison betweeen the two departments and the national average. The 
percentage increase in the period 1955-1979 for France as a whole is 
4952 . The figure for the Charente is 2052 whilst that for the Vaucluse 
is 1812. It is clear, therefore, that neither of these departments has 
been amongst those most drastically transformed by mechanization.
If we turn our attention to the other side of the coin, there is a 
difference between the two departments. The level of debt in French 
agriculture has, as we have seen, increased dramatically, particularly 
since the late 1960s. In the Poitou-Charentes region, Credit Agricole 
lending to farmers increased from 2,729 million francs in 1969 to 13,623 
million in 1979, an annual increase of 17.4 per cent. This made the 
region the fifth most indebted in the country. By contrast, Provence 
CSte d'Azur, in which the Vaucluse is situated, was at the other end of 
the scale. From 3,441 million francs in 1969, Credit Agricole lending 
to farmers increased to 11,162 million in 1979, an annual increase of 
only twelve per cent.(5)
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Along with mechanization and borrowing came the need to rationalize the 
labour force. Table 3:1 details the changes which have taken place. In 
both departments, the decline in the agricultural population has been 
below the national average. However, whilst the decline in the active 
agricultural population has been extremely small in the Vaucluse, the 
decline in the Charente has reflected the national trend. On the other 
hand, the decline in the number of farmers and family members working on 
the farm has been relatively similar in each department. The two 
departments are both remarkable by their relatively heavy use of full 
and part-time labour (explainable partly by the requirements of the 
grape harvest). This suggests that the two departments have not been as 
drastically transformed by the modernization of agriculture as other 
less favoured departments.
Rationalization of the labour force has been accompanied by 
rationalization of farm structure. Concentration has taken place as 
fewer farms compete for the extra land necessary to their mechanized 
operations profitable. In the Charente, approximately 11,500 farms have 
disappeared since 1955, the majority (8,000) disappearing between 1955 
and 1970.(6) Between 1955 and 1979, more than half the farms under ten 
hectares disappeared or were enlarged. The number of farms between ten 
and twenty hectares has fallen by two-thirds whilst the number of farms 
over fifty hectares has tripled between 1955 and 1979. Given the fact 
that the total area of land in agricultural use has remained more or 
less stable, the average size of farm therefore increased from fifteen 
hectares in 1955 to twenty hectares in 1970 and to twenty-five hectares 
in 1980.(7) Furthermore, though more than half of Charentais farms 
cover less than twenty hectares, they only occupy seventeen per cent of 
agricultural land whilst the twelve per cent of farms over fifty 
hectares occupy thirty-seven per cent of the land.(8) These
developments have made the average size of farm in the Charente slightly 
above the national average of 23.4 hectares but the rate of change has 
been average. In this respect, the Charente is not remarkable.
There are difficulties in trying to compare the degree of concentration 
in different departments because of differences in types of agriculture.
The highly intensive nature of agriculture in the Vaucluse means that 
the average size of farm, as well as the size of the large farm, is much 
smaller than in the Charente. Nevertheless, similar changes are 
apparent in Vaucluse agriculture. During the period 1955-1979, 6,100 
farms disappeared, 2,900 between 1955 and 1970 and the remainder during 
the 1970s. The main victim of this process has been the operator of the 
farm with less than ten hectares, particularly those in the five to ten 
hectare category. The decline in the number of farms between ten and 
twenty hectares has been less rapid whilst the principal beneficiaries 
of concentration have been those farming between twenty and fifty 
hectares. However, because of the decline in available agricultural 
land, the average size of farm only increased from 9.6 hectares in 1955 
to eleven hectares in 1979. Though the 13.5 per cent of farms of more 
than twenty hectares occupy forty-seven per cent of agricultural alnd, 
the pace of concentration in the Vaucluse has been far below the 
national average.(9) Tables 3:2 and Tables 3:3 show the progression of 
concentration since 1955.
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TABLE 3:2 CONCENTRATION IN THE CHARENTE 1955-1979
YEAR 1955 1970 1979
FARM SIZE NUMBER OF FARMS IN EACH CATEGORY
Less than 10 ha 11,739 6,816 5,243
1 0 - 2 0  ha 8,926 4,857 3,099
20-50 ha 6 ,2 2 0 6,555 5,763
50-100 ha 587 1,205 1,724
1 0 0 - 2 0 0  ha 59 126 219
More than 200 ha 9 17 27
Source: Recensement 
Charente
General de 1'Agriculture 1979-1980: La
TABLE 3:3 CONCENTRATION IN THE VAUCLUSE 1955-1979
YEAR 1955 1970 1979
FARM SIZE NUMBER OF FARMS IN EACH CATEGORY
Less than 1 ha 1,015 1,257 1,096
1 - 2  ha 1,762 1,588 1,393
2-5 ha 5,160 3,517 2,743
5-10 5,208 3,823 2,887
1 0 - 2 0 3,328 3,282 2,991
20-35 ha {
{1,241
1,119 1,218
35-50 ha { 232 285
More than 50 ha 2 20 233 254
Recensement General de l'Agriculture 1979-1980: Le Vaucluse
Perhaps the greatest contrast of all between the two departments is the 
income difference. In the Charente the goal of parity with urban 
incomes has remained as illusory and as obtainable as it has proved in 
the rest of France. In the Vaucluse, the position has been much more 
favorable. Two comparisons need to be made. On the one hand, there is 
the problem of regional variations in agricultural incomes. On the 
other hand, the question of the relationship between agricultural and 
non-agricultural incomes within specific regions. In both cases, the 
farmers of the Vaucluse have occupied a much more comfortable position 
than their colleagues in the Charente.
T A B L E 3:4 AGRICULTURAL INCOMES CHARENTE AND VAUCLUSE 1970-1978
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YEAR CHARENTE
(Francs)
CHARENTE AS 
OF FRANCE
X VAUCLUSE 
(Francs)
VAUCLUSE AS X 
FRANCE
1970 16,248 91.3 44,642 150.7
1971 19,718 98.0 43,571 156.0
1972 18,538 75.2 41,589 168.7
1973 28,667 1 0 2 . 6 33,872 168.4
1974 29,476 1 0 1 . 1 41,386 142.0
1975 24,921 77.9 39,343 123.0
1976 34,279 100.5 44,081 127.1
1977 26,771 70.2 70,679 187.3
1978 25,965 63.0 65,834 160.8
Source: Les Disparités de Revenus en Agriculture, SCEES, No. 22,1 9 7 9
H 7
Table 3:4 provides details of comparative agricultural incomes. As has 
already been pointed out in Chapter 2, such figures should be regarded 
with a certain degree of suspicion. This is particularly so in the case 
of the Charente since fluctuations in cognac stocks are assumed to be 
reflected in farm incomes which is not true in practice. Nevertheless, 
the figures provide a reasonable guide to fluctuations in income and to 
regional variations. It would therefore appear that Charente farmers 
have normally received an income which has varied from substantially 
below the national average to about average. The department is 
therefore one which is relatively underprivileged but which has not 
suffered from the more extreme deprivation experienced in the 
neighbouring departments of the Massif Central. The Vaucluse, on the 
other hand, has been one of the most successful departments in the 
entire country.
A similar contrast is visible between the two departments when one 
considers the relationship between agricultural and industrial incomes. 
In the Poitou-Charentes region, the industrial wage index rose from 100 
in January 1974 to 200.7 in December 1978. Over the same period, the 
RBE index for the Charente fell from 100 to 88.1. In monetary terms, in 
1978 the regional average wage in light engineering, which predominates 
in Angouleme, amounted to 33,352 francs. This compared favourably with 
the average farm income of 25,965 francs.(10)
The average Vaucluse farmer was in a much more favorable position. Over 
the same period, the Provence Cote d'Azur regional industrial wage index 
rose by 62.5 points whereas the RBE index rose by fifty-nine.
Furthermore, the 65,834 francs average farm income compared extremely 
favorably with the 39,852 francs of the average food processing industry
worker and even with the 65,472 francs of the average power worker. 
Nevertheless, this optimistic picture should be tempered by the 
knowledge of the insecurity of income revealed by Table 3:4.(11)
These divergences show that reductionism is of limited value. Though the 
Charente and the Vaucluse have undergone similar social and economic 
changes, the pace of change and the ratio between costs and benfits of 
change has been very different. In order to understand how MODEF has 
been able to attract similar levels of support in such different 
departments, the micro-analysis must be taken much further. A detailed 
analysis of the agricultural economies and the political sub-systems of 
each of the two departments with particular emphasis on the contrasts 
within each department is required.
3. THE CHARENTE
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The Charente is a department of 5,596 square kilometres, divided into 
four main agricultural regions, six Chamber of Agriculture 
constituencies, three Parliamentary constituencies and thirty-three 
cantons.
Before proceeding any further, it is necessary to illustrate the pattern 
of MODEF support. The following series of maps (Maps 3:1 to 3:4) show 
the communes in which MODEF secured a majority in the Chamber of 
Agriculture elections held between 1964 and 1979.
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Map 3:1 deals with the election of 1964 in which all the seats in the 
department were up for election. MODEF secured an average of fifty per 
cent over the six constituencies with results ranging from forty-five 
per cent in Angouleme-Sud to sixty-five per cent in Angouleme-Nord. In 
terms of seats, this success gave MODEF victory in the constituencies of 
Angouleme-Nord, Barbezieux and Ruffec. As this map shows, MODEF's 
strongholds were the cantons of Rouillac, St.Amant de Boixe, La 
Rochefoucauld and Montbron. It also achieved a reasonable degree of 
support in Brossac, Baignes, Jarnac, Chabanais, Villefagnan and Ruffec.
Map 3:2 demonstrates MODEF's performance in the 1967 and 1970 elections. 
The three seats contested in 1967 were those in which it had been at its 
weakest in 1964 whilst those contested in 1970 were those it had won in 
1964. In 1967, MODEF obtained forty-one per cent of the votes cast with 
a high of forty-three per cent in Confolens and with a low of 
thirty-seven per cent in Cognac. No seats were won. MODEF's main areas 
of support in this election were the cantons of Jarnac, Chabanais and to 
a lesser extent Confolens-Sud.
In the three more favorable constituencies contested in 1970, MODEF 
secured a total of fifty-one per cent of the vote and retained its 
seats. This success was heavily dependent on the support of the farmers 
of Rouillac, St. Amant de Boixe, Villefagnan, Ruffec, Baignes, Brossac 
and Aubeterre.
Map 3:3 depicts the results of the elections held in 1974 and 1976. In 
the 1974 election, MODEF obtained thirty-eight per cent of the vote with 
forty-five per cent in Confolens, twenty-eight per cent in Cognac and 
forty per cent in Angouleme-Sud. The major contributions to the MODEF 
total came from the cantons of Chabanais, Confolens-Sud and La
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Rochefoucauld.
In 1976 MODEF managed to hold eight of its twelve seats but lost those 
it had previously held in the Ruffec constituency. The decline in MODEF 
support in Villefagnan and Ruffec was accompanied by less spectacular 
declines in Aigre and Mansle. In the other constituencies MODEF was 
forced into an even heavier reliance on strongholds such as Rouillac, 
Baignes and Brossac. In all MODEF obtained forty-six per cent of the 
votes cast with a peak of fifty-two per cent in Angouleme-Nord and 
forty-three per cent in both the other constituencies. (The presence of 
a third slate presented by the FFA permitted MODEF to hold the 
Barbezieux seats despite the lack of an absolute majority).
Map 3:4 once again demonstrates a further increase in the concentration 
of the MODEF vote. Cantons such as La Rochefoucauld and Chabanais 
became more and more essential to MODEF. These two cantons accounted 
for a quarter of the communes with MODEF majorities in 1979. They also 
contributed seventeen per cent of the total MODEF vote in the three 
constituencies. Overall MODEF obtained forty per cent of the vote with 
forty-four per cent in Confolens, forty-one per cent in Angouleme-Sud 
and thirty-five per cent in Cognac.
Finally, Map 3:5 shows the communes which have given a majority of their 
votes to MODEF on every possible occasion. As this map shows, the 
traditional bastions of MODEF support are Brossac, Baignes and Rouillac. 
These have been closely followed by La Rochefoucauld, Chabanais and St. 
Amant de Boixe.(12) On the other hand, MODEF attracted a very limited 
degree of support in cantons such as Blanzac, Champagne Mouton and above 
all Segonzac.
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Such contrasts in the electoral geography of MODEF reflect the different 
types of agricultural economy and of political organization which exist, 
and which have existed, within the department. After these differences 
have been examined, the pattern of clusters and dispersion witnessed by 
Map 3;5 will be shown to have a rational rather than a random basis.
4. AGRICULTURAL REGIONS AND AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY
ft
There are four main agricultural regions in the Charente. The Cognacais 
is, of course, dominated by the production of cognac whilst the 
Angoumois-Ruffecois is largely devoted to cereal farming. The 
Confolentais is a beef, lamb and pork-producing region whilst the 
Montmorelien farmers engage in polycultural farming but in which dairy 
farming is the major activity.(13)
Each of these forms of agriculture has specific problems related to the 
nature of the production process, the level of demand and organization 
in each market. For example, the importance of the difference between 
an organized market in private hands, an organized market dominated by 
co-operatives and a disorganized market in private hands will become 
apparent in the next few pages.
A) THE COGNAC INDUSTRY Despite the extent of technological innovation 
on the farm, the transformation of the grape harvest into cognac has 
remained virtually unchanged for several centuries. Once the grapes 
have been pressed the wine is distilled by the farmer himself or by one 
of the small distilleries to be found in the region.(14) The method of
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distillation, perfected in the sixteenth century, requires seven litres 
of wine for one bottle of cognac, intense labour for approximately a 
week every year and the use of skills which are usually inherited rather 
than acquired. The resulting product is poured into large barrels of 
Limousin oak where it is allowed to mature for anything between two and 
a half and ten years depending on the quality required.(15)
The complex and long-term nature of the production process helps to 
explain the dominant position of the cognac merchants such as Hennessey 
and Martell within the industry. Although production can be carried out 
on a small scale, the ageing process requires heavy investment. The 
inadequate financial resources of most farmers limit the extent to which 
they can age their own cognac in order to reap the financial benefits 
which accrue from the ageing process. Furthermore, the control which the 
merchants exercize over the stocks allows them to produce higher quality 
cognac since the best produce is normally a blend of cognacs from the 
various "crus". Given that quality has been the main aspect of the 
product's market appeal, the scope for individual and co-operative 
enterprise in marketing has been limited. The fact that the cognac 
market has been traditionally an export rather than a domestic one has 
cemented the dominance of the merchants.
Until recent years the international marketing strategy has been 
combined with an insular firm structure. Until the 1960s and 1970s 
cognac firms were family businesses conducted on paternalistic lines. 
Indeed the smaller firms still tend to operate in this way. Since then 
the larger firms have expanded into other areas either through 
marketing agreements or mergers. For example, Martell is linked to 
Champagne Mercier and markets Benedictine, Sandeman Port, Black and
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Vhite Whisky, etc. Hennessey have similar connections with Moet-Chandon 
and Teachers. The Jarnac firm of Bisquit has been taken over by the 
Ricard empire whilst on a smaller scale Remy Martin and Cointreau have 
joined forces for marketing purposes.(16)
With stagnation in the cognac market since 1973, competition between 
these firms has become much more ferocious. Those most prepared for 
ruthless competition have been able to outstrip their rivals and 
increase their share of the market. The most successful firms in this 
respect have been Remy Martin and Martell.(17)
Apart from a more aggressive marketing strategy the way chosen to 
maintain profitability has been an effort to squeeze the suppliers of 
the raw material. This has been done in two ways. On the one hand, 
there has been an effort to place the burden of the ageing process on 
the farmer by cutting back on purchases of new cognac and thereby 
reducing the level of stocks herd by the firms. On the other hand, the 
merchants have placed constant pressure on the Bureau National 
Interprofessionnel du Cognac (BNIC) to relax its regulation of the 
market. There has been overt pressure on the BNIC to liberalize 
purchasing regulations in order to allow firms to exercize greater 
freedom of choice in purchasing from different "crus". This was 
designed to allow them to purchase as much of the top quality Grande et 
Petite Champagne "crus" as they wished and to reduce their obligation to 
absorb the products of the other "crus" to the absolute minimum required 
for blending. Less honestly, there have been widespread violations 
(allegedly by the smaller firms rather than by the household names) of 
the price levels and payment periods laid down by the BNIC.
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Yet another policy adopted by the merchants has been an attempt to bring 
about vertical integration in the industry by acquiring their own 
vineyards. This has only taken place to a limited extent for two 
reasons. In the first place, the context of the cognac crisis meant 
that vertical integration, an effective way of increasing control in a 
period of expansion, was no longer profitable. The crisis meant that 
the interests of the merchants were best served by entering the 
production and ageing cycle as late as possible. Secondly, the hostility 
of farmers threatened the peace of the region. For instance, in 1976, 
one of the cognac firms was accused of exceeding planting quotas on its 
estates. The popular impact of a MODEF commando raid to uproot the 
offending vines provided a clear indication of the dangers of the 
vertical integration policy.
As in many other sectors of agriculture, the dominant position of 
private capital has led to attempts to defend the interests of farmers 
through the establishment of co-operatives. But the conditions which 
created the subordination of the farmer apply just as much to 
co-operatives. The traditional skills of the "maitre de chais", the 
heavy capital investment involved, the entrenched positions of long 
established firms in a largely international market are severe obstacles 
to co-operative as well as individual venture. Given the hostility of 
the merchants to the co-operatives their role has remained limited. In 
1978 they accounted for a mere eleven per cent of production and barely 
six per cent of sales.(18) In fact most of these sales were made to the 
merchants rather than to consumers. In effect, the co-operatives have 
acted as production and storage co-operatives rather than as rivals to
the merchants.
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Cognac producers have faced further difficulties stemming from national 
and EEC policy, both in terms of taxation and agricultural policy. The 
ideology of "quality" and the luxury good image given to cognac by its 
publicists played into the hands of successive governments. Cognac has 
therefore been used as a source of government revenue through the 
imposition of heavy duties. By 1980, 43.7 per cent of the retail price 
of a bottle of three star cognac was composed of VAT and excise duty.(19)
Although the EEC proved beneficial by providing a wider market, the 
traditional markets continued to absorb the vast majority of sales.
Since the traditional markets consisted of the UK and the US, the EEC 
cannot be said to be responsible for the expansion in sales.
Furthermore, the major growth markets in the 1970s were located in the 
Far East, particularly Japan and Hong Kong. In reality, the EEC has 
proved more of a threat than an opportunity for the cognac industry.
For example, in 1980 the European Court of Justice ruled that 
discriminatory taxation of imported alcoholic beverages, such as whisky, 
was illegal. The Barre government responded by increasing taxes on 
cognac and reducing customs duty on whisky in the 1981 Budget, a Budget 
which provoked a storm of protest in the region.(2 0 )
The effects of such developments are shown by the decline in the number 
of farmers in the region by thirty-eight per cent over the period 
1955-1980. The 1970s alone showed a 13.5 per cent dimunition in the 
number of farmers.(21) As these departures took place, they were 
accompanied by concentration. Table 3:5 gives details of the extent of 
concentration in all four regions of the Charente. In the absence of 
statistics on income levels within the department, a crude measure of 
the financial impact of the cognac crisis has to be employed. Graph
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TABLE 3:5 CONCENTRATION BY AGRICULTURAL REGION: CHARENTE 1955-1970 
REGION FARM SIZE
0-20 ha 20-50 ha 50+
No. of farms as X of total)
C0GNACAIS
1955
1970
75
61
2 2
33
3
6
C0NF0LENTAIS
1955 7 19 A
1970 62 30 8
ANGOUMOIS-RUFFECOIS
1955 76 23 1
1970 60 32 8
MONTMORE LIEN
1955 72 26 2
1970 52 AO 8
Source: Recensement General de l'Agriculture 1955: 
Caractéristiques Generaux des Exploitations, 
Recensement General de l'Agriculture 1970: Fascicules 
Départementaux.
TABLE 3:5a CONCENTRATION IN THE CHARENTE 1980
REGION FARM SIZE
0 - 1 0 ha 10-30 ha 30-50 ha 50+ ha
(No. of farms as X of total)
COGNACAIS 31 A3 17 9
CONFOLENTAIS 33 AO 26 1 2
ANGOUMOIS-RUFFECOIS AO 27 18 15
MONTMORELIEN 26 38 19 IA
Recensement General de l'Agriculture 1979-1980: La Charente
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TABLE 3:5 CONCENTRATION BY AGRICULTURAL REGION: CHARENTE 1955-1970
REGION FARM SIZE
COGNACAIS
0 - 2 0  
No. i
ha 20-50 
of farms as
ha 50+
X of total)
1955 75 22 3
1970 61 33 6
CONFOLENTAIS
1955 7 19 4
1970 62 30 8
ANGOUMOIS-RUFFECOIS
1955 76 23 1
1970 60 32 8
MONTMORELIEN
1955 72 26 2
1970 52 AO 8
Source: Recensement General de l'Agriculture 1955: 
Caractéristiques Generaux des Exploitations, 
Recensement General de l'Agriculture 1970: Fascicules 
Départementaux.
TABLE 3:5a CONCENTRATION IN THE CHARENTE 1980
REGION FARM SIZE
0 - 1 0 ha 10-30 ha 30-50 ha 50+ ha
(No. of farms as X of total)
COGNACAIS 31 43 17 9
CONFOLENTAIS 33 40 26 1 2
ANGOUMOIS-RUFFECOIS 40 27 18 15
MONTMORELIEN 26 38 19 14
Recensement General de l'Agriculture 1979-1980: La Charente
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3:1 shows the evolution of the share of final output by produce within 
the department over the period 1973-1978. Cognac has clearly suffered 
the most drastic change, its share falling from forty-nine per cent in 
1973 to twenty-eight per cent in 1977 with a limited recovery in 1978. 
Moreover, these developments have had uneven effects in different parts 
of the region. Certain areas have had much less severe difficulties 
than others. For example, the cantons of Chateauneuf and Segonzac, the 
two richest in the department, experienced a slower rate of exodus after 
the onset of the cognac cris than average and a substantially slower 
rate than one of the worst affected cantons, Hiersac. Production of 
cognac has become increasingly concentrated in the central zones of the 
official delimited cognac zone. Although most of the department is 
officially considered to be part of the zone (all except the 
Confolentais and the Ruffec area), cognac is no longer commercially 
produced east of the line Ruffec-Angouleme-Chalais. Within the 
Cognacais itself, production has become increasingly concentrated in the 
central "crus" of Grande and Petitie Champagne (covering the cantons of 
Segonzac, Chateauneuf and parts of Cognac-Sud and Barbezieux) and, to a 
lesser extent in the Borderies "cru" (covering the canton of 
Cognac-Nord). The real victims of the cognac crisis have been producers 
in the outlying Fin Bois "cru" whihc covers the cantons of Jarnac, 
Rouillac, Hiersac and part of Baignes. Since these cantons include the 
cantons in which MODEF has achieved some impact, it seems reasonable to 
argue that the economic difficulties, and the greater differentiation, 
of farmers provides relatively fertile soil for MODEF. However, the 
fact that this group includes a MODEF stronghold such as Rouillac and a 
canton such as Hiersac where MODEF influence has been much less 
extensive suggests that there is no automatic connection between such
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difficulties and support for MODEF. Finally, it would also appear that 
economic success is a strongly inhibiting factor on MODEF.
B) THE CONFOLENTAIS The Confolentais is at the opposite end of the 
spectrum to the Cognacais as it is the most impoverished part of the 
department. It is really a border region of Limousin, hence the 
alternative name by which it is known, "la Charente limousine". The 
poor, hilly land is covered by forests and farms raising cattle, pigs 
and sheep. Just as Segonzac in the Cognacais is synomous with success, 
the canton of Montemboeuf is a symbol of decline. By the end of the 
1970s, the population of this canton had fallen to twenty-four per 
square kilometre, just four above the number considered to be the 
minimum level of viability. Of the 620 farmers of the canton in 1980, 
twenty per cent were over sixty-five years of age, no rationalization of 
the parcellization of land had taken place, no machinery co-operatives 
had been established and barely thirty farmers had joined agricultural 
development associations. A mere ten per cent of farmers had lined up 
their successors, a number so low that the UDSEA and the CDJA organized 
a campaign to persuade farmers from other parts of the department to 
consider setting up in Montemboeuf.(2 2 ) This is the extreme case but it 
nevertheless shows the contrast which exists in the department as well 
as providing a potential indicator for the future of the rest of the 
Confolentais.
This state of affairs is largely a reflection of the problems with which 
the meat industry has been confronted. Markets have been among the 
least organized and producers have been subject to intense foreign 
competition since the EEC has refused to adopt a policy of 
self-sufficiency in meat in order to facilitate the disposal of 
surpluses of other products on international markets. For example, the
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shortage of pork in the early 1970s led to a major investment programme 
by French farmers but of which the results coincided with a dramatic 
increase in imports from as far afield as China. Similarly, British 
entry into the EEC with the associated exemptions for Commonwealth 
products brought about British competition on the European and domestic 
scene. This was, of course, directly the opposite of what government 
leaders and FNSEA officials had claimed in the early 1970s.
This competition emerged within the context of a more or less advanced 
degree of chaos in the organization of markets. The meat industry has 
been described as one in which "feudal structures" still prevail. (23) 
Though the desire to organize meat markets inspired the first great 
post-war farm revolt led by the Comité de Guerêt, the extent to which 
improvements were made remained limited. Even as late as 1972, it was 
still the case that attempts to ameliorate the situation through the 
development of co-operation had generally failed because co-operatives 
did not have "le poids suffisant pour combattre l'influence des 
intermédiares traditionnels que sont les grossistes-éxpediteurs avec 
leurs manditaires, les commissaires qui "régnent sur les lieux".(24)
In the 1970s a more favorable evolution (from the farmer's point of 
view) took place. The co-operatives came to account for fifty per cent 
of pork sales, thirty per cent of beef sales but only ten per cent of 
the veal market. The fact that the co-operatives achieved their 
greatest market share in the pork industry suggests that private firms 
were only too happy to allow someone else to take the risks of the 
chaotic market. Furthermore, the ability of the co-operatives to 
protect farm interests was limited by the fact of their effective 
dependence on the large private firms who remained responsible for 
purchasing meat on the large urban markets such as La Villette.
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At the same time, attempts to limit market anarchy also implied 
restriction of the freedom of the producer . In the 1960s and 1970s, 
tighter controls were established over the slaughtering of animals both 
in terms of hygiene and in terms of the numbers of licensed abbatoirs. 
Given the essential role of auto-consumption of produce in the 
Confolentais economy, this was an important consideration. In 1965, 
there were fifty-four public abbatoirs, three private ones and 300 
butchers in the Poitou-Charentes region where animals could be 
slaughtered in large numbers for the market or in small numbers for 
household consumption. In an attempt to promote greater centralization 
and therefore, hopefully, a greater degree of organization, the 
government introduced a closures plan in 1966. Under the terms of the 
plan, slaughtering was to be concentrated in a few large abbatoirs such 
as Bressuire and Parthenay in the Deux-Sevres with a limited number of 
medium-sized abattoirs in each department. For the farmers of the 
Confolentais, this meant that their options were limited to the 
slaughterhouses of Parthenay, Confolens, Ruffec and Montmorillon 
(Vienne). In practice the result has been a centralized rather than a 
local form of anarchy in which farmers have had to put up with the 
disadvantages of anarchy and centralization without the advantages which 
one or the other in isolation might have provided.(2 5 )
The Confolentais has therefore provided M0DEF with a higher level of 
support than the Cognacais. But the opportunity which the condition of 
Confolentais agriculture has afforded to M0DEF has also been accompanied 
by obstacles created by that same condition. One the one hand, 
insecurity and unrewarding investment has created a receptive audience 
for MODEF. On the other hand, the disorganized state of the industry 
and the low level of collective organization (of whatever description) 
has limited the extent to which MODEF has been able to capitalize on the
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opportunity. It is therefore no surprise that MODEF should have been 
more successful in the relatively dynamic canton of Chabanais than 
successful in atrophied and demoralized Montemboeuf.
C) THE ANGOUMOIS-RUFFECOIS This region is the one in which 
agricultural co-operation has been at its most advanced. By the late 
1970s seventy percent of the cereals produced in the department was 
marketed by co-operatives, of which two, the Co-operative Agricole de la 
Charente (CAC) and the Co-operative Céréalière de la Charente (CCC), 
accounted for fifty per cent.(26) As Graph 3:1 indicates, cereals 
production was the major growth area in the 1970s.
There has been a systematic increase in the acreage under cereals, 
particularly since 1970. Thanks to the influence of the AGPB within the 
FNSEA, cereals producers have benefitted most from EEC and national 
policy. Therefore cereals farmers have not suffered from the same 
degree of insecurity as other types of famrers. This can be seen by the 
fact that another 10,000 hectares in the Charente were given over to 
cereals during the 1970s.(27)
A closer analysis of the distribution of this extra acreage shows that 
problems remained. The specialist cereals farmers of the 
Angoumois-Ruffecois only accounted for twenty-four per cent of the 
increase. The substantial increases took place in polycultural cantons 
such as Aubeterre and Montmoreau in the south of the the department and 
on the periphery of the Cognacais (e.g. the southern part of 
Barbezieux). This suggests that the growth of the area under cereals 
reflects, not the satisfaction of the specialist cereals farmers with 
their protected position, but rather the increasing specialization by
132
polyculturalists in the least risky lines of business.
In fact the cereals farmers of the Angoumois-Ruffecois have experienced 
several problems not the least of which was the natural disaster of the 
mid-1970s drought. In the first place, prices of cereals have not kept 
pace with the prices of necessary industrial goods, especially 
fertilizers and fuel. Secondly, there is the problem of the increasing 
bureaucratization of the co-operatives, itself facilitated by increasing 
concentration as demonstrated by the pre-eminence of the CAC and the 
CCC. The financial demands of such co-operatives lent itself to certain 
practices such as the extension of the period between delivery of the 
crop and payment to the farmer, practices which undermined the 
identification between co-operatives and their members.(28) Finally, the 
strength of the AGPB, though providing benefits for cereals farmers, 
also permitted the AGPB to secure its own rewards for such services. 
Para-fiscal taxes on cereals designed to finance the development of the 
industry and compulsory AGPB duties levied by the co-operatives reduced 
the actual revenue of the farmer from the level to which he was 
theoretically entitled.
Nevertheless, it appears that the disadvantages have been outweighed by 
the benefits. The market protection secured by official unionism 
succeeded in creating a material basis for loyalty to the FNSEA. 
Similarly, objections to the EEC were undermined by the relative success 
of the CAP in providing a certain degree of security. This is clear 
from the decline of the MODEF vote in the region. In 1964 MODEF won the 
Ruffec Chamber of Agriculture seats and secured a majority in 
forty-three out of sixty-six communes. But since the stabilization of 
the EEC in 1966-67, the MODEF vote has consistently declined. In 1970, 
MODEF secured a majority in thirty-seven communes in the Ruffec
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constituency but by 1976 it was only able to do so in twenty-one 
communes and lost the seats. Only in the canton of St. Amant de Boixe 
(in the Angouleme-Nord constituency) did MODEF continue to be in a 
strong position. But even here the MODEF vote fell from fifty-six per 
cent in 1964 to forty-nine per cent in 1976.
This suggests that support for MODEF arises from a material basis rather 
than from congenital oppositionism. Faced with a state of relative 
stability guaranteed by co-operatives, official unionism and the EEC, 
MODEF has been unable to maintain its early level of support. In short, 
if grievances are eliminated or accommodated then the ground is cut away 
from under MODEF's feet.
D) THE MONTMORELIEN This is a polycultural region in which cereals, 
beef and dairy farming are the main activities. As such it experienced 
the problems of the meat and cereals industries which have been 
described above. But more importantly, it has had to face the major 
changes in dairy farming which have occurred since 1960.
Until 1970, milk production and the number of cows increased steadily. 
This was partly in response to the greater and more profitable 
organization of the market brought about by the EEC. However, dairy 
farming was a victim of its own success. Responding to incentives, it 
produced itself out of a market and demonstrated the contradictions of 
the EEC's attempt to combine specific common policies with the absence 
of a genuine Common Agricultural Policy.
The 1970s saw the end of the boom as the milk subsidy was reduced and 
finally eradicated only to be replaced by the milk levy. As was seen in
Chapter 2, European milk policy has been ineffective in terms of 
reducing surpluses since it merely obliged farmers who have no 
alternative line of production to be more productive. In this respect 
the Montmorelien has been typical. Whilst the number of cows in the 
department declined by twenty-two per cent during the period 1970-1980, 
the decline in the Montmorelien was only twelve per cent. Given the 
fact that cereals production increased faster in the region than in the 
department as a whole, it seems likely that dairy farming is a trap in 
which are caught farmers who have no choice but to produce milk.(29)
This trap is partly a result of ecological conditions but it is also 
related to the structure of the industry. Dairy farming in the Charente 
has traditionally been a field in which co-operatives have marketed most 
of the output, reaching the ninety per cent level by the end of the 
1970s. (30) However, these co-operatives have been transformed during 
the 1960s and 1970s from small local operations to regional and 
inter-regional concerns. In 1960, the average Charente dairy 
co-operative operated on an artisanal scale, surviving mainly because of 
the gap between the low price of the milk received and the high price of 
butter sold. It was estimated at the time that rationalization of the 
industry would require the elimination of a quarter of the 
co-operatives. (31)
This is exactly what happened, and happened with a vengeance. The 
co-operatives expanded their staff and recruited technically qualified 
personnel, in the process acquiring a much more bureaucratic character. 
They also invested in new equipment on such a scale that they soon 
became over-equipped. The result was a series of mergers and takeovers 
which left two dominant co-operatives, the Co-operative de Baignes and 
the Co-operative de Sers-St. Anne de Claix. Both these co-operatives
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extended their operations into neighbouring departments such as the 
Dordogne and the Gironde in order to make their investments profitable. 
The case of the Baignes co-operative is particularly interesting. During 
the 1960s Baignes absorbed other co-operatives in Montendre, Clion, 
Chepniers and Montguyon in the Charente-Maritime, those of St. Savin and 
Marsac in the Gironde as well as those of Medillac, St. Georges,
Puyreaux and Vars in the Charente itself..(3 2 ) In 1976 it fused with the 
Toulouse-based Union Laitière Pyrénéenne to form the Union Laitière 
Pyrénées Aquitaine Charentes (ULPAC), thus becoming the largest dairy 
co-operative in the south west. Not content with this, in 1981 ULPAC 
entered into negotiations on amalgamation with its nearest rival, 
Tempé-Lait of Montauban. (3 3 )
Howver much the process of concentration has limited the damage to the 
industry, from the point of view of the individual farmer co-operatives 
have taken on an existence of their own. Competition between 
co-operatives for the farmer's produce has given way to the 
rationalization of production and collection by the co-operatives. 
Instead of picking up each day's output from the farm, co-operatives 
have obliged farmers to store milk until the less and less frequent 
visits of the collector. This involves investment in the form of 
refrigeration tanks and associated equipment. Such investment often 
effectively traps the farmer in the industry. Similarly, the change of 
emphasis on the part of the co-operatives from serving tie farmer 
towards supplying urban demands has involved the co-oper£.tives in 
demanding more and more control over the quality and supply of milk. One 
way in which this has been done is through the signing oi long-term 
contracts lasting for ten years with an option for a further five. (31*) 
This obviously limits the degree to which the farmer can respond to 
changes in price. In effect the co-operatives have come to occupy such
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a strong position with respect to their members and suppliers that they 
are able to subordinate the needs of the farmer to their own 
requirements.
Les impératifs de la modernisation semblaient aller parfois à 
l'encontre de leurs (farmers) intérêts immédiats, et les ristournes 
se faisaient plus modestes et plus rares, sans parler des nouvelles 
exigences imposés par la recherche de "la qualité"... recompensé 
par des primes, sanctionné par des pénalisations. (3 5)
A clear demonstration of this tendency occurred in 1981. Hardly had 
farmers the time to savour their relative victory of the EEC price rises 
agreed to assist the Giscardian re-election campaign when the 
co-operatives announced that the 12.67 per cent rise agreed in Brussels 
would not be passed on to farmers until and unless the co-operatives 
managed to raise their own prices first. . (3$)
Given the difficulties of dairy farming, it might have been expected 
that MODEF would have been more successful in the Montmorelien than it 
has been. As will become apparent later, there are very good political 
reasons for this. For the moment, the economic factors alone will be 
considered. These are threefold.
The first inhibition is the notorious difficulty of organizing dairy 
farmers because of the nature of the production process. For dairy 
farmers the working year consists of 365 days since anim<Is have to be 
attended to every day. As a result they have much less freedom to 
organize their working, social and activist lives than h« ve other 
farmers, especially wine growers. Secondly, the rise of LODEF in the
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1960s also coincided with the expansion of the industry thanks to higher 
EEC prices. MODEF's anti-EEC propaganda therefore fell on deaf ears. In 
the 1970s, though the crisis was severe, it was very different from 
those affecting the Confolentais and the periphery of the Cognacais. 
Unlike the problems in the meat industry, the milk crisis was organized 
and gradual. Dairy farmers have not been subjected to the wild 
fluctuations which occurred on meat markets. Finally, the management of 
the crisis has been in the hands of a highly developed cc-operative 
sector. In the Montmorelien the crisis has been handled by the leaders 
of the farming community through their positions on the loards of 
Directors of the co-operatives. By contrast, the cognac crisis has been 
"inflicted" on the farmers by "outsiders" from private firms.
Having examined all four regions of the Charente, it is time to attempt 
to draw some general conclusions about the connection between the 
economic environment and the level of HODEF support. The above analysis 
suggests that the key variables in this link are the degree of security 
which is afforded to each type of agriculture and the na ure of control 
over the process by which agricultural produce is transfc rmed into 
consumer goods. Before going any further, it must be recognized thta 
there are certain dangers in this kind of comparative analysis. The 
major problem is that one runs the risk of refining the analysis into 
meaninglessness by introducing too many qualifications. But not to do 
so means running the risk of irrelevance by presenting a set of examples 
which are not placed in a coherent framework. In the belief that the 
risks of the latter policy outweigh those of the former, the comparative 
analysis will proceed. Having stressed the impossibility of finding 
easy answers in previous chapters, logic requires that the consequences 
of such an argument are followed through.
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Security includes two dimensions. On the one hand, thert is the 
question of the level of revenue generated by the farm whilst, on the 
other hand, there is the problem of the predictability of such revenue. 
For instance, the cognac producers of the outlying parts of the 
Cognacais are generally considered to obtain higher revenues than the 
cereals farmers of the Angoumois but the organization of the cereals 
market is such that the revenue of the latter is more secure.
The second variable relates to the way in which the market is organized 
in order to transform agricultural produce into commodities. The 
distinction made here is between the industries in which this role is 
performed by private enterprise and those in which the representatives 
of farmers in the co-operative sector carry out this function.
The various areas of the department can now be classified in terms of 
these variables. The Confolentais is effectively subordinated to 
private industry and suffers from insecurity both in terms of the level 
and the predictability of income. The Montmorelien, by contrast, is 
dominated by the co-operative sector. A low degree of security in terms 
of income levels exists but the region occupies an intermediary position 
in terms of the predictability of income. The Angoumois-Ruffecois is 
also a co-operative zone, relatively secure as far as income levels as 
concerned but benefitting above all from a high degree of 
predictability. Finally, there is a need to distinguish between the two 
parts of the Cognacais. The central cantons enjoy high levels of 
security in both senses whilst the peripheral cantons are less favoured 
in both respects. This distinction between the centre and the periphery 
is purely a geographical one and is not an attempt to smuggle in another 
variable.
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Confronting this typology with the pattern of MODEF support, certain 
conclusions can be drawn. In terms of the concept of security, it 
appears that a high level of security in both respects is not conducive 
to the growth of support for HODEF, as its relative failure in the 
central Cognacais shows. At the other end of the scale, it appears that 
very low levels of security in both its dimensions limit the prospect of 
MODEF support. Levels of support for MODEF are much higher in cantons, 
such as Rouillac, where insecurity takes the form of low predictability 
rather than low levels of income. This would appear to be yet another 
confirmation of Eric Wolf's theory of the middle peasant as the 
political activist.
As far as the ownership and control of the means of transformation are 
concerned, the evidence suggests that farmers are quit'* prepared to 
accept the dominance of private enterprise as long as . t pays them to do 
so. The difference in MODEF support in the central and peripheral 
Cognacais is a case in point. Cantons favoured by the purchasing policy 
of the merchants have been much more docile and more hostile to MODEF 
than those which have become the real victims of the ccgnac crisis. By 
contrast, co-operatives enjoy more leeway than private enterprise.
Their members appear to be more tolerant of their failure to protect the 
security of the farm than are the suppliers of private enterprise. The 
position of the farmers of the Montmorelien supports this conclusion. 
This suggests that the ability of those organizing a p; rticular industry 
to guarantee security to their suppliers brings its owi rewards in terms 
of maintaining loyalty to the FNSEA. MODEF is weaker where the 
combination of the EEC, national government, the FNSEA and agro-industry 
is able to provide clear benefits to farmers..(37) Unfortunately for
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MODEF the reverse is not true. The inability to supply such benefits 
does not automatically work in MODEF's favour. Insecurity, therefore, 
provides an opportunity but does not ensure MODEF success. There are 
sociological and political factors which also have an effect on the 
outcome. It is to these that we now turn.
5. CLASS DIFFERENTIATION IN THE CHARENTE
In the two preceding chapters, inequality within agriculture was 
identified as one of the factors which helps to explain the existence of 
MODEF and the degree of support which it has been able to attract. The 
purpose of looking at the sociological aspects of agriculture is not to 
find alternative explanations for cases which cannot be explained by 
economic factors. It is simply a recognition of the need for 
multi-dimensional explanations.
A casual drive around the Charente provides a graphic illustration of 
the contrasts to be found within the department. Simply by looking at 
the types of farmhouse and buildings, one gains a rapid and valuable 
insight into the extent of inequality. For instance, moving from the 
small functional farmhouses of the Confolentais, one discovers the solid 
affluence of the Angoumois and the walled-in chateau-like farmhouses of 
the Cognacais.
Nevertheless, for inequality to have any political significance, there 
must be an awareness of inequality. But the extent and nature of this 
awareness depends on what is being compared. Therefore, the subjective 
awareness of inequality does not reflect any objective league table of 
inequality which the external observer may construct. Farmers do not
compare themselves to abstract departmental or national averages but to 
other groups of farmers with whom it is felt legitimate to compare 
oneself. These comparisons are of two types, infra-regional and 
inter-regional.
This would explain the success of MODEF in the peripheral Cognacais. 
Though in an above average position by any objective criteria, the 
farmers of the peripheral Cognacais compare themselves to those of the 
central Cognacais. Witnessing the increasing concentration of production 
in the Segonzac and Chateauneuf areas, they are only too well aware of 
the conflict of interests between the two groups. In the case of the 
Confolentais, there is a strong connection between subjective 
appreciation and the objective hierarchy of inequality. Since the 
farmer of the Confolentais sees his position as unfavorable compared to 
that of farmers in the rest of the department, the perception of 
inequality is helpful to MODEF.
In the other regions it would appear that the comparisons made are 
infra-regional. In the Angoumois -Ruffecois, the obvious distinction is
between the large cereals farms and the small and medium-sized sector. 
Thanks to the flat rate subsidies provided by the EEC, the CAP has 
helped the larger farm, with its lower unit costs, more than the small 
and medium firm it was allegedly designed to help. Though this division 
provides a certain base for MODEF, the fact that such farmers see the 
consequences of the absence of such protection just beside them in the 
Confolentais limits the extent to which this inequality has political 
repercussions. The common interest of all categories in maintaining the 
relatively privileged situation which cereals farmers ha'e enjoyed under 
the CAP outweighs conflict over the distribution of the :polls.
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In the Montmorelien, the internal comparison also seems to have taken 
precedence. As Table 3:5 shows, the Montmorelien is the region in which 
concentration has advanced most rapidly. Paradoxically, the high level 
of concentration has had an egalitarian effect. By increasing the 
numbers of farmers in the medium category, the gap between the 
extremities has been narrowed. The expectation of becoming a 
medium-scale farmer has counteracted the fear of losing one's farm 
altogether.
In order to conclude this analysis, there is another aspect of 
inequality whcih must be introduced. One must assess the extent to 
which perceived inequalities are compatible with the continued existence 
of the farms at the wrong end of the scale. Clearly, such inequality as 
exists in the Montmorelien and the Angoumois-Ruffecois does not involve 
an immediate threat to the small and medium-scale farm. The same is 
also true of the Confolentais. But in the Cognacais, the conflict for 
markets between the central and peripheral areas poses a direct threat 
to the survival of the periphery, as the pressure to liberalize the 
market in the interests of the centre demonstrates.
The political significance of inequality and the prospects for MODEF 
depend therefore on the two dimemsions of inequality. MODEF is most 
successful where inequality occurs within a zero sum context. The gains 
of the central Cognacais have been made at the expense of the periphery. 
The advantage for MODEF is that such forms of inequality lead to 
conflict within the farming community and thus confirm MODEF assumptions 
about the class divisions within agriculture.
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6 . THE POLITICS OF THE CHARENTE
It is now time to deal with the final piece of the jigsaw, the political 
context in which MODEF has operated in the Charente. As we have seen, 
economic failure does not automatically incur political costs. This is 
due to the fact that one of the primary functions of political elites 
is, at the risk of being taken for a Poujadist, the management of 
failure and the containment of its potential consequences.
In order to account for the pattern of MODEF support in :he department, 
one has to examine the different ways in which this cont :ol has been 
maintained in each area of the department. One of the laading figures 
in the post-war politics of the Charente has described the department in 
the following terms: "Par bien de ses aspects, la Charente est 
exemplaire en ce que, tout en demeurant originale, elle a toujours eu le 
bon goût de ne pas vouloir se faire rémarquer".(3 8) Senator 
Marcilharcy's view of the Charente as a tranquil republican department 
derives as much from myth as reality. This myth has been perpetuated by 
both academic and literary writers. Jacques Chardonne and Francois 
Mitterrand, to name but two of the Charente's most famois writers, have 
both made contributions to the legend whilst a 1934 study of electoral 
geography describes the citizens of the Charente as "prudent, respecteux 
de l'administration, peu révolutionnaire et ennemi des aventures". (3g)
The problem is that this ignores the Charente's equally remarkable 
capacity to provide a home for every political bandwagon since Louis 
Napoleon. The tradition of moderation and accommodation with central 
government and the powers-that-be has been persistently challenged by 
movements of resistance to those powers. In reality, both the victors
and the losers of national political conflicts have been represented in 
the department. In 1899, Deroulede was elected to the National Assembly 
for the constituency of Angouleme. The region of Confolens demonstrated 
an early predilection for the PCF as the party managed to increase its 
vote in the disastrous class against class election of 1932.
Furthermore, the CGPT presence in the 1930s was followed by a 
substantial Poujadist influence in the 1950s. (*♦')
This should not be regarded as an explanation for MODEF's strength in 
the department since historical explanations were rulec out in Chapter 
1. It is merely to point out that, beneath the mask ol tranquility, the 
politics of resistance have played a part, and perhaps a more 
interesting part, in the life of the department. It also reveals that 
such politics were not invented by MODEF. Nevertheles:, it remains to 
be seen how MODEF was able to renew and continue the tiadition of 
resistance.
The Charente provides a classic example of the importaice of the 
different strategies used to maintain control over the mass of farmers. 
In each of the three Parliamentary constituencies, Angculeme, Cognac and 
Confolens-Ruffee, a different model of elite leadershi) and domination 
has been applied.
A „
A) ANGOULEME The Angouleme constituency was held by ( ne man for 
forty-six years. Raymond Rethore was elected as a rad:cal socialist in 
1936 and won every election in the constituency until 1 is defeat in 1978 
at the hands of the socialist mayor of Angouleme, Jean-Michel Boucheron. 
Rethore's politics remained unchanged after 1940 when he supported de 
Gaulle. From then on, he was to remain an individualis Gaullist. As 
mayor of the rural commune of Magnac Lavalette, his in luence was
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concentrated in the rural areas of the constituency. His style of 
political operation has been described in Michel Bélanger's study of the 
Charente.
Il a acquis une influence considérable auprès des masses 
rurales... recevant très simplement en son chateau, écrivant 
chaque année des milliers de lettres d'intervention, il a su 
s'attacher ces populations paysannes qui ont retrouvés en lui, 
dans un certain sens, le notable du dix-neuvième siècle, 
c'est-à-dire le hobereau local. (UZ)
This, of course, represents a classic case of partial integration. 
Dealings between the state and the farmer are mediated by local 
notables. In Rethoré's social work-style of politics, there was limited 
scope for the emergence of lay elites since there was no pressing 
necessity for them to do so. It is therefore hardly surprising that 
MODEF should be at its weakest in this constituency. None of the six 
cantons identified as MODEF strongholds are to be found here. 
Furthermore, within the constituency only eleven communes consistently 
voted for MODEF over the 1964-1979 period. Of these eleven, three were 
situated in the semi-urban cantons of Ruelle and Soyaux (previously part 
of the Angoulême cantons) where Rethoré's influence was at its weakest. 
Three other communes were at the geographical extremities of the 
constituency. In the immediate vicinity of Rethoré's base, Magnac 
Lavalette, only the commune of Gardes-le-Pontaroux supported MODEF.
This suggests a case of local rivalry. In the other cases, the 
explanation would appear to be the emergence of capable local leaders 
confident enough to challenge the Rethoré monopoly. Grassac, in the 
canton of Montbron is a vivid example since it has been the local base 
of Raymond Mineau himself.
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B) COGNAC The structure of political control has been very different 
in this constituency. The cognac dynasties have been traditionally very 
reluctant to engage openly in political activity. Those of their 
members who have done so, such as Edouard Hennessey in the 1920s or 
Francois Hardy in the 1970s have had to overcome the hostility of their 
families and colleagues.
The dominant figure in the post-war politics of Cognac was Félix 
Gaillard, deputy from the Liberation to his accidental death in 1970. 
Though he had family connections in the Barbezieux area, he was a 
Parisian by birth and education and was therefore an outsider for both 
the farmers and merchants of the Cognacais. In contrast to his 
colleague in the Angoulême seat, his career depended on his role in 
national rather than local politics. As a leading member of the 
Resistance, of the Inspection des Finances and of various Fourth 
Republican Governments until the formation of his own ministry in 1957, 
the Rethoré style of politics was not a practical proposition. Neither 
did he have the local status to permit himself the all-embracing role 
which Rethoré played. He was therefore obliged to deal with his 
constituents through local leaders and activists. Bélanger describes 
him as a "rassembleur des élites". (¿,3)
As one would expect on the basis of the hypotheses put forward in the 
preceding chapters, such political arrangements allowed a great deal 
more scope to MODEF. MODEF was able to fit itself into the vacuum 
between Gaillard and his agricultural constituents. Out of the six 
pro-MODEF cantons identified above, three are in this constituency, 
Brossac, Baignes and Rouillac. The former two are in the southern half 
of the constituency where Gaillard was at his strongest, being both a 
municipal councillor for Barbezieux and conseiller general for Baignes.
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C) CONFOLENS-RUFFEC Unlike the other constituencies, Confolens-Ruffee 
has lacked a dominant political figure. But a dominant leader has been 
present on both the Left and the Right. The outcome of most of the 
Parliamentary elections over the 1962-78 period has been determined by a 
narrow majority. In the 1950s and the early 1960s, the standard bearer 
of the Right was the independent extreme right-winger, Jean Valentin, 
but whose position was gradually captured by the Gaullist mayor of 
Ruffec, Michel Alloncle. Whilst the Right led in the
Angoumois-Ruffecois area of the constituency, the Confolentais provided 
the geographical base of the Left. Throughout the period under 
consideration, the dominant figure on the Left was the PCF 
representative, Andre Soury, mayor of Pressignac and conseiller general 
for Chabanais.
The consequences of this geo-political division for MODEF have been 
fourfold. As Map 3:7 shows, the thirty-one pro-MODEF communes can be 
divided into two categories; those in the three clusters of Chabanais, 
St. Amant-de-Boixe and La Rochefoucauld and those scattered about the 
rest of the constituency. Every canton, except Champagne-Mouton, 
includes at least one of these pro-MODEF communes. This suggests that 
the intense rivalry between the competing political elites has permiited 
more space for self-organization by farmers and, therefore, more 
favourable terrain for MODEF. Second, the existence of overlapping 
zones of political influence, such as cantons like St. Amant-de-Boixe 
and La Rochefoucauld on the periphery of the Gaullist and Communist 
zones, has also encouraged farmers to take matters into their own hands. 
Third, the absence of a political leader in such a solid position as 
Rethor£ and the consequent absence of the absolutely reliable provision 
of services has increased the necessity for farmers to deal with their
own problems. In this respect, it is interesting to note the 
coincidence of the decline in MODEF support in the Ruffec area and 
Alloncle's gradual consolidation of his position. Finally, the fact 
that the Left was represented by a supporter of MODEF (and indeed a 
former member) provided MODEF with political sympathy and demonstrated 
how far farmers could participate in the political system without 
non-farmer intermediaries.
On the basis of this evidence, one can conclude that the form of 
political organization and the way in which political leadership is 
exercized in a given area is a more valuable indicator of MODEF 
prospects than party political predelictions. In other words, there is 
no simple connection between the level of support enjoyed by the PCF and 
that obtained by MODEF. The following section is therefore devoted to 
an analysis of the connection between PCF and MODEF electoral successes 
in the department.
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PCF AND MODEF IN THE CHARENTE
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TABLE 3:6 PCF VOTE IN PRO-MODEF COMMUNES: CHARENTE 1962-1979
CONSTITUENCY ABOVE; AVERAGE PCF VOTE PCF BEST-PLACED LEFT PARTY
1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978
ANGOULEME 
( 1 1  communes) 8 5 8 6 7 1 0 5 6 4 3
COGNAC
(31 communes) 15 23 24 2 1 22 0 4 3 2 1 1 2
CONFOLENS 
(31 communes) 18 20 2 1 16 17 31 30 30 27 2 1
CHARENTE 
(73 communes) 41 48 53 43 46 41 39 40 52 36
This Table illustrates the performance of the PCF on the first ballot of 
each Parliamentary election between 1962 and 1978 in the communes with 
permanent MODEF majorities. These elections have been selected for 
consideration since they provide the best indicator of party 
identification. Before going any further in the examination of the 
implications of Table 3:6, there is a serious methodological question to 
consider. There is, of course, a major problem in comparing 
professional and political election results. How does one isolate the
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farming vote from the rest of the electorate? In other words, what does 
the fact that the PCF secures an above average vote in Parliamentary 
elections tell us about the voting behaviour of the farmers in the 
commune.
The most serious attempt to deal with this problem is the analysis 
conducted by Derivy. (i*Z() Derivy begins by criticizing the approach of a 
pioneer in this field, Klatzmann. In the 1950s, Klatzmann attempted to 
isolate the farming vote by considering the results of elections in 
cantons where the vast majority of the population were farmers and 
concluded that there was a significant difference between the farming 
vote and the behaviour of the electorate as a whole. Derivy points out 
that the flaw in this procedure is that the exceptional cantons which 
Klatzmann studied could not be regarded as a cross-section of rural 
society. Therefore, one could not generalize from these results. Using 
a much wider range of rural cantons and more advanced statistical 
techniques, Derivy concludes that farmers tend to vote along the same 
lines as the rest of the rural population. This means that farmers in 
right-wing areas vote mainly for the parties of the Right whilst those 
in left-wing regions vote for the parties of the Left. Unfortunately, 
Derivy's case has one major weakness, the absence of an explanation of 
why this should be so.
An explanation for this state of affairs will become apparent in 
succeeding chapters. It will be seen that farmers play a major role in 
local electoral politics and many are local councillors. Many of those 
interviewed in the course of this research reported that farmer 
candidates of all parties were frequently poll-toppers and that many 
were elected even when their lists lost. This would suggest that the
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coincidence between the farmer and the general vote is not due to 
farmers following non-farmers but is a result of the influence which 
farmers exercise as local political leaders. It is on the basis of this 
coincidence that the following analysis will proceed.
Table 3:6 makes it clear that the image of MODEF as an electoral 
satellite of the PCF is somewhat misleading. If such arguments were 
correct, one would expect these seventy-three communes to be much more 
favorable to the PCF than they have been; both in terms of the 
percentage of the votes secured by the party and in terms of the party's 
strength relative to the rest of the Left. Using the contingency 
co-efficient technique (C), one finds a large gap between expected and 
actual results. (¿*5 ) With respect to the average vote of the PCF, C = 
0.80 for the Angouleme constituency, 0.89 in the Cognac constituency, 
0.98 in the Confolens constituency and 0.95 in the department as a 
whole. As far as the PCF being the best placed party is concerned, C = 
0.87 for Angouleme, 0.97 for Cognac, 0.66 for Confolens and 0.97 for the 
department as a whole.
The contingency co-efficient shows that MODEF cannot be reduced to the 
PCF. Even in the case of the relatively low figure of 0.66 for the PCF 
as the best-placed party in Confolens, one must remember that the number 
of communes in this category was increased by the fact that the PCF 
enjoyed a virtual monopoly on the Left in the constituency during the 
1960s. This is plainly demonstrated by the rise of the reconstructed PS 
in the constituency and the consequent fall in the number of pro-MODEF 
communes in which the PCF remained the best-placed party of the Left.
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At the same time, the absolute figures show that the PCF has attained a 
certain degree of success in the pro-MODEF communes which it would be 
equally misleading to ignore. This degree of influence suggests that 
PCF supporters provide a hard core of support for MODEF. But it is 
equally clear that the success of MODEF in becoming the largest force in 
oppositional unionism has been due to its ability to win support beyond 
the political boundaries of the PCF from the supporters of the other 
parties of the Left. This is particularly apparent in Cognac where the 
electoral successes of the PCF in the pro-MODEF communes were 
overshadowed by the electoral popularity of Félix Gaillard. In order 
for MODEF to have secured the level of support which it obtained in the 
1960s it had to have won support from a certain section of the Gaillard 
electorate and, judging from the MRG presence in MODEF during the 1970s, 
it is reasonable to assume that such support came from those who would 
provide the electoral base of the MRG after the split in the Radical 
Party.
A high PCF profile is therefore indispensable to MODEF but is not 
enough. One consequence of the weakness of the party in the Angoulême 
constituency has been a relatively weak MODEF. On the other hand, 
Confolens provides an even more striking example of the second part of 
the equation. Despite being the most communist area of the department, 
MODEF has failed to win the Chamber of Agriculture seats for Confolens. 
It is where a strong PCF presence has coexisted with strong 
representation of other parties of the Left that MODEF has achieved its 
greatest successes. It is as if MODEF required a PCF rocket to get off 
the launching pad but also needed a non-communist Left second stage in 
order to enter into orbit. However large the PCF part is, as in the 
Confolentais, the second stage is still vital. That MODEF is acutely
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aware of this interdependence is testified to by the almost pathological 
concern for internal unity between the different political tendencies 
within MODEF with which the organization is preoccupied. (**6 )
8. THE VAUCLUSE
As has been seen above, the Vaucluse differs in many respects from the 
Charente. The purpose of this section is to investigate whether these 
differences are such that the factors isolated in the analysis of the 
Charente are still applicable to the Vaucluse.
Just as the Charente contains diverse types of farming, within the 3,556 
square km of the Vaucluse one finds an even more extreme diversity.
Apart from the three major agricultural regions, the Comtat, the 
Tricastin and the Monts de Ventoux, Vaucluse and Luberon, there are 
three other regions on the fringes of the department. The borders of 
these regions are traversed by the boundaries of the four Chamber of 
Agriculture constituencies and the three Parliamentary constituencies.
This diversity is reflected in the pattern of support for MODEF, 
analysis of which is greatly assisted by the pioneering article of 
Grosso, The great value of this article for present purposes is
that it poses the same question which is being addressed here - why do 
some farmers support MODEF instead of the FNSEA or instead of remaining 
indifferent?
Map 3:8 shows the communes in which MODEF secured a majority in the 1964 
Chamber of Agriculture elections. MODEF won forty-nine per cent of the
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vote in the Orange constituency, thirty-six per cent in Apt, 
thirty-seven per cent in Carpentras and twenty-seven per cent in 
Avignon. This gave MODEF an average of thirty-seven per cent for the 
whole department and permitted it to win two seats in Orange. The MODEF 
majorities were concentrated in two blocs; one in the north of the 
department around the cantons of Beaumes-de-Venise, Bollene and Vaison 
with extensions into Orange-Est and Carpentras-Nord; the other in the 
south around Bonnieux, Gordes and Apt.
Map 3:9 reveals the major victory obtained in Orange in 1967. With 
fifty-six per cent of the vote, MODEF took all four seats. Not only did 
the original bloc hold together but MODEF also extended its influence 
into the previously recalcitrant canton of Malaucene. Only Orange-Ouest 
and Valreas held out for the FNSEA. In the Apt constituency, the 
picture was somewhat different as MODEF held on to its position in 
Bonnieux and Gordes but suffered a setback in the canton of Apt. Its 
share of the vote fell slightly to thirty-five per cent.
In 1970, MODEF discovered that Avignon's tradition of providing a 
sanctuary for schism did not extend to farm unionism. Its vote 
increased only marginally to thirty per cent and it could only muster a 
majority in two out of the twenty-two communes in the constituency. In 
Carpentras, however, MODEF made further advances, particularly in the 
cantons of Mormoiron and Pernes, which raised its share of the vote to 
forty-three per cent.
The elections of 1974-76 represented MODEF's high point in the 
department, just as it did at the national level. As Map 3:10 suggests, 
the Orange seats were held with relative ease as MODEF obtained 
fifty-three per cent of the vote. The pattern established in previous
elections was confirmed except for a notable decline in support in 
Malaucene. In Apt, the Bonnieux-Gordes axis remained intact whilst at 
the same time the dramatic inroads into Cadenet, and to a lesser extent, 
Pertuis ensured MODEF's first electoral victory in this constituency.
By 1976, MODEF believed themselves to be challenging the FDSEA for 
control of the Chamber. However, MODEF's rapid progression in the 
Carpentras constituency continued but fell just short of the target, 
reaching forty-eight per cent of the vote. In Avignon matters were 
complicated by the addition of a third slate of right-wing dissidents. 
The communes marked in the Avignon constituency are those in which MODEF 
secured a majority and those in which it was by far the most successful 
list, narrowly failing to score fifty per cent. MODEF just managed to 
hold on to its 1970 level of support but still only won a majority in 
three communes.
Map 3:11 synthesizes this series of results. The communes indicated are 
those in which MODEF secured a majority on at least two out of three 
occasions between 1964-76. This is a less restrictive definition of the 
MODEF stronghold than that employed for the Charente. There are two 
reasons for this. On the one hand, unlike the Charente Federation, the 
Vaucluse Federation was a newly-created organization. As the process of 
construction of the Federation continued until the late 1960s, it would 
be misleading to use the same definition. Furthermore, if one took such 
a rigid stance there would be too few cases of MODEF strongholds on 
which to base a serious analysis.
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As Map 3:11 shows, the strongholds of MODEF are the cantons of Bollene, 
Beaumes-de-Venise, Bonnieux, Vaison and Mormoiron. On the fringes of 
these cantons are to be found small groups of neighbouring communes, 
such as those in Gordes, Orange-Est, Carpentras-Nord and Pernes.
MODEF's weakest points are, by contrast, those in proximity to the three 
main towns of the department, Avignon, Carpentras and Orange.
AGRICULTURAL ECONOMY AND AGRICULTURAL REGIONS IN THE VAUCLUSE
Map 3:12 shows the borders of the six agricultural regions. The Comtat 
Venaissin, Tricastin and Monts de Ventoux, Vaucluse and Luberon are the 
major regions in which the vast majority of the farmers of the 
department are to be found. The other three regions are extensions of 
regions which lie mainly in other departments such as the Drôme 
(Baronnies), Alpes de Haute Provence, (Plateau de St Christol) and 
Bouches-du-Rhône (Basse Vallée de la Durance.) This map also indicates 
that agricultural region is an important variable as the concentration 
of MODEF support in the Tricastin and the Monts suggests.
A) THE COMTAT VENAISSIN: In the commercial centre of the Comtat, 
Chateaurenard, there is a fountain in the town centre with the following 
inscription: "Eici l'aigo es d'or". It is because the Comtat is so
well off in this respect that it is one of the richest regions in 
France. The Comtat is the 'garden of France', a status which it owes to 
its history as a mediaeval clerical state. For agriculture, the great 
benefit of papal authority was the construction of a system of
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irrigation. Canals were constructed as early as the tenth century 
whilst the Durance had been harnessed for irrigation purposes by the 
fourteenth century. (4 3 )
With the exception of the part of the canton of Orange-Ouest which lies 
in the Comtat, and the commune of Chateauneuf-du-Pape in particular, the 
farmers of the Comtat are mainly producers of fruit and vegetables. 
Through most of the 1960s and 1970s, the Comtat was able to maintain its 
privileged position thanks to the frequency, quality, variety and the 
precociousness of their crops. Because of the irrigation system, more 
than one crop a year can be raised, thus increasing the productivity of 
the land whilst the variety of output usually permitted bad results on 
one market to be compensated by success on another. The reputation for 
quality and the early entry of its crops onto seasonal markets allowed 
them to compete fairly effectively with the produce of other regions and 
countries.
Though these factors allowed the Comtat to retain its leading position 
in French agriculture, dealing with foreign competition became 
increasingly difficult so that by the 1980s, the Durance served not only 
as a source of water but as the ultimate destination for produce which 
failed to find a buyer. {^3) As Langevin points out, the Comtat has only 
survived so long by the openness to innovation demonstrated by its 
farmers (i.e. as in the use of greenhouses) and their heavy investment. 
For example, whilst the average French farm used ninety-five kgs of 
fertilizer per hectare, in Provence Cote d'Azur, this figure rose to 150 
kgs. In consequence, along with other rises in costs, the share of the 
costs of production in final output value rose from twenty-two per cent 
in 1970 to thirty-seven per cent in 1976. (50)
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As a result, the natural advantages of the Comtat have not prevented 
the decline in the number of farmers over the 1955-1980 period being 
about the average for the department, though slightly less than that of 
France as a whole. Furthermore, the decline has been accompanied by a 
spectacular rise in the proportion of farms in the twenty hectares-plus 
category, a size which very definitely makes a farm a capitalist 
operation in the Comtat.
As for the organization of the market for fruit and vegetables, the 
farmers of the Comtat have been in a position where: "La soumission au 
négoce résulte de l'absence de régulation des marchés qui favorise les 
comportements dominateurs des négociants..." (51) Because of the lack of 
market organization, farmers have had to contend with large fluctuations 
in the prices of their produce. Graph 3:2 gives an idea of these 
fluctuations.
The dominant position of private merchants on the market is illustrated 
by the fact that seventy-five per cent of the output of fruit and 
vegetables in the department is purchased by these merchants, fifty per 
cent in the free for all of the marketplaces of the region such as 
Chateaurenard, Cavaillon and Carpentras and only twenty-five per cent 
through advance contracts. (52)
Attempts to bring some order to the industry have been limited. 
Co-operatives and producer groups have enjoyed little success, 
accounting for only ten per cent of output. This has been due to two 
things. The entrenched position of private enterprise has restricted 
the scope for co-operatives, a tendency which has been increased by the 
growing concentration of such enterprise and the penetration of 
multi-national capital into the region.(53) Rather than deal with a

plethora of local firms, farmers have come more and more to find 
themselves dealing with large firms operating on a European, if not a 
world-wide, scale.
The other block on the development of co-operatives is the individualist 
mentality of the Comtat farmer. The Comtat has enjoyed the mixed 
blessing of a privileged position on a chaotic market. This has meant 
that though the dangers have been all too apparent, so have the rewards 
of success. This has led the co-operative sector to be used as 
'l'assurance contre la mévente' rather as a positive instrument of 
emancipation, Over 20 years ago, one writer described the behaviour
of Provencal fruit and vegetable farmers in the following terms:
Certaines cooperatives sont anciennes, mais n'ont pas toujours 
prospéré, parce que l'esprit cooperative n'y était pas; le paysan 
adhérait pour une somme minime, et vendant sa production au plus 
offrant, n'apportait à la cooperative que les fruits les moins bons 
ou ceux qu'il n'avait pas réussi à écouler.
That this situation has hardly changed since then is confirmed by the 
daily ritual of Chateaurenard and by many of those interviewed in the 
Vaucluse.
Grosso points out that the fruit and vegetable sector, contrary to 
Tavernier's conclusions, is not particularly favourable to MODEF.
Grosso explains this in terms of the individualism of the fruit and 
vegetable farmers, which makes them ill-adapted to collective 
organization.(56) However, he fails to explain why such individualism 
should be so deep-rooted, the most simple and powerful explanation being
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that such behaviour has given enough proofs of its success for it to 
remain a plausible strategy.
If one looks at the Comtat in terms of the typology used in the analysis 
of the Charente, there is an obvious problem of classification. In 
relation to the ownership of the means of transformation and the level 
of revenue, the Comtat is clearly on a par with the central Cognacais. 
But with respect to the predictability of income, it has similarities 
with the Confolentais. Although there is no necessary connection 
between the degree of security in terms of both size and predictability 
of income, there are several indications that this is the case in the 
Comtat. In the first place, given that the fluctuations in prices and 
incomes have taken place at a relatively high level of income, their 
importance is less than in cases where the fluctuations occur around a 
low average point. In the latter case, such insecurity produces a more 
immediate threat to the continued existence of the farm thanks to the 
limited margin of safety. Second, the importance of price fluctuations 
in the Comtat has been limited by the variety and frequency of crops, 
thus minimizing the danger of finding oneself dependent on a 
slow-selling crop. Finally, the emergence of a large capitalist sector 
in the Comtat implies that revenues are predictable enough to permit the 
intensive investment required by the capitalist farm. For these 
reasons, the Comtat should be placed in the same category as the central 
Cognacais. At least in this case, the predictive value of the 
conclusions drawn from the case of the Charente is confirmed. The level 
of support for MODEF in the Avignon constituency is consistent with that 
in the Cognac constituency and the blank spaces on the map of the Comtat 
in Map 3:11 are similar to those to be seen in the central Cognacais in 
Map 3:6.
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B) THE TRICASTIN: The Tricastin is the main viticultural zone of the 
department, covering part of the Appélation d'Origine Contrôlée (AOC) 
Côtes du Rhône area and most of the AOC Côtes du Rhône-Villages area. 
Unlike the producers of less high quality vines, the vine grovers of the 
Tricastin have tended to benefit from the problems associated vith the 
income inelasticity of demand for agricultural produce. Whilst the 
consumption of ordinary table vine stagnates then eventually falls vith 
rising urban incomes, the producers of AOC vines benefit from the 
increasing purchases of higher quality vines. By 1980, Côtes du Rhône 
producers held approximately sixteen per cent of the market vhilst the 
Vaucluse vas only exceeded by the Gironde and the Marne in the output of 
AOC vines. (57)
Nevertheless, the Tricastin has had to vork hard to achieve this 
position in terms of raising the quality of the produce as veil as being 
obliged to make the same heavy expenditure as the Comtat. For instance, 
the chemicals needed to treat the vines to fight off the various 
diseases to vhich are they susceptible has played a major part in the 
rise in the costs of production. In addition, despite the fact the 
Tricastin has made a major contribution to the French balance of 
payments by tripling the volume of exports betveen 1970 and 1980, the 
value of this produce, in terms of farm revenues remained stagnant. In 
reality, the Tricastin has had to run hard to stand still. This is 
reflected in the decline in the number of farms vhich has been slightly 
above average for the department. As for concentration, it has been the 
small to medium-scale sector, rather than the very small-scale 
enterprises, vhich have disappeared most rapidly.
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As for the organization of the industry, it is as dominated by the 
co-operative sector as the Comtat is by the private sector.
Seventy-five per cent of output is marketed through the co-operatives 
with most of the rest being handled by the "viticulteur récoltant", the 
capitalist growers with sufficient capital to accquire the equipment 
necessary to transform grapes into bottles of wine and with sufficient 
expertise to sell their own wine to wholesalers and retailers. (58)
In terms of security, the Tricastin resembles the peripheral Cognacais, 
producing for a market in which a certain degree of stability exists but 
in which the level of competition is persistently increasing. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be a major difference between the 
Vaucluse and the Charente. In the Charente, co-operative dominance has 
been inimical to the growth of MODEF. But the cooperative-dominated 
Tricastin is MODEF's No. 1 stronghold in the Vaucluse.
Rather than proving that the conclusions valid for the Charente are 
inapplicable to the Vaucluse, this reveals that it is necessary to 
introduce some refinements into the analysis. The first point which 
must be made is that the co-operative sector is not a monolith, it 
covers a wide variety of types of enterprise. In this diversity, the 
co-operatives of the Montmorelien and those of the Tricastin are at the 
opposite ends of the spectrum. The major difference between the 
co-operatives of the Charente and those of the Tricastin lies in their 
scale. There is simply no comparison between the Union Laitière 
Pyrénées Aquitaine Charentes and the co-operatives to be found in 
Tricastin villages such as Sainte Cécile-les-Vignes. The process of 
amalgamation and bureaucratization has not made much headway in the 
region. Co-operatives are based on the commune rather than the region 
or the department. Each village has its own co-operative, or even two
as in the case of Ste Cécile, serving to dispose of local produce. This 
is mainly due to the quality and reputation of this produce which means 
that farmers, in communes such as Gigondas, Rasteau, Vacqueyras, etc, 
depend on the preservation of the individual identity of the product. 
There is no incentive to amalgamate to produce anonymous vine.
As a result, the lack of bureaucratization has prevented the 
co-operatives from either insulating their members from the rest of the 
economy and its logic or inflicting the costs of crisis on their members 
in order to preserve themselves. There is an unusual degree of 
involvement and understanding between the co-operatives and their 
members, reinforced by the technical and economic awareness of the 
region's farmers. In effect, if the co-operative relieves the farmer of 
the burden of producing and marketing his own vine, it has also 
contributed substantially to the economic education of its members, 
particularly with respect to the subordination of agriculture to 
industry and commerce.
Finally, in the Tricastin, as in the rest of the Midi, there is a close 
relationship between co-operatives and unions. Co-operative leaders are 
often also the local union leaders. Co-operatives are therefore 
regarded in a much more political light, as an instrument of defence for 
the industry rather than as simple economic institutions.
If one makes this distinction between bureaucratized and participatory 
co-operatives, the situation of the Tricastin is much closer to that of 
the peripheral Cognacais. Though private industry and commerce 
intervenes much later in the process of production and transformation in 
the Tricastin, the fact remains that it does do so. Private enterprise 
ultimately dominates the industry through its control of commercial
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circuits, particularly in the export markets on which both the Cognacais 
and the Tricastin depend. Though the co-operatives of the Tricastin may 
have more bargaining power than the individual farmers of the peripheral 
Cognacais, it is not comparable to the kind of influence which giants 
such as the ULPAC can exercise in commercial negotiations. The economic 
similarities between the peripheral Cognacais and the Tricastin are 
reflected in the comparable levels of support for MODEF in the two 
regions.
C) MONTS DE VENTOUX, VAUCLUSE AND LUBERON: Despite being classified as 
three parts of the same region, there are great contrasts between the 
Ventoux, Vaucluse and Luberon zones. Ventoux covers the 
Beaumes-Carpentras-Nord cantons and the northern half of Mormoiron, the 
plateau de Vaucluse covers Pernes and the southern half of Mormoiron 
whilst Luberon covers Apt, Gordes and Bonnieux. To the extent that these 
three areas form a coherent region, this is due to the type of Provencal 
polyculturalism which is practiced there. The main products of the 
region are fruit, wine and vegetables.
Unlike the regions already considered, the farmers of the region do not 
have the same advantages which have helped to protect Comtat and 
Tricastin agriculture. With the exception of the Beaumes-Carpentras 
area, they do not benefit from either the irrigation system which allows 
the Comtat to minimize the dangers of the market or the reputation which 
sells the wines of the Tricastin. In particular, imports of fruit and 
vegetables have posed a major threat to this region. Such imports 
increased throughout the 1970s with extensive and increasing Spanish 
competition. Certain product markets, such as aubergines, witnessed the 
tripling of imports. (59) However, the problem is accentuated in 
Ventoux, Vaucluse and Luberon by the question of time. Because of the
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lack of irrigation and the higher altitude of this region, its products 
enter the market at a later date than those of the Comtat. And a week 
is a long time in Vaucluse agriculture as the fluctuations in prices 
shov. The region is therefore much more vulnerable to foreign 
competition from Spain and Italy than the Comtat.
The lover incomes of the region are self-perpetuating. There are two 
classic examples of this. Because of these lover incomes, the region's 
fruit and vegetable grovers have been less able to attempt to control 
the supply of their produce onto the market in order to influence the 
price. For instance, in the disastrous summer of 1981 vhere virtually 
all fruit and vegetable prices vere depressed, the Chamber of 
Agriculture advised farmers that the EEC apple harvest vould fall far 
short of demand. Given that other prices had been so lov, the Chamber 
varned farmers that it vas necessary to avoid panic selling, or else 
apple prices vould collapse too. By delivering apples to the market 
gradually, higher prices could be sustained. The problem vith such 
advice is that the farmers most able to follov it vere those who had 
less need to do so. Postponing receipt of income, and even perhaps 
paying cold storage costs, was a much more practical proposition for the 
richer farmers of the Comtat than it was for those walking a tightrope 
in Luberon or on the plateau de Vaucluse. (60)
Yet another example of the self-perpetuating nature of inequality 
between the regions is the case of irrigation. The obvious answer to 
the lack of water in the dry zones around Apt vould be to create an 
irrigation system. But the effort to irrigate the Calavon valley is the 
local equivalent of the Channel Tunnel project, always under 
consideration but never under construction. Though the Conseil Général
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and the Parc naturel régional de Luberon provided the impetus to get the 
project off the ground in the 1970s, by the time official approval had 
been secured another problem had emerged. By the early 1980s, local 
farmers were beginning to be very suspicious of the project. In a 
context of permanent crisis on the market, such an irrigation system 
would immediately increase costs without providing much prospect of 
increased revenue.
As for wine production in the region, there is a hierarchy descending 
from north to south. That section of the canton of Beaumes which is in 
the region still forms part of the Côtes du Rhône-Villages zone. 
Therefore its produce is a combination of Côtes du Rhône and the lesser 
known Côtes du Ventoux AOC. Beaumes has therefore been able to compete 
with the Tricastin on more or less equal terms. At the other end of the 
scale, at the other end of the region, the Vin Délimité de Qualité 
Supérieure (VDQS) Côtes du Luberon has not benefit ted from the changing 
patterns of urban expenditure to the same extent. Though not as 
vulnerable to Italian competition as the non-AOC producers of the 
Hérault and the Aude, the intermediate status of VDQS has left it open 
to a degree of competition which the department's AOC producers have not 
had to face. (62)
MODEF strongholds in the region are to be found in three areas. Two of 
these areas, the Mormoiron-Pernes group and the Bonnieux-Gordes group, 
fit into the model described above in section Three. In terms of 
security and ownership of the means of transformation, they resemble the 
Confolentais. (The fruit and vegetables sector outweighs wine in 
importance.) MODEF strength in the two regions is broadly comparable.
On the other hand, MODEF's weakness in the canton of Apt reinforces the 
assumption that MODEF's success in such circumstances is not inevitable.
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Unfortunately for the symmetry of the argument presented here, MODEF's 
success in the Beaumes-Carpentras region contradicts the argument that 
economic success brings its own political rewards. By inter-regional 
and infra-regional standards, this area has been highly successful. 
Though MODEF's strength can be partly attributed to the experience of 
collective organization and discipline arising from the co-operative 
organization of the market, it is necessary to look to the non-economic 
factors to explain this attraction to MODEF. That the position of 
Beaumes is wholly exceptional is testified to by the mixture of 
suspicion and admiration with which MODEF activists in other parts of 
the region view the MODEF leaders and activists from Beaumes.
D) THE MINOR REGIONS: The Plateau de St Christol owes its fame, such as 
it is, to pacifist literature and military grandeur. Giono's idyllic 
picture of shepherds and their flocks has been replaced by de Gaulle's 
vision of nuclear missiles and their guardians. As in Giono's time, the 
Plateau remains dominated by sheep farming. It has therefore, like most 
mountain regions, suffered from the lack of organization of meat 
markets. And like other mountain zones, it has suffered a rapid 
decline. Between 1955-80, the region experienced a forty-seven per cent 
decline in the number of farmers, well above both the departmental and 
the national average. As in the case of the Charente's most depressed 
canton, Montemboeuf, this type of decline is not conducive to MODEF. 
Farmers concentrate on eking out a living rather than on taking positive 
action to defend their region. (63)
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The Baronnies cover most of the canton of Malaucene and the communes of 
Puymeras and Faucon in Vaison. The part of the region which lies in the 
Vaucluse forms the northern foothills of Mont Ventoux and is therefore 
distinguished from the rest of the northern Vaucluse by its altitude and 
the difficulty of its terrain. The main produce of the region is Cotes 
du Ventoux AOC and fruit. But it does not have the advantages of the 
lower parts of the Ventoux region. In most of the region, fruit 
predominates over wine, so in terms of its economic organization it is 
closer to Luberon than Ventoux. Malaucene resembles Apt as an area in 
which MODEF has failed to capitalize upon the opportunities available to 
it.
Covering those communes in Pertuis and Cadenet bordering on the Durance, 
the Basse Vallée de la Durance is a polycultural region. Vhilst fruit 
and vegetables are grown on the plains, the hillsides are occupied by 
vineyards and cereals. This is the most important of the minor regions, 
and one in which MODEF had an increasing impact during the 1970s. In 
terms of altitude and water supply, the region is comparable to the 
Beaumes-Carpentras area of Ventoux. But the difference in quality 
between Côtes du Ventoux AOC and Côtes du Luberon VDQS gives the region 
an intermediate status between Ventoux and Luberon in terms of the 
security of income. In terms of market organization, the predominance 
of fruit over wine (except in Cadenet) makes it closer to Luberon than 
to Ventoux. However, MODEF's growth in the region in the 1970s meant 
that MODEF support came to reflect the pattern established in parts of 
Luberon, such as Bonnieux, in the 1960s.
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What is left of the typology with which this analysis begun. Of the 
major regions, the Comtat and the Monts de Vaucluse and Luberon fit into 
the typology without difficulty. As for its predictive value in terms 
of the level of MODEF support, the Comtat and Vaucluse-Luberon are more 
or less comparable to the central Cognacais and the Confolentais 
respectively.
It is the Tricastin and the Beaumes-Carpentras-Nord area which provide 
the greatest problems. In the case of the Tricastin, it is necessary to 
introduce a modification into the analysis, i.e. the distinction between 
bureaucratized and participatory co-operatives. In the latter, farmers 
find themselves in a much more direct relationship to industry and 
commerce, a relationship which makes their situation closer to that of 
the peripheral Cognacais than to the Angoumois-Ruffecois or the 
Montmorelien. The Beaumes area calls into question the hypothesis about 
the connection between economic success and political quiescence. It 
shows the necessity of placing these economic factors into their 
political and sociological environment, since such factors may override 
the effects of economic conditions.
m  ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
We now have a basis for evaluating alternative explanations for the 
distribution of MODEF support. Two in particular deserve attention. 
The first is the connection between type of product and the second and 
most important is the EEC.
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Grosso has pointed out the connection between the distribution of the 
vineyards of the Vaucluse and the distribution of the MODEF majorities. 
There is an extremely close overlap between the maps of these two 
distributions. Grosso also points out that fruit and vegetable growers 
in the Vaucluse are much less favourable to MODEF. This is certainly 
true if one compares the two essentially monocultural regions, the 
Comtat and the Tricastin. Problems arise when one considers the mixed 
zones of the Monts. These are also relatively favourable to MODEF and 
it is impossible to detect whether particular communes are more 
dependent on the fruit and vegetable side or the wine side of their 
operations. And as Grosso himself points out, the Chateauneuf-du-Pape 
AOC zone has proved MODEF-resistant. (£i|)
Extending this analysis to the Charente shows that this type of 
explanation is untenable. If one looks at the wine growers of the 
Cognac?is, their divided allegiance to the FNSEA and MODEF is patently 
clear. Nevertheless, to look at the problem in reverse, a comparison 
between the two departments makes it clear that MODEF reaches its peak 
performance in wine growing areas. Grosso gives some of the reasons why 
this should be so:
On a toujours prêté... des opinions politiques plus avancées aux 
viticulteurs. Ici, leur milieu, depuis longtemps gagné à 
l'organisation cooperative de la fabrication du vin et de sa 
commercialisation accepterait plus volontiers des solutions plus 
radicales... il est plus homogène dans ses occupations et 
préoccupations, partant dans ses options. L'action syndicale y est 
peut être plus facile d'autant plus que, souvent libéré des 
problèmes de vente du vin et bénéficiaire d'un calendrier agricole
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moins chargé, le viticulteur est sans doute plus disponible pour la 
confrontation des idées et l'action. (6 5 )
This shows that the wine grower's position as an 'aristocrat of 
agriculture' makes him ready to organize and support organizations such 
as MODEF. It is the level of security and the organization of the 
market which, however, explains why these 'aristocrats' turn into 
activists. It is the relatively secure but menaced position of the 
Tricastin and the peripheral Cognacais which gives its farmers both the 
opportunity and the incentive to resist the development of capitalism in 
agriculture. By contrast their counterparts in Chateauneuf-du-Pape and 
Segonzac may have the opportunity but they do not have the incentive 
since they are the prime beneficiaries of this capitalist development.
As for the question of the impact of the EEC on the distribution of 
support for MODEF, this is a question raised by Tavernier in his studies 
of MODEF. Tavernier has argued that much of MODEF support has stemmed 
from hostility to the EEC. In particular, Tavernier claims that this is 
the explanation why the technically advanced farmers of the Vaucluse 
should associate themselves with such an allegedly conservative 
organization. (6 6) in order to assess the validity of this claim, one 
has to consider the impact of the EEC on each region on the basis of the 
evidence above. Until the late 1970s, the Comtat's relationship to the 
Common Market was, on the whole, beneficial. New markets were opened up 
on European markets but excessive competition on the domestic market was 
avoided. Though the Tricastin has always had an export orientation, the 
EEC again facilitated exports without providing too much in the way of 
competition. It is the Monts region which has been the real victim of
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the EEC and the advantages conceded by the Community to non-EEC states 
such as Spain. Although the level of MODEF support in the region may be 
seen as a reflection of this, it should also be remembered that the 
Tricastin is the strongest MODEF region. If one considers the Charente 
as well, the point becomes even clearer. Over the period of MODEF's 
existence, the EEC was beneficial to the Angoumois-Ruffecois and the 
Montmorelien and had a more or less neutral effect on both parts of the 
Cognacais. (<07) Only the Confolentais can claim to have consistently 
suffered from the EEC, and even in this case the region's problems 
predate the EEC. Once again, though MODEF is strong in this region, it 
is still the peripheral Cognacais which is the strongest zone of MODEF 
support. It would appear that though the 'depredations' of the EEC offer 
an advantage to MODEF, MODEF is not simply an expression of 'le 
nationalisme légumier'. MODEF is quite capable of securing the support 
of farmers whose grievances are based on domestic considerations. There 
is both a class-based as well as a nationalist perspective sustaining 
MODEF.
1 1 . CLASS DIFFERENTIATION IN THE VAUCLUSE
What do these differences between and within the regions mean in terms 
of the nature and extent of differentiation in the department. Thanks 
to a special study on relative farm revenues in the Vaucluse, there is 
some firm statistical evidence to illustrate the extent of inequality 
within the department. (6 8>Graph 3:3 shows the relative position of each 
canton in terms of gross farm incomes in 1970. As one would expect, 
four of the top five cantons are in the Comtat whilst those in the 
Tricastin are in the top half of the scale. The Plateau de Vaucluse
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cantons are in the lower half whilst Luberon is on the lowest level 
accompanied by the Plateau de St Christol and the Baronnies.
But, as in the Charente, it is necessary to look at the perception of 
inequality as well as the objective indicators and to discover which 
groups are compared with which. To the extent that the Comtat farmers 
recognize inequality, they can only perceive themselves to be the 
beneficiaries. On the other hand, though the Tricastin enjoys an above 
average position in the department, its self-comparison with the Comtat 
makes sure that it sees itself as a victim of inequality. As for the 
other regions, the Beaumes-Carpentras-Nord zone of Ventoux is in 
competition with the Tricastin in disposing of its wine and with the 
Comtat in selling its fruit and vegetables. Thus sandwiched between the 
most comfortable regions, it compares itself with them rather the less 
privileged sections of the rest of the Monts region. Similarly, the 
competition which the fruit and vegetables farmers of the Plateau de 
Vaucluse and of Luberon confront is the battle for markets with the 
farmers of the Comtat. This provides a solid basis for antagonism 
between the regions, and hence helps to explain MODEF's strong position 
in the Monts compared to its subordinate status in the Comtat. The 
Baronnies deserves some attention because it provides an example of an 
unusual case, one where the perception of inequality hinders rather than 
assists MODEF. The Baronnies canton of Malaucene is cut off from the 
rest of the department by the Tricastin and the Beaumes area of 
Ventoux. Since these areas are much better off compared to Malaucene, 
inequality is on the doorsteps of Malaucene farmers. The rich farmer is 
epitomized by the neighbours in Beaumes, which is of course dominated by 
MODEF. In this perspective it is, paradoxically, MODEF which represents 
the emergence of a capitalist sector rather than the FDSEA.
With respect to the contrast between inter-regional and infra-regional, 
compatible and conflictual forms of inequality, the Vaucluse does not 
reflect the Charente pattern. There are two major differences between 
the two departments. First, there is no case of inter-regional 
conflictual inequality in the Vaucluse. Superficially, the contrast 
between Ventoux and Luberon provides a basis for such a conflict but 
this is to ignore the fact that the contrasts within the Monts are 
overshadowed by the presence of the Comtat. The second difference is 
perhaps more important. On the basis of the Charente evidence, one 
would have predicted that the absence of a direct conflict between 
Comtat and Tricastin would prove unfavourable to MODEF. But the 
opposite is true which suggests that the Tricastin farmers have a much 
more sophisticated perception of inequality than farmers elsewhere, a 
perception in which experience is reinforced by a political analysis. 
There is little direct competition between the two regions, except to 
some extent between the fruit and vegetable growers of the canton of 
Bollène and the Comtat or between the wine growers of 
Chateauneuf-du-Pape and those of Gigondas. However, there are 
developments in the Comtat which indicate what the future capitalist 
development of agriculture could bring. Examples include the 
encouragement provided to the "viticulteur récoltant" by the success of 
Chateauneuf-du-Pape and the growth of this capitalist viticulture as 
witnessed by the creation of the Association Nationale des Vignerons 
Récoltants in 1978. Given the need for a political framework into which 
such developments can be inserted if they are to have any consequences 
in terms of farm unionism, it would seem that the coexistence of the 
areas of peak MODEF and PCF performance in the Tricastin is not entirely 
coincidental. (6!»
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1j. THE POLITICS OF THE VAUCLUSE
Like the rest of the Midi, the Vaucluse enjoys a reputation for 
radicalism, a reputation which tends to neglect the other features of 
Mediterranean politics. In fact, two traditions have coexisted in the 
Vaucluse, one of popular radicalism being accompanied by clientelist 
notablism.
The departmental Archives testify to the variety, if not to the extent, 
of such popular radicalism in the 1930s.(.7 0) The CGPT, the CNP and the 
Dorgerists were all active. With the war and the Resistance, the 
tradition of self-organization strengthened. The sufferings inflicted 
on the department, and in particular the Tricastin, through the 
massacres carried out by retreating SS units in the summer of 1944 in 
villages such as Seguret further reinforced the activist orientation. 
That this activism was not confined to those on the Left is demonstrated 
by the success of Poujadism in the Vaucluse. (71)
At the same time, notablism remained an essential element in the 
political life of the department. Daladier's pre-war eminence reposed 
on a Radical-socialist network which involved a quarter of the mayors in 
1939. (72) Though the Radical Party may have lost the war, Daladier 
soldiered on well into the 1950s, maintaining his Carpentras town hall 
and Parliamentary seats. By the time Daladier faded away, SFI0
notablism was ready to fill the void.

A) AVIGNON: If Carpentras was the centre of political life in 
Daladier's day, Avignon has taken on that position since. As the 
constituency in which notablism found its new home, it bears remarkable 
similarities to Angouleme. Henri Duffaud, as deputy-mayor and later 
senator-mayor of Avignon, was the dominant figure in the post-war 
politics of the constituency. As a protege of Gaston Defferre,
Duffaud's Avignon was run on lines similar to those of Marseille 
(although without some of the more dubious aspects of the port's 
politics). In ideological terms, Avignon socialism was heavily 
anti-Communist, in instrumental terms, clientelistic, indeed nepotistic.
The primacy of anti-Communism was even clearer in agricultural politics.
If, on an electoral level, the department divided in left-right terms, 
the main cleavage in agricultural politics was between the SFIO and the 
PCF. Duffaud's political dominance was assisted by his close alliance 
with the FDSEA leader, Robert Dion, mayor of Morieres, sometime senator 
and later president of the Chamber of Agriculture. Dion's political 
options were such that he failed to adapt to the transformation of the 
SFIO into the PS and became one of the small group of irreconcilables 
expelled for opposing the Union of the Left.
The existence of such clientelistic networks, as one would expect, 
seriously hindered the growth of MODEF in the Avignon area. Since the 
FDSEA-SFIO/PS alliance provided the link between Duffaud and his 
agricultural constituents, farmers had little incentive to organize 
themselves and even less to turn to MODEF. In terms of protecting 
individual interests and of access to services, it made more sense to 
address oneself to the FDSEA.
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B) CARPENTRAS: Though Carpentras had been the centre of the Daladier 
web, clientelistic patterns broke down with no dominant political 
leader, or even dominant party leaders, emerging. Throughout the period 
of MODEF's existence, the politics of the constituency has been a 
struggle for electoral supremacy between the SFIO/PS and 
centrists/centre right, a struggle in which neither side has ever become 
completely dominant. Over the 1962-78 period, the constituency was 
represented by three different socialists (in 1962, 1967, 1973) one 
Gaullist (1968) and one Giscardian (1978). Though the Giscardian junior 
minister Maurice Charretier appeared to be establishing his control over 
the Right, this took a serious blow with the PS landslide in the 
Vaucluse in June 1981. In any case, his influence derived mainly from 
his control of Carpentras town hall, not from support in the surrounding 
rural areas. In this context of instability, with no dominant political 
leader or party machine, MODEF activists had more room to manouevre, 
attempting to provide the services supplied by the FDSEA-Duffaud 
alliance in Avignon.
C) ORANGE: Orange resembles Carpentras in the sense that it has lacked 
a Duffaud-type personality. On the other hand, there is a substantial 
difference as far as party leadership is concerned since there has been 
a high degree of continuity. Of the five general elections considered, 
two men dominated the contest, a contest decided by a very narrow margin 
in all bar the 1968 election. Leon Berard, the Gaullist leader, fought 
a more or less private battle with Fernand Marin of the PCF, a political 
double act only spoiled by the PS in 1981. Though Berard won three 
times (1962,1968 and 1973) to Marin's two victories (1967,1978), the 
margin was never large enough to guarantee him the security required to 
establish an Avignon-style clientelistic network. This combination of
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electoral instability and party continuity proved of tremendous benefit 
to MODEF. On the one hand, there was a need to fill the elector-elected 
gap. On the other, the continuity of party leadership, with the 
dominant personality on the Left sympathetic to MODEF and of whom some 
of the closest associates were MODEF leaders, gave MODEF the legitimacy 
necessary to successfully attempt to fill the gap.
13 . THE ROLE OF THE PCF
As the previous two sections imply, there appears to be a stronger link 
between PCF and MODEF implantation in the Vaucluse than was seen to be 
the case in the Charente. Table 3: 7 attempts to translate these 
impressions into quantifiable terms.
TABLE 3:7 PCF VOTE IN PRO-MODEF COMMUNES: VAUCLUSE 1962-1978
CONSTITUENCY ABOVE AVERAGE PCF VOTE PCF ;BEST-PLACED LEFT PARI
1962 1967 1968 1973 1978 1962 1967 1968 1973 1978
AVIGNON 
1 commune 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0
CARPENTRAS 
30 communes 16 18 19 17 20 13 6 1 0 14 2 0
ORANGE 
32 communes 23 18 20 19 18 31 25 27 22 24
VAUCLUSE 
63 communes 40 37 40 36 39 45 31 37 36 44
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These figures suggest that the assumption of a connection between MODEF 
and PCF support, particularly in so far as the Orange/Tricastin area is 
concerned are unfounded. The low number of cases in the Avignon 
constituency precludes the use of the contingency co-efficient but for 
the other constituencies C= 0.91 in terms of the level of the PCF vote 
in both Carpentras and Orange. There is, however, a significant 
difference between the two constituencies with respect to the relative 
position of the PCF within the Left since, in this case, C = 0.96 for 
Carpentras and 0.77 for Orange.
Orange and Confolens are the only constituencies examined here in which 
there is a greater correlation between MODEF support and the relative 
strength of the PCF within the Left than there is with the level of PCF 
support. What this indicates is that MODEF, within these 
constituencies, benefits more from the relative weakness of the 
non-communist Left than it does from a high level of PCF support. But 
there is a major difference between the two constituencies in that MODEF 
held the Orange Chamber of Agriculture seats for many years but was 
never victorious in Confolens. This difference stems from the different 
political environments of the two departments. In the Charente, it has 
been seen that the divide in agricultural politics is between the Right 
and the PCF-PS-MRG alliance. For MODEF to win elections, it must secure 
the support of all three sections though a strong organization can be 
constructed on the basis of PCF activists and voters alone. In the 
Vaucluse, the situation is different since the political divide in 
agricultural politics cuts through the Left with the MRG being of no 
political significance. Since the SFIO/PS apparatus was so closely 
allied to the FDSEA, MODEF's chances have depended on, not so much the
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unity of the Left, but the relative weakness of the PS and of its SPIO 
old guard in particular. This interpretation is further supported by 
the coincidence of the rise of the PCF relative to the PS and the growth 
in support for MODEF in the Carpentras constituency during the 1970s.
In the Vaucluse, therefore, MODEF's interests have been furthered by the 
weakness of the PS, rather than by the strength of the PCF or the Left 
as a whole.
1». THE QUESTION OF LEADERSHIP
So far the conditions which allow MODEF to operate and secure support 
have been analysed. The question of whether and how MODEF realizes its 
potential has been postponed until now. This is, of course, a very 
large question to which the following chapters, especially Chapter 4 
give a long answer. Without pre-empting that answer, there is one 
element which must be dealt with at this stage. This is the question of 
local leadership.
Given the weak apparatus within MODEF and the lack of material incentive 
to join the organization, the face of MODEF which is visible to farmers 
is that of its local leadership. In practice, the degree to which MODEF 
makes the most of a favourable economic, sociological and political 
environment or overcomes hindrances is largely in the hands of the local 
representatives of MODEF. This helps to explain why many communes with 
similar environments vote in entirely different ways in professional 
elections. This is seen in the number of dispersed communes in which 
MODEF has secured majorities and the way in which certain communes in
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cantons dominated by MODEF have held out for the FNSEA, e.g. the commune 
of Sonneville in the canton of Rouillac. MODEF's success has depended, 
therefore, on its local leaders and activists proving that they are more 
capable than their FNSEA counterparts and establishing their greater 
credibility as union leaders.(7 3 ) The idea of good leadership is 
therefore a relative one.
Some of the instability in the MODEF vote can be attributed to this 
problem. Perfectly competent MODEF leaders who succeeded in securing 
substantial successes for MODEF later find themselves confronted a new 
group of FNSEA leaders emerging out of the CNJA. A classic instance of 
this took place in the canton of Villefagnan where MODEF activists who 
had proved their capacities in the 1960s found themselves challenged by 
a new generation of FNSEA activists led by Raymond Mangon, a future 
president of the UDSEA, in the 1970s. As a result, the USDEA recovered 
the ground lost in the 1960s. Similarly, the importance of local 
leadership was demonstrated by the defection of the MODEF leader,
Georges Deslandes, to the FNSEA in the mid-1970s. The consequent 
transfer of the loyalties of his supporters in the canton of Chabanais 
helps to explain the losses sustained by MODEF in the 1979 elections.
This is a two-way process. MODEF has benefited from the emergence of 
its own new leaders. For instance, the growth of support for MODEF in 
the Carpentras constituency is generally attributed to the new leaders 
who took over in the early 1970s. In particular, MODEF's success in 
Carpentras-Nord is considered to be primarily due to the work of Jean 
Chardon, a recognition given substance by his election to the MODEF 
National Council in 1982. Similarly, MODEF's progression around Apt and 
Pertuis in the latter half of the 1970s coincides with the supply of new 
leaders and activists coming from MODEF's young farmers organization,
the Federation Nationale des Jeunes du MODEF (FNJ-MODEF).
This is a point explicitly recognized by MODEF leaders and activists 
themselves. The most popular explanation of infra-departmental 
variations and, to a certain extent, inter-departmental variations in 
MODEF support amongst those interviewed was the difference in the 
capacity and energy of local leaders. It is an explanation almost 
always used to explain the difficult cases. In the case of Beaumes, a 
canton which surprises even MODEF activists by its commitment to MODEF, 
the MODEF leadership is given virtually all the credit for its success 
over the obstacles in its way. Understandably, the opposite is not 
quite so true. Though weaknesses in MODEF strength are, in cases where 
MODEF's influence is less than it is considered it ought to be, 
sometimes explained with reference to the nature of the local 
leadership, this is rarely made explicit.
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1 5. ONE AND A HALF MODEFS
To a large extent, the similarities between the two departments are such 
that MODEF, in both cases, is a result of the same pressures of economic 
development, sociological change and political conflict. There are 
several obvious parallels between the two departments. As far as the 
economic situation is concerned, the Comtat and the central Cognacais 
both testify to the connection between a relatively secure branch of 
agriculture dependent on private enterprise and low levels of support 
for MODEF. On the other hand, the Confolentais and the Monts de 
Ventoux, Vaucluse and Luberon reveal a connection between insecurity in 
a privately-controlled branch of agriculture and high levels of support 
for MODEF. Similarly, the Comtat and the central Cognacais occupy 
positions at the top of the hierarchy of class in their respective
departments. The Confolentais and the Monts at the opposite end of the 
scale confirm the connection between class differentiation and support 
for MODEF.
It is the comparison between the Tricastin and the peripheral Cognacais 
which presents the greatest difficulty. Both share a relatively secure 
position compared to other regions of their departments and a strong 
MODEF presence. However, the organization of the transformation process 
in the two regions differs, the Tricastin being dominated by 
co-operatives. However, the difference between the co-operatives of the 
Charente and those of the Tricastin, between the participatory and the 
bureaucratized, is such that the apparent similarities are illusory. In 
practice, the Tricastin shares the effective subordination of the 
peripheral Cognacais to private enterprise and dependence on a 
competitive international market. Similarly, there is a contrast 
between the peripheral Cognacais perception of inequality based on the 
intra-regional conflict with the central Cognacais and the more abstract 
politicized conception of the Tricastin.
Nevertheless, it is the different political environment of the Vaucluse 
and the Charente which leads to the conclusion that there are one and a 
half MODEF's. Though both departments confirm the importance of the 
farmer-political system linkage, the partisan context of the two 
departments is considerably different. In both cases MODEF represents 
the convinced supporters of the Union of the Left. In the Charente, 
this includes the entire Left but in the Vaucluse this is limited to the 
PCF and the left of the PS. In consequence, the relative strength of 
the PCF within the Left is a better indicator of MODEF support in the 
Vaucluse than it is the Charente.
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CHAPTER A BUREAUCRACY, CAMPAIGNING AND SOCIAL WORK: 
THE ORGANIZATION OF MODEF
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter seeks to describe MODEF's organizational arrangements and 
the way in which it has operated in practice. It will be seen that 
these two factors are closely linked with one another, the inadequacy of 
the apparatus precluding certain types of activity whilst the types of 
behaviour adopted by MODEF perpetuate the organizational weaknesses.
The methods by which unity is maintained within the organization, given 
the diversity of the economic interests and political affiliations of 
the membership, are examined. Particular attention is paid to the role 
of the young farmers' wing of MODEF - the Federation Nationale des 
Jeunes du MODEF (FNJ) and its potentially disruptive role within MODEF.
The latter part of the chapter is concerned with the activities of 
MODEF. Both its activity designed to influence agricultural policy and 
its internal maintenance work are considered, the former being heavily 
politicized whilst the latter is characterized by a begrudging 
clientelism. Finally, the potential conflict between "institutional 
needs" and formal objectives is discussed in the light of the evidence 
and of the relevant literature.(1 )
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2. THE APPARATUS
The relative success which MODEF has achieved in its battle against 
state and FNSEA hostility is all the more remarkable when one considers 
the limited resources with which MODEF has had to contend. By 
comparison to the FNSEA, with its Parisian headquarters off the Champs 
Elysée and its army of officials in the provinces, MODEF's 
administrative apparatus is ludicrous. In 1981, of the national 
leadership, only four members were able to devote themselves to MODEF 
affairs on a full-time basis. Of the twenty-three people employed by 
MODEF, the Landes Federation employed sixteen, the Charente Federation 
two, the Tarn-et-Garonne and Côtes du Nord Federations one each and the 
national headquarters in Angoulême three. Most of these were technical 
and administrative staff. Apart from the national administrators only 
the departmental administrators in Mont-de-Marsan and Montauban, along 
with the FNJ organizer for the Landes could be regarded as "political" 
full-timers - in the sense that, although not members of the elected 
leadership, they played an important role in the leadership of their 
Federations.
Similarly, MODEF's means of communication with the farm population was 
limited. Apart from the obvious personal contact between its activists 
and other farmers in the villages, MODEF had to rely on its own 
press.(2) The national organization published L'Exploitant Familial 
every month. Special editions were produced by each region which 
supplied enough material to justify it. The Vaucluse and the Breton 
Federations were most successful in this respect. Two specifically 
regional newspapers were also produced, La Charente Agricole by the 
Federations of Poitou-Charentes concentrating mainly on the Charente and
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Les Information Agricoles published by the Landes Federation in 
Mont-de-Marsan. Again, this was comical compared to the blanket 
coverage of the FNSEA which had various national publications and a 
newspaper for each department. The FNSEA, with the assistance of the 
Chamber of Agriculture, had enough resources to provide every farmer in 
the department with free copies of the newspaper - whether he requested 
it or not.(3) MODEF's distribution was limited more or less to its own 
members. Only in exceptional cases where a dynamic local leadership 
managed to raise enough money did MODEF achieve the level of saturation 
reached by the FNSEA. The case of the canton of Isle sur la Sorge in 
the Vaucluse was exceptional in this respect.
Though the MODEF press was, as Grosso puts it, probably the only example 
of "un journalisme authentiquement paysan", this was due to necessity 
rather than design.(A) Lack of resources prevented, except in the case 
of the Landes, the employment of a professional journalist or even a 
full-time editor which showed in the quality of the finished product. If 
L'Exploitant Familial allowed farmers to address farmers in their own 
language (which makes it a more useful source for analyzing MODEF than 
the FNSEA press is for the study of that organization) it also suffered 
from the neglect of presentation. The paper was densely packed with 
articles and information but in a way which was sometimes difficult to 
assimilate. Furthermore the infrequency with which it appeared 
prevented it from dealing with specific problems in all their 
complexity. Though many articles were purely technical accounts of new 
regulations, the argument was often transferred to a political plane 
because there was no space to analyze fully the consequences of 
government action. This infrequency also restricted the political 
impact of the paper, since it could not be used as a tool of agitation
by responding quickly to events. MODEF's leadership were aware of these 
problems and began to study ways of publishing the paper more frequently 
when official recognition in 1981 opened up possibilities of additional 
finance.
Les Informations _Agr icoles in the Landes, appearing every week, was by 
far the most effective of the three papers. Not only was it able to 
counter FNSEA propaganda but since it appeared weekly and carried most 
of the local information required by farmers, it dispensed them from 
reading other agricultural publications. In this way, MODEF was able to 
take the initiative rather than react to the FNSEA in the Landes.
One of MODEF's major problems was the reluctance of its membership to 
put its money where its politics were. Over the years many appeals have 
been made in the pages of L'Exploitant Familial for militants and even 
entire Federations to collect and, equally importantly, send their 
subscriptions to the national headquarters.(5) Attempts to raise the 
membership fee (in 1981 contributions were made according to a sliding 
scale depending on size of farm but where the maximum was fifty francs) 
have always been resisted. The national treasurer was probably the most 
unpopular member of the national leadership through no fault of his own. 
Simply because of his job, some activists seemed to see him as an enemy. 
The only heated exchanges at the 1982 Congress came during the debate on 
the treasurer's report where recalcitrant Federations criticized by the 
treasurer hit back.
Another financial headache for MODEF was the fact that the main method 
open to it to demonstrate its representativity was the presentation of 
candidates in the elections to the Chambers of Agriculture. Unlike 
other such bodies as the Chambers of Commerce, factory committees and
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industrial tribunals the elections to the Chambers of Agriculture are 
unique in that they are not financed by the state. In all the other 
professional elections, manifestos and posters are printed and 
distributed at the state's expense. Given that the amount involved is 
so small, at least for the government and the FNSEA though not to MODEF, 
the real explanation for this vas the desire to maintain the FNSEA 
monopoly of representation. As Raymond Mineau put it: "Vous ne voyez 
pas quand même M.Firino-Martell coller les affiches dans les rues de 
Cognac".(6 ) This meant that MODEF was obliged to face a financial 
crisis every three years, a crisis which sometimes lasted until the next 
one. For example, even by February 1982, MODEF had not yet liquidated 
the debts incurred in the 1979 election campaign. This problem alone 
would justify MODEF's support for the Mauroy government's decision to 
postpone the elections which should have been held in February 1982.
One of the major functions of farm unions in France has traditionally 
been the provision of services to their members. Unions were sometimes 
more like co-operatives than what is normally understood by unionism -
i.e. organizations devoted to protecting the general interests of the 
profession. Even today, in certain regions of France the co-operatives 
and the unions are virtually indistinguishable, as in the Hérault or the 
Gard.
In this respect MODEF differs substantially from the FNSEA. The latter 
has extensive technical and commercial services to provide advice and 
assistance on almost every aspect of agriculture. These include 
accountancy schemes and services to deal with the complexities of 
Value-Added Tax (VAT). Only the Landes was able compete with its FNSEA 
rival in this respect. Though some Federations such as the Charente
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were able to provide a VAT service, the majority of Federations had to 
rely on their own activists to give advice to the members and supporters 
on matters which are highly technical. Not only did this involve a 
limitation on MODEF's effectiveness in its rivalry with the FNSEA, it 
also affected the way in which the organization was forced to operate. 
These consequences will be analyzed below.
To some extent this financial and organizational weakness was 
self-imposed. For a large part of MODEF's existence in the 1960s, its 
main concern was to challenge the political decisions of government and 
the EEC rather than to establish the organization as an end in itself. 
Therefore its recruitment and organization were, in theory, to be based 
on its political appeal rather than on the material assistance it could 
provide for its members. Even in 1975, the Constitution adopted by the 
Conference ruled out the development of profitable commercial activities 
by the Federations, e.g. the bulk purchase of seeds.(7) Only the 
Charente-Maritime has violated this prohibition but only on a minor 
scale.
MODEF bitterly criticized the extent of state finance for the FNSEA.
Yet its criticisms neglected the fact that, at least in law, such grants 
were provided for specific projects rather than for the general aims and 
objects of the FNSEA. If MODEF had attempted to launch similar kinds of 
projects, such as new efforts to market the produce of a particular 
region, MODEF could have obtained more resources or at least placed the 
government in an embarrassing situation. The government would have had 
to assist MODEF or reduce its level of assistance to the FNSEA, or have 
been seen to be distributing public money on political criteria. Given 
the ingenuity of many MODEF activists in extracting state subsidies when
acting in a personal capacity, it is somewhat surprising that their 
organization has not been more efficient in manipulating the bureaucracy 
of agriculture.
There is a dichotomy in the thought of MODEF activists. On the one 
hand, they are perfectly willing, as individuals, to take the state's 
money for their own purposes. But as an organization, MODEF has a 
somewhat puritanical attitude towards the use of state money for more 
general purposes. In the eyes of MODEF, the extent of financial support 
extended by the government to the FNSEA, and even more so the CNJA, 
precludes these organizations from taking an oppositional, or even 
independent, position.(8 ) This idea was often reiterated in interviews. 
One MODEF leader in the Charente, for example, claimed that his doubts 
about official unionism began when, as a CNJA activist, he was paid what 
he considered to be over-generous attendance allowances.(9) In fact, an 
important part of MODEF's self-image is its poverty and the devotion of 
its leaders and activists, not only expecting no financial compensation 
for their efforts but indeed having to finance their own activities.
Rene Gondran, assistant general secretary, drew a comparison between the 
vast army of FNSEA officials and the privileges afforded to its leaders 
and the situation prevailing in MODEF:
Une poignée de dirigeants, les serviettes pleines de dossiers, de 
rapports, qu'il a fallu établir, étudier, font la navette entre 
Paris et leur région... Pas en avion comme les dirigeants de la 
FNSEA, mais en train et en seconde...(10)
This is a sentiment often repeated by MODEF officials. To chase after 
state finance would detract from the heroic image of the work carried
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out by MODEF.
These material weaknesses help to explain the administrative informality 
of MODEF. Since the apparatus is so weak, there are no clearly defined 
areas of responsibility and authority for the leaders. Legalistic 
bureaucratic procedure is not a strong point of the organization. The 
detailed statutes which exist are more of a moral affirmation of what 
should be done rather than legally binding rules of procedure.
One aspect of this is that the Constitution contains certain articles 
which have never been applied. For example, Article Five authorizes the 
expulsion of Federations who fail to pay their national subscription. 
This is, of course, a traditional method of political control in 
agricultural organizations and provided the pretext for the expulsion of 
the FNSEA Federations who were to create MODEF. Despite the fact that 
some Federations have been bad payers, Article Five has never been 
invoked against them. MODEF simply cannot afford to sacrifice its 
influence in a particular department for the sake of a few thousand 
francs.
More importantly, as in many organizations, the Constitution does not 
accurately reflect the relative position of the various levels of the 
organization's leadership. For example, between Conferences the 
National Council (Comité Directeur) is the sovereign body of the 
organization. The Executive Committee (Bureau National) is formally the 
servant of the former. In practice this relationship is completely the
opposite.
A more detailed analysis of the various parts of the national leadership 
reveals exactly hov misleading the formal Constitution is. The role of 
the National Conference occupies eight out of the forty-two articles in 
the Constitution and its role in electing the national leadership is 
described in two others. Article Ten describes the Conference as the 
"organisme souverain de la Confederation". But at the same time,
Article Nine states that the Conference should meet every three years.
Its role is therefore limited by the infrequency of its meetings. 
Similarly, though the Conference is supposed to define policy for the 
next three years, the amount of time spent on debating resolutions for 
future activity is limited.(11) At the 1982 Congress only about a 
quarter of the time available was given over to the debate on future 
policy. Furthermore, the Constitution provides an elaborate method of 
organizing the elections involving the presentation of candidates by 
regional and product groupings present at the Congress. Not only is 
this method ignored, the following clause of the Constitution negates it 
by allowing the Conference to adopt "des modalités differentes 
d'élection qu'apparaitront nécessaires... à condition qu'elles 
respectent l'esprit d'unité et la representation collégiale".(12)
Next in the hierarchy of authority is the National Council (Comité 
Directeur). Its function is "l'administration et la gestion de la 
Confederation" (Article Twenty One). To make this more efficient an 
Executive Committee is elected to take care of business between meetings 
of the National Council (Article Twenty Seven). But this subordination 
of the Executive to the Council is entirely illusory. The Council is a 
large unwieldy body which is difficult to convene. This has been 
recognized by the modification made to the Constitution in 1978 to 
reduce the statutory number of annual meetings from four to two. This
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obviously increased the autonomy of the Executive. A further 
modification was made in 1982 to reduce the number of Council members 
from 120 to seventy-five. The large numbers involved meant that it was 
almost impossible to assemble the entire Council. Each Conference sees 
a purge of a certain number of members of the Council because of their 
bad attendance records. This is not simply due to lack of interest but 
also to financial constraints. For example, in 1981 a meeting in Paris 
would cost a delegate from the outlying regions, such as the 
Bouches-du-Rhône or the Finistère, something in the region of 70 pounds 
sterling. Not every Federaton is able to reimburse its delegates. 
Indeed, one full-time official admitted that there have been occasions 
when he had to miss meetings of the leadership simply because there was 
no money available.
This means that, in practice, the Executive Committee is the real 
leadership of the organization. Its members meet approximately every 
four to six weeks and are in constant contact by telephone with the 
national headquarters. Yet within the Executive, the full-time 
officials are obviously in a stronger position simply because they have 
more time to devote to MODEF's affairs. This is particularly clear in 
the relationship between the Presidents and the general secretary.
Since 1978 MODEF has been led by a triumvirate of Raymond Mineau of the 
Charente, Henry Dofny of the Aude and Pierre Desigors of the Eure. The 
ostensible reasons for this collective Presidency were administrative.
By dividing the country up into three areas, the link between the 
Federations and the top-level leadership could be strengthened whilst at 
the same time rationalizing the work of the Presidency. (The political 
reasons are analyzed in Chapter 7). Though the Constitution enshrines 
the supremacy of the Presidents - "ils assurent la responsabilité de la
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marche de la Confederation" (Article Thirty One) and the secondary role 
of the general secretary - "Le secretaire general assiste les Presidents 
dans la gestion de la Confederation" - the reality is different. The 
Presidents assist the general secretary. This is not simply due to 
political conspiracy or personal authority, though it is undeniable that 
the first holder of the office, Raymond Mineau, certainly conferred a 
great deal of authority on the post. It would be misleading and 
insulting to suggest that some members of the leadership can be 
manipulated by others. It is simply that the general secretary is the 
only member of the elected leadership who works full-time for the 
national organization. Of the three Presidents only Raymond Mineau is a 
full-time official but his responsibilities include running the Charente 
Federation, presiding over the Poitou-Charentes regional Federation, 
editing its newspaper and leading the MODEF contingent in the Charente 
Chamber of Agriculture. The other Presidents have similar 
responsibilities in MODEF together with the job of running a farm and 
being heavily involved in political parties. They also experience the 
problem of distance, being hundreds of miles distant from headquarters 
in Angouleme. Though the general secretary works as closely with the 
Presidents as the telephone (sometimes tapped) allows, he is 
occasionally able to take certain initiatives which do not meet with the 
wholehearted approval of the Presidents. The most obvious example was 
Lindenstaedt's attack on the PS in February 1981.(13) In general, 
however, the members of the Executive complain about excessive 
consultation rather than the lack of it.(14)
3. CO-OPTION AND DEMOCRACY IN MODEF
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Decision-making and leadership selection within MODEF depend on a 
conception of democracy typical of mass organizations in France. A 
detailed look at the 1982 Conference debates, leadership elections and 
the internal conduct of MODEF Federations will reveal the 
characteristics of this system of rationalist democracy and co-option.
At the 1982 Congress, the debates on the reports presented by the 
leadership involved a wide range of speakers on the problems of various 
regions and products. Time limits were not strictly enforced, neither 
did speakers appear to be selected for their docility.(15) Similarly 
the debate on policy was dominated by the concern to achieve unanimity. 
Despite a formal procedure for presenting amendments, verbal amendments 
were accepted during the debate. The majority of these amendments were 
terminological to remove or create ambiguities in the substantive 
motion. One cannot accuse the leadership of trying to stifle debate - 
unless one attributes to them the Machiavellian tactic of allowing 
debate to be drowned in its own confusion.
Similarly the young farmers' section provided a remarkable example of 
the overriding desire for unanimity in decision-making. When the 
results of the National Council's ballot on the election of the 
Executive were announced at the 1982 Conference, the delegates of the 
young farmers' section went into emergency session to discuss their 
response to the reduction in their representation in the Executive. 
Despite the pressure of time, the debate continued until a position had 
been agreed in preference to making a quick decision by voting.
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This desire for unanimity is a reflection of the perceived need to 
maintain the unity of the organization at all costs. Conventionally 
critics have identified unanimity as an absence of democracy. Unanimity 
is a facade which prevents the rank and file participating in the real 
debates which are held behind closed doors.(16) This is not, however, 
the feeling of the rank and file activists of MODEF. As a 
Bouches-du-Rhône Conference delegate explained - "If the Conference has 
been properly prepared in the departments, the debate at Congress should 
really be a formality". Delegates are made aware of the feelings of the 
membership and are then sent to Paris to speak and vote along those 
lines. By the time the Conference arrives at the policy debates, the 
Resolutions Committee should have been able to produce a motion which 
will secure unanimity. In this perspective Conference is more of a 
symbolic occasion than a real centre of decision. Its real purpose is 
to provide a focus for debates, legitimize the leadership and to inspire 
the activists to further endeavour in the future.
Similarly, the Constitution provides a complicated method of electing 
the leadership in which the initiative rests with the Federations. 
According to Article Eighteen, the delegates of each region at the 
National Conference and the delegates of specialist organizations are 
supposed to meet to choose candidates to present for election. In 
practice, there is nothing so formal. Federations simply put forward 
names which are examined by a Nominations Committee which has no formal 
status but which is elected by the Conference. But this Committee itself 
is proposed by the outgoing leadership. A list prepared by the 
Committee is presented to the Conference and then voted upon by secret 
ballot. Delegates can only reject the entire list or cross out certain 
names. They cannot vote for non-approved names. This results in a
1 9 7
system where the leadership is elected virtually unanimously. For 
example, at the 1982 Conference, out of the 400 delegates, all bar one 
delegate voted for the list, expressions of dissent being limited to 
crossing out of the names of certain individuals. Even this type of 
behaviour was the result of personal grievances rather than more general 
concerns.
This system can be criticized on the grounds that it effectively means 
the outgoing leaders co-opt their successors, most of whom will be, of 
course, themselves. However, the adoption of a formally more democratic 
system of individual candidatures would present MODEF with serious 
problems. To begin with, the media blackout from which MODEF has 
suffered means that very few members of the leadership are known outside 
their own region. Delegates would therefore tend to support candidates 
from their own region or alternatively of the same political persuasion. 
Even with the present system, three south-western regions -Aquitaine, 
Languedoc-Roussillon and Midi-Pyrénées have nineteen members on the 
National Committee elected in 1982 compared to the ten representatives 
of six north-western regions of Nord-Pas de Calais, Haute Normandie, 
Basse Normandie, Pays de la Loire, Picardie and the Région Parisienne. 
This obviously reflects the regional implantation of the organization 
but without this guided democracy, it is likely that the imbalance would 
be even more acute.
Furthermore, MODEF owes its survival to its concern to maintain an 
equilibrium between the main political tendencies within the 
organization.(17) It would be a natural tendency for delegates to vote 
for candidates of their own political outlook. The consequences of free 
voting would be a degree of internal politicization which MODEF has
tried to avoid. In a period of conflict within the Left, such free 
voting would have been particularly damaging to MODEF. One can well 
imagine what would have happened in 1978. Since it is one of MODEF's 
main arguments against those who regard it as a front for the PCF that 
the PCF does not have a majority of the MODEF leadership, it is vital 
that elections are conducted in such a way as to prevent delegates from 
expressing political preferences.
A similar situation prevails in the Federations. Few limitations are 
placed on speakers and meetings sometimes become extremely heated. 
Neither do departmental leaderships get docile audiences in their 
meetings. For example, a meeting of the departmental committee of the 
Vaucluse observed in June 1981 appeared to be extremely anarchic.
Members listened to speakers and simultaneously engaged in discussion 
with other delegates. In the less formal surroundings of the smaller 
Bouches-du-Rhône Federation committee, members engaged in wide-ranging 
discussions with varying views being exchanged. However, rather than 
seeking a clear-cut decision one way or another, the normal procedure 
was to blur any differences by accepting potentially contradictory views 
as equally valid.
Similarly the need to maintain a political and geographical equilibrium 
is also visible in the Federations. Within a department geographical 
differences usually also cover differences in types of agriculture and 
produce. For example, in the Charente in 1981, a MRG President from the 
centre of the department in the cognac-producing zone was matched by a 
PCF general secretary from the south of the department in a polycultural 
zone. An MRG vice-president was matched by a PCF treasurer and PS 
Executive members. In the Vaucluse the concern for political balance
has been even greater, given the more intense competition within the 
Left in Provence in general, and the Vaucluse in particular. The 
leading members of the Federation include a PCF President and PS 
vice-president from the centre of the department, a PCF assistant 
secretary from the eastern extremity of the department with non-aligned 
vice-presidents from the southern and western ends of the department.
The search for unanimity is a practice which exists at all levels of the 
organization. Indeed it is enshrined in the Constitution. Article 
Twenty Eight obliges leaders to search for unanimity. "Le Comité 
Directeur et le Bureau devront, avant tout vote, rechercher les 
solutions pouvant exprimer l'opinion unanime de l'organisation dans 
l'esprit d'unité". That this is not purely illusory is proved by the 
fact that voting in the Executive is extremely rare. One member 
interviewed pointed out that the disputes over the 1981 elections were 
the first problems not to be decided unanimously since his election to 
the leadership in the early 1970s. However, this unanimity is based on 
the assumption that reason and common interest will prevail. Once a 
problem is properly analyzed, only those with interests divergent from 
those of the mass of small and medium farmers can disagree.(18) What 
really happens usually is that differences are masked and unanimity 
equals confusion. It is this mode of operation which accounts for some 
of the contradictions analyzed in the chapter on MODEF ideology.
However, in the six months after May 1981 more decisions had to be made. 
Due to the tradition of non-conflictual debates, some of the changes 
which took place were masked and some activists had not yet realized the 
consequences. There was a risk of a backlash from certain sections of 
the organization when some socialist proposals accepted by MODEF would
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be put into practice. This was particularly the case for income tax 
reform and the product boards.
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A . THE LANDES FEDERATION
To the extent that one can talk of a dominant group within the MODEF 
leadership it is the Landes Federation representatives. Not only is the 
Landes the most powerful Federation, it has also been the traditional 
source of innovation within MODEF, as the example of the young farmers' 
organization, the Federation Nationale des Jeunes de MODEF (FNJ), 
described below shows.
The Landes has traditionally played a major role in the leadership of 
MODEF. The Federation leaders have usually occupied leading roles in 
the National Executive. Of the Executive elected in 1982, four members 
were officials of the Landes Federation, including the national 
treasurer, Franck Marcade. Only one other department, the Drome, had 
more than one representative in the Executive. Similarly the Landes, 
with five seats, was the department with most representatives on the 
National Council. (This did not include FNJ representatives from the 
Landes. )
This prominent position stems from the Federation's local successes.
Not only have its successes given it greater stature within MODEF but 
the fact that it has managed to create an administrative apparatus 
worthy of a FNSEA Federation means that its leaders have material 
support which other Federations lack. In terms of finance, expert
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advice, and even on the most basic level of secretarial support, its 
leaders are extremely privileged by comparison to their colleagues in 
other departments. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that the Landes 
has not played an even greater role in MODEF affairs, particularly since 
its innovation has sometimes been frustrated by the conservatism of the 
rest of the organization.
However, rather than provoke resentment against its prominent position, 
the Landes Federation was usually criticized for its refusal to take 
even more responsibility within the organization. Given the resources 
of the Federation it was argued that it should take some of the burden 
off the shoulders of national officials by taking administrative 
responsibility for the regions of Aquitaine and Midi-Pyrénées. The 
Landes Federation categorically refused to do so, not merely through 
lack of ambition or energy but because it believed that its members 
would resent paying subscriptions to subsidize other farmers. 
Furthermore, to extend its activities outside the confines of the 
department would, it believed, jeopardize the grants received from 
Landes bodies such as the Conseil Général. Even more importantly, to 
neglect the interests of the Landes in favour of other south-western 
departments would endanger its strong position in the Landes and the 
resources which allow it to make its distinctive contribution to the
national leadership.
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5. REGIONAL ORGANIZATION
Apart from the problems created by the geographical distribution of its 
members, MODEF has given more and more attention to the economic and 
demographic diversity of its membership. It has realized that the 
description "petit et moyen exploitant" in fact disguises a multitude of 
differences.
The reluctance of the Landes to accept responsibilities is indicative of 
the problems which HODEF has experienced in linking national and local 
concerns. In an effort to strengthen the apparatus and the link between 
the Federations and national headquarters, some regional Federations 
have been set up. For example, in March 1981, the MODEF Federations of 
Loir-et-Cher, Loiret, Cher, Eure-et-Loir and Indre-et-Loire set up the 
regional Federation for the Centre in order to "aider au développement 
de notre syndicat, de coordonner ses actions, et de lui permettre de 
s'exprimer sur le plan régional".(19) However, these regional 
organizations have a limited role with no authority over the 
Federations. The Poitou-Charentes region with a longstanding regional 
organization publishing its own newspaper is exceptional. Apart from 
this region, only Provence and Brittany had full-time officials with 
responsibility for the entire region. But even in these cases, the 
full-timers were expected to devote the greater part of their time and 
efforts to the dominant Federation - the Charente in Poitou-Charentes, 
the Vaucluse in Provence and the Côtes-du-Nord in Brittany. Given these 
constraints, regional organization has been confined to irregular 
meetings between Federation leaders to discuss specific problems as they 
arise. In this light, the weakness of MODEF implantation within a 
region is not simply based on differences in types of agriculture and 
local class structure. It can also be seen to be related to relative
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proximity to the leading Federation and to the regional headquarters.
For instance, in Provence MODEF is strongest in the Vaucluse and the 
border areas of the southern Drôme, western Alpes de Haute Provence and 
northern Bouches-du-Rhône. MODEF's position in the south of the Vienne, 
the north of the Gironde and the east of the Charente-Maritime as well 
as in eastern Finistère and western Ile-et-Vilaine confirm the 
importance of organizational resources.
But why has MODEF neglected regional organization so much? To some 
extent, MODEF's lack of interest in the region is typical of the 
problems which the regions have had to face. As various writers have 
pointed out, many of the regions are arbitrary administrative creations 
corresponding neither to historical borders nor to present-day economic 
zones. Since they are artificial, there is little popular regional 
consciousness. Furthermore, since Eckstein it has been taken for 
granted that pressure groups are moulded by the institutional 
environment in which they operate.(21) But for MODEF almost all the 
institutions with which it is concerned, the FDSEA, the Credit Agricole, 
the Conseil Général and the various official committees, are organized 
on a departmental basis. Indeed, since one of the main ways in which 
MODEF demonstrates its legitimacy and representative status is through 
participation in professional elections to the departmental Chambers of 
Agriculture, it is hardly surprising that the departmental Federation 
should be the fundamental unit of MODEF organization. More explicitly 
political concerns underlying this lack of interest in the region are 
discussed in Chapter 8
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6. THE SPECIALIST ORGANIZATIONS
Since 1975, MODEF has been formally a Confederation of departmental 
Federations and specialist organizations. These specialist organizations 
are of two main types, those concerned with particular products and 
those concerned with particular categories of the agricultural 
population. Of the former the main ones are the Association Nationale 
des Petits et Moyens Producteurs de Céréales, Oléagineux et Betteraves 
(ANPMPC) and the Association Nationale des Petits et Moyens Producteurs 
de Fruits et de Légumes (ANPMPEL). The latter are the Association 
Nationale des Anciens Exploitants (ANAE), the Section Nationale des 
Fermiers et Métayers (SNFM) and the most important, the Federation 
Nationale des Jeunes du MODEF (FNJ). The latter is analyzed separately. 
There is also an organization which combines the two concerns by 
organizing the producers of a specific product in a particular region - 
the Comité de Défense de la Viticulture Charentaise. Three motives have 
dictated this process of bureaucratic inbreeding. The official 
explanation is that specialist organizations are needed to develop 
detailed policies since Annnual General Meetings (AGMs), Conferences and 
the National Council do not have the time nor the knowledge to monitor 
developments and form policy on every issue. More importantly, the 
specialist organizations are designed to compete with the panoply of 
FNSEA-affiliated producer groups.(22) For example, the cereals 
association is designed to undermine the monopoly of the Association 
Générale des Producteurs du Blé (AGPB), an organization dominated by 
northern capitalist agriculture and extremely influential within the 
FNSEA. One of its activities was a campaign to prevent the 
co-operatives from automatically paying subscriptions for their members 
to the AGPB.(23) Most important of all, the creation of such 
organizations reflects the widespread apathy of farmers for the problems
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of other farmers. The specialist organizations are in a better position 
to appeal to the pockets rather than to the politics of potential 
supporters. Recognizing the need for constructive proposals as well as 
global denunciations, MODEF's specialist organizations are an attempt to 
avoid the political overtones of the organization as a whole.
In theory the specialist organizations are autonomous, linked to the 
Confederation by the purely formal means of affiliation. In practice 
they are inseparable from MODEF. The membership and leadership of these 
organizations are virtually the same as those of MODEF. That is to say 
that the membership of the specialist organizations is essentially 
comprised of members of MODEF eligible for membership of the 
organization in question.
MODEF also has a number of specialist committees such as the Wine 
Committee (Commission Nationale Viticole) and the Women's Committee 
(Commission Feminine) which are theoretically distinguished from 
specialist organizations by the fact that they do not have any autonomy. 
But in practice, the specialist organizations are little more than 
specialist committees. This is shown not only by their overlapping 
personnel but also by their passivity within MODEF. For example,
Article Eighteen of the constitution allows these organizations to 
nominate candidates for election to the national leadership. However, 
at the 1982 Conference, only the FNJ did so. Leaders are elected 
because of their departmental and national work for MODEF, not because 
they are the leaders of particular categories of farmers. Furthermore, 
despite the fact that these organizations may have separate membership 
cards and subscriptions, they do not have their own administrative 
personnel or newspaper. They must rely on L'Exploitant Familial. This
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lack, of resources means that these organizations are effectively limited 
to detailed study of particular problems and the elaboration of detailed 
proposals.
There are material and ideological inhibitions on the development of 
these organizations. Most obviously, MODEF just does not have the 
financial and administrative resources or a sufficiently large clientele 
to sustain such organizations. On the other hand, MODEF's own ideology 
militates against sectionalism. Since the vast majority of MODEF 
activists see their problems as resulting from political decisions and 
the role of the state in promoting the development of capitalist 
agriculture, technical questions seem secondary to them. The official 
boycott of MODEF by the state until 1981 both forced them into and 
confirmed them in such an attitude. Finally, even though MODEF accepted 
the reality of the fragmentation of interests amongst small and 
medium-scale farmers, there is still a reluctance to encourage such 
sectionalism. For MODEF, all small and medium-scale farmers, whatever 
their region or product, have an overriding common interest. MODEF's 
role is to make them aware of this. Sectional organization is therefore 
a threat to MODEF's aims.(24)
Two groups of the agricultural population deserve particular attention, 
women and young farmers. Traditionally, women were more or less 
excluded from agricultural organizations. Since such organizations were 
based on the concept of family representation, the head of the household 
participated on behalf of his entire family.(25) MODEF was no exception 
to this rule. In recent years, MODEF has attempted to involve women in 
its activity. A Women's Committee was created to further this aim.
This policy has largely been the work of MODEF's present general
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secretary, Frederic Lindenstaedt, who has made constant appeals to the 
Federations to involve farmers' wives in MODEF. This is not purely the 
result of an ideological commitment but also reflects a supremely 
practical concern. Given the decline of the farming population, it is 
an expensive luxury for any farming organization to forego the potential 
support of the female part of the agricultural population. This 
attitude is not confined to ritual appeals. Women are actively 
encouraged to participate at all levels. Women are over-represented in 
the leadership compared to their presence in the Federations. For 
example, at the 1982 Conference one in ten of the delegates was female. 
Even this was a higher proportion than the situation in the Federations 
would suggest. But the proportion increases to one in eight in the 
National Comittee and to one in seven in the Executive Committee.(26) 
This is, of course, yet another example of the process of co-option.
However, progress remains limited. The Women's Committee has an 
extremely shadowy existence, meeting infrequently and with virtually no 
organization in the Federations (except the Landes and the Var).(27) 
According to those involved the main problem is a total lack of interest 
on the part of the farmers' wives for involvement in any kind of 
organization. Women are blamed as much for their passivity as men for 
their conservatism. A further problem is that many farmers' wives have 
outside occupations and may have little interest in agriculture.(28)
The main problem is that the attempt to encourage women to participate 
by allocating top-level positions to women activists is self-defeating. 
The leaders of the Women's Committee have departmental and national 
responsibilities which prevent them from dedicating themselves to the 
organization of women and eventually changing the sex composition of
MODEF in the long run. For instance, the president of the Committee 
was already fully occupied by the tasks of vice-president of the 
Confederation and general of the Calvados Federation. These material 
are compounded by the traditional attitude amongst women activists on 
the Left, and particularly in the PCF, that separate organizations for 
women are a capitulation to the bourgeois idea that the fundamental 
political division is sex rather than class. "Nous ne voulons pas 
mettre les femmes d'un coté et les hommes de 1'autre."(29)
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7. THE FEDERATION NATIONALE DES JEUNES DU MODEF
The FNJ is the most developed and autonomous of MODEF's specialist 
organizations. It is also the one which has provoked the most 
controversy. When the idea was first advanced by Franck Marcade , one 
of the younger leaders of the Landes Federation, in 1964 he was 
denounced bitterly as a splitter.(30) It was felt that the organization 
had enough problems without creating divisions within it. Several other 
reasons which were not made explicit help to account for this hostility. 
Firstly, the example of the CNJA and its role in undermining the 
traditional rightist leadership of the FNSEA and as an ally of the 
government was still fresh in people's minds. Youth was associated with 
a modernizing rhetoric which really covered up a commitment to the 
capitalist transformation of agriculture. Secondly, many of the leaders 
of MODEF were themselves relatively young and did not feel that MODEF 
neglected the interests of young farmers. At the time of MODEF's 
foundation, its general secretary was only thirty-seven years old. Many 
other Federations were led by even more youthful activists. For example,
in the Vaucluse the leading militants were in their late twenties or 
early thirties. On the other hand, the older leaders were not 
favourable to the prospect of a diminishing influence over younger 
farmers. Finally, the problems which the PCF had encountered with its 
youth section in the 1960s created suspicion in the minds of PCF members 
in MODEF.
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Eventually the necessity for a separate young farmers' organization made 
itself clear to all but the most recalcitrant elements of the 
leadership. Encouraged by the success of the pioneering efforts of the 
Landes Federation, the FNJ was set up in 1972. This step resulted from 
a number of factors. Firstly, there was the growing realization that 
MODEF was no longer acting as a pressure group on the FNSEA and hoping 
that the policy and leadership of the FNSEA would change in a direction 
more acceptable to MODEF. MODEF itself was here to stay and would have 
to itself to become a fully fledged union, which it did 1975. At the 
same time the diminishing prospect of the kind of political change which 
would make MODEF superfluous after the debacle of 1968-69 impressed the 
need upon the leadership to prepare for the long-term future. The 
organization was now seen as a necessary means to an end, not simply one 
tactic among many.
Therefore there was a clear need to prepare future leaders to carry on 
the struggle after the first generation leaders had retired. Indeed by 
the early seventies many of the older members of this first generation 
were in need of replacement. In order to achieve this, the CNJA's 
monopoly of recruitment of young farmers had to be challenged. Since 
there were substantial differences in style between the CNJA and the 
FNSEA, one had to adopt different approaches depending on with which
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organization one was competing. Since such different styles could create 
tensions within MODEF, it was necessary for external (competition with 
the CNJA) and internal (maintaining unity) purposes that young farmers 
should be segregated from the wider organization.
Both MODEF and FNJ deny that there is any conflict of interest between 
young and old farmers. Such differences as exist are the result of the 
fact that young farmers have problems which are specific to them and 
that they have an entirely different political experience. Young 
farmers, for instance, face the problem of setting up in business for 
the first time with the associated difficulties of finding and then 
purchasing or renting land and equipment. Similarly young farmers are 
more likely to have more dealings with the Credit Agricole and with the 
various technical agencies responsible for monitoring their progress if 
they have presented a Development Plan - necessary to obtain the grants 
and cheaper loans which often make the difference between success or 
failure.
In political terms, as a leading MODEF official explained, the 
differences result from the fact that the older farmers have had to 
fight more wide-ranging and politicized battles.(31) Instead of 
fighting for modification of a law or resisting a ministerial order, the 
older men have had the experience of fighting for the establishment of 
an entirely new law, e.g. the Statut du Fermage et du Métayage. On the 
other hand, young farmers have much greater technical and economic 
knowledge than their fathers. The result is that one has to approach 
young farmers, of whatever political tendency, in a much less 
politicized way. "Il faut leur parler technique."(32) The attempt to 
combine the two approaches would lead to incomprehension.
Finally, there was probably an ulterior motive behind the realization 
that the CNJA had to be combatted directly rather than just regarded as 
a satellite of the FNSEA. Since the late 1960s and early 1970s was a 
period of intense political conflict within the CNJA, it became less and 
less realistic to denounce the CNJA in such terms. Whilst the official 
line of the CNJA was in direct opposition to MODEF policy, the left-wing 
opposition within the CNJA was more dangerous to MODEF. One should 
remember that this opposition came within a few votes of becoming a 
majority at the 1970 Blois Conference.(33) This opposition, which 
developed into the Paysan Travailleur tendency, appeared to threaten not 
only the CNJA/FNSEA monopoly of state recognition and their 
collaborationist policies but also undermined MODEF's virtual monopoly 
of opposition. The FNJ was necessary to undermine the Paysan 
Travailleur tendency just as much as it was needed to combat the CNJA.
As an autonomous organization, the FNJ is far more developed than any 
other specialist organization within MODEF. Yet its strength remains 
limited. On the one hand, it has its own finances and the more 
organized Federations were, even before 1981, able to obtain grants from 
local institutions, such as the Credit Agricole or the Conseil Général, 
which MODEF Federations could not get, on the grounds of vocational 
training, cultural improvement, etc. On the other hand, the overall 
financial position of the FNJ is extremely precarious. The Federations 
with money keep it to themselves whilst many others failed to capitalize 
on the opportunities to obtain such grants. Secondly, until December 
1981 the FNJ had its own full-time general secretary, Guy Berthomier.
The importance of this official in preserving the identity of the FNJ 
was not fully recognized until his resignation. His personalized style 
of administration was highly successful for the organization but at the
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same time camouflaged its weaknesses. With his departure the financial 
and administrative weaknesses were exposed. Finally, there is the 
question of the autonomy of the FNJ. The FNJ has its own elected 
leadership elected by its own national Conference. Its members are 
chosen on the grounds of their activity in the FNJ rather than in the 
Confederation. Young farmers elected to the MODEF leadership on 
regional lists are not considered representatives of the FNJ, and indeed 
are regarded with some suspicion by FNJ activists. However the question 
of the relationship between MODEF and the FNJ is the greatest source of 
controversy within the Confederation, outweighing any conflicts inspired 
by political divisions. The resignation of the FNJ general secretary 
was a symptom of an underlying malaise. There is a contradiction 
between the existence of the FNJ as an autonomous organization and its 
role as an integral part of MODEF. This is accentuated by the 
administrative informality of the organization. Decisions are likely to 
be taken by one official which, strictly speaking, are the province of 
another. In practice the autonomy of the FNJ is jeopardized.
The basic problem is that the number of effective FNJ Federations is 
inadequate to support a separate administration. As Berthomier's 
successor as FNJ general secretary admitted, the FNJ could not exist 
without MODEF.(34) Even though the idea of the FNJ has been accepted, 
there are many departments where the idea of a young farmers' Federation 
does not arouse enthusiasm. The FNJ claims to exist in twenty-four 
departments but only in eight, the Charente, Charente-Maritime, 
Côtes-du-Nord, Drôme, Finistère, Gers, Tarn-et-Garonne and of course the 
Landes, does the FNJ have an effective separate existence. In some 
departments the absence of the FNJ is the result of the absence of any 
significant numbers of young farmers. Other Federations are too small to
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maintain two separate organizations in the department. On the other 
hand, many Federations have made little effort to organize a FNJ 
Federation. In the worst cases, some Federations appear to have done 
everything they can to prevent the emergence of a young farmers' 
Federation by co-opting any potential leaders of such a Federation into 
the departmental hierarchy of the MODEF Federation. The Vaucluse is a 
noted example of this type of MODEF Federation. Although this is 
sometimes regarded as deliberate sabotage, the more probable explanation 
of this behaviour is that it reflects a short-sighted view of the role 
of the FNJ.(35) Since the FNJ is designed to supply a new generation of 
leaders, rather than allowing young leaders to carry on the work, of 
organizing the FNJ until they reach the age limit of thirty-five, the 
MODEF Federation snatches them as soon as possible. But since this kind 
of cradle snatching cannot take place without the consent of the victim, 
this demonstrates that not even young farmers are entirely convinced of 
the need for the FNJ. However, one would expect that MODEF leaders, as 
farmers, would realize that harvesting the crop before it is ripe is 
likely to have disastrous consequences.
It is true that certain militants were aware of the possibility of such 
problems arising and argued, at the foundation of the FNJ, that it 
should not be part of MODEF itself but should work with MODEF as an 
independent ally. Agreement would be negotiated on specific issues 
rather than being taken for granted. This position was rejected on both 
political and practical grounds. The lack of resources made total 
ndependence impractical. It is a view which has usually been 
expressed as a result of anger at a particular MODEF decision but which 
has been rejected by even the most critical elements of the FNJ 
leadership.(36)
Paradoxically, the FNJ pursuit of greater autonomy has been based on a 
strategy of seeking greater representation within MODEF on the 
assumption that having greater responsibility within MODEF would mean 
greater possibilities of bartering with the autonomy of the FNJ. The 
danger in such a strategy is that the FNJ leaders are prematurely drawn 
into devoting more and more time to MODEF business, thus cutting the 
head off the organization, and leading to the FNJ repeating, at the 
national level, the failures apparent in the departments. The leaders 
find themselves in a dilemma, whether to represent MODEF in the FNJ or 
the FNJ in MODEF.
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The limited success of the FNJ presents a serious problem for the future 
of MODEF. The young men who created MODEF are, in many cases, coming to 
the end of their careers. The problem is particularly acute when one 
looks at the full-time officials of MODEF. To judge by the 1982 
Conference, MODEF has sufficient replacements for the lay members of the 
national leadership. The real problem is at the extremes of the 
pyramid. Replacing the full-time officials will be extremely difficult 
since all elected officials of MODEF must be farmers themselves. Given 
the problems involved in entering into the profession, those involved 
are likely to be extremely dedicated to farming and will not be easily 
persuaded to effectively give up farming in the interests of the 
organization. The other problem is the replacement of departmental 
leaders in those Federations which have neglected or obstructed the 
development of the FNJ and the training of future leaders. This 
accounts for all but the handful of MODEF Federations named above. Of 
these, the Landes is in the most comfortable position being able to 
simultaneously maintain a viable FNJ Federation and place young 
activists in positions of responsibility. For example, the MODEF 
President of the Mutualité Sociale Agricole of the Landes (MSA) elected
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in 1981, Michel Barrouilhet, was the youngest man to hold this office in 
the country.
In the short term, MODEF can continue to neglect the problem. Indeed 
for most of the 1980s, placing younger militants in positions of 
responsibility will involve sacrificing present certainties for future 
risks. Put another way, ageing is simply a reflection of continuity. In 
the early 1980s MODEF had a highly experienced and in many cases 
respected national and departmental leadership. For example, Raymond 
Mineau's role in the world of Charente and French agricultural unionism 
began in 1947. Similarly though Frederic Lindenstaedt's role in the 
MODEF leadership began in 1973, he first came to attention as secretary 
of the Tenant's Section of the Lot-et-Garonne FDSEA in the 1950s. 
Similarly in the departments, there are many leaders whose active role 
in agricultural affairs began in the 1940s. In many cases the present 
leaders of MODEF Federations are the men who led the organizations into, 
or created, MODEF in 1959-60. For example, in 1982, the Presidents of 
the Federations of the Landes, Vaucluse, Corrèze and Charente-Maritime 
had been intimately involved in their Federations since the beginning. 
The rejuvenation of MODEF in the 1980s involves replacing men who have 
attained a quasi-notable status with younger, less and less well-known 
men - a development which has obvious risks which restrict the 
enthusiasm for change.
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8. MODEF AS CAMPAIGNER
This section is concerned with the forms which MODEF's campaigning 
activity has taken and the reasons for these forms. It will be shown 
that MODEF concentrated on political targets and that it effectively 
abandoned the representation of the short-term economic interests of 
agriculture to the FNSEA. This reflects both the material constraints 
upon MODEF and the ideology of the organization.
MODEF's protest activity is well documented by its own press, and to a 
lesser extent, by the regional press. An examination of the MODEF press 
and the regional dailies, La Marseillaise and La Charente Libre, for the 
period January-September 1981 shows the following incidents. The year 
began with a group of MODEF demonstrators surprising the Minister of 
Agriculture, Pierre Mehaignerie, in his mayoral office in Vitré 
(Ile-et-Vilaine) and forcing him to engage in a dialogue with MODEF 
leaders that he had hitherto refused. Later that month the MODEF 
Federations of the Charente and Charente-Maritime demonstrated against 
increased duties placed upon pineau and cognac (the staple industries of 
the region) by the government.(37) In February, the Landes Federation 
demonstrated against the prohibition of the BACO hybrid vine by the 
government.(38) In March, the south-western Federations joined together 
in Auch to protest against the extension of the EEC.(39) Further north, 
the Sarthe Federation demonstrated against a court decision to expel a 
tenant farmer from his farm. One of MODEF's rare protests against an 
economic target occurred in the Côtes-du-Nord where the Federation 
demonstrated against a dairy which had discontinued its collection from 
one of the Federation's members. In Angoulême, the Federation organized 
a direct sale, in conjunction with the Confederation Générale du Travail
(CGT), to the workforce of an armaments factory in the suburbs. This 
was followed by a demonstration outside the MSA and the Prefecture over 
social security contributions.(40) In April the Landes Federation 
participated in a demonstration organized by machinery co-operatives 
against the government's alleged discrimination against 
co-operatives.(41) Then came the elections and a period of truce until 
July when the fruit, vegetable and wine growers of the Midi erupted on 
to the scene.
The Federations of the Bouches-du-Rhône and the Vaucluse were involved 
in a demonstration at the Chateaurenard market and the subsequent 
invasion of the Tarascon tax office.(41) MODEF activists from the 
Hérault were also involved in the most spectacular of the summer's 
protests, a protest which finally forced the government to act - the 
storming of a Greek tanker and the destruction of its cargo of 8,750 
hectolitres of Italian wine.(42) Throughout the summer the MODEF 
Federations of the Aude, Hérault, Gard, Bouches-du-Rhône and Vaucluse 
participated in the checks made on foreign lorries for potential imports 
of wine, vegetables and fruit.(43)
The wide variety of grievances which this activity reveals is a serious 
problem for MODEF.(44) It reflects the attitude which dominates most 
farmers' concerns. Increasing specialization and the diminishing 
agricultural population means that mobilization of farmers is much more 
difficult now than in the past. The minimum viable region for a 
demonstration has passed from the canton to at least half a 
department.(45) Many farmers display a total lack of interest in the 
problems of products other than their own. Even when they do show some
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interest, their opinions may differ. For example, whilst the MODEF 
leader responsible for the wine sector claims that there is no need 
whatever for Italian imports, many MODEF activists in the AOC Côtes du 
Rhône zone of the Vaucluse believe that such imports are necessary in 
order to strengthen the low alcoholic content vins de table of the 
Hërault and the Aude.(46) This lack of solidarity reduces the potential 
number of participants in particular manifestations of protest whilst at 
the same time reducing the possibility of organizing action on more 
general grievances.
Another important feature of these activities is that in the vast 
majority of cases the action was peaceful. This is almost a principle 
rather than a tactic with MODEF. For example whilst MODEF participates 
in motorway road blocks in order to stop lorries carrying imported goods 
and to destroy their cargo, it rejects the use of unnecessary violence 
such as the burning of lorries or the beating of drivers. Mineau summed 
up the MODEF attitude towards the use of force in an interview with La 
Nouvelle Critique in 1972.(47) Basically MODEF is "contre ces actions 
de dépradations et autres qui se retournent contre nous en fin de 
compte". On the one hand, farmers themselves may be the victims of 
violent actions:
Nous n'irons pas scier les poteaux téléphoniques, parce que nous 
avons davantage le sens paysan que certain gauchistes qu'sont 
parfois manoeuvrés. En effet, scier des poteaux téléphoniques, 
c'est bien joli, mais c'est isoler un village qu'est peut-être à 
deux kilomètres de là.
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More importantly, ill-considered violence can alienate the urban 
population whose support the farmers need. "Nous cherchons en tout cas 
à ne pas faire supporter à l'éxecutant la responsabilité de ceux qui 
ordonnent, c'est-à-dire le gouvernement, le pouvoir, les grands 
capitalistes et les grands agrariens..." For example, attacks on 
railvaymen are condemned because "ils nous coupent de la masse des 
travailleurs et nous perdons de notre force dans la bataille". In this 
respect, MODEF's views are indistinguishable from those of the PCF or 
the CGT. MODEF leaders are proud of their relative success in taming 
the unruly instincts which have caused so many farmers' demonstrations 
to end in violence. After MODEF's first demonstration in Brussels in 
February, 1982, MODEF leaders commended their members for their 
behaviour. According to MODEF, the Belgian riot police were surprised 
to find French farmers in Brussels who had not come looking for a fight, 
unlike the annual FNSEA protests in the city. Similarly road blocks are 
designed to guarantee safety for both demonstrators and motorists and 
are timed to disrupt economic rather than social life. Road blocks are 
set up at a time when they delay people going to work rather than on 
their way home or in their spare time. For example, the action of the 
CDJA of Alpes de Haute Provence in setting up road blocks on a Sunday 
afternoon was bitterly denounced by the MODEF Federation.(48) As far as 
MODEF was concerned, such an action could only serve the interests of 
the Right. Another important criteria for MODEF was that protest actions 
should involve as many farmers as possible rather than be restricted to 
small "commandos". Such actions create a sensation rather than 
enlightenment.(49) They permit the media to concentrate on the protest 
itself rather than on the grievances of the protestors. The different 
styles of MODEF and the FNSEA in this respect was demonstrated clearly 
in their reactions to the crisis on the fruit and vegetables markets in
the summer of 1981. Whilst MODEF in the Bouches-du-Rhône organized 
direct sales in working class estates in Marseilles with the assistance 
of the CGT, the Vaucluse FDSEA organized a commando raid in Avignon. At 
the height of the Theatre Festival, fifteen trucks arrived in the city 
centre, discharged their loads of fruit and vegetables in front of the 
Town Hall and promptly disappeared without the slightest explanation. 
Dumbfounded tourists were only brought to their senses by the outbreak 
of a mini-riot after tomatoes and pears were thrown at the police in 
which the author's political education was completed by a dose of tear 
gas.
The one exception to this rejection of "commando" protest was part of 
MODEF's campaign for official recognition. The surprise visit to Pierre 
Mehaignerie was only the most spectacular of a series of similar events. 
Raymond Barre was also caught by surprise in a visit to the Vaucluse in 
1978.(50) Though this involves a certain amount of intimidation, it 
cannot be regarded in the same light as the treatment which FNSEA 
activists accorded to socialist ministers after May 1981, particularly 
to the Minister of Agriculture in February 1982.
MODEF has also had some influence in preventing the kind of anti-trade 
union protest which FNSEA leaders have been only too willing to 
countenance, or indeed organize. As MODEF points out, agricultural 
organization has traditionally been hostile to the labour movement and 
many MODEF activists would regard political neutralization of farmers as 
a victory, let alone winning them over to the Left.(51) Unlike a leader 
such as Alexis Gourvennec, one of the angry young men of the CNJA in the 
early 1960s, who responded to a CGT strike at the port of Roscoff by 
organizing a gang of farmers to smash the picket line, MODEF sees such
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actions as ineffective in the short-term and politically damaging for 
the farmers' cause in the long-term.(52) However this attitude is not 
simply a reflection of the political affiliations of MODEF leaders and 
activists but also due to a more general conception that protest should 
be aimed against those responsible for the problems of farmers rather 
than their powerless subordinates.
Finally, despite MODEF's reluctance to get involved in violence, it 
should not be assumed that it is a pacifist organization. It is simply 
that it does not wish to incite violence but it will not run away from a 
fight. As Hineau pointed out to La Nouvelle Critique, MODEF would 
consider itself justified to involve itself in:
toute action contre l'éviction de familles de métayers avec des 
méthodes musclées, des méthodes vigoureuses, pour empêcher la 
spéculation, pour s'opposer à l'achat des terres en faussant les 
enchères.
Later in the interview Mineau defended the farmers who fought pitched 
battles with the CRS in the towns of the Midi in February 1971 since, he 
argues, they were only protecting themselves against police 
brutality.(53)
As we have seen, MODEF concentrated on political targets - on prefects, 
government departments and ministers. Even in clear-cut cases where 
private enterprise was the guilty party, MODEF preferred to pressurize 
the state to force private concerns to conform to the law or to adopt a 
more reasonable policy rather than to directly confront private
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enterprise. Both the Charente and the Vaucluse provide perfect examples 
of this tendency. For example, in the Charente, MODEF vas faced with 
the problem of the persistent violation of the agreement drawn up by the 
Bureau National Inter-Professionnel du Cognac (BNIC) and given legally 
binding status by the government.(54) Rather than address itself to the 
cognac merchants, or to the famous firm considered to be the worst 
offender, MODEF protested to the BNIC and in particular to the 
government representative within the BNIC. Similarly faced with a 
disastrous collapse of prices, MODEF in the Vaucluse and 
Bouches-du-Rhône reacted by appealing to the state and invading 
government premises. The local or regional offices of the firms 
responsible for foreign imports, alleged to be the source of the 
problem, were left untroubled. This behaviour is one of the FNSEA's 
major criticisms of MODEF - that it was concerned only to embarrass the 
government, not to resolve the problems of farmers by giving them a 
greater place in the economic institutions of agriculture and 
agro-industry. For example, one of MODEF's leading adversaries in the 
Charente claims that in a dispute between farmers and a dairy firm,
MODEF protested against the government despite the fact that the prefect 
was actively involved in supporting the farmers against the firm.(55)
Apart from the temptation to attack the government for political 
reasons, there were several material and ideological reasons for such a 
strategy. In the first place, the administrative weakness of MODEF 
encouraged the politicization of economic issues. Given that there was 
no research department within the organization, analysis of new 
political and economic developments and new legislation had to be 
carried out by an already hard-pressed leadership. Given the lack of
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time and resources there was a natural tendency to cut corners by 
substituting a global political critique for a concrete analysis of 
advantages and disadvantages. But without such detailed knowledge it is 
extremely difficult to fight economic battles. Secondly, there is the 
problem of sectionalism. On the one hand, agro-alimentary industry is 
so dispersed into relatively small firms operating in specific product 
markets in specific regions that a strategy for a national economic 
conflict would be extremely difficult to elaborate.(56) The 
sectionalism of the industrialists only reinforces the sectionalism of 
the farmers. Since each product has its own problems with different 
firms, it would be even more difficult than it already is to unite the 
entire organization on certain demands. As will be seen in Chapter 6, 
this helps explain the emphasis which MODEF has placed on the one issue 
which concerns all farmers - social security contributions.
The traditional tendency to hold the state responsible for "la pluie et 
le beau temps" must also be considered. This is considered in more 
detail in Chapter 5. There is a long and respectable tradition of 
criticizing the government for everything.(57) This should not be 
regarded as irrational or backward but nevertheless represents an 
abdication of responsibility which has permitted French political 
culture to be characterized by the cynical remark - "le coeur a gauche, 
la portefeuille a droite". The other side of the coin is that 
governments have behaved as if "la pluie et le beau temps" was their 
responsibility. The existence of the prefect as a sort of local head of 
state and the arrogance of the administration in general has also 
contributed to the popular view which sees them as the root of all 
injustice.
A further reason for concentrating on political rather than economic 
targets is that whilst government and administration are seen as remote 
and technocratic, the same is not true of the firms involved in 
supplying goods to and purchasing goods from agriculture. On the one 
hand, many of these firms are co-operatives in which farmers themselves 
are the shareholders. Since these organizations are controlled by the 
farmers themselves, or at least their leaders, there are great 
inhibitions on demonstrating against them.(58) Similarly the 
small-scale nature of many of the firms in the industry means that there 
is often a large amount of face-to-face contact with industrialists and 
merchants which inhibits protest. Economic elites exercise a more 
direct influence on farmers than do political elites. Even in MODEF 
there is widespread acceptance of the idea that the interests of the 
small and medium firms converge with those of the farmers themselves.
This is particularly the case in Provence where the decline in the 
number of farmers has been paralleled by a decline in the numbers of 
local firms purchasing at the local markets.(59)
On the other hand, this direct relationship also means that economic 
elites have a more direct capacity for retaliation than political 
elites. Though deaths and serious injuries have taken place, in general 
those who demonstrate against political institutions risk little more 
than a breath of tear-gas. But to do so against the firms involved in 
the industry can result in the effective loss of one's livelihood. Such 
firms can retaliate by refusing to purchase one's produce.
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A particularly interesting example is the fruit and vegetable market at 
Chateaurenard in the Bouches-du-Rhône. To the outsider, this market, the 
largest of its kind in Europe, is totally anarchical. Hundreds of 
farmers arrive from the Vaucluse, Gard, Ardèche, Drôme and 
Bouches-du-Rhône between six and seven a.m. each morning. Their produce 
is displayed over an area of 200 acres whilst the agents of the 
merchants patrol the grounds, picking out merchandise which suits their 
requirements. After a brief haggle, the farmer takes his goods to the 
merchant's depot or awaits the next offer. It would appear that the 
farmer is in a position of complete uncertainty. In reality, the chaos 
is reduced by the fact that there are often longstanding links between 
individual farmers and buyers which mean that particular farmers get 
privileged treatment from particular buyers. The farmers of the commune 
of Chateaurenard itself benefit most of all from such arrangements.
The other side of the coin is that the farmer is placed in a state of 
personal dependency upon the buyers. In order to maintain his 
privileged situation, the farmer is necessarily hindered in doing 
anything to create a more organized market since to do so would be to 
disrupt the informal relationships. This is one of the main reasons why 
Chateaurenard has traditionally been a right-wing oasis in a leftist 
desert, known locally as the "Vendée provençale".(60)
MODEF's tendency to politicize issues is also a reflection of the 
political options of its leaders and activists. This does not mean 
simply that they wished to attack right-wing governments and draw their 
supporters towards the parties of the Left, there are also less direct 
ideological considerations involved. On the one hand, MODEF, along with 
the parties of the Left, has been permeated by a certain conception of
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the capitalist state. The theory of monopoly state capitalism is only a 
more sophisticated version of the concepts of "le mur d'argent" and "les 
200 families" prevalent in the inter-war period.(61) This theory 
undermines the distinction between politics and economics. The state and 
capital are becoming increasingly interlinked whilst capital itself is 
constantly being concentrated in fewer and fewer firms. The state is 
therefore the representative of an ever-diminishing group, the owners 
and managers of large-scale capital. The lesson which is often drawn in 
practice is that the state is responsible for capitalism, rather than 
capitalism being responsible for the state. A further consequence of 
this instrumentalist form of vulgar Marxism is that individuals and 
groups are seen as prisoners of their socio-economic positions. It is 
therefore regarded as a waste of time to attempt to challenge the agents 
of economic organizations since they are only doing what the laws of 
capitalism oblige them to do.
At the same time, there is the syndicalist tradition of twentieth 
century popular organizations. This "apolitical" syndicalism defined by 
the Amiens Charter of the CGT formally excluding political 
considerations from professional organization has meant the opposite in 
practice. The formal refusal to ally with a political party means that 
the barrier erected in other countries by the explicit division of 
labour between union and party does not exist. The union is therefore 
led to participate directly in political conflicts. The combination of 
these two tendencies leads MODEF to fall between the Marxist and 
revolutionary syndicalist stools. On the one hand, the Marxist idea 
that it is necessary to overthrow the state in order to achieve 
long-term economic objectives is accepted. On the other hand, this task 
devolves to the union rather than the party. In the period of MODEF's
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existence when revolution and reforms have been confused by the PCF, 
where revolution is seen as a series of reforms, the consequence is the 
tendency of organizations like MODEF to concentrate on political reforms 
rather than on the short-term direct economic interests of their 
members. In MODEF's case there has been an uneasy tension between 
political intervention and angry denials of political involvement. It 
is this kind of tension which led one MODEF official to make a 
distinction between "la politique économique" et "la politique 
politicienne". The former is legitimate territory for MODEF whilst the 
latter must not be allowed to interfere with the unity of the 
organization.(62)
9. MODEF AS SOCIAL WORKER
It has already been seen in the previous chapter how important the 
question of personal leadership has been to MODEF. But the nature of 
such leadership has not been discussed. The analysis of the contacts 
between MODEF activists and supporters reveals the necessity to combine 
ideological appeal with a service role. The ability to mobilize support 
for the kinds of activity described in the preceding pages depends on 
maintaining close contacts between activists and supporters. This has 
been done in two ways; firstly by maintaining permanent structures at 
the level of the commune or canton; secondly by providing services to
individuals.
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MODEF's activity reflects the seasonal nature of agricultural workloads. 
In general, protest has been concentrated in the summer months when the 
difficulties of disposing of the harvest are at their most acute.
During the winter most farmers have a relatively light workload and are 
therefore available for less pressing action so this has been the period 
where the Federations concentrate on their internal organization, 
holding meetings in as many villages as possible. Such meetings serve 
three purposes, education, recruitment and organization. The events of 
the past year and likely developments in the next are analyzed in order 
to draw the necessary conclusions about the future role of MODEF. 
Secondly, they are used for recruitment purposes where new members could 
acquire the basics of the organization's programme. Finally, 
organizational requirements are met by electing branch officials for the 
coming year. Similarly, the Federations use the opportunity of the 
respite provided by the winter to deal with their departmental 
organizational needs.
Nevertheless, the greater part of the efforts of MODEF activists are 
devoted to resolving the individual problems of their supporters.
Farmers confronted with complex issues placed before them by the 
administration call upon local leaders to deal with them. Common 
examples include sorting out tax demands, social security contributions 
demands, difficulties in getting a pension, etc. As far as his 
supporters are concerned, the primary role of the MODEF activist is that 
of a social worker. His legitimacy therefore derives from his ability 
as a "fixer" and his understanding of administrative rules, regulations 
and procedure. The campaigning role is secondary.
This view is freely admitted by MODEF activists. Given the lack of 
administrative services in MODEF, supporters are forced to address 
themselves to local leaders. Indeed, the importance of this role is 
accepted, if not explicitly encouraged, by the fact that Federations 
hold surgeries throughout the department. For example, the Drome 
Federation holds regular surgeries at Chabreuil, Remuzat, Nyons, 
Taulignan, Die, Bourdeaux, Loriol, Mirabel, St. Vallier, St. 
Barthelemy-de-Vais, Dieulefit, and Romans.(63) Those interviewed agreed 
that a large part of MODEF's support comes from individuals who had 
received such assistance or those who, insuring themselves against 
future risks, felt they might require aid in the future. Indeed, one 
National Council member argued that MODEF has been much more effective 
in defending individual rather than collective interests.(64) Though 
there is agreement on the importance of such clientelistic practices, 
there are differences over their desirability. Many activists, 
particularly the older ones, derive their sense of legitimacy and 
satisfaction from their role as social workers which usually permits 
them to achieve results as opposed to the limited success they enjoy as 
campaigning crusaders against government policy.
Others, particularly amongst the young, dislike this role. This is 
partly for ideological reasons, reasons made explicit in MODEF's own 
ideology. MODEF has always argued that farmers must free themselves 
from political subordination by refusing to base their political and 
professional choices on personalities.(65) Ironically, Marcel Ginoux, 
one of MODEF's own notables and PCF substitute deputy for Arles, 
identified the major difference between MODEF and the FNSEA as the 
attitude towards the relations between leaders and led. MODEF is seen 
as the egalitarian "syndicat de revendication" as opposed to the
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hierarchical FNSEA, "le syndicat de service". On a more practical 
level, some MODEF activists worry about the consequence of social 
work-style operations. The concentration on individual grievances 
represents a danger to the organization since it creates loyalty to 
individual leaders rather than to the organization itself. This in turn 
leads to the danger that leaders operate as autonomous territorial 
chieftains rather than as members of a collective leadership. We have 
already seen how such patterns of loyalty have inhibited the 
rejuvenation of MODEF.
The problem for the anti-social work tendency is that MODEF did not 
invent clientelist practices in rural France. Organized clientelism 
dates back to at least the July Monarchy.(66) Neither is it specific to 
rural France as Southern Italy or the cities of Nice, Marseille and 
Lille show.(67) Given the role of agricultural organizations in France 
in supplying goods and services to their members, it is hardly 
surprising that MODEF should have had to conform to such expectations. 
Even if the entire organization was united in hostility to these 
practices, the problem would remain since the clients would demand 
services anyway. For example, even the dynamic Landes Federation had to 
adapt itself to its more conservative members. Unlike the FNSEA VAT 
services, the MODEF service in the Landes made no attempt at assisting 
its clients to draw up their own returns. It simply did the work for 
them and handed them completed documents.(68) MODEF's dilemma was that 
it was trapped in a position where it was obliged despite itself to 
engage in clientelistic practices in an effort to bring about a society 
where such relationships would be absent. The ultimate goal hindered 
the immediate needs of the organization required to attain the goal, and 
vice versa. The result has been that MODEF activists have acted in such
230
a way that though its most successful leaders have attained virtual 
notable status, this was done in an apologetic and almost accidental 
manner. The organization itself has not made systematic use of the 
opportunities available to engage in a collective clientelism. A 
glaring example is the failure of the Landes Federation to use the 
Chamber of Agriculture as an instrument of control during the period in 
which it was in MODEF hands.(69)
The 1982 Conference saw MODEF reiterate its desire to to base its 
appeal in terms of ideology and policy than personality:
Sans doute devons-nous nous attacher à rendre service aux 
agriculteurs, leur faire des démarches, remplir des papiers, mais 
ne nous faisons pas d'illusions, sur ce terrain, nous ne battrons 
pas la FNSEA... Bien entendu, certaines de nos Federations ont les 
moyens de rendre ces services et elles doivent le faire, mais ce ne 
doit pas être l'essentiel. C'est l'action syndicale qui doit 
primer. C'est cela qu'il faut faire comprendre aux 
agriculteurs.(70)
In consequence, the official position of the organization hindered it in 
its rivalry with the FNSEA. The FNSEA enjoys the best of both worlds. 
Whilst its leaders and activists were able to negotiate with government 
and or to campaign occasionally on issues such as prices, its 
administrative apparatus dealt with the clientelistic tasks. It was 
able to present itself as a modernizing force to the outside world 
whilst perpetuating more traditional hierarchical patterns in the 
countryside. The division of labour between employees and activists 
masked the contradiction. MODEF, on the other hand, was unable to
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ignore the contradiction. Its ideology undermined the practice of many 
of its activists, a practice which played a major role in MODEF's 
relative success. This ideological block contributes also to the 
understanding of why the success has been only relative. MODEF's 
attempt to compete with FNSEA in ideological terms was therefore doomed 
to limited success unless the negotiating and campaigning of FNSEA 
activists became divorced from the role of the FNSEA administration. 
There are signs that this happened to a certain extent. The phenomen of 
dual membership of MODEF and the FNSEA, which MODEF leaders believe is 
quite prevalent, is an indication. More politicized members of the FNSEA 
may have adhered to MODEF in order to campaign more vigorously against 
the government. At the same time, less scrupulous MODEF members are 
alleged to have joined the FNSEA in order to benefit from its services. 
However, for this divorce to become final, it would require the 
achievement of the FNSEA's formal objective of liberating farmers from 
their social and economic subordination - an objective which is against 
the interests of the leaders and the bureaucracy of the FNSEA.
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10. MEANS VS ENDS
The literature on the sociology of organization and social movements has 
raised a particularly important question of relevance to the MODEF 
issue. Since Michels, writers have devoted a great deal of attention to 
the question of "institutional needs" and the tendencies of 
organizations to pursue their own interests rather than those of their 
members which they formally exist to defend.(71) His concept of the 
iron law of oligarchy, according to which the bureaucracy of an 
organization becomes dominant, virtually irremoveable, socially distinct 
from the organization's members and brings about a situation in which 
"....from a means, organization becomes an end..." has been the basis 
for many studies in organizational conservatism.(72)
Less subtle writers have fallen into the trap of what Hyman describes as 
re-ification.(73) Organizations are attributed personalities whilst the 
fact that it is individuals who form organizations is forgotten. So is 
the distinction between the interests of the membership and those of the 
organization. Such "institutional needs" have been identified by Hyman 
and Fryer as: "security and stability, financial solvency and strength, 
unity and cohesion and administrative efficiency."(74)
In general, not only is it assumed that these considerations undermine 
the pursuit of formal objectives, but that they are usually decisive in 
determining the behaviour of the organization. Hyman and Panitch are 
exceptional in denying the validity of the latter part of this 
assumption.(75) Hyman identified three main countervailing factors; the 
necessity for leaders to provide sufficient benefits to maintain the 
loyalty of members, the democratic preconceptions of activists and many
leaders and the existence of local centres of opposition.(76) To this 
list could be added the existence of rival alternative or even 
alternating leaderships.
The MODEF experience inspires three questions. The first two are 
orthodox; to what extent has MODEF acquired 'institutional needs' and 
how much influence have these 'needs' had upon its behaviour? The final 
one is perhaps more original, are 'institutional needs' necessarily in 
conflict with membership needs?
As this chapter has shown, MODEF's bureaucracy has not had much scope to 
develop. Its material weakness has been compounded by the ideological 
traditions of farm unionism, particularly the requirement that leaders 
must be active farmers. Full-time officials have therefore been 
materially prevented and ideologically obstructed from substituting 
themselves for the lay leaders. MODEF's outsider status in agricultural 
officialdom has further weakened the bureaucracy since there were no 
national negotiations in which to engage. Consequently expertise took 
second place to the capacity for creating personal clientelistic 
networks.
The absence of bureaucratic domination within MODEF led to the 
downgrading of 'institutional needs'.(77) Administrative efficiency as 
an end in itself went by the board for the simple reason that too few 
people in the organization had anything to gain from it. As for 
security and stability, this has not been a major concern, particularly 
before the decision to finally register as a union in 1975. Though the 
decision to change its legal status has not been particularly important 
in terms of the operation of MODEF, it does reveal a great deal about
the state of mind of the leadership. For most of its history, MODEF 
itself has not even been seen as a necessary means, let alone an end.
It was caught between the fear that successful capitalist 
rationalization would eradicate its social base and the hope that the 
FNSEA majority would finally see the light and properly defend the 
interests of the family farm. Even in more recent years, the chequered 
history of the FNJ shows that long-term strength has been sacrificed to 
short-term expediency.
As to finance, the lack of interest in such problems within MODEF is 
legendary. It would appear that there has been an almost deliberate 
policy of tying the hands of the apparatus with the chains of poverty.
Or, as one leader described MODEF's financial resources: "Celles que 
nous avons actuellement en certains departements sont toute juste 
suffisantes pour acheter des fleurs pour 1'enterrement de 1'exploitat ion 
familiale".(78)
It is nevertheless true that unity has been a major concern of MODEF, a 
concern not only enshrined in its Constitution but also deeply embedded 
in its decision-making practices. Indeed the lack of bureaucracy has 
been compensated by a surfeit of unity. Discipline by unity rather than 
bureaucracy has sustained the organization. But given MODEF's largely 
oppositional role under the de Gaulle-Pompidou-Giscard regimes, this 
emphasis on unity could not have been said to have been inimical to the 
pursuit of formal objectives. The aggregation of grievances, although 
not a primary aim in itself, was a concomitant to the fundamental aim - 
the defence of the family farm. The early stages of the Mitterrand 
regime saw some indications that unity and the defence of the family 
farm were no longer compatible when MODEF was obliged to take definite
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decisions which could have an impact on agricultural policy-making.
This demonstrates that there is no necessary conflict between formal 
objectives and institutional needs. That depends on the context. It 
was the context of the ghetto which accounted for the pre-eminence of 
MODEF's formal objectives over its institutional needs. The next two 
chapters deal with the ideological stability of MODEF as a result of 
this ghettoization and the nature of the isolation in which MODEF 
existed with respect to the major institutions of agriculture.
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CHAPTER 5 CLASS, STATE AND NATION: THE IDEOLOGY OF MODEF
1. INTRODUCTION
This chapter is concerned with MODEF'S view of agricultural society and 
its relations with the nation state and the international economy. The 
reasons for devoting so much attention to ideology are threefold. In 
the first place, political life in France has been characterized by the 
clash of ideologies rather than by the incrementalist conflicts unjustly 
associated with Anglo-Saxon politics. To determine an organization's 
position in the political spectrum it is therefore necessary to examine 
its ideology. Secondly, MODEF's ideology has played a major role in 
determining its organizational structure and the campaigning methods 
described in the previous chapter. Finally, in MODEF's case, ideology 
has an added importance. To a large extent, for MODEF activists, the 
word is the deed. Since MODEF was excluded from the decision-making 
process for most of its existence, and because it lacked material 
resources, it has been mainly concerned to express its dissent at the 
course of agricultural policy and to establish its identity in 
ideological terms.
The description of MODEF is preceded by some methodological remarks on 
the nature of ideology and the conception employed here. The remainder 
of the chapter is devoted to examining the ideology in relation to the 
three considerations identified above. Particular attention is given to 
the derivation of MODEF ideology, followed by a consideration of the 
impact of ideology on organization. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
an explanation of the low level of change in world view which MODEF has 
undergone since its inception. The examination of MODEF's ideology is
based on evidence drawn from interviews with MODEF officials and 
activists, selections from MODEF literature and the programmes which it 
has presented at various times since 1959.
Such a procedure obviously reflects a certain conception of ideology.
It avoids the extreme of ideology as doctrine where ideology is seen 
merely as a collection of official statements. Such a conception 
involves treating ideology simply as a less reputable sub-genre of 
political philosophy. Similarly, the more extended conception in which 
ideology is described as "... traditions, beliefs and characteristic 
procedures and feelings..." vitiates the concept of all explanatory 
value.(1) In this view of ideology, it becomes impossible to make a 
distinction between ideology and practice and therefore impossible to 
assess the contribution of ideology to behaviour. By defining ideology 
in terms of verbal and written, formal and informal, expressions of 
beliefs, it will be possible to avoid the narrow view which would lead 
one to identify illusory contradictions and to avoid the tautological 
evasion of contradictions implicit in the broader view.
It might be objected that the use of MODEF's programmes as an element in 
the definition of its ideology is mistaken. For instance, if one 
applies Seliger's distinction between fundamental and operative ideology 
to MODEF, one could argue that the programme represents the operative 
every day ideology used to justify the fundamentals.(2) However, there 
are several reasons which make the Seliger thesis inapplicable. On the 
theoretical level, the distinction between fundamental and operative 
ideology is based on a dual confusion. By identifying the fundamental 
ideology in doctrinal terms and operative ideology in terms of practice, 
the potential conflict between the two types of ideology is, in reality,
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the contradiction between ideology and practice.
As far as HODEF is concerned, the nature of the programme itself means 
that the programme is conceived of as a fundamental ideological 
statement. The programme has only been modified at infrequent intervals 
and, though it contains many policy proposals, it is not overly 
concerned with details. The programme is seen as laying down the basic 
principles which are supposed to guide the organization. Four themes in 
MODEF's ideology have been selected for analysis here. These are its 
idealization of the "traditional" model of small-scale agriculture, its 
ambivalence towards modernization, its hostility towards bureaucracy, 
and its nationalism. The first two themes have been chosen because of 
their importance in relation to MODEF's definition of the ideal form of 
agriculture and because they subsume such traditional themes of farm 
organization as private property in the land. The latter two are 
particularly interesting for the purpose of analyzing the connection 
between ideology and practice.
It will become apparent that MODEF has shared many of the preoccupations 
of previous agricultural movements, both in France and in other 
countries which have undergone the process of the second agricultural 
revolution. For example, many of the themes of MODEF were to be found in 
the agitation of American populists in the nineteenth century or the 
Dorgerist movement of the 1930s.(3) It is a short step from recognizing 
these similarities to equating the ideology of MODEF with that of the 
Dorgerists, a step which is mistaken for two reasons. At the simplest 
level, ideological similarities cannot obscure the fact that the 
conclusions drawn have been diametrically opposed. For instance, though 
both MODEF and Dorgeres would identify the source of agricultural
difficulties as being located in the cities, Dorgeres saw the villains 
as workers, civil servants and Jewish capitalists whilst MODEF found 
them in the technocrats and the trusts.
In order to assess the real degree of affiliation between MODEF and 
previous agricultural movements, it is vital to avoid an essentialist 
conception of ideology. Before describing MODEF's ideology in detail 
and attempting to place it in its social and historical context, it is 
necessary to make a few remarks about the social basis of ideology.
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2. IDEOLOGY AND CLASS
MODEF leaders usually relate the ideology of their organization to the 
class position of their supporters. The last two chapters have shown 
that, in practice, the pattern of MODEF support is more complicated than 
that. By examining recent theoretical developments on the connection 
between ideology and class, one can gain greater insight into the 
connection between MODEF's ideology and its milieu. Ideas are not 
disembodied forces, they must be placed in the context of social classes 
and political arrangements. Both the theorists of totalitarianism and 
the metaphysical Marxists such as Luxemburg and Lukács treat ideologies 
as abstractions. For the former, ideologies do not have a class content, 
they are not modified by social arrangements, they are simply good or 
bad wherever they are to be found. For the latter ideology is 
Inseparable from class. Ideology is defined in terms of class and class 
is defined in terms of ideology to form a tautological circle.(A) More
recent Marxists have realized the problems involved in such conceptions 
(not the least of which is the empirical evidence for the distinction 
between class position and class consciousness). Poulantzas argues 
that the ideology typical of any class is a mixture of an ideology 
specific to itself and of the ideologies of other classes.(5) But since 
he still regards ideology as class-determined in all cases, he is unable 
to explain why certain ideologies should have an unusual appeal or why 
they should continue to persist after the class structure which had 
given them birth had changed or disappeared. One alternative argument 
developed by Laclau claims that ideology has no necessary class content 
- a view which undermines any attempt to place ideology in its social 
context. This is not the place to engage in a full-scale critique of 
Laclau but one point must be made. His views represent a kind of 
conspiracy theory of ideology in which individuals and organizations 
manipulate ideologies at their own convenience. Though ideologies can 
be manipulated within certain limits, one should not make the mistake 
that those who manipulate the ideologies are themselves free of or 
cynical about them. In MODEF's case, the pattern of conviction and 
expedience will be demonstrated.
The most convincing theory to dace is that proposed by Therborn. He 
points out that the problem is quite simply resolved once it is admitted 
that there is more to ideology than class. An individual's class 
position is only one of the roles which he occupies in society. It is 
therefore possible to appeal to individuals in their role as worker, 
citizen of a nation-state, religious believer, etc. At the same time, 
"all ideologies in class societies exist in historical forms of 
articulation with different classes and class ideologies".(6)
2b 1
In this light, it is no longer necessary to resort to theories of 
psychological inadequacies or of convergence between the extremes of 
Left and Right. Similarities between MODEF and, for instance, the 
Dorgerists, can be related to certain continuities in agricultural life 
(e.g. the farmer as property owner, manual labourer, country dweller, 
etc.,). On the other hand, the differences can be explained in terms of 
the changing nature of the rural political system. Once the ideology of 
MODEF has been described, the influence of the variables identified in 
Chapter 1 on the determination of the ideology will be examined.
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3. MODEF'S IDEOLOGY
A) The Idealization of "Traditional" Small-Scale Agriculture The basis 
for the idealization of the "traditional" small-scale farming with which 
MODEF's founders grew up is the belief that farmers form a class or, 
more exactly, a race apart from their fellow countrymen.(7) One of the 
early leaders of MODEF wrote: "La paysannerie a une psychologie spéciale 
que l'on ne peut connaitre si l'on n'a pas vécu, et assez longtemps, 
dans les milieux paysans".(8) To this group are then attributed certain 
qualities such as "le bon sens paysan" or "le sérieux".(9) Unlike other 
types of economic activity, one does not engage in farming for the sake 
of making money, one does so because "il faut aimer le métier, il faut 
pas compter les heures".(10) Outsiders can gain acceptance by conformity 
to the ideal. The death of Georges Pompidou after a long struggle 
against illness was the occasion of the only compliment that MODEF 
extended to any of the pre-1981 rulers of the Fifth Republic: "Le MODEF
rend hommage à la ténacité toute paysanne dont a fait preuve le 
president Georges Pompidou".(11) Refusal to recognize the validity of 
such qualities is therefore a provocation. "Nous sommes exaspérés devant 
ces injustices, à croire que la valeur d'un paysan, en tant que personne 
humaine, ne réprésente rien de bon aux yeux de certains".(12) These 
personal qualities are then extended to the agricultural system which 
both promotes and is sustained by them. Small-scale agriculture is 
therefore contrasted favourably with the developing capitalist nature 
of present day farming. Frederic Lindenstaedt describes the situation 
in the 1940s in the following terms:
On était au début de la mécanisation. On était au début d'une 
commercialisation concentrée. On était au début de financement de 
l'agriculture par les banques. On était vraiment encore 
l'exploitation familiale telle qu'elle avait subsisté depuis avant 
la guerre de 1939. C'était à peine modernisée. C'était encore des 
petits paysans qui travaillaient encore traditionnellement.
C'était une mode de vie particulière et particulièrement heureuse 
parce qu'on ne dépendait pas de finance ou du commerce. On était 
assez tranquille...(13)
By comparison, the present is retrograde:
Aujourd'hui, l'exploitant doit dépenser, en moyenne, quatre vingt 
pour cent de sa récolte sous forme de reimboursement d'annuités ou 
d'intérêts aux banques pour des emprunts à court et moyen terme.
Et plus de la moitié des terres est gagée, hypothéquée, par le seul 
Credit Agricole. Les exploitations deviennent de plus en plus 
grandes, et les dettes également.(14)
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Therefore, according to MODEF, it is necessary to make a clear 
connection between the problems of the farm and those of the farmer.
"La defense de l'exploitation familiale ne veut pas seulement dire la 
terre de l'exploitation mais aussi leur mode de vie".(15)
Two specific aspects of this idealization are particularly important. 
These are the attachment to private ownership of the land and the 
emphasis placed on the homogeneity of the farming community. To quote 
Marcel Simmonet, one of the founders of MODEF and a pillar of the 
Charente Federation for many years, farmers felt:
une sensibilité très aiguisée, axée sur le droit de propriété, la 
terre son outil de travail, et le bien lègue par ses ancêtres. 
Toucher à çela, c'est arracher au paysan sa raison de vivre, sa 
liberté ancestrale à laquelle il tient par dessus tout.(16)
Less conservative MODEF activists have been more cynical. "Tous les 
Français sont des apprentis bourgeois".(17) Nevertheless they accept 
the legitimacy of private property. It is true that the case has 
usually been put in less theological terms but MODEF's reverence for 
property rights led it to oppose all schemes which would separate the 
right to work the land from the right to own it. Despite the enormous 
burden which purchase of the land involves in terms of fixed capital, no 
deviation from the principle of ownership was accepted until 1981.
Indeed rather than being regarded as a necessity to guarantee access to 
the land, ownership is regarded as a positive virtue.
In 1981, this position was re-affirmed by Frederic Lindenstaedt. He 
rejected the view that renting rather than purchasing the land would be 
more advantageous to farmers and that the traditional attitude towards 
property is outdated. Arguing that high land prices are the result of 
speculation by non-farmers and high interest rates, and that rents would 
be just as much a burden in a period of declining incomes, he insisted 
on the need for property rights to be strengthened. Failure to do so 
would mean the eventual proletarianization of agriculture.(18)
Furthermore, this respect of property extends to that of others. The 
present system of inheritance requires the heir who remains on the land 
to his siblings for their share of the land by outright purchase or by 
rent. This means that many farmers have to subsidize their often 
wealthier brothers and sisters in urban occupations. Yet at no time has 
MODEF or any of its activists criticized these arrangements, even when 
incited to do so in interviews.
The emphasis on the homogeneity of the "traditional" farming community, 
(entirely mythical as we have seen), is less clearly expressed, but it 
is implicit in MODEF attitudes to capitalist agriculture. This kind of 
agriculture is condemned not because it is capitalist, nor because it 
involves exploitation, nor because of any of the traditional grievances 
against capitalism but because it is disruptive of the farming community 
and distorts the pattern of competition. It is not competition as such 
but the "unfair" competition of the capitalist sector which is resented. 
Large-scale farming is denounced for its excessive greed. The term 
"accapareurs" is often applied. "Les gros exploitants sont des
accapareurs. Ils ont accaparé la terre, puis le syndicalisme.... Le
Credit Agricole, on ne l'a pas fait pour les riches, mais ils l'ont 
accaparé...."(19)
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On the other hand, richer farmers who are prepared to co-operate with 
their neighbours and use their privileged position to help the less well 
off are highly regarded. For example, the capitalist who is prepared to 
lend machinery to his neighbours is widely admired. Similarly, richer 
farmers involved in MODEF are considered with great respect. In the 
Vaucluse, for instance, the relatively prosperous MODEF contingent in 
Beaumes-de-Venise are praised by their less-privileged colleagues around 
Gordes.
In fact this view of the consequences of capitalism in agriculture is 
fundamental to MODEF. On the one hand, without such divisions, there 
would be no social basis for MODEF. On the other, condemnation of the 
divisions provides MODEF with a powerful ideological appeal. MODEF is 
able to criticize its opponents for being responsible for the 
development of class-based politics within agriculture. MODEF's view of 
the divisions within agriculture and the lack of common interests 
between all farmers has been summed up by one of its leaders. MODEF 
activists: "reconnaissent les divisions, mais ils les regret tent".(20)
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B) Modernization Critics of MODEF often point to its alleged resistance 
to modernization in agriculture. As one of MODEF's leading adversaries 
put it: "On a été toujours partisan d'une evolution de l'agriculture et 
on a toujours encouragé les agriculteurs à ...se perfectionner. Je ne 
pense pas que le MODEF le fait".(21) Of course such criticisms involve 
concentrating on the benefits to the total exclusion of the 
disadvantages of technological advance. MODEF's ambivalence on the 
question of modernization reflects more accurately the mixed blessings
provided by such change. Sometimes it emphasizes the defence of the 
traditional way of life, at other times it declares itself ready to 
accept change, providing it is really progress and not a regression to 
an earlier age.
The former position has been stated openly less and less frequently. 
References such as the following are sometimes made. "En toutes 
circumstances notre organisation a pris la défense de l'agriculture
traditionnelle..... "(22) Of course this idea of traditional
agriculture is just as much based on a myth as the concept of 
modernization to which it is opposed since agriculture has been in a 
constant state of change, particularly since 1945. Neither is MODEF 
normally so blunt since it cannot sustain itself purely through 
conservatism. However, such an idea lies just beneath the surface, 
emerging in references to the need to re-establish the right to distill 
alcohol, the frequent contrast which is made between the number of 
people the land could support in the past compared to the present, and 
in the attitudes towards the organization of marketing in certain 
areas.(23) For example, despite the costs in terms of transport, time 
and the uncertainty involved, no one in MODEF has contested the 
principle of markets such as Chateaurenard and Cavaillon.
On the other hand, there is a tendency to regard the idea of progress as 
an absolute necessity, indeed sometimes as a positive virtue. MODEF has 
frequently denied that it rejects modernization. For example:
Le progrès technique frappe à la porte du plus modeste exploitant 
agricole et lui impose ses lois. Comme tout autre celui-çi se rend 
compte qu'à très brève échéance il devra en tenir compte ou 
disparaître....(24)
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Another leader regretted the fact that "le progrès qui peut nous 
permettre de vivre dans des conditions décentes, serve de pretexte à 
nous évincer". But, MODEF argues, unfortunately progress cannot be 
considered in the abstract. Its consequences must be considered. As 
Alfred Negre put it:
avant de vouloir transformer les conditions d'exploitation en 
France, il me parait nécessaire de savoir dans quel but on veut le
faire....  pour l'heure, dans ce pays et sous ce régime, la
nécessite de l'adaptation de l'agriculture au monde moderne ne 
parait pas avoir des objectifs évidents.(25)
There have been two responses to this question. On the one hand, the 
type of modernization designed to benefit a minority at the expense of 
the majority is denounced. For instance, meeting the Minister of 
Agriculture, Edgard Pisani, in June 1965, MODEF informed him that:
Notre mouvement n'est... nullement une sorte de poujadisme. Tout 
en luttant au jour le jour contre les plus criantes injustices 
sociales, il ne se borne pas à une position critique et négative 
mais il est aussi retourné vers la construction de l'avenir à la 
condition que celui-çi s'édifie au profit du plus grand nombre et 
non à celui d'un infime minorité.(26)
This is to argue that the social consequences of modernization outweigh 
the potential economic benefits. On the other hand, MODEF sometimes 
denies that modernization is really progress and argues that it 
represents a return to the past. MODEF has warned against the
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"implantation d'une nouvelle féodalité foncière". Similarly, recent 
changes in the Statut des Fermiers et des Métayers in the Giscardian Loi 
d'Orientation of 1980 have been described as preparing the way for the 
establishment of a state of "neo-métayage".(27)
Que l'on nous excuse, nous n'avons rien de commun avec les faiseurs 
de nouveautés à tous prix qui mènent un tintamarre épouvantable 
autour d'idées prétendues nouvelles (et qui sont souvent bien 
vieilles) et dont le battage ne s'arrête que lorsque la comédie ne 
faisant plus recette, ceux qui tirent les ficelles lancent une 
autre "nouveauté" destinée,elle aussi, à détourner l'attention des 
véritables problèmes.(28)
MODEF's aim is to transform the economic conditions in which agriculture 
operates so that farmers will:
enfin disposer des moyens techniques d'innover à leur guise sans 
les soucis de manque de sérénité ou de garantie dans un métier qui 
aura enfin cessé d'être celui de 'forçat' mais pourra au contraire 
être celui de novateur.(29)
To obtain a clearer picture of MODEF's ambiguous attitude to 
modernization, it is necessary to break down this nebulous concept into 
some of its components - concentrating on the issues of management 
techniques and investment policy. As we have already seen capitalist 
agriculture is condemned for its negative effects on farmers. In 
contrast to government and FNSEA, MODEF stresses the desire to earn a 
reasonable income rather than the modernization of agriculture. "Nous 
ne demandons pas grand chose, seulement manger, boire, des vacances de
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temps en temps, une voiture qui roule, le matériel qui marche__"(30)
Similarly, MODEF's 1978 programme gives priority to the question of 
incomes. The opening chapter is significantly entitled: "Assurer une 
juste rénumeration du travail paysan".(31)
In this context, the word "juste" is a programme in itself, a striking 
contrast with the conventional FNSEA vocabulary of profitability. The 
following chapter deals with the problems of social security and only in 
the third chapter are the problems of modernization and efficiency 
mentioned. Even in this chapter, seven out of ten sections are 
concerned with property rights whilst only three deal with the economic 
and technical problems of the farm as an enterprise.
The concept of the farmer as "chef d'entreprise" propounded by the FNSEA 
is rejected by MODEF. It is seen as a purely political catch phrase 
designed to persuade farmers to identify themselves with their 
exploiters - the urban bourgeoisie. Though MODEF accepts that the 
farmer has to pay more and more attention to rational management 
techniques in operating his farm, it argues that this view is partial. 
Firstly, unlike the industrialist, the vast majority of farmers are also 
manual labourers. Secondly, in terms of income and standard of living, 
farmers are closer to the working class. Finally, since farmers are 
exploited by industry and finance, they would be ill-advised to identify 
with their exploiters. A clear example of this was seen in 1977 when 
Michel Debatisse of the FNSEA , Leon Gingembre of the Confederation 
Nationale des Petites et Moyennes Entreprises (CNPME), Yves Charpentier 
of the Confederation Générale des Cadres (CGC) and the president of the 
Association des Chambres de Métiers set up the Groupe d'initiatives et
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de Responsabilités (GIR). This Giscardian initiative vas designed to 
cement links between farmers and the urban petit bourgeoisie. MODEF was 
quick to denounce the new organization as an effort to confuse the class 
divisions in politics and to prevent farmers associating with their 
genuine allies, the industrial working class, and the forces associated 
with the Union of the Left.(32) However, despite the political 
identification with the working class, MODEF does not believe that 
farmers are simply rural workers. The concept most frequently used by 
MODEF is the "petit patron exploité". The dual management-worker role 
of the farmer is recognized but without either being given primacy.
A less explicit theme is that greater investment in productive capital, 
if it is to be successful, leads to greater investment in land, and thus 
accentuates the pressure towards concentration of the land in fewer 
hands. This is not a rejection of investment and technical progress per 
se but of its economic consequences.
Finally, the concomitant of any rational investment programme is the 
existence of an efficient method of keeping track of income and 
expenditure. MODEF is against any moves to make accounts compulsory for 
the farmers, as the PS proposed. The official explanation is that any 
financial benefits derived from accounting would be swallowed by 
accountants' fees. The hostility, however, goes much deeper since it 
could to train farmers to prepare their own accounts or encourage them 
to Management Training Centres. The development of accounting systems 
would represent a change from an agriculture where the farmer is first 
and foremost a producer to one in which he is a businessman.
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C) Bureaucracy MODEF's attitude to bureaucracy, and to the state 
bureaucracy in particular, is also characterized by ambivalence.
Although MODEF has consistently called for state intervention to resolve 
various problems, it has almost equally consistently denounced most 
actions of right-wing governments. The fraud inspectorate are denounced 
as were the proposals for the establishment of the "producer groups":
Mais ou çela devient inquiétant c'est que les dits organismes 
doivent pour obtenir cette reconnaissance, s'engager à se soumettre 
aux indications du Ministère....Le groupement de producteurs sera 
finalement de gré ou de force un agent d'application de la 
politique décidée autoritairement par le gouvernement. Le paysan 
ne deviendra qu'un tâcheron...(35)
The establishment of the SAFERs was criticized in similar terms. Even 
Pisani's efforts at streamlining the agricultural bureaucracy were 
attacked because they prepared the way for more efficient intervention 
into agricultural affairs. This also explains why MODEF was hostile to 
the reform of the Senate in 1969 since MODEF saw it as a way to allow 
non-farmers to intervene more effectively in the affairs of the 
profession. Even where bureaucracy is not a state bureaucracy, MODEF has 
objected. For example, MODEF has opposed the growing domination of 
co-operative directors and the members of the management committee 
inside the co-operatives and insists on the need to democratize the 
co-operatives by stimulating the participation of all their members.
This schizophrenic attitude reflects differences of opinion within the 
organization. As MODEF activists sometimes point out, control and 
regulation is accepted if it is seen to be effective in terms of putting
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more money into the farmer's pocket or protecting him from the vagaries 
of the market. There are two outstanding examples. MODEF has 
systematically opposed all attempts to undermine the status of the 
Office National Interprofessionel des Céréales (ONIC). Similarly, in 
the Charente, MODEF poses as the defender of the BNIC, even if its 
actions are sometimes criticized. Pressure for liberalization of the 
cognac market is limited to the larger growers and certain merchants, 
particularly those specializing in top quality cognacs.
In the south-east, however, a different picture emerges. In the eyes of 
fruit and vegetable growers in traditionally badly organized markets, 
administrative regulation is only favoured if it applies to others. For 
instance, the majority of those interviewed welcomed the Product Boards 
proposed by the Mauroy government but saw as their main role the 
regulation of imports.
However, both tendencies are united in their hostility to the way in 
which officials work. For example the MODEF Federation of the Vaucluse 
denounced the fraud inspectors in the following stringent tones:
Les agents des services de repression des fraudes sont beaucoup 
plus zélés pour verbaliser les producteurs français que pour 
contrôler efficacement les normes et la qualité souvent 
approximatives des produits étrangers.(36)
Similarly, in the Charente, MODEF delegates in the Chamber of 
Agriculture have consistently denounced state intervention to prevent 
the spread of diseases such as brucellosis. At the same time, moves
which would increase the strength or the status of the Chamber's 
full-time officials have been resisted. The planned transfer of the 
Chamber offices to the city centre of Angoulême has been obstructed by 
MODEF's haggling over every detail.(37)
Denunciations of administrative "paperasserie" are frequent. The 
complexity of administrative procedures and the incomprehensibility of 
official forms are common targets of abuse. The more arbitrary 
government intervention appears, the more likely it is to be denounced. 
The governments periodic efforts to prohibit certain hybrid vines 
generally gives rise to a levée en masse. "On leur arrache leur vigne, 
on leur interdit de vendre du vin s'ils ont des plantes hybrides, ils se 
rebiffent. Ils manifestent en grande nombre et très facilement. Un coup 
de geuele, ça suffit".(38)
These specific grievances provide the basis for a more general theory, 
that of the state monopoly capitalist thesis advanced by the PCF. 
Bureaucrats are seen as agents of the monopoly capitalists who oppress 
the farmers. In a training document entitled La Crise Economique et le 
Programme du MODEF dated April 1978, the message is clearly spelt out:
La situation de l'agriculture est conditionnée depuis 1958 par la 
volonté des gouvernements au service des banques, des grandes 
industries et du gros négoce de faire produire des denrées 
agricoles en grande quantités, à des prix relativement de plus en 
plus bas et par un nombre toujours plus réduit de cultivateurs.
Tout çela au nom de la 'libre concurrence'...L'agriculteur est 
ainsi totalement "intégré" dans le processus de la production 
monopoliste, mais il l'est en qualité de tout petit producteur
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individuel face aux trusts souvent multinationaux de plus en plus 
concentrés et puissants et faisant, par dessus le marché, la loi 
dans l'Etat.
This hostility to bureaucracy has been translated into positive terms. 
Chapter 3 of MODEF's 1978 programme contains demands for the 
democratization of agricultural rent tribunals, of the SAFERS, of the 
procedures for "remembrement" and of the co-operatives. The final 
chapter is entitled: "Garantir les libertés paysannes et assurer une 
réprésentation démocratique dans tous les organismes agricoles".(39)
This is largely devoted to calls for union pluralism, proportional 
representation in the Chambers of Agriculture, the democratization of 
the Credit Agricole and concludes with an appeal for "une lutte 
constante contre la bureaucratie et le gaspillage".(40)
In the absence of such democratic reforms, MODEF activists have to rely 
on the spirit of "débrouillardise" - the ability to get by through one's 
own more or less devious (and not necessarily legal) expedients. 
Bureaucratic control has either to be supplemented or subverted by 
individual initiative. Indeed the ideal form of state intervention is 
that which hinders one's colleagues but which allows the enterprising 
individual with an eye for the loophole to profit from his sharp 
sightedness. There are both moral and material benefits to be gained 
from success in such practices. On the one hand, there is the simple 
pleasure of outwitting the neighbours since, in the words of one young 
MODEF activist: "Ils se croient tous plus malins que les autres". On 
the other, there are the material advantages to be gained by 
sidestepping the administration. The classic example is the MODEF 
activist who circumvented planning regulations which require the farmer
to seek permission before constructing buildings housing more than 500 
pigs. He simply built two separate buildings with a capacity of 450 
each. In his own words, "il y a des lois bêtes en France". His 
self-respect forced him to find a way around the legal obstruction. To 
obey a stupid law would be plain stupid.
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D) Nationalism
MOOEF's nationalism has been directed against the USA and even more so 
the EEC. Although in its early years MODEF's hostility was directed 
against the US, it came to be replaced as a target by the EEC as the CAP 
was gradually established during the 1960s. MODEF has frequently 
denounced the role of American multinationals in the world food trade 
and the dominance of the US economy in the world monetary system. When 
President Nixon put an end to the Bretton Woods system in September 
1971, Alfred Nègre denounced the US for its behaviour. "Brutalement, 
illégalement, avec un cynisme total... Oncle Sam nous exporte son 
chomâge". (41) The tradition has been maintained under the Lindenstaedt 
leadership as shown by his denunciation of the UK as the "American 
Trojan horse" in the EEC.
However, MODEF's criticisms of the EEC are of two kinds. At times MODEF 
couches its criticisms in an internationalist language, at other times 
the mask drops. In its internationalist phases, MODEF's most 
fundamental criticism of the EEC is that it has failed to achieve its 
stated objectives of the equalization of prices and costs of production,
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in guaranteeing income parity and in ensuring financial solidarity 
between the member states. The incompetence of the EEC is repeatedly 
stressed. One MODEF official in the Vaucluse denounced the EEC as "une 
connerie" since the Fonds Européen d'Orientation et de Garantie Agricole 
(FEOGA) has proved itself totally incapable of organizing markets or 
even predicting crisis. Its role is limited to reacting to emergencies 
which it should have prevented. The same official claimed: "Nous sommes 
les vrais européens". This claim is often repeated by MODEF 
activists.(42) This is justified by the fact that only MODEF defends 
the principles of equal prices (by opposing the monetary compensation 
amounts), community preference and financial solidarity.
The EEC is commonly regarded in MODEF circles as "le nouveau 
colonialisme des nouveaux seigneurs".(43) In 1967, when the Le Monde 
agricultural correspondent argued that the EEC meant that French farmers 
would have to engage in "une véritable lutte au couteau" with other 
European farmers, MODEF reacted indignantly:
Nous sommes des gens trop pacifiques pour ne pas être révoltés par 
la perspective d'une lutte au couteau entre les paysans du Marché 
Commun qui, comme nous, sont les victimes de la liquidation de 
l'exploitation familiale pour le plus grand profit de 
financiers...dont les capitaux n'ont pas de patrie.(44)
When the Mansholt report was published the following year, MODEF's 
denunciation was once again couched in terms of the consequences for 
European agriculture, not in terms of French national interest. "Le 
MODEF leur oppose une terre ou le salaire de celui qui travaille sera 
respecté, facilité, encouragé..."(45)
258
Furthermore, although the EEC is severely criticized, except for a small 
minority within the organization, MODEF is not prepared to advocate 
pulling out of the Common Market. Major reform is necessary but the 
principle of European unity is not challenged. However, this European 
unity is seen in a somewhat wider perspective than the present 
capitalist club. Frequent contrasts are made between "l'Europe 
politique" or "l'Europe des peuples et des travailleurs" and the reality 
of the EEC as a mere free trade zone. These positions are once again 
justified on grounds of "common sense" and material interests rather 
than in abstract ideological terms. Because certain markets have been 
established, it is unrealistic to pull out. Similarly, trading with the 
Eastern bloc is presented as a means of making money rather than as a 
step towards détente.
MODEF's attitude to extension of the EEC and of the powers of the 
European Parliament is also couched in terms of farmer internationalism. 
MODEF argues that Spanish entry would not only be catastrophic for 
French agriculture but also for Spanish farmers. (It has, incidentally, 
failed to convince Spanish farm organizations of this.) As for the 
European Parliament, Frederic Lindenstaedt summed up MODEF's attitude to 
any extension of its powers. "C'est une institution ou l'on sent le 
poids de l'industrie et du grand négoce".(46) The deputies of the 
European Parliament are alleged to be animated by "des sentiments 
anti-paysans bêtes", the British MEP Barbara Castle being regarded as 
one of the worst offenders in the eyes of MODEF. But once again this is 
an argument in terms of class rather national interest or sovereignty.
However, this is only a partial view of MODEF's attitude to the EEC. 
MODEF officials have denounced Italian imports of wine in no uncertain
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terms. Spanish imports are even more bitterly attacked because of 
Spain's non-membership of the EEC. "Ce serait un peu plus rentable si 
on n'avait pas cette concurrence étrangère...Il faut voir quelle 
marchandise, quelle merde plutôt, ils envoient en France. C'est ce 
qu'on donne, nous, à nos cochons".(47) Claims have also been made that 
agricultural surpluses in Europe are not the responsibility of French 
farmers but of foreign capitalist farms.(48) Whilst Emilien Soulié 
condemns the idea that there is any over-production of wine in France, 
Frederic Lindenstaedt goes further. "Nous disons qu'il n'y a pas de 
stocks de beurre en France. Les stocks c'est la responsabilité de la 
Hollande, de l'Allemagne et de la Grande Bretagne qui importent". This 
is, of course, a weak, indeed a double-edged argument. If the foreign 
farmers produce more than enough, then it is French agriculture which is 
superfluous. This argument is only tenable if one thinks purely in 
French terms and thinks only of the shortfall between French output and 
demand rather than the overall European levels. The case against the 
corresponsability tax on milk has been largely argued in this way with a 
consequent inability to convince enough farmers to be able to mount an 
effective campaign against the tax. The case in terms of the effect of 
the tax on dairy farmers has been relatively neglected.
One must also examine the MODEF claim to be the true Europeans. To the 
extent that it appeals to such clauses of the Treaty of Rome as the 
community preference clause, the claim is legitimate. However, MODEF 
has usually concentrated on appeals for the application of the safety 
clauses allowing governments to take exceptional measures for the 
temporary protection of a domestic industry. But the safety clauses are 
effectively anti-European clauses. Even though they form part of the 
Treaty of Rome, they contradict its philosophy. Their consistent 
application would negate the rest of the Treaty.(49)
MODEF has also demonstrated frequently that it regards supra-national 
developments within the Community, not only with hostility but with 
contempt. Alfred Nègre argued in 1965 that "Il est donc d'un intérêt 
fondamental pour les agriculteurs, les exploitants 
familiaux.... d'éviter à tout prix la création d'une autorité 
supranationale".(50) Twelve years later, Raymond Mineau was stressing 
the same theme - "Nous vérifions une fois de plus la noçivité du Marché
Commun.... Ceci nous amène à redouter toute extension de ses
prérogatives".(51) But MODEF has always insisted on the responsibility 
of the French government for the course of agricultural policy, in the 
sense that governments really had the power of decision whilst EEC 
deliberations were a charade. As Mineau explained in 1974: "Les 
responsabilités du Marché Commun ne doivent pas masquer celles du 
gouvernement. Le MODEF souligne que la responsabilité du gouvernement 
français est égale à celle de ces partenaires", and accused the 
government of practising "une opposition de comédie aux propositions de 
la Commission". The clearest expression of MODEF's contempt for the EEC 
came during the 1980 price negotiations when MODEF sent a telegram to 
the Minister of Agriculture, Pierre Mehaignerie, demanding that he walk 
out of the negotiations and unilaterally declare a fifteen per cent 
price rise. At the same time, it issued a press statement entitled 
"Assez de vaines discussions à Bruxelles! Rentrez à Paris".(52)
However, it is MODEF's insistence on import controls which ensures that 
the nationalist elements outweigh the internationalist elements in its 
ideology. As the spokesman for the MODEF commando which occupied a ship 
containing 750,000 gallons of wine and poured petrol into it said, "Nous 
entendons, par cette occupation, montrer notre determination à nous 
opposer aux importations des vins italiens qui... cassent le marché des
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vins français".(53) Import controls against foreign farmers mean that 
the largest and the smallest French producer are protected from 
competition. Whilst the capitalist farmers will derive a super-profit 
because of the reduced competition, the small farms will just provide a 
living for their owners. In other words, by demanding import controls 
MODEF lines up with its French adversaries against its potential foreign 
allies. A clearer demonstration of nationalism could not be made.
It must be pointed out, however, that this nationalism is not 
aggressive. MODEF does not encourage international competition. There 
is no great desire to find foreign markets or to compete with other 
countries. The emphasis on protectionism precludes this since: "on ne 
peut pas demander aux autres ce qu'on n'accepte pas soi-même".(54) 
"Agriculture in one country" has been MODEF's watchword:
Ainsi nous pensons que la solution de nos difficultés ne réside pas 
dans une concurrence acharnée visant à inonder les marchés de nos 
voisins de produits à bas prix, concurrence qui ne peut qu'être 
fatale aux exploitants familiaux qui la pratiquent comme à ceux qui 
la subissent. La solution est que chacun, maitre chez soi, puisse 
régler lui-même ses difficultés et en même temps les comptes de ses 
propres requins.(55)
Given the emphasis on the reconquest of the domestic market, typical of 
weak industries, it is not surprising that the Giscardian dream of "le 
petrôle verte" has only aroused a cynical laugh from MODEF.
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4. THE ROOTS OF IDEOLOGY
Having described MODEF's ideology, it is now necessary to deal with 
three questions.
1) To what extent has such an ideology been determined by the 
traditions of agricultural organizations?
2) How much influence has been exercised by post-war economic and 
sociological changes in agriculture?
3) What has been the distinctive contribution of MODEF?
The themes identified above have, of course, been an integral part of 
agrarian politics, both in France and elsewhere. Regarded as the 
highest form of property under the Ancien regime, ownership of the land 
was the key to social prestige and political power. The individual's 
relation to the land determined his social and political position.
Since the dominant position of the aristocracy derived from control of 
the land, the bourgeoisie invested in land in order to become part of 
the aristocracy. Judging by the extent of the lands held by the 
peasantry before 1789, the desire for land and the possibility of 
acquiring it was not limited to aristocracy and bourgeoisie. The 
purchase of land was an attempt by the peasant to liberate himself from 
his aristocratic oppressors.(56)
The Revolution and the political and often physical destruction of the 
aristocracy which it provoked spelt the emancipation of the peasantry. 
As the key feature of their previous subordination was their lack of
control over the land, freedom came to mean property. From then on, the 
confirmation of the peasantry in their legal independence was the price 
every regime had to pay for its political passivity. As Marx put it: 
"The peasants' title to property is the talisman by which capital 
captivates him..."(57)
This tradition has been maintained by the constant repetition of the 
theme by the various elites who have competed for their support 
throughout the Third and Fourth Republics. When Joseph Ruau identified 
private property in the land as the foundation stone of the regime in 
1909 and when Henri Queuille idealized "l'exploitation familiale qui 
apparait pour celui qui la possède comme l'égale d'une mère nourricière, 
la protection tutélaire de ses droits, le gage le plus sûr de son 
indépendance" in 1927, they were merely conforming to and perpetuating 
the tradition.(58)
As each successive elite has embraced the defence of the farmer's 
property, each has outbid its predecessors in order to gain acceptance 
by the peasantry. Since entrenched elites can more easily deviate from 
their apparently intransigent ideology, the newer elites are often led 
to defend values which are not their own but which they have to accept 
in order to establish themselves. To use the term invented by an 
Italian observer, the new elite serves as a "loud-speaker" for the 
values of the old.(59) And like their predecessors, MODEF leaders have 
conformed to the pattern.
Again, the egalitarian myth owes a great deal to non-agricultural 
agrarians, particularly those of the Third Republic. The educational 
apparatus of a Republic whose rallying cry referred explicitly to
equality was designed to diffuse egalitarian ideology. Once out of the 
school gates, radical politicians took up the task of perpetuating such 
myths. Even the Catholics, by their insistence on the fact there was a 
place for everyone in the agricultural community - as landlord, farmer 
or labourer - and by the development of the "syndicat mixte" contributed 
to this myth despite themselves.
Frederic Lindenstaedt's article cited above is much more in a 
specifically French tradition, a tradition of which Marx was the 
declared opponent. MODEF's themes coincide to a much greater extent with 
the conservative anti-capitalist tradition of Rousseau and Proudhon.
MODEF's attitude is akin to Rousseau's description of the idyllic 
society where:
no citizen shall be rich enough to buy another and none so poor as 
to be forced to sell himself; this in turn implies that the most 
exalted persons need moderation in goods and influence and the 
humbler moderation in avarice and covetousness.
Similarly, MODEF's ambivalence over modernization is an attitude with a 
long history. French ruling classes, whether aristocratic or bourgeois, 
were noted for their Malthusianism. Particularly after the Paris 
Commune, political fear of a large industrial working class and the 
economic fear of overproduction and stagnant markets paralyzed its 
modernizing tendencies. This lack of confidence was given the official 
seal of approval by the Meline tariffs, a capitulation before the 
deep-rooted fear of modernization ingrained in both peasant and 
bourgeois. The collapse of 1940 and the discredited ultra-traditionalism 
of the Vichy regime led to a transformation of capitalist and 
agricultural attitudes towards modernization. This new-found enthusiasm
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was sustained by Marshall Aid. Only the most marginal sectors of 
economic activity and those on the margin of conventional politics 
rejected the new doctrines of efficiency and technological innovation. 
Even in agriculture, the young farmers of the Jeunesse Agricole 
Chretienne began to talk the same language as the technocrats of the 
Planning Commission - an alliance which was to be cemented by the Fifth 
Republic.
However, as the ex-Vichyites rehabilitated themselves and the 
consequences of modernization began to be visible, opposition was 
organized. Realizing that economic modernization would entail political 
modernization and the loss of their political pre-eminence, such elites 
attempted to stem the tide. But rather than directly confront the 
ideology of modernization, they preferred to graft on more traditional 
themes. In particular, they emphasized the human aspects of agriculture 
and the impossibility of treating agriculture as just another sector of 
the national economy. When the Left were themselves marginalized in 
agricultural politics and excluded from government, they had every 
incentive to regain their popular support by draping themselves in the 
colours which the mainstream bourgeoisie had abandoned. Along with the 
PCF and SFIO, MODEF based itself on such a strategy.
Hostility towards bureaucracy is yet another attitude to which the rural 
ruling classes have greatly contributed. This is part of a more general 
hostility to the rise of the nation state and the centralization of 
political and administrative control. For hundreds of years, there has 
been a tradition of rural disorder inspired by local notables as a 
weapon in their power struggles with the more or less temporary holders 
of central government power. The Revolution consecrated the Fronde
tradition with the royalist elites leading the peasantry in a crusade 
against Jacobinism in many of the peripheral areas - Vendée, Provence, 
etc. Only with the Third Republic did a centralized state manage to 
build itself upon peasant support. But this centralization did not 
involve direct intervention, except on the ideological level with the 
creation of compulsory education, and served to protect farmers against 
developments in world agriculture. Throughout this "golden age" (1880 - 
1930), the majority of the political class continued to campaign 
actively against state intervention in agriculture in order to maintain 
their own pre-eminence. Henri Queuille's ambitious schemes for 
agricultural modernization in the 1920s and 1930s were sabotaged by 
vigorous opposition to the extension of the scope of the state.(60) The 
hostility of the inter-war leaders of agriculture to the Eight Hours Law 
cannot be explained solely by their unconscious or conscious 
subordination to the interests of urban capitalists. It must be seen in 
terms of their opposition in principle to the state intervening to 
regulate dealings between individual citizens - a development which 
would undermine their own role as mediators between state and commune, 
official and citizen.
The commitment of socialists and communists to state intervention as a 
way of resolving problems was strengthened by this right-wing opposition 
- though their influence was limited. However, the final victory of 
right-wing technocracy in 1958 and the end of their ability to influence 
the direction and intention of state intervention led them to take a 
more nuanced view. State and state bureaucracies were no longer concepts 
which were taken for granted. Certain sections of the Left and leftish 
regionalists began to adopt themes which had traditionally been those of 
the Right. In this context, MODEF's hostility to the bureaucracy of the 
state and its role in agriculture is not specific to agricultural
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politics or to allegedly backward sectors of the economy.
Nationalism has almost invariably been a feature of farm movements.
This has been the case in nineteenth century America and Ireland as much 
in twentieth century China, as much in 1930s France as that of the 
present day. Because this nationalist aspect appears to be inherent in 
agricultural organizations, it has been taken for granted. However, 
recently, historians of the French peasantry have begun to explore the 
lack of nationalist feeling in nineteenth century France and the efforts 
of governments and their rural supporters to instil such sentiments.(61) 
Veber has produced the classic account of this situation. He quotes 
Alexandre Sanguinetti who argued that national consciousness stemmed 
from deliberate policies which "permitted the making of France despite 
the French, or in the midst of their indifference...France is a 
deliberate political construction, for whose creation the central power 
has never ceased to fight".(62)
The main instrument employed in this struggle was the education system. 
According to Weber, rural national consciousness dates from the 
educational reforms of the Third Republic. Political missionaries 
disguised as teachers instilled nationalist doctrines. Their task, as 
seen by one of their masters, Gambetta, was to create the "new 
Frenchmen", soldiers capable of "enduring bravely all conceivable 
hardship for the nation".(63) During World War One the success of the 
educational crusade was convincingly and catastrophically demonstrated 
by the peasantry. Post-war farm leaders were amongst the leading 
promoters of nationalist ideology. Ritual tributes to the dead served as 
highly effective emotional appeals to the survivors. But when the 
nationalists defected in 1940, the door was open for the Left to 
re-acquire the patent on patriotism.
As the consequences of the post-war transformation have become more and 
more evident, traditional values such as the desirability of private 
property have provided a refuge. As the present becomes more difficult, 
the past is seen in a more attractive light, particularly selective 
aspects of the past. This is a tendency which has been documented in 
rural societies undergoing rapid and continuous change. The 
reconstitution of social life centres on the part of the social 
structure which has best survived the changes - thus giving this 
structure or institution a new lease of life.(64) The institution of 
property is one of the few elements which has not been transformed since 
1945. Given the voluntary and compulsory rural exodus, many farmers 
have been labouring under the constant fear of proletarianization.
Since property has been the distinguishing feature between the farmer 
and the proletarian, the farmers' position in agricultural society has 
dictated his place in the social hierarchy. To hold on to his status in 
an increasingly rigid class structure, his property must be retained at 
all costs. Similarly, because of the changes in the nature of economic 
activity on the farm, particularly the intensification of labour and the 
subordination of agriculture to industry, the formal independence which 
property ownership implies is seen as a great advantage. The position 
of many Marxists and modernizers that property makes no difference to 
the real economic situation of the farmer is misleading. If it is 
legitimate to argue that agriculture is becoming more and more 
subordinate to industry, it is a mistake to equate this with the 
proletarianization of farmers.(65) Ownership guarantees the farmer's 
managerial status, and his freedom to organize his working day as he 
wishes. In other words, job satisfaction depends on the farmer's legal 
independence. This freedom is highly prized. For example, in the 
Vaucluse farmers hire day labourers from time to time, not for
assistance in essential work, but to free themselves for a day's 
hunting. Such independence obviously costs money but is nonetheless 
very real and real enough for farmers to be willing to accept that "la 
liberté ça coûte cher".(66)
It has been argued in Chapter 2 that the egalitarian view of the past 
was based on a myth. Similarly, developments in post-war agriculture 
have only served to strengthen class differentiation. The obvious 
question to ask is why the egalitarian idyll has survived the cut-throat 
competitive practices of modern agriculture? Quite simply, it is a 
useful myth for defensive mobilization. As Kautsky pointed out, one of 
the constraints on the development of capitalism in agriculture is that 
land is limited.(67) The creation of capitalist farming on an extensive 
scale involves the centralization of ownership of land, unlike industry 
where capitalist firms can develop without eliminating their 
competitors, at least in the short and medium term. The development of 
capitalist agriculture depends on the expulsion of small-scale farmers. 
Co-existence is difficult. Furthermore, agricultural life has always 
been characterized by mutual aid, a situation which has not been changed 
by mechanization but which threatens to do so. When a large farmer 
acquires a combine harvester he is no longer dependent on his 
neighbour's help to bring in the harvest. To use an example of more 
modern relevance, a farmer who expands may be able to purchase his own 
machines rather than sharing in a co-operative purchase. This will 
undermine the financial strength of the co-operative and restrict the 
access of smaller farmers to the machinery needed for them to remain 
competitive.
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Similarly, MODEF's ambivalence towards modernization can be traced to 
the material drawbacks, such as exodus, debt, intensification of labour, 
etc. which were described in Chapter 2. In the same way, hostility to 
bureaucracy is connected with the role of the state in promoting these 
changes. Even if the process of modernization had been an unmitigated 
success, farmers would still have reason to criticize the intervention 
of officialdom into their affairs. Official intervention in production 
and marketing involves restrictions on the autonomy which is seen as one 
of the great advantages of the profession. There is also the problem of 
the culture gap between farmers and officials. In the pre-war system of 
partial political integration, the farmer could hide behind the screen 
of his political representatives. Now he must face the administration 
in a position of weakness. The administration is governed by formal 
rules of procedure, its members selected on the basis of formal 
education. The farmer, on the other hand, whatever the extent of his 
formal education (which has been constantly increasing), thinks in terms 
of concrete and particular decisions. It is as if there were two 
opposing cultures, reinforced by the conflicting interests of officials 
and farmers. The official's career depends on a mastery of bureaucratic 
procedure and successful implementation of instructions handed down, the 
farmer's success may well depend on evading such administrative 
decisions. It is, therefore, hardly surprising that farmers and farm 
organizations such as MODEF see themselves as victims of bureaucratic 
aggression.
Neither are the drawbacks of bureaucracy confined to the cultural level. 
Financial reasons also exist. Even in terms of time spent in dealings 
with officials or filling in forms, the farmer is kept from his work on
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the farm. More important, bureaucracy which is regarded to have failed 
discredits the idea of bureaucratic intervention. For example, frequent 
criticisms are voiced against market regulation agencies such as the 
Fonds d'Orientation et de Régulation des Marchés Agricoles (FORMA) on 
the grounds that its policies have either failed or will fail. 
Alternatively, it is sometimes argued that the policy pursued is not the 
most efficient way of attaining the objective. For instance, it is 
often argued in the wine industry that import controls would be more 
effective than domestic production controls in attaining objectives such 
as higher quality produce or reasonable prices for the grower.
Finally, the most obvious explanation of agricultural nationalism must 
be rejected. The kind of Canard Enchaîné argument which sees such 
nationalism as a mask for less legitimate material interest involves a 
contradiction. To argue in such a way is to accept that nationalist 
rhetoric is in itself legitimate. But such legitimacy cannot exist 
if a genuine nationalist consciousness does not already exist. To frame 
demands in nationalist terms would otherwise be intellectually 
impossible and politically useless. However, once such a consciousness 
has been created, economic interests serve to reinforce it. Post-war 
France saw a combination of circumstances which provided a firm basis 
for nationalist propaganda. Having survived foreign occupation, rapid 
economic change undermined agricultural society. This process was 
accompanied by the rise of the EEC. Not only did the smaller operators 
see themselves as victims of capitalism and technocracy, but as victims 
of foreign capitalists and technocrats. Contrary to the hopes of the 
Liberation period, the headquarters of foreign exploitation merely 
shifted from Berlin to Brussels.
MODEF's ideological creativity has been extremely limited. The 
externally imposed aspects, the history of elite domination and the 
pattern of post-war modernization have played the major role in shaping 
MODEF ideology. Even where MODEF has contributed distinctive elements 
to the ideology, these are largely re-iterations of Leftist views of 
agriculture and society first put forward in the nineteenth century. 
Bearing this in mind, Mineau's warning against "les faiseurs de 
nouveautés" is inevitable for an organization which seeks to put old 
wine into new bottles. For instance, HODEF's explicit justification for 
the defence of private ownership can be traced back to the Guesdists.
Just as the Guesdists argued for the defence of small property against 
the encroachment of capitalism, MODEF sees respect for private ownership 
and the consequent social structure it sustains as a stronghold from 
which to resist the extension of capitalism in agriculture.(68) The 
real difference between MODEF and the Guesdists is that MODEF's 
attachment to private property is more sincere. Unlike nineteenth 
century socialists MODEF has experienced the transient nature of 
reformism as progressive reforms have later been undermined by 
right-wing governments. The history of the evasion, non-application and 
subtle modifications of the Statut des Fermiers et des Métayers is a 
classic example. Surrendering the protection of property rights and the 
aura of legitimacy which surrounds them for more or less temporary 
reforms would, in MODEF's view, be totally irresponsible.
Similarly, other parts of MODEF ideology are inherited from popular 
movements. The egalitarian myth has been endemic to such movements, 
whether in industry or agriculture. MODEF's ambivalence towards 
modernization has been a traditional feature of both popular movements
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and socialist theory in France, perpetuated by Utopian socialists, 
anarchists such as Proudhon and revolutionary syndicalists. Hostility 
to bureaucracy and its supposed liaison with the dominant economic 
elites has also been acquired from other sources, such as the post-war 
PCF and the pre-war traditions of the Left. MODEF's only advance over 
the CGPT is the replacement of the populist "200 familles/mur d'argent" 
rhetoric of the 1930s with the pseudo-scientific jargon of the State 
monopoly capitalism theory. Finally, even though MODEF's non-aggressive 
nationalism distinguishes it from the PCF and the contemporary Left in 
general, it nevertheless conforms to Jaures' synthesis of nationalism 
and internationalism.
MODEF provides a particularly clear case of an ideological synthesis as 
opposed to the genesis of an ideology. This synthesis has been 
elaborated on the basis of a combination of expediency and conviction.
The ideological traditions of Left and Right, of popular movements and 
non-farming elites have been combined to analyze the changes brought 
about since 1945. For example, MODEF has perpetuated the Leftist 
tradition of defending private property. But unlike its forerunners, 
this is not simply a matter of political expediency. MODEF has 
internalized Rightist values on the desirability of private ownership.
At the same time, MODEF's nationalism stems from the same coincidence of 
expediency and principle. The Resistance period led to a temporary 
identification of the national interest and the interest of the Left. 
Activists who had themselves been profoundly imbued with nationalist 
ideology were led to return to the old themes of the Resistance. Since 
the greatest successes of the Left, and of the PCF in particular, 
occurred when it was identified with the cause of the nation, expediency
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dictated the use of nationalist rhetoric. The contradiction between de 
Gaulle's nationalist foreign policy and the growing internationalization 
of the economy in MODEF's formative years reinforced this tendency.
Paradoxically, MODEF's lack of originality and its reliance on synthesis 
has been one of its most original features. It is precisely this which 
distinguishes it from movements with which it has been equated. Unlike 
the CGPT, MODEF's committment to values traditionally regarded as 
non-socialist, such as private property, has been reinforced by a 
genuine belief in the values. On the other hand, contrary to the 
campaigning movements of the Right, such as Dorgerism or Poujadism,
MODEF has attempted to link the ideas of rural and urban progressives 
and conservatives, thus avoiding the danger of creating an isolated 
movement of reaction oblivious of the need to secure urban support.
5. THE IMPACT OF IDEOLOGY ON PRACTICE
Because of the mixture of conviction and expediency from which MODEF's 
ideology has been forged, the consequences of the ideology on the 
organization have been both positive and negative. In turn the 
combination of costs and benefits helps to explain some of the apparent 
contradictions in the ideology. The two most obvious contradictions 
which are readily visible are that between the idealization of the past 
and the positive aspect of MODEF's ambivalence to modernization, and 
that between anti-bureaucratic individualism and nationalism.
275
Purely on the formal level, the first contradiction is illuminating. It 
means that MODEF accepts the idea of a modern mechanized agriculture, 
yet at the same time it defends the traditional concept of property. In 
practical terms, this means a labour-intensive capital-intensive 
agriculture based on private property in the land with the obvious 
economic consequences. Similarly, if one is aware of the consequences 
of mechanization and modernization, it is contradictory to argue that 
one is only interested in securing a reasonable income. In fact they 
are guilty of the same blindness for which they reproach others - the 
view which sees technical progress as an economically neutral process. 
MODEF wants the security of the past with the convenience of modernity. 
Put bluntly, they want to have their cake and eat it. Yet the 
contradiction has practical advantages. The past has great mobilizing 
potential. An appeal to the past to criticize the present is yet 
another area where ideology as conviction and as an instrument coincide. 
Oppositional organizations have consistently used such rhetoric in order 
to create a situation in which: "Images of the future provoke, not a 
denial of the present, but a re-structuring of the present in accordance 
with the organizing principles exhibited in the idealized portrayal of 
the past".(69)
Ambivalence towards modernization also provides advantages for an 
organization seeking to maximize its support. It allows MODEF to appeal 
to the most progressive, in terms of economic modernization and 
political ideas, and at the same time give comfort to the least dynamic 
members of the profession. In order to maximize support, a certain 
element of confusion is advantageous, a political manifestation of the 
marketing strategy of product differentiation. Such contradictions are 
reconciled in practice by the Unitarian practices described in the
previous chapter. Veak discipline and the emphasis on unanimous rather 
than majority decision-making hold this disparate alliance together. 
Another of MODEF's distinctive practices, its reluctant clientelism, can 
also be traced to the ideology of the organization. Apart from the 
contradictions mentioned above, there are contradictions within each 
element of the ideology. For example, reluctant clientelism reflects 
MODEF's vision of the past and the emphasis on property and 
egalitarianism, which contradict each other. The importance which is 
attached to property undermines egalitarian sentiments since it 
inevitably leads to the definition of personality and social status in 
terms of economic position.(70) This allows the emergence of the 
quasi-notables within the organization. At the same time, egalitarian 
feelings are strong enough to ensure that such quasi-notable status is 
never considered fully legitimate by the activists. Furthermore, the 
levelling-down type of egalitarianism typical of farm and small business 
protest organizations also has adverse effects. (71) On the one hand, 
their hostility to successful members of the profession reduces their 
appeal to those who hope to be successful. On the other, governments 
are quick to see the moral weakness which this lack of confidence 
implies and do not hesitate to press home their advantage. Such an 
attitude also leads to defensiveness, a defensiveness which is 
re-inforced by the ambivalent attitude to modernization. The danger of 
emphasizing the prevention of change is that one is trapped on the 
defensive, reacting to rather than initiating events. This, in turn, 
ensures that even victories are limited to negative ones, thus 
contributing to the demoralization of the activists. In MODEF, this 
demoralization was clearly apparent in the pre-1981 electoral period.
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The contradiction between MODEF's anti-bureaucratic spirit of 
"débrouillardise" and its nationalism appears to be even more serious 
for the organization. An ideology emphasizing the role of the 
individual is confronted with one which is, by definition, concerned 
with the collective. The individualist spirit undermines organization.
The logical consequence is to drive farmers away from collective 
solutions towards individual evasions of problems. Furthermore the 
respect in which the "débrouillardise" attitude is held demonstrates 
that this individualism is not one of passive isolation but competitive 
individualism. All this tends to legitimize the "free rider syndrome". 
Many farmers may benefit from the presence of MODEF without paying the 
costs of activism or even membership.(72)
These problems have been recognized by MODEF leaders. Rene Gondran gave 
three reasons for the underdeveloped state of the MODEF apparatus.
Le MODEF est un "mouvement" sans structure très stricte, qui s'est 
développé bien souvent d'une façon anarchique... Nos dirigeants à 
tous les stades sont de petits et moyens exploitants, donc sans 
grands moyens financiers personnels pour consacrer une grande 
partie de leur temps au syndicalisme. Enfin l'état d'esprit des 
paysans assez conservateur, très prudent, et indépendant à l'excès 
sont autant d'obstacles qu'il nous faut cependant franchir si nous 
voulons atteindre notre but.(73)
MODEF's nationalist rhetoric must be seen in this light. Far from being 
contradictory, MODEF's nationalism is a consequence of its 
individualism. MODEF provides a classic confirmation of Ernst Gellner's 
thesis on nationalism. According to Gellner, nationalism emerged with
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the rise of individualist ideologies and has served a major role in 
neutralizing the potential for disaggregation created by 
individualism.(74) Furthermore, nationalist declarations are yet 
another weapon in MODEF efforts to reach the widest possible audience. 
Firstly, to speak in terms of class is to place oneself in a particular 
political tradition and thus to reduce one's potential audience.
Perhaps more importantly, MODEF's failure to define class in agriculture 
and its insistence on national themes allows it to attract farmers of 
relatively comfortable economic and social status. Class status is left 
to the individual farmer to decide. Someone who joins MODEF is 
considered an honorary small or medium-scale farmer, no matter what size 
his farm is. Attracting the farmer from the upper income brackets of 
the profession has many practical advantages. Not only is he likely to 
be able to accept more responsibility in the organization but given the 
notabilist nature of local politics in many areas, he is more likely to 
bring other farmers with him into the organization. This does not mean 
that the MODEF apparatus is dominated by large farmers, merely that 
there is no discrimination against them to prevent them joining and 
actively participating in MODEF.
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6. STABILITY AND CHANGE
The themes stressed by MODEF have shown a great deal of stability ever 
since the creation of MODEF. But given that French society in general, 
and agriculture in particular, have undergone radical changes in the 
intervening years this is somewhat surprising. Tavernier argued that 
MODEF's attitude changed after 1968.(75) Up till then MODEF confined 
itself to denouncing government policy without making any positive 
contribution. Realizing that such a strategy was no longer viable MODEF 
adopted a more careful approach to government proposals, countering them 
with its own proposals rather than just issuing a denunciation. However 
this was merely a change in the style of operation rather than one of 
ideology. The constructive proposals were based on the same ideological 
foundations as the negative denunciations. What did happen is that, as 
MODEF attracted more militants after 1968, it was able to devote enough 
time to developing a clearer picture of the agriculture it wished to 
maintain. This was essentially a process of filling in details rather 
than one of ideological innovation.
This stability has been largely due to the fact that MODEF has had an 
extremely minor part in the decision-making processes responsible for 
the formation of agricultural policy. This allowed it to express its 
views without being forced to adapt them to the conflicting pressures 
which full participation in the political system would have involved. 
Indeed expressing its views was the raison d'etre of the organization 
since its bureaucracy was too weak to develop its own interests. At the 
same time, because of the political domination by the Right, it had no
sense of loyalty or responsibility towards the governing party. Within 
MODEF, the stability of the leadership, mainly occupied by the practical 
details of running an organization, restricted the potential for 
ideological change. Finally, the state of "semi-clandestinity" to which 
MODEF was confined meant that the only reaction which MODEF received 
from farmers was confined to the local level and to the periodic Chamber 
of Agriculture elections - which in any case reinforced the ideology by 
the increase in the MODEF vote until 1979.
This interpretation is reinforced by three quite different examples.
The first is the change in the ideology of the CNJA leaders as they took 
over the FNSEA in the early and mid-1960's, and their gradual abandon of 
their more progressive ideas.(76) The emergence of a Left opposition in 
the CNJA, particularly in the West, as the consequences of Gaullist 
agricultural policy and CNJA participation in its elaboration became 
apparent provides yet another example of the pressures leading to 
ideological change. The final example consists of the changes within 
MODEF which became visible in the late 1970s and which were accentuated 
by the installation of the Left in power in 1981. The major changes 
which have been visible are the attitude towards the place of French 
agriculture in the world economy and on the question of property. The 
1978 programme contains a reference to the desirability of agriculture 
contributing to the balance of payments and helping to end hunger in the 
world. Both of these concepts are new in MODEF ideology. Until then 
exports were considered as a poor substitute for the domestic market and 
hence regarded with suspicion. However these ideas are still viewed 
with mixed feelings. One leading MODEF official in the south-east, 
interviewed in 1981, recounted the story of Daudet's miller who, a
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victim of modernization, claimed that his non-existent work was destined 
for export. Similarly other MODEF officials and activists have 
criticized the Lomé Convention for wrecking Third World agriculture, 
encouraging the development of cash crops and therefore leading to even 
greater hunger in these countries.
The explanation for this somewhat limited change of heart lies in the 
growing awareness of the importance of exports for maintaining the 
demand for French products. As pointed out in Chapter 2 not every 
farmer benefits equally from export markets, but most have something to 
lose if export markets were closed. This is particularly the case in 
the south-east which is, of course, a stronghold of MODEF,and where a 
fall in demand for fruit in Germany is immediately felt in terms of 
lower prices at Chateaurenard.
At the same time, the decline in the number of farmers and the 
agricultural share of GNP means that it is no longer automatically in 
the interests of the nation that agriculture should be supported. MODEF 
is therefore led to place more stress on how important agriculture is 
and should be in the national economy in order to give its demands a 
greater legitimacy. The rights of property no longer remain sacrosanct. 
The programme adopted in 1978 contains a proposal that no farm should be 
allowed to grow beyond the legal maximum size laid down by the Prefect 
in each department - even if the farmer involved inherited more land. 
This represents a violation of principle which is justified by its 
conformity to other principles - the desire to restrain the development 
of capitalist agriculture and the concentration of farms. More radical 
changes were announced at the 1982 Congress. Less than a year after 
Lindenstaedt's impassioned defence of private property and the need for
the farmer to own his own land, a sub-committee of the National 
Executive set up to study the land question reported in favour of 
separating the right to own from the right to farm the land. Similarly, 
after Lindenstaedt's attack on the PS proposal to set up departmental 
land offices, the same proposal was endorsed.(77)
There are several factors behind this change of heart. On the one hand, 
it registered the victory of the PS in 1981 and represented the price 
which MODEF had to pay for official recognition. On the other, it is an 
admission of the economic costs to farmers of being forced to buy their 
land. This reveals that official recognition placed constraints on 
MODEF. Though it had some prospect of exercizing influence over the 
direction of agricultural policy, at the same time it could not alienate 
the government or the PS. Similarly, it could no longer adopt positions 
knowing that they would not directly affect the farmer's position since 
its positions might have been taken more seriously than previously. If, 
as Seliger argues, the key to ideological change is the demands of 
day-to-day political conflict and compromise, the stability of MODEF's 
ideology was largely the result of its political isolation.(78) In this 
case, further developments can be expected which will change the 
ideology and policy of MODEF.
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7. CONCLUSION
Out of this examination of MODEF ideology, three points concerning the 
class content and political location of the ideology emerge. In the 
first place, MODEF has succeeded in amalgamating different ideological 
traditions. Its multi-faceted Utopia has something to appeal to 
everyone - tradition, tranquility and progress. This shows that 
ideology has no necessary class content. MODEF's nationalism is a clear 
example of a strategy based on occupying the ground vacated by opponents 
since the attempt to identify oneself with the nation has been the key 
to political success in twentieth century French politics. Secondly, 
this strategy has been a generally conservative one. Any ideology which 
seeks to appeal to a mass audience has a dual nature, including both 
adaptive and transformative elements. The former identifies and 
justifies certain traditional features of the environment in which the 
ideology has to operate. Transformative elements are those which are 
concerned with the changes deemed necessary. The evidence in this 
chapter suggests that MODEF's ideology has been dominated by the 
adaptive elements but that its originality has been to use adaptive 
ideology for transformative purposes. Given the drastic changes which 
farmers have experienced, this has permitted MODEF to secure a 
respectable level of support but has also placed limits on its potential 
for mobilization. Finally, given this ideological conservatism, the 
limited extent to which Marxism has impinged on the organization is 
hardly surprising. What is surprising is that many of MODEF's leaders 
and activists belong to political parties, such as the PCF or factions 
within the PS, which regard themselves as Marxists. The reasons for 
this dichotomy will be examined in Chapter 7 where the connections 
between MODEF and the parties of the Left are examined in detail. The 
ideological vacuum left by Marxism has been filled by another tradition
284
of popular politics in France. If MODEF were to appoint a philosophical 
guru for the organization, the obvious choice would be Proudhon. His 
conservative radicalism appears to have won a posthumous victory over 
his apparently more influential contemporary.
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CHAPTER 6 MODEF IN THE AGRI-COMPLEX
As the frequent use of abbreviations - from which the present study, 
along with most works on French agriculture, suffers - suggests, there 
is a wide range of organizations and para-statal institutions concerned 
with the political, economic and social aspects of agriculture. In the 
interests of brevity, these will be collectively referred to as the 
agri-complex. This term is also useful in the sense that the private 
and public are not always clearly distinct in agriculture. Not only are 
the distinctions between separate organizations and institutions 
sometimes unclear but it is also often difficult to decide where 
voluntary effort finishes and state regulation begins.
The first half of the chapter is concerned with the representational 
side of the agri-complex. These are the organizations which claim to 
represent the overall interests of the more or less numerous body of 
supporters which they attract, the FNSEA, the FFA and the Paysan 
Travailleur tendency. Given the pre-eminence of the FNSEA in this 
field, particular attention is paid to the relations between it and 
MODEF. It will be seen that the MODEF strategy of exerting pressure on 
the FNSEA has had only limited success thanks to the contradictions of 
its classical approach to the united front. The electoral damage 
inflicted on MODEF by the FFA and the intellectual barriers placed in 
front of MODEF by the Paysan Travailleur group are also considered.
The institutional foci of the representational side of the agri-complex 
are the Chambers of Agriculture. The section of the chapter dealing 
with them is primarily concerned with the MODEF policy of using the 
Chambers as agitational platforms. The way in which the FNSEA has
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assisted or obliged MODEF to adopt such a policy is also described.
The bulk of the latter half of the chapter is devoted to the subject of 
the socio-economic parts of the agri-complex. The three major areas, the 
Credit agricole, agricultural co-operation and the social security 
system are analysed in terms of MODEF attitudes towards them and the 
role which MODEF has played within them. It will be seen that the 
latter has been dictated by the former; the more positive the 
evaluation, the greater the participation. There is, however, another 
dimension, that of the extent of the institutional barriers to MODEF 
participation. The ideological constraints identified in the previous 
chapter will also be seen to have had an inhibiting effect on MODEF 
strategy, precluding a systematic campaign of colonization of the 
socio-economic institutions and the construction of clientelist networks.
Finally, the chapter concludes with a case study of one of the 
para-statal agencies of agricultural policy - the SAFERS. The changes 
in MODEF attitude and behaviour towards the SAFERs are charted. These 
changes of stance lead to the conclusion that MODEF has been more 
effective when contesting individual issues than when trying to change 
the thrust of agricultural policy under the Fifth Republic.
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1. THE FNSEA
The FNSEA plays a key role in the agri-complex, being the instrument of 
coordination between the various agencies of the complex. Not only is 
the FNSEA the largest representative organization of the farming 
community, but its leaders are also to be found in influential positions 
in many other organizations and institutions, both in the economic and 
representative sides. By its dominance in the Assemblée Permanente des 
Presidents des Chambres d'Agriculture (APPCA), it combines a de facto 
and de jure status as the official voice of agriculture.
This situation has arisen because of the strategy of alliance between 
the FNSEA and the Gaullist regime and its successors, adopted by both 
sides after the 1965 Presidential elections. Since then, as Keeler has 
pointed out, "the modernization process has been furthered through a 
corporatist dynamic, i.e. through the development of an intimate, 
symbiotic relationship between the state and the FNSEA."(1) Keeler 
continues :
The FNSEA has maintained its hegemonic status largely because of 
tangible and intangible benefits it receives from the state in 
exchange for performing the official union role... By reinforcing 
FNSEA hegemony, the state has pushed forward the modernization 
process while maintaining at least a semblance of social peace.
But it has also been forced to ignore, if not to sanction, the 
misuse of public funds and semi-public agencies and to stifle 
legitimate expressions of pluralism in agriculture.(2)
The major expression of such pluralism has, of course, been MODEF. The 
FNSEA has been the biggest obstacle which MODEF has had to overcome in 
its intermediate aim of extending its own influence and in its 
fundamental aim of reversing the course of agricultural policy. 
Naturally, this conflict has meant that little love has been lost 
between the two organizations.
As national organizations, communication between MODEF and the FNSEA 
have been limited to abuse. No description is considered offensive 
enough by MODEF when it comes to characterizing the leaders of the 
FNSEA. The former FNSEA president Michel Debatisse was described as a:
cumulard aux mains blanches... Partisan d'un syndicalisme entretenu 
et appointé, M. Debatisse n'en continuera sans doute pas moins à 
parader à la télévision, à parler au nom de toute la profession et 
à siéger au Conseil Economique, palpant à travers de ces divers 
responsabilités des indemnités très largement supérieures à celles 
d'un parlementaire.(3)
Similarly other leaders of the FNSEA have had the same doubts cast upon 
their motives. "Aussitôt le décès de Blondelle, de Caffarelli avait 
pensé que la présidence de l'APPCA lui irait comme un gant".(A) And 
just as the leaders of the FNSEA were alleged to be motivated by their 
own self interest, the organization itself was considered in the same 
light. The behaviour of the FNSEA was explained in terms of the 
financial assistance which it obtained from the state, i.e. its 
co-operation was secured through bribery. L'Exploitant Familial of July 
1975 contained a crude expression of this view in an article entitled 
"En récompense de leur bons et loyaux services: substantielles
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subventions gouvernementales à la FNSEA et au CNJA." The article then 
vent on to claim that the FNSEA had received 890,000 francs under the 
pretext of vocational training but that this was really a reward for the 
political co-operation of the FNSEA.
To make matters worse from the MODEF point of view, this money was 
specifically designed to keep the FNSEA on the modernizing and 
liquidating path. It was a bribe to persuade the leaders of the FNSEA 
to sacrifice the interests of the majority of farmers to the stability 
of the leadership's relationship with the government. MODEF has 
concentrated its fire on this aspect of FNSEA policy. Betraying its 
members is its raison d'être. For example, in 1972 the FNSEA Congress 
adopted a series of constitutional amendments which increased the 
control of the Debatisse leadership over the activities of the 
departmental Federations and sectional organizations. According to 
MODEF, these changes had been made in order to permit the right-wing 
leadership of the FNSEA to:
s'enfoncer encore plus dans sa collaboration avec le gouvernement 
dans sa nouvelle offensive contre les exploitants familiaux, et en 
même temps elle va s'efforcer de briser dans ses rangs toute 
tentative de s'y opposer.(5)
The last phrase above leads us on to MODEF's final major grievance 
against the FNSEA; its monopoly of representation and its lack of 
internal democracy. Since the original nucleus of MODFF was composed of 
Federations which had been victims of this state of affairs, being 
expelled on one pretext or another, this question was bound to take on 
some importance in the rivalry between the two organizations. Indeed,
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one could argue that one of the reasons for MODEF's style of internal 
democracy based on the search for unanimity is the result of unpleasant 
experiences as FNSEA members. It is important to note that the vast 
majority of those MODEF militants interviewed who had previously been 
members of the FNSEA stressed the impossibility of securing a hearing 
for a dissident line as one of the two major reasons for leaving the 
FNSEA (the other being the contents of FNSEA policies).
As far as the FNSEA was concerned, it saw no reason why its official 
monopoly of representation should not be matched by a monopoly of 
membership. The fact there was no legal basis for a closed shop in 
France was merely an unfortunate obstacle to be overcome. The FNSEA 
relied on various highly effective if dubious methods to press-gang the 
entire profession into one union. This included MODEF members since the 
FNSEA shared the view of certain civil servants that if MODEF was not 
officially recognized, it did not exist.
MODEF persistently contested both the principle of the closed shop and 
the means which the FNSEA employed in its effort to enforce it. By 
1965, MODEF had defined its attitude to this problem:
Le bureau du MODEF s'élève avec vigeur contre la prétention de la 
FNSEA de percevoir une cotisation obligatoire sur tous les produits 
livrés par les cultivateurs qu'ils soient adhérents ou non... Il 
souligne que cette atteinte à la liberté syndicale qui trouve un 
précédent dans la Corporation Paysanne de Vichy de sinistre 
mémoire, ne peut se réaliser qu'avec l'accord du gouvernement, ce 
qui mettrait sous sa dépendance total, l'organisation qui accepte 
un tel financement.(6)
Since then MODEF has contested the FNSEA's various techniques of 
pursuing this goal. Amongst those with which MODEF had to contend were 
relatively benign forms such as the negotiation of special SNCF rates 
for FNSEA members, and more malevolent forms such as the blocking of 
Credit Agricole loans to non-FNSEA members. However, the most 
profitable and popular method was the affiliation of co-operatives to 
the FNSEA or its specialist organizations. The AGPB was particularly 
effective in this respect. After affiliation, co-operatives then levied 
their members to pay subscriptions, sometimes without the knowledge of 
the members of the co-operative.(7)
Despite MODEF's hostility to such practices, it did not launch any 
systematic campaigns to eradicate them until the early 1980s.
Individual grievances, such as those concerning the Credit Agricole were 
remedied more or less effectively, but collective action against 
co-operative conscription was absent. It was left to individual 
activists to protest at co-operative AGMS. Given the shaky ground on 
which co-operative officials were treading, this could sometimes 
suffice. In 1980, the Charente Federation initiated a policy designed 
to turn this tactic against the FNSEA. Instead of opposing such levies, 
cereals farmers were advised to demand that their share of the levy be 
paid to MODEF's specialist cereals organization instead of to the AGPB.
Apart from MODEF's own organizational interests, there was a substantive 
reason behind MODEF's opposition to this artificially created unity. 
Alfred Nègre explained the MODEF position in the following terms:
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Unité, que de crimes on commet en ton nom... La fameuse unité tant 
prônée par les dirigeants du syndicalisme officiel... a eu pour 
premier et évident résultat de renforcer sans cesse les positions 
de la grande propriété. Comment pourrait-il en être autrement 
puisque seuls ses réprésentants occupent les postes de direction, 
tiennent les léviers de commande et que seuls, ils ont accès et 
audience auprès des pouvoirs publics.(8)
Since then little has happened to make MODEF revise its attitudes. 
Nègre's remarks amount to a critique of corporatism which predates the 
academic debate on the subject by some 15 years. At this series of 
quotations suggests, MODEF's critique of corporatism has generally been 
reduced to an obsession with the finances of the FNSEA. However much an 
intellectual weakness this may appear to the observer, it proved a 
practical advantage to the activist. By refusing to recognize that the 
policy of the FNSEA represented an intellectually respectable, if 
unpalatable alternative, MODEF limited the damage which the continuing 
decline of the family farm inflicted on the morale of its activists. 
Reducing the policy of the FNSEA to bribery and corruption prevented 
doubts arising about the inevitability of the decline and the consequent 
logic of the FNSEA approach.
MODEF's hostility to the FNSEA is reciprocated by the FNSEA. Addressing 
the FNSEA Congress in 1971, Michel Debatisse defended the monopoly of 
representation. Debatisse began by launching an attack on MODEF for its 
emphasis on the negative effects of the EEC and its insistence on 
pricing policy as a solution to the ills of agriculture. Denouncing 
this attitude as "agricolisme", Debatisse claimed MODEF:
s'apparente à un courant poujadiste dont les attaches politiques, 
pour être opposés, n'en sont pas moins certaines... Elle porte en 
soi la condamnation des exploitations de type familial d'autant 
plus sûrement que certains de ceux qui préconisent cette politique 
se sont empressés de faire disparaître ce type d'exploitation dans 
les pays ou ils ont pris le pouvoir... Quoi qu'en disent certains, 
l'éclatement du syndicalisme ne se ferait pas sur des bases 
économiques. En réalité, c'est bien sûr des bases politiques que se 
ferait l'éclatement du syndicalisme agricole.(9)
Pluralism would bring about a situation in which would occur "la 
création de syndicats annexes ou succursales des partis politiques.(10) 
Rather than make farmers more independent of the state, it would 
increase the influence of the state over agriculture and would prevent 
farm unionism from dealing as an equal with the economic institutions of 
agriculture.
This speech contains two of the three main themes of the FNSEA critique 
of MODEF. The connection between MODEF and the PCF was alleged to be 
such that MODEF defended the interests of the party rather than those of 
farmers. This view has been constantly re-iterated by FNSEA spokesmen 
at all levels and has constituted one of their favourite electoral 
campaign issues. From a less partisan point of view, the second theme 
is more important. FNSEA leaders have been even more insistent that the 
break up of the monopoly would damage the interests of farmers by 
reducing the influence of agricultural unionism as a whole:
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On tient beaucoup à ce que le syndicalisme reste unitaire. Ça nous 
parait très important pour la défense des agriculteurs, ça nous 
parait plus efficace. S'il y a plusieurs syndicats on a la 
conviction que les revendications perdraient de leur efficacité. 
Quand on se compare avec les syndicats ouvriers, on se rend compte 
que les syndicats regrettent de ne pas avoir une unité d'action et 
ils sont souvent en train d'essayer de s'associer.(11)
Indeed, the leaders of the UDSEA in the Charente were well placed to 
discover the truth of this claim since, as Bélanger points out, the 
MODEF-FNSEA divide meant that farm unionism did not receive the same 
degree of attention as the administration paid to it in more homogeneous 
departments.(12)
It is the final element in the critique which is the most sophisticated. 
MODEF's emphasis on agitation rather than negotiation is deeply resented 
Dy the FNSEA:
Pour nous, servir les intérêts des agriculteurs, c'est les aider à 
faire face à leurs problèmes du moment et à préparer l'avenir.
Alors passer son temps à exciter les gens en permanence, sans leur 
proposer en même temps quelque chose de constructif, nous apparaît 
pas la bonne méthode.(13)
MODEF was therefore guilty of a demagogic policy, opposing change and 
demanding that the state protect present and untenable positions. Or, 
as one FNSEA official described MODEF's tactics: "Vous travaillez bien, 
continuez, nous allons vous défendre."(14) This made MODEF incapable of 
intervening in the most important areas. The first of these was the
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technical and economic education and organization of farmers. The FNSEA 
defended itself from the bribery accusation by pointing out that state 
money was attributed on the basis of actions carried out in these 
fields. For instance, MODEF's claims that the Charente Chamber of 
Agriculture agricultural development service (SUAD) was being used for 
UDSEA purposes were dismissed by Mangon on the grounds that it was the 
UDSEA who was providing more assistance to the SUAD than vice versa.(15)
On a essayé d'être present sur le terrain en répondant aux 
besoins... Par exemple, le service TVA, le service vendangeur, le 
service de comptabilité et les réunions de formation... on essaie 
davantage de faire des actions de ce genre, de former, plutôt que 
mener une action de polémique.(16)
The other requirement which the FNSEA alleged MODEF failed to fulfil was 
the need to engage in permanent negotiations with the administration. 
This meant that MODEF could not represent farmers properly because it 
was incapable of providing the kinds of dossiers needed to persuade the 
administration to adopt particular policies. Unlike MODEF, the FNSEA 
has always recognized the distinction between government and 
administration and the consequent necessity to deal with both. As 
Mangon pointed out, the 1980 Loi d'Orientât ion was only a rough guide to 
the future of agricultural policy.
Il y a une loi mais la loi c'est une chose, son application est une 
autre. La loi prévoit des schémas directeurs pour chaque 
département. Mais ces schémas, il va falloir les bâtir. Il y aura 
des choix à faire département par département et qui ne seront pas 
forcément les mêmes en Charente que dans la Somme. Puis après, il 
faut veiller à l'application tous les jours et tous les ans.(17)
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In a sense, the FNSEA view of MODEF is the mirror image of the MODEF 
view of the FNSEA. Unlike rival trade unions, such as the CFDT and the 
CGT, neither organization was prepared to admit that the other had any 
legitimate right to exist. Both made virtues of their necessities - the 
FNSEA stressing the importance of negotiations and MODEF its 
independence from the state. However, the different positions occupied 
by the FNSEA and MODEF in the agri-complex meant that whilst the 
interests of MODEF resided in an united front policy, the FNSEA strategy 
could be summed up by one of its officials in these terms: "Nous 
cherchons à avoir le moins à faire avec le MODEF".(18) To what extent 
is the barrier between the two organizations at a national level 
reflected in the departments? Before examining this question, it is 
necessary to consider MODEF's conception of unity in action.
MODEF's strategy relied on two not always compatible principles. The 
first was an insistence on the possibility and desirability of 
co-operation with some of the FDSEAs and the specialist organizations of 
the FNSEA. The second was the idea that MODEF should act as a spur to 
the FNSEA, pressurizing it into taking action to defend the family farm.
Frederic Lindenstaedt defined this role in the following terms;
Nous préparons les esprits pour démarrer. Comme nous on est 
devant, la FNSEA n'est pas loin. Elle ne peut pas, elle ne veut 
pas se laisser dépasser. C'est le rôle d'aiguillon du MODEF. 
L'aiguillon est un baton pour piquer le boeuf. Notre rôle, c'est 
de piquer la FNSEA pour qu'elle se mette dans le mouvement.(19)
MODEF's emphasis on collaboration with the FNSEA on specific grievances 
was not simply a question of tactics. As we have seen, MODEF's
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attitude towards the class divisions in agriculture has been more one of 
sorrow rather than anger and the responsibility for the division of 
agricultural unionism has been placed firmly on the shoulders of the 
FNSEA. Given this nostalgia for "l'unité paysanné": "Celui qui, aux 
yeux de l'opinion agricole, porte la responsabilité de la rupture, 
risque de perdre toute influence, tout moyen d'action pour avoir violé 
un tabou."(20) It was therefore in MODEF's interests to maintain 
goodwill by a constant effort to be seen to co-operate wherever possible.
Whilst the cattle prod theory has remained intact, MODEF's attitude 
towards the FDSEAs has undergone some drastic changes, changes resulting 
from the gradual affirmation of MODEF's position as a solid 
organization. Between 1959 and 1980, MODEF made a clear distinction 
between the FNSEA leadership and the departmental Federations opposed to 
the leadership. Alfred Nègre warned the delegates to the first Congress 
in 1965 that they should not:
confondre les dirigeants de ces organisations (FNSEA/CNJA) avec 
leurs éléments constitutifs qui sont, pour la plupart, nos 
semblables... Il est par conséquent infiniment nécessaire à mes 
yeux, chaque fois que vous aurez l'occasion de porter les débats 
sur ce point, de distinguer soigneusement les dirigeants avec les 
troupes qui constituent ces organisations.(21)
With this idea in mind, MODEF went to greater lengths to appeal to FNSEA 
dissidents. In its early phase as a loosely-knit pressure group seeking 
to force the FNSEA to change its policies, MODEF was careful to avoid 
placing the dissident FDSEAs in an awkward position. At the first AGM 
in 1960, it was made clear that there was no objection to dual
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membership of MODEF and the FNSEA, either by individuals or FDSEAs. A 
deliberate decision was taken to avoid rigid organization. Anarchy was 
something of a positive virtue in this case:
Pour atteindre ses buts, il faut renforcer l'organisation du 
Mouvement, tout en lui gardant une forme de structure souple qui 
permette d'y adhérer quiconque désire défendre efficacement 
l'exploitation familial, quelle que soit l'organisation à laquelle 
il appartient déjà.(22)
Indeed several delegates warned against setting up any kind of formal 
organization.
In the various campaigns of agitation which took place in the early 
1960s, constant stress was laid on the need to persuade or oblige the 
FDSEAs into action:
Dans ces actions, il nous est possible d'avoir à nos côtés des 
hommes qui, même s'ils ne partagent pas notre point de vue sur les 
dirigeants de la FNSEA et même leur reste plus ou moins fidèles, 
n'en voient pas moins le danger qui les menace...
wrote Mineau in September 1960. This advice was repeated the following 
year. "Dans cette lutte nous ne devons négliger aucune possibilité 
d'action commune avec ceux qui restent fidèles à la FNSEA..."(23)
However, as it became clear that the Debatisse leadership, the Fifth 
Republic and MODEF were here to stay, MODEF began to take a less 
friendly attitude towards the FNSEA dissidents and other farmers likely
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to respond to MODEF appeals. Rather than treat these people as 
potential allies, by the early 1970s MODEF viewed them as potential 
members. In 1972, MODEF called on the dissident Federations and 
individual members of the FNSEA to come over to MODEF. MODEF argued that 
it was now clear that it was impossible for the family farm sector to 
influence the direction of the FNSEA:
Dans ces conditions, il apparait encore plus clairement que les 
petits et moyens exploitants n'ont rien à faire dans cette galère. 
C'est la raison pour laquelle nous devons montrer à ceux qui y 
restent encore que leur intérêt est de rejoindre le MODEF et d'y 
mener le combat pour faire échec à ceux qui organisent leur 
disparition.(24)
Nevertheless, MODEF was obliged to qualify this attitude and continue 
to distinguish between the FNSEA majority and the dissidents. It would 
have been self-destructive sectarianism to refuse to associate with such 
dissidents when they were advocating similar policies to those of MODEF:
Nous ne ferons exceptions que pour les organisations qui, bravant 
les interdits de la FNSEA, poursuivront sans défaillance leur 
action pour la défense de l'exploitation familial. Nous 
continuerons A mettre tout en ouevre pour mener le bon combat avec 
ces organisations.(25)
This attitude prevailed during the rest of the 1970s. For example, in 
1975, MODEF took care to distinguish between the FNSEA and certain of 
its Federations in the conflict over the proposed Giscardian alterations 
to the tenant-sharecropper regulations.
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Once MODEF moved to yet another higher stage of organization through 
official recognition in 1981, its attitude towards its sometime allies 
in the FNSEA became much harder. Shortly before the elections, MODEF 
called into question the motives of the FNSEA dissidents, as well as 
other oppositional tendencies:
En fin de compte, nous pouvons nous demander si ces soi-disant 
opposants à la FNSEA n'ont pas comme objectif d'empêcher tout 
simplement les agriculteurs mécontents de l'activité du syndicat de 
Francois Guillaume de rejoindre le MODEF.(26)
Once official recognition vas obtained in June 1981, MODEF vas able to 
call on the FNSEA dissidents to sever their ties with the FNSEA and 
bring their supporters and resources over to MODEF. This change of 
attitude was dictated by several considerations. Firstly, MODEF's 
interests as an increasingly structured organization meant that the 
dissident FDSEAs, from MODEF's point of view, would serve a more useful 
purpose in MODEF than in the FNSEA. Secondly, as far as MODEF was 
concerned, the longer the dissidents remained in the FNSEA, the less 
influence they appeared to have. The removal of Paul Le Saux and Pierre 
Abégueille from the leadership of the FNSEA's Tenants Section in 1980 
and their replacement by officials more acceptable to the FNSEA majority 
only reinforced this view. Thirdly, the presence of the dissidents 
within the FNSEA was seen as legitimizing the right-wing leadership, a 
factor which became particularly important after the FNSEA launched its 
campaign against the Mauroy government. The presence of socialists and 
communists within the FNSEA allowed the leadership to deny that their 
actions were politically motivated. Finally, with official recognition, 
the material constraints on the dissident Federations were loosened. In
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the past, any FDSEA which went too far in its defiance of the national 
leadership risked disciplinary sanctions and possible expulsion which 
would place them in the same position as MODEF itself, officially 
ignored and deprived of the state's material support. With MODEF's 
recognition, an FDSEA could transfer itself to MODEF without incurring 
such risks. The benefits to MODEF in terms of increased strength and 
resources made the capture of these FDSEAs a possible as well as a 
desirable goal.
What has this concern for co-operation with the FDSEAs meant in 
practice? At the most elementary level, MODEF's willingness to place 
the contents of policy before organizational affiliations has been 
demonstrated by its decision not to set up a Federation in those 
departments where the policies of the FDSEA were acceptable to MODEF. 
These departments are the Allier, Dordogne, Lot-et-Garonne, Ariège, 
Alpes-Maritimes, Haute-Vienne, Haute-Garonne and Creuse. To some 
extent, this was really a euphemism for the control of the FDSEA by 
activists of acceptable political organizations, primarily but not 
exclusively the PCF. The leader of the Creuse Federation was, for 
instance, the socialist Roland Viel. Another case exists of MODEF 
deciding to leave a department to its own devices in the Puy-de-Dôme. 
Here MODEF was motivated by a desire to leave the field open to a 
Federation whose merits lay in its hostility to one of its natives, 
Michael Debatisse, and its resistance to his attempts to impose his 
clientele as the leadership of the Federation.
Certain of these Federations were and are closer to MODEF than others. 
The outstanding example is the Alpes-Maritimes FDSEA whose close 
association with MODEF extended to paying a subscription to MODEF and
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participating in MODEF's south-eastern regional committee. Co-operation 
with these Federations was obviously limited by the fact there was no 
MODEF Federation in these departments. Co-operation could only take 
place at the regional level, a level at which MODEF has failed to 
construct strong organization.
Nevertheless, more positive forms of co-operation occurred in the 
various regional groupings such as the Comité d'Agen (covering 
southwestern departments), the Comité de Redon (linking the departments 
of the west) and above all the Comité de Guerêt in which the departments 
of the centre-west associate. The Comité de Guerêt, as befitting its 
longer history, is the most institutionalized of these departments. 
Though MODEF has played an active role in the Comité de Guerêt, it has 
been one of the areas in which co-operation and the cattle prod have 
proved to be in conflict with each other. According to MODEF, the 
problem with the Comité was that:
Nous n'ignorons pas que parmi les Federations d'exploitants qui le 
composent, trop d'entre elles sont liées aux dirigeants de la 
Federation nationale et ne marche que sous la pression des 
cultivateurs de leur département.(27)
19 years later, speaking as a vice president of the Comité de Guerêt, 
Raymond Mineau made it clear that the MODEF view had scarcely changed. 
"Le Comité de Guerêt est un comité d'action et de compromis."(28)
Mineau described his role and that of the other MODEF representatives as 
one which constantly obliged them to take the initiative, attempting to 
persuade the FDSEAs represented (whose activities were constrained by 
the national leadership) to take action. Despite these problems, MODEF
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has always regarded the Comité de Guerêt as a useful body as a focus of 
opposition to the FNSEA leadership since combined action, when it 
occurs, carries more weight than isolated protests by either MODEF, the 
FDSEAs or by individual departments. At the same time, MODEF's cattle 
prod theory meant that it did not always wait for the Comité to decide 
what to do, neither did it respect majority decisions against taking 
action. In effect, despite its emphasis on unity, MODEF has had a 
take-it-or-leave-it attitude towards co-operation with the FDSEAs. If 
its terms were accepted, MODEF was happy to do business with them, if 
not it continued on its path.
At the departmental level, this primacy of the cattle prod over 
co-operation was not quite so clear cut. In certain departments, the 
FDSEA and the MODEF Federation were very close allies. The Alpes de 
Haute Provence was the classic example. Between 1967-79, MODEF and the 
FDSEA put forward a joint slate of candidates in every Chamber of 
Agriculture election, generally obtaining well over ninety per cent of 
the vote. This can partly be explained by the department's political 
make-up since the strong MRG presence is uncharacteristic in Provence. 
MRG leaders played an important role both in the wider political life of 
the department and in its agricultural politics. Bridging the gap 
between the PS and PCF, the MRG helped to hold the alliance together.
But the political considerations behind the alliance were strongly 
reinforced by the drastic decline in the number of farmers in the 
department. This led to a realization that it was extremely difficult 
to sustain two separate farm unions. In departments where such 
alliances were not underpinned by this consideration, such as the Aude 
or the Gironde, this form of co-operation had a much shorter life span.
However, in the majority of departments, to the extent that there was 
co-operation between the two organizations, this was limited to 
temporary agreement on specific campaigns. For example, the censure 
motion debate of November 1964 against the Pompidou government was 
preceded by a series of protests to individual MPs in which many MODEF 
and FNSEA Federations combined.(29) In Brittany, May 1968 was 
characterized by co-operation between the two farm organizations as well 
as with the trade unions.(30) The mid-1970s drought led many 
Federations, particularly in the south west, to cooperate with each 
other in agitating for adequate compensation.(31) A similar development 
occurred in the Mediterranean coastal departments in the 'Opération 
Région Morte' of August 1976.(32)
Paradoxically, it is the departments where such collaboration would have 
had the greatest effect in which it proved least possible. In the 
departments where MODEF and the FNSEA were fairly evenly matched, such 
as the Landes, Charente and Vaucluse, relations between the two 
organizations were at their worst. The fact that MODEF were serious 
rivals embittered relations between them. Indeed "relations" is an 
inappropriate word in this context since they were more or less 
non-existent. Since the continuing pre-eminence of the FNSEA depended 
so much on its monopoly of representation and its greater capacity to 
provide services, every effort was made to keep the debate at this 
level. By moving on to a more ideological level, the FNSEA would have 
placed itself on much weaker ground. One way of preventing this from 
happening was to ignore MODEF as far as possible. Where popular 
pressure proved too great to maintain this attitude, little was done to 
bridge the gap between the two organizations.
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MODEF's difficulties in this respect were demonstrated in an incident in 
the Vaucluse in 1966. Faced with problems in disposing of the year's 
fruit harvest, MODEF's departmental committee met and proposed a 
temporary alliance with the FDSEA on the basis of a four-point 
programme. These were: an immediate ban on fruit imports; state 
purchase of excess produce for distribution to schools, hospitals, etc; 
exemption from social security contributions for the year and the 
creation of a product board to regulate the markets.(33) This was 
followed by a series of meetings between the Federations from which 
emerged a consensus on objectives but complete disagreement on means. 
MODEF then went ahead and organized its own demonstration, expressing 
its regrets that agreement had not been reached. At the same time, it 
claimed that the FDSEA's decision not to endorse the demonstration did 
not mean that it was opposed to such a protest.(34)
Conscious of the need to maintain the credibility of its "unity" 
discourse, the reluctance of most FDSEAs to cooperate with MODEF often 
required MODEF initiatives. MODEF made it its business to participate in 
protests organized by their rivals. At times this unwanted support was 
rejected, thus reducing MODEF from the status of an extremely junior 
partner to an even more humiliating position as a total outsider. For 
instance, when the Vaucluse FDSEA president was being tried for offences 
arising out of his union's protest activities, MODEF participated in a 
picket of the court. FDSEA officials then tried to remove the MODEF 
banners present.(35) Though this attempt failed, due to the opposition 
of many FDSEA members present, this served as a forceful reminder to 
MODEF that it was not engaged in unity of action with the FDSEA so much 
as committing itself to subordination in action.
This state of affairs suggests that the cattle prod theory and the 
emphasis on unity in action were not always compatible. Knowing that 
MODEF's object was to persuade or oblige the FNSEA to take the most 
vigorous action possible, FNSEA leaders had little incentive to launch 
campaigns over which they would have had to share control with MODEF. 
Neither did they want to allow MODEF to take the credit for initiating 
any actions which might have eventually proved necessary.
On the other hand, the same fear also worked against MODEF in cases 
where the cattle prod was used with success, or where popular discontent 
was so great that the FNSEA had no alternative but to take the 
initiative in organizing the protests. In such cases, MODEF was again 
placed in a state of subordination. In order to demonstrate its 
identity and to make use of the climate of agitation, MODEF was obliged 
to attempt to escalate the demands. This, naturally, threatened the 
credibility of its commitment to unity in action.
A classic example of this occurred in the winter and spring of 1980-81 
in the Charente. The Cognacais was convulsed by the implications of the 
European Court of Justice decision declaring that discriminatory 
taxation of domestic and EEC alcoholic beverages was illegal. In 
response, the French government proposed, in Article Four of the 1981 
Budget, to raise taxes on cognac to the same level as those on imported 
products. Competition from whisky manufacturers was seen as the main 
source of concern. By the time Article Four was debated in the National 
Assembly at the end of October 1980, the political and economic leaders 
of the department had all expressed their varying degrees of opposition 
to it. Throughout November and December, the UDSEA prepared the 
extra-parliamentary resistance to Article Four. MODEF was the only
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organization connected with the cognac industry to stand aloof from this 
agitation. In a report to the Charente Federation Executive at the 
beginning of December, Mineau only mentioned Article Four in passing, 
concentrating instead on the difficulties of marketing cognac under 
existing taxation and the threat posed by the proposed liberalization of 
the BNIC.(36).
As the Parliamentary struggle against Article Four was lost on 17 and 18 
December, the UDSEA, the specialist organizations of the industry and 
many of the region's mayors met at Cognac to decide upon the next step. 
This is precisely what they failed to do, disagreeing over whether there 
should be a simple refusal to pay the new taxes, an attempt to secure 
compensation from the FORMA, or an appeal to the government to 
reconsider Article Four. The last and weakest option won out. At this 
stage, MODEF, in the person of Mineau, made its first public statement 
on the issue, two months after it had become a matter of widespread 
concern. Mineau explained the Parliamentary defeat as the result of 
disunity within the region (one of the signs being the exclusion of 
MODEF from the planning meetings, although MODEF had not demonstrated 
much interest in the issue as yet) and because of the way the dispute 
had been limited to a faction fight between the pastis and eaux-de-vie 
lobbies.
On ignore superbement le vin, il nous manque les bataillons du 
Midi. La seule solution valable était non pas une bagarre entre 
eaux-de-vie et anis pour savoir qui paierait mais celle préconisée 
par le MODEF: refus pur et simple et de toute augmentation des 
droits de nos vins et eaux-de-vie et de toute réduction des droits 
de nos concurrents. C'est d'ailleurs le meilleur moyen d'amener le 
Cour de justice à revenir sur ses positions.(37)
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Only with the coining of the new year did cognac producers finally resort 
to direct action, several weeks after the mayors had begun a not 
particularly effective administrative strike. A mass demonstration was 
scheduled for Cognac on 23 January. Despite its exclusion from the 
group of farm and industrial organizations behind the demonstration, 
MODEF decided to participate, as its unitary emphasis obliged it do do. 
Nevertheless, MODEF differentiated itself from this group by 
specifically condemning the compensation option, an option still in 
favour amongst certain groups, such as the UDSEA. According to MODEF, 
compensation would be withdrawn as soon as the government had disarmed 
the opposition to Article Four.(38)
The Cognac demonstration proved to be the high point of this developing 
regional unity. MODEF were represented on the speakers platform and in 
the delegation which was received at the sub-prefecture. Support for a 
proposal that the industry should refuse to levy the new taxes was 
forthcoming from all groups involved. This proposal, however, did not 
come from MODEF but from the Syndicat Viticole of the Charente-Maritime, 
a body representing both farmers and merchants.(39)
From this point on, the paths of MODEF and the UDSEA diverged. Whilst 
the UDSEA concentrated on negotiating a settlement to the Article Four 
dispute, MODEF attempted to widen the basis of the campaign. When the 
government announced its proposals for compensation on 28 January, MODEF 
was amongst the most virulent critics of the sceheme, claiming that the 
level of compensation was inadequate and expressing doubts as to where 
the money would end up. It also insinuated that the official 
organizations rather than farmers would be the prime beneficiaries.
This was hardly designed to facilitate co-operation with the UDSEA.(AO)
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On 1 February, the new taxes and the anti-tax campaign came into force. 
Although MODEF was a firm supporter of the refusal to levy the new 
taxes, it did little to cement the alliance visible on 23 January. Its 
specialist organization, the Comité de Défense de la Viticulture 
Charentaise, met in Cognac on 5 February. The debate treated the 
taxation as a secondary issue and stressed the difficulties of marketing 
and the need to ensure the application of BNIC decisions. It was 
decided to denounce the merchants, allies two weeks previously, and 
their "collaborators" in the BNIC who were trying to deregulate the 
cognac market. The CDVC therefore decided to protest against the BNIC 
(and by implication the UDSEA), the merchants and the taxes by 
demonstrating outside the next meeting of the BNIC on 25 February.(41)
After this demonstration took place, the next MODEF initiative was on 
similar lines. The CDVC met again at the end of March and once again 
placed the Article Four issue in the context of the wider problems of 
the industry. This time it decided to appeal to the other farm 
organizations to agree a plan of action aimed at resolving these 
problems. As the Charente Libre summed up the MODEF attitude: "Le MODEF 
prêche l'unité mais fait cavalier seul".(42) In other words, MODEF was 
attempting to use its cattle prod whilst being in a state of 
subordination in action. In order to transform that situation into 
unity in action, it had to resort to tactics which undermined the 
possibility of doing so.
The contradictions of the MODEF strategy were not the only reasons why 
co-operation between MODEF and FNSEA Federations should have been so 
limited. FNSEA dissidents were obliged to tread a narrow path, 
appreciating that there were limits to the degree of autonomy which the
national leadership would tolerate. The FNSEA's official monopoly of 
representation gave the national officials a great deal of leverage over 
the departmental organizations. Fontaine has provided a case study of 
the way in which this was done. In order to be successful in its 
dealings with local and national administration, an FDSEA required the 
backing of the national organization. Fontaine concludes that the FNSEA 
was only willing to provide this support:
dans la mesure que la federation départementale demanderêsse ne lui 
apparait pas comme une adversaire irréductible; les bonnes 
relations de la FNSEA avec les pouvoirs publics peuvent faire 
avancer ou oublier un dossier.(A3)
Few Federations were willing to jeopardize their relationship with the 
FNSEA for the sake of co-operation with MODEF.
But what allowed the FNSEA to impose its will on dissident Federations? 
In the final analysis, this depended on the asymmetry between MODEF and 
the FNSEA. It was not a case of two rival organizations competing for 
the ear of the government and administration. The difference between 
the corporatist link between the state and the FNSEA and MODEF's 
ghettoization drastically reduced the possibility of finding any common 
ground. Whilst the FNSEA enjoyed privileged access to the state,
MODEF's attempt to secure access inevitably challenged the FNSEA's 
special relationship with the state. In practice, this meant the FNSEA 
was an obstacle rather than a potential ally which in turn involved 
MODEF in incessant attacks on the FNSEA. The latter was therefore able 
to blame MODEF for the division of the agricultural community and 
therefore refuse MODEF proposals for unity in action with a clear
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conscience and with a reasonable degree of credibility. MODEF was 
therefore saddled with the reputation of the splitter, even in the eyes 
of many who opposed the policies of the majority of the FNSEA leadership.
2. THE CENTRE NATIONAL DES JEUNES AGRICULTEURS (CNJA)
Since MODEF always believed that the CNJA was little more than a 
creature of the FNSEA, it's analysis of the two organizations was 
similar. The only significant difference is that MODEF hostility to the 
CNJA was even more extreme. MODEF's critique of the CNJA was based on 
its dependence on state finance and its wholehearted commitment to 
agricultural modernization. These two themes were united in an attack 
on the CNJA made in MODEF's early days, themes which persisted 
throughout MODEF's existence. Referring to the CNJA's demands for 
radical reforms in agricultural policy in the early 1960s, MODEF claimed 
that:
le CNJA voulant aller plus vite que son patron. Parler de patron 
n'est pas trop dire. Chacun sait que les seuls cotisations de ses 
adhérents sont loin de couvrir les dépenses engagées par cette 
organisation... Se plaçant de la sorte à la rémorque du 
gouvernement et les principaux responsables se constituant de 
solides assises financières, il faut bien obéir au grand chef.(A4)
This kind of accusation was made frequently for the next twenty
years. (45)
The CNJA's commitment to modernization and the managerial approach to 
farming incensed MODEF. Modernization was taken to mean the development 
of capitalist agriculture at the expense of the vast majority of 
farmers. Unlike the FNSEA, the CNJA did not face the constraints which 
the heterogeneity of its membership imposed on FNSEA leaders. This was 
particularly true after the defeat of the Left at the 1970 Congress, 
after which the CNJA became a much more ideologically homogeneous group.
MODEF therefore did not entertain much hope of creating alliances with 
the CDJAs. Given the degree of homogeneity, there was little point in 
appealing to activists over the heads of the leaders. Furthermore, the 
ageing of the farming profession involved a constant decline in the 
CNJA's potential membership. Since MODEF believed that the CNJA was 
more a manifestation of the state than a reflection of popular support 
by young farmers, there was little point in dealing with it.(46)
MODEF's hostility to the CNJA eventually crystallized over the issue of 
access to agricultural training colleges. For most of the period under 
consideration, the CNJA was the only organization permitted to enter 
these establishments to put its case. Future farmers were therefore not 
made aware that there was an alternative to CNJA, and hence eventual 
FNSEA, membership. In the late 1970s MODEF set about remedying this 
state of affairs. Faced with the CNJA's resistance, the success of the 
FNJ campaign to secure access depended on a favourable combination of 
MODEF strength and the willingness of college officials to allow such 
access. Given the CNJA-FNSEA-state connection, it is not as surprising 
as it may appear on first sight that this campaign was more successful 
in the mainly Catholic private sector than in the state sector.(47)
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MODEF's strategy towards the CNJA has therefore been one of direct 
confrontation rather than the combination of confrontation and attempted 
co-operation which characterized its relations with the FNSEA. The 
limited degree of co-operation between FDSEAs and MODEF Federations was 
not paralleled by any such alliances between FNJ Federations and CDJAs. 
This does not imply that MODEF recognized that the CNJA was autonomous 
from the FNSEA. As far as MODEF was concerned, the CNJA was only the 
clearest expression of the real objectives of the FNSEA leaders. In 
this light, the creation of the FNJ was not an implicit recognition of a 
genuine autonomy, but an expression of the need to use different tactics 
to combat the different style adopted by the CNJA.
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3. THE PAYSAN TRAVAILLEUR TENDENCY
Though MODEF likes to regard itself as the only opposition to the FNSEA 
and its allies, the reality is somewhat different since it has had to 
face opposition from both Left and Right. On the Left, the defeat of 
the CNJA minority in 1970 was the signal for an emergence of an 
agricultural hard left, the Paysan Travailleur tendency.(PT)
PT has had an unstable, tempestuous relationship with the Parti 
Socialiste Unifié (PSU), in which both parties have had a certain 
influence on the other. Perhaps the most peculiar aspect of PT is its 
determination not to have its suggestions adopted by political parties 
or the government. Despite its determined efforts to avoid 
"récupération" by political parties, that is the association of PT, 
either organizationally or ideologically with parties, it has not been 
particularly successful in this respect. Not only has it attracted the
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interest of the PSU, the PS and even the European Commission which has 
expressed interest in its ideas for energy savings and the disposal of 
EEC surpluses through import substitution.(48)
Coupled with this is a rejection of the notablist and clientelistic 
practices to which other farm organizations have resorted with varying 
degrees of enthusiasm. "Comme les trapézistes travaillent sans filet, 
nous travaillons sans notables et nous en assumons les risques."(49)
PT has a very distinct analysis of the problems of the non-capitalist 
farming sector. In opposition to the official view, PT denounces the 
expansionist conceptions which have dominated French and European 
agricultural policy-making. Rather than encourage greater investment 
and productivity, and hence surpluses, the goal of agricultural policy 
should be to ensure the survival of the non-capitalist sector. Across 
the board price increases should be replaced by guaranteed prices for 
fixed quotas. PT has also distinguished itself from other farm 
organizations through its insistence that agro-industry, the prime 
beneficiary of expansionism, should be treated as an enemy. In 
particular, PT refuses to distinguish between private and co-operative 
firms.
This analysis provides the basis for the PT critique of MODEF. PT 
claimed that the problem with MODEF was its corporatist ideology, in the 
sense of being concerned only with the interests of farmers. Because of 
its failure to analyze the connection between agriculture, the domestic 
economy and the international economy, it was committed to defending a 
type of agriculture which could not be defended. In PT's view there was 
no future for the individually-owned and operated family farm if the
present expansionism continued. Since MODEF denied that surpluses 
existed, it was supporting a less systematic but still dangerous 
productivist model of agriculture.(50)
MODEF's view of PT was been one of condescension. Unlike in the case of 
the right-wing threat from the FFA, MODEF realized the potential dangers 
which PT presented to its monopoly of opposition. As has been seen in 
Chapter 4, the emergence of PT was one of the considerations involved in 
the decision to set up the FNJ. However, once it was realized that PT 
presented no electoral threat to MODEF and had only a limited impact 
amongst MODEF activists, MODEF's criticisms of PT portrayed its 
activists as a group of mistaken idealists. The basic reproach was that 
PT was incapable of translating its theoretical analysis of the problems 
facing farmers into practical suggestions for remedial action. After 
the CNJA Congress of Blois where the future PT activists narrowly failed 
to take control of the CNJA, MODEF criticized them for their abstraction:
Le contre rapport est trop remplie de phraséologie pour être 
convainquant. Se proposer de convaincre les jeunes et les paysans 
en général des vices du "capitalisme" et des chances qu'offrirait 
une société plus socialiste est peut être plus genereuse, mais 
quelles solutions concrètes propose le contre rapport pour 
1'immédiat... (51)
Since then, the offical MODEF view has scarcely changed as Frederic 
Lindenstaedt made the same point more elegantly in 1980. "Ils 
s'envolent dans les nuages"(52)
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This gap between the two organizations was widened by the fact that 
official condescension was often replaced by overt hostility on the part 
of the MODEF activists who were most involved in dealings with PT. This 
was particularly clear in Brittany since this is the region in which PT 
had the greatest success. MODEF Breton activists were much more likely 
to take a much less tolerant view of PT. One MODEF official in the 
Côtes du Nord expressed his contempt for PT. "Des bourgeois un peu 
révoltés, pas révolutionnaires je le dis bien, parce qu'ils n'ont pas 
fait fortune. Ils retourneront à leurs anciens amours."(53) This is of 
course a more traditional response of the official Left to their 
challengers on the far left.
In consequence, there has been little co-operation between MODEF and PT. 
This was due more to mutual incomprehension than to emnity.
Paradoxically, PT is the most politicized farm organization but at the 
same time it has been the one most concerned with the economic dimension 
of class conflict in agriculture. PT has combined a vague commitment to 
structural political change with a constant search for economic 
solutions which, however radical they may seem, remain reformist since 
they do not threaten the state. MODEF, on the other hand, has combined a 
more concrete and limited form of political change with a blatant 
disregard for the economic limitations imposed by the capitalist economy.
In practice, therefore, MODEF and PT activists were only able to 
co-operate on particular cases rather than issues. When dealing with 
individual or local problems, such as resisting evictions, co-operation 
was possible. Issues on which the wider views of the two organizations 
impinged offered little hope of successful alliances. The failure of 
attempts to arrive at an agreed strategy over the EEC milk levy was a 
case in point.
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Given PT's desire to steer clear of the political parties, it is ironic 
that its main impact on MODEF has been to restrict the latter's 
influence on the PS. MODEF attempts to win support for its policies 
within the PS were hindered by the fact that an alternative body of 
theory existed, an alternative which had more appeal to the PS 
"enarques' than that of MODEF. As the next chapter demonstrates, if the 
substance of PS agricultural policy in the late 1970s was similar to 
that of the MODEF, the logic behind the respective policies, the modes 
of thought which they revealed and the language in which they were 
expressed were very different. MODEF's relative weakness within the PS 
appparatus can therefore be partially explained by the existence of PT.
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4. THE FEDERATION FRANÇAISE DE L'AGRICULTURE
In terms of electoral competition, opposition to the FNSEA from the 
right has had a much more severe effect on MODEF than has the far left 
opposition. The Federation Française de l'Agriculture (FFA) was created 
after the withdrawal of the FDSEA of Indre-et-Loire from the FNSEA in 
1970. As a recrudescence of agrarian Poujadism, its influence has 
remained confined to western France, with a few exceptions such as the 
Poujadist and CID-UNATI stronghold of the Isère. The founders of the FFA 
were motivated by the belief that the FNSEA was not sufficiently 
vigorous in its defence of agricultural interests. Along with the 
state, the FNSEA was engaged in subordinating agriculture to industry 
and undermining the political and moral basis of conservative France.
It is this refusal to relate agriculture to the rest of the economy and 
society which distinguishes the FFA from all the agricultural unions.
For example, in 1981, the other organizations were all united in
demanding price rises of 15.3X in order to maintain incomes. Only the 
FFA dissented, calling for increases in real income to be assured by a 
25X rise.(54)
This tunnel vision was reflected in MODEF criticism of the FFA. On the 
one hand, its promises were demagogic and could only lead to cynicism 
and despair. On the other, MODEF claimed that the FFA was an instrument 
of the state:
Devant la perte d'audience de la FNSEA, le gouvernement essaie en 
sous main d'implanter la FFA. La FFA vise manifestement à 
concentrer l'attention de petits et moyens exploitants sur un 
danger imaginaire tandis qu'en s'opposant à ce que les grands 
exploitants supportent des charges compatibles avec leurs revenus, 
elle favorise la concentration capitaliste des terres et de la 
production agricole. C'est le même but que poursuit la FNSEA par 
d'autres moyens. Il y a donc entre la FFA et la FNSEA division de 
travail dans le but de favoriser la politique agricole du 
gouvernement...(55)
However, MODEF did not adopt this position from the beginning of the 
FFA's existence. It had watched the creation of the FFA with 
equanimity, assuming that a right-wing opposition would only create 
problems for the FNSEA rather than MODEF. It was only after MODEF had 
realized that the FFA posed a greater threat to MODEF than it did to the 
FNSEA that the conspiracy theory was put forward.
MODEF has admitted the electoral damage which the FFA has inflicted upon 
it. Lindenstaedt explained what had occurred:
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La FFA a effectivement récupéré une partie des électeurs 
d'opposition qui votait pour le MODEF auparavant parce que c'était 
la seule opposition... Le pouvoir politique n'a pas pu laisser ce 
bénéfice au MODEF. Quand la FFA s'est présenté avec son programme 
corporatiste et a participé a la campagne anti-MODEF, il y a une 
partie des gens, qui ont voté MODEF, qui sont revenu à leur façon 
de penser et leur façon de voter précédent.(56)
The election results for the Chamber of Agriculture constituencies in 
western France tell an eloquent story. In virtually every constituency 
in which the MODEF slate was confronted by FNSEA and FFA slates, it was 
beaten into third place. For example, in 1970, MODEF won thirty-one per 
cent of the vote in the Indre-et-Loire constituency of Tours. With the 
presence of the FFA in 1976, this proportion fell to twelve per cent.
The gap between MODEF results in such departments in 1970 and those of 
197A (the first elections contested by the FFA) was a major shock.
MODEF candidates in the Isère in 1970 obtained an average of 26.5%. The 
corresponding figure in 197A was 12.5%. In Loire Atlantique, the MODEF 
share fell from 20% to 7.5%. Most spectacular of all was the collapse 
of the MODEF vote in Vendée from forty-seven to twelve per cent. Only 
in the Morbihan constituency of Pontivy did MODEF manage to beat the FFA 
into third place. The pattern was repeated in the 1976 and 1979 
elections, leaving MODEF with a large hole in its organization in the 
Loire Valley and in the Pays de la Loire region.
The fact that MODEF became convinced that the primary purpose of the FFA 
was to undermine the MODEF monopoly of opposition rather than the FNSEA 
monopoly of representation prevented the establishment of any systematic 
contacts between the two organizations. This was reinforced by the
chasm between their platforms. Despite the differences which exist 
between MODEF and FNSEA, they nevertheless live in the same mental 
century. The FFA does not. Therefore there is no common discourse, 
which is the minimum requirement for any relationship, whether of 
conflict or co-operation.
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5. THE CHAMBERS OF AGRICULTURE
As the Chambers of Agriculture are the official voice of agriculture as 
a whole, every farm and other form of agricultural organization has a 
political and bureaucratic interest in maximizing its influence within 
them. Article 506 of the Code Rural defines the role of the Chambers. 
Their function is to give government and administration advice on 
agricultural issues. They are also allowed to involve themselves in 
initiatives designed to promote agricultural development.
The Chambers represent all those in involved in agriculture, farmers, 
landowners, labourers, and the recognized agricultural organizations. 
Their legal status is that of an "Etablissement Public". Their 
relationship with the state is thus legally defined rather than being 
determined by mutual advantage, as in the case of the FNSEA. In order 
to carry out their functions, Article 507 of the Code Rural allows them 
to employ a large bureaucracy and to finance their activities by taxing 
the owners and users of agricultural land. The official status of the 
Chambers at the national level and control of resources at the 
departmental level has made the battle for influence within the Chambers 
a matter of vital importance for the FNSEA.(57)
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The efforts of the FNSEA in this direction have been rewarded with a 
high degree of success. The FNSEA succeeded in maintaining control of 
virtually every departmental Chamber, the exception being the Landes 
between 1964 and 1979. Its dominance in the Assemblée Permanente des 
Presidents des Chambres d'Agriculture (APPCA) was demonstrated by the 
fact that not only did its nomimees occupy the principal posts in the 
APPCA but the two organizations shared the same headquarters building in 
Paris.
If the FNSEA dominance of the APPCA strengthened the political influence 
of the FNSEA, it was its control over the departmental Chambers which 
proved of most assistance in maintaining its influence over farmers. 
MODEF never ceased to complain that the resources of the Chambers were 
being misappropriated for the benefit of the FNSEA. In the more extreme 
cases, MODEF claimed that farmers were refused access to Chamber 
services unless they paid FNSEA subscriptions. Less dramatically, MODEF 
denounced the close links between Chamber services, such as the SUADs, 
and the FDSEAs, claiming that the former were paying their staff to act 
as agents of the latter. Similarly, MODEF accused the Chambers of 
subsidizing the FNSEA, either through clandestine payments or through 
the purchase of excessive numbers of FNSEA publications. The latter was 
particularly galling to MODEF given its limited access to the means of 
communication.
The FNSEA reply to allegations about the links between Chamber staff and 
the FDSEAs has already been seen above. It would appear that there was 
some substance to the MODEF claims. A Cour des Comptes report in 1971 
revealed that the auditors had discovered certain irregularities. They 
found that between the Chambers and the FNSEA, there existed "des
situations contestables et interferences multiples et parfois 
anormales". Evidence was also discovered that certain Chambers had in 
fact made clandestine payments and had given an abnormal amount of 
assistance to FNSEA publications.(58) Significantly, the report was not 
denied, though Chamber officials argue that the situation has changed 
since then. A further Cour des Comptes report in 1981 suggested that 
this confidence vas misplaced. In any case, MODEF persisted with its 
accusations.(59)
MODEF also had two other grievances against the Chambers, both connected 
with the electoral system. The first was the lack of proportional 
representation which created a vide gap between MODEF's respectable 
percentage of votes and its almost negligible share of seats.
Proportional representation became MODEF's first victory after its 
official recognition in 1981. The other grievance was the nature of the 
electoral system. MODEF claimed that the reforms in the electoral 
system carried out in 1969 amounted to gerrymandering. Previously, all 
farmers subject to taxation by the Chambers had the right to vote in 
the farmers electoral college. This was changed to create a separate 
college for retired farmers and to disenfranchise small farmers with 
other jobs who were not subject to the agricultural social security 
system. To make matters worse from the MODEF point of view, 
representation of landowners and the official organizations was 
increased. The latter measure was widely seen as a way of permitting 
Michel Debatisse to overcome his electoral humiliation in Puy-de-Dôme by 
obtaining a seat through nomination by one of these organizations.(60)
As MODEF's official cartoonist put it: "Ils ont du modifier les Chambres 
pour ne pas, les MODEFier".(61)
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The behaviour of MODEF in those Chambers where it was represented 
conformed to the organization's practice of politicizing economic 
issues. After its first electoral victories in 1964, MODEF eventually 
realized the danger which such representation created. To concentrate 
purely on technical issues was to accept the definition of problems by 
the state, i.e. to accept the broad lines of agricultural policy. By 
1965, MODEF leaders were warning against the threat of indirect 
incorporation. MODEF representatives were instructed to "éviter que les 
travaux des Chambres d'Agriculture soient accaparés par des enquêtes et 
études concourant à l'application du plan gouvernemental de liquidation 
des exploitations familiales..."(62)
This view has dictated MODEF policy ever since. MODEF's strategy was 
therefore to use the Chambers as a platform for agitation rather than 
attempt to use their services as a means of overcoming the difficulties 
of the family farm. This was the case in both the Landes where MODEF 
controlled the Chamber and in the Charente where it was a strong 
minority.
The Landes case is of particular interest. As president of the Landes 
Chamber, Marcel Sintas opened every meeting with a global attack, on 
government policy since the captive audience included the Prefect. Most 
of the deliberations of the Chamber were conducted in a similar spirit. 
Contrary to the mythology which insists that a PCF activist who gains an 
official position sets out to increase his empire of subordinates and 
colonize the bureaucracy, such a policy was conspicuously absent in this 
case. Indeed the services provided by the Chamber were kept to the 
minimum and there was no evidence to suggest that staff were appointed 
on political criteria. Such a policy served two purposes at the same
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time. On the one hand, it helped to maintain MODEF popularity by 
limiting the level of taxation. On the other, it prevented the growth 
of services which would rival those of MODEF, services which were an 
important part of MODEF's success in the department. As a result, when 
the FDSEA finally gained control in 1979, it was left with a seriously 
underdeveloped institution which, in the short term, presented more 
problems than advantages.(63)
The agitational policy was even more marked in the Charente where 
MODEF's minority status allowed it the luxury of a purely oppositional 
role. Criticism of government policy was accompanied by an extremely 
negative approach, reminiscent of a "rate payer" county councillor, to 
any initiatives undertaken by the UDSEA-led majority. One of the main 
themes of MODEF speakers was the alleged extravagance of the 
majority.(64) For instance, in 1965 MODEF denounced the proposed 
employment of a researcher.(65) In 1969, Mineau denounced the rise in 
the cost of subscriptions to the Regional Chamber and the cost of work 
carried out on the Chamber's premises. "3,000 par çi, 3,000 par là. Les 
petits ruisseaux font les grands rivières".(66) Throughout the 1970s 
MODEF kept up a constant barrage of criticism over the alleged 
dishonesty of the accounts presented to the Chamber by its Executive.
By the end of the decade, MODEF had found itself a cause celebre to keep 
itself occupied, obstructing the projected plan to move the Chamber 
headquarters to more conveniently located and more suitable offices in 
the centre of Angouleme by persistent demands for further information on 
costs and specifications.(67)
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A policy based on all-out opposition to the majority, a majority 
considered to be in the service of the state, led MODEF into positions 
which were not always accepted without question in its own ranks. The 
most extreme case occurred in February 1980. The majority of MODEF 
representatives, led by Mineau, condemned the compulsory slaughter of 
animals suffering from brucellosis on the grounds that it was 
unnecessary, ineffective in stopping the spread of the disease and that 
compensation was insufficient. Mineau claimed that: "Si on avait mis 
tous les tuberculeux en sanatoruium autrefois sous prétexte qu'ils 
pouvaient devenir contagieux, il aurait fallu en couvrir des villes 
entières."(68) Instead, MODEF called for more research to be conducted 
on vaccines which would remove the need for such drastic solutions as 
slaughter. Given the dangers which the disease presents to animals and 
farmers, this was too much for one of MODEF's MRG representatives who 
therefore abstained in the vote.
MODEF's increasingly negative stance resulted from its pessimistic 
appraisal of the possibilities open to it in the Chamber. Its 
representatives became more and more convinced that it had no hope of 
persuading the majority to adopt even the most innocuous of its 
proposals. Just as MODEF opposed the majority, the majority 
systematically opposed MODEF. This was particularly clear after 1970 
when the UDSEA took over the presidency of the Chamber. As relations 
between the majority and the minority deteriorated, MODEF was 
increasingly excluded from the less public work of the Chamber. Since 
the Chamber normally met only twice a year, the bulk of its business was 
conducted by the Executive Committee and by its delegates to the various 
institutions, government advisory committees, and local voluntary 
associations. MODEF was always excluded from the Executive, prompting
complaints from MODEF that the official accounts were meaningless in the 
absence of MODEF scrutiny. But it had been given a limited but 
significant share of the delegate posts. These responsibilities were 
gradually eroded until MODEF was excluded from all its remaining posts 
of any significance such as the Regional Chamber, the SUAD and the 
Etablissement Départementale de l'Elèvage (EDE) in 1979. After the first 
meeting following the 1979 elections, MODEF was left with representation 
on only six of the forty-two bodies on which the Chamber was 
represented. Removed from the important bodies such as the SUAD and the 
EDE (important because of the funds at their disposal), MODEF had to 
content itself with such interesting bodies as the departmental advisory 
committee on student grants.(69)
Inevitably, demoralization set in. Though Mineau, seconded by the dumb 
insolence of Jacques Dournois, had always made the bulk, of MODEF's 
interventions, this became even more marked as the decade wore on. But 
even these interventions became less and less frequent as Mineau found 
it more and more difficult to summon up enthusiasm for the conflict with 
the omnipotent majority. MODEF's other representatives came to regard 
their position as more of a burden than an honour and there was little 
competition for nomination as a candidate by the early 1980s.(70)
By the end of Giscard's reign, it was patently clear that MODEF had only 
two motives in continuing to pay any attention to the Chamber. Firstly, 
and less importantly, it provided a limited platform and attracted a 
certain amount of publicity from the local press. More importantly, 
MODEF was obliged to devote a large proportion of its limited resources 
to the Chamber since the elections were a vital test of its 
representative status. In this light, electoral victory was an end in
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itself rather than as a means to an end. Victory did not allow MODEF to 
implement its proposals but it did serve warning on the state that MODEF 
was a force with which it had to reckon.
MODEF's pessimism and the FNSEA's belief in MODEF's inability to be 
constructive were both self-fulfilling predictions. By limiting MODEF 
participation in the Chambers, the FNSEA prevented the kind of indirect 
incorporation which MODEF feared. At the same time, MODEF's agitational 
strategy confirmed the FNSEA in its view that MODEF should be kept out 
of Chamber policy-making and administration as far as possible. MODEF's 
strategy in the Chambers leaves a question mark hanging over its head; 
is MODEF really the kind of demagogic group it was alleged to be by its 
detractors? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to 
examine MODEF's role in the economic side of the agri-complex.
6. THE CREDIT AGRICOLE
Apart from the FNSEA and the APPCA, the only other body officially 
recognized as representative before June 1981 was the Federation 
Nationale de la Co-operation, du Credit et de la Mutualité Agricole 
(FNCCMA). This organization links the three main areas of the economic 
agri-complex, marketing, finance and social security. Rather than deal 
with these organizations in order of precedence, it will prove more 
useful to analyse them in order of the degree of hostility which MODEF 
manifested towards them. In such a competition, the Credit Agricole had 
no rival for first place.
The Credit Agricole is not only the major financier of French 
agriculture but also one of the world's largest banks.(71) By 1975, it 
had 3 million shareholders drawn from the agricultural community, AO,000 
of whom served as local elected officers. Its 55,000 full-time staff 
handled the affairs of some 12 million clients.(72) The structure of 
the Credit Agricole distinguishes it from its rivals in the banking 
world. Legally, it is a co-operative with its shareholders organized in 
91 "Caisses Regionales", most of which are constituted on a departmental 
basis. These are co-ordinated by the Caisse Nationale du Credit 
Agricole (CNCA).
Obviously, given its financial importance the Credit Agricole is not 
just another co-operative. In order to ensure the effectiveness of 
financial and monetary policy, successive governments had to exercise 
supervision over it. In practice, the co-ordinating role of the CNCA was 
used to limit the autonomy of the CRCAs. Apart from laying down the 
framework in which the Credit Agricole was permitted to operate, the 
government also nominated the managing director of the CNCA; an office 
held between 1963 and 1975 by a Gaullist Inspecteur des Finances,
Jacques Mayeux.
As the agricultural bank and as a major financial institution, the 
Credit Agricole has been an instrument of financial and agricultural 
policy. Its shareholders, i.e., the farmers, were caught between the 
periodic credit squeezes inspired by the Ministry of Finance and credit 
regulations designed to further the development of "viable farms" 
imposed by the Ministry of Agriculture. To a large extent, this 
resulted in a policy of robbing the poor to feed the rich. The savings 
of the smaller farmers were lent to the richer modernizing elements.
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From MODEF's point of view, the purpose of the Credit Agricole was being 
betrayed by its role in furthering capitalist agriculture at the expense 
(literally) of the family farm.(73)
MODEF's sense of grievance was aggravated by the influence of the FNSEA 
within the CRCAs and the presence of its activists as elected local 
officers. One writer claims that the Credit Agricole "has 
responsibility for deciding which farms survive and which founder, 
bringing a degree more rationality into the sifting process than the 
operation of entirely free market conditions would have done."(74)
MODEF took a less sanguine view, believing that the logic of the market 
was being replaced by the even harsher logic of the FNSEA. According to 
MODEF, constant vigilance was necessary to prevent the Credit Agricole 
from being used as a weapon in its battle to incorporate the entire 
profession into the FNSEA. MODEF repeatedly claimed that certain CRCAs 
had a policy of refusing to grant loan applications unless they were 
countersigned by the local FNSEA chieftain. It was also alleged that 
MODEF activists and candidates were warned that their union activities 
would threaten their relations with the Credit Agricole.
At the same time, MODEF claimed a certain degree of success in 
preventing such occurrences. Where MODEF was relatively well organized, 
the publicity given to such practices succeeded in more or less 
eliminating them. But MODEF failed to launch a systematic campaign 
about these alleged abuses, nor did it make a co-ordinated effort to get 
its activists elected as local officials. This was left to individual 
initiative. Rather than seek such limited but possible victories, MODEF 
preferred to pursue wider and more optimistic goals.
During the 1970s, MODEF mis-directed its efforts to the question of 
Credit Agricole surpluses. (Being a co-operative, it does not make 
profits). Like many other banks, the Credit Agricole made a great deal 
of money out of the economic crisis. MODEF seized upon this opportunity 
to demand that the money be used to halt the decline of the family farm.
Pourquoi cet argent n'est-il pas replacé dans l'agriculture? Parce 
que le gouvernement, avec l'encadrement du credit, empêche le 
réinvestissement de ses sommes dans l'agriculture. Maintenant il 
va prélèver sur ses bénéfices qui appartiennent aux agriculteurs.
Le Credit Agricole est une co-operative et il faut distribuer les 
bénéfices. Le gouvernement fait une ponction pour financer une 
partie du budget de l'agriculture... C'est de l'argent qui est 
détourné de son objectif. Avec ça on pouvait à la fois remettre un 
peu d'argent aux agriculteurs, leur prolonger leur credit, baisser 
leur taux d'intérêt, etc.(75)
The problem with such an argument vas that it ignored the changes in the 
Credit Agricole which permitted the generation of such surpluses. If 
the Credit Agricole remains the farmers bank, it is no longer an 
agricultural bank. At the crudest level, this is visible in the 
ever-growing number of Credit Agricole branches in the farmer-free zone 
of Paris. Gaudibert points to the vide range of activities in which the 
Credit Agricole has invested, ranging from travel firms to computers.
One famous example was its role in financing the acquisition of 
L'Express by James Goldsmith.(76) Even in its role as a clearing bank, 
the major growth area has been in the mortgage market with its saving 
plan for urban house purchases.(77) If the MODEF solution was adopted, 
one would be transferring money from the urban to the agricultural
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economy, not restoring it to its rightful owners. In this respect.
MODEF violated its stated desire to analyse the problems of agriculture 
in the context of the economy as a whole.
But why should MODEF violate its own principles in such a way, 
abandoning the possibility of limited reform in favour of what would 
amount to an economic counter-revolution? In this case, at least, the 
dangers of close involvement within the CRCAs appeared to outweigh the 
potential benefits. If MODEF had succeeded in winning a strong 
position, it would only have been a negative victory, permitting it only 
to prevent what it saw as FNSEA abuses. All it could have achieved was 
fairer implementation of the policies dictated by the Finance and 
Agriculture Ministries through the intermediary of the CNCA. It 
therefore risked incorporation. By concentrating on the wider policy 
issues, such as the disposal of the surpluses, MODEF was able to put 
forward a positive policy and challenge the principles rather than the 
details of official policy. Rather than maintain an outsider status for 
the sake of it, MODEF's strategy was therefore dictated by a rational 
cost-benefit analysis. Whether this analysis was correct is a problem 
which will be deferred until the concluding pages of this chapter.
7. CO-OPERATION AND MODEF
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As far as the co-operative sector is concerned, the cost-benefit 
analysis resulted in a more favourable attitude to a strategy of working 
from the inside. Since the late 1960s, MODEF has treated co-operation 
as an essential element in the defence of the family farm and its 
activists have played a part in the affairs of the co-operatives. The 
idea of the co-operative as an instrument of economic defence is, of 
course, a theme common to all organizations in French agriculture.
The problem which MODEF faced was that the Proudhonian idyll of 
co-operation was undermined by the political and economic pressures 
unleashed by the Fifth Republic. Just as farmers divided into 
modernizers and traditionalists, co-operatives themselves became divided 
between the large bureaucratized giants and the small-scale 
participatory co-operatives.(78) Chapter 3 shows that MODEF found the 
latter more conducive than the former.
The case of the Union Laitière Pyrénées-Aquitaine-Charentes described in 
Chapter 3 is far from unique. The concentration of co-operatives led to 
the formation of other giant co-operatives such as the Union Laitière 
Normande. In the most detailed study of co-operatives yet carried out, 
Canevet points out that twelve co-operatives accounted for eighty per 
cent of the turnover of the co-operative sector in Brittany by 1970. 
Confronted with the logic of the capitalist economy, these co-operatives 
were obliged to be more or less capitalist themselves. Not only did 
such co-operatives find themselves in direct competition with private 
multinationals, they began to combine with private firms in order to 
meet such threats. In some cases, the co-operatives formed such close 
links with private firms that virtual mergers took place, as between the
Union Laitière Normande co-operative and the privately owned 
Negobeurouef.(79)
As several writers have pointed out, such co-operatives no longer served 
as agents of defence of the family farm but of the kind of modernization 
desired by the state.(80) Canevet has described the change in the 
nature of the relationship between co-operative and farmer brought about 
the emergence of such co-operatives:
La co-operative tend donc à devenir une véritable entreprise 
industrielle et commerciale, en vue de constituer un pôle de 
développement régional et de lutter contre les effets de domination 
par les secteurs secondaire ou tertiaire. Mais, ce faisant, elle a 
souvent tendance à adopter un comportement de firme, qui n'est pas 
nécessairement conforme aux intérêts des producteurs: tendance à 
sélectionner les adhérants en éliminant les moins efficaces; à 
comprimer les prix payées aux producteurs et aux salariés - pour 
demeurer competitive face aux entreprises du secteur privé.(81)
This transformation of the co-operative sector was actively assisted by 
the state. In its hurry to create a French agro-business sector capable 
of competing with the US, UK and Anglo-Dutch multinationals, the state 
dismantled the barriers to the capitalist development of co-operation.
In order to allow co-operatives to overcome the restraints imposed by 
the principle of one man-one vote, various legal changes were made. 
Different categories of membership were permitted, ranging from full 
membership to temporary contracts. The possibility of the establishment 
of Sociétés d'intérêt Collectif Agricole (SICAs) to carry out some of 
the activities of the co-operatives also reduced democratic
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participation since, unlike co-operatives, voting rights in SICAs are in 
proportion to the share of capital invested. SICAs also provided a 
vehicle for private investment in the co-operative sector.(82) Finally, 
through its control of the Credit Agricole, the government was able to 
decide which co-operatives should receive the necessary finance for 
modernization and which ones should be swallowed by their rivals.
MODEF's initial reaction to this state of affairs was to condemn the 
co-operatives for betraying their members interests. But unlike Paysan 
Travailleur, MODEF never took a position of systematic opposition to the 
co-operatives. By 1976, MODEF was arguing that the traditional 
principles of co-operation, the defence of the family farm and 
democratic decision-making, had to be defended. The connection between 
MODEF support and small-scale co-operation (as in the Vaucluse) and this 
stance is self-evident. Though recognizing the transformation in the 
nature of co-operation, MODEF re-iterated the traditional view of the 
purposes of co-operation.
Le MODEF accorde à la co-operation agricole une large place dans 
la recherche des voies et des moyens d'atténuer, de freiner et de 
contrecarrer les desseins d'une politique agricole dont la 
malfaisance à l'égard des agriculteurs laborieux n'est plus à 
démontrer.(83)
However, MODEF's solution to the problems created by modernization 
addressed itself to symptoms rather than causes, calling for the 
re-establishment of democracy within the co-operatives. This remained 
MODEF's position throughout. As far as MODEF was concerned, economic 
changes were the reflection of political will rather than vice versa.
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In MODEF's 1978 Programme, the economic problems of co-operation are 
analyzed but the conclusion drawn is that such problems are due to the 
fact that: "Une réglementation anti-co-operative soumet des branches 
entières de la co-operation à la domination directe du grand 
capital."(84) Nevertheless, MODEF was:
hereux de constater que, maigre un système économique hostile à la 
co-operation, malgré les difficultés et le manque d'encouragement 
les agriculteurs recherchent de plus en plus des formes nouvelles 
d'organisation pour la production et la commercialisation. Cette 
recherche d'une autre voie plus sociale et plus humaine répondant 
aux nécessites de développement technique et économique est une des 
grandes richesses de notre agriculture.(85)
But MODEF's proposals for overcoming this state of affairs, apart from a 
vague reference to financial assistance, remained confined to demands 
for democratization.
The favourable attitude to the principle of co-operation meant that 
MODEF activists were to be found in positions of responsibility within 
the co-operatives. Apart from the cases already mentioned, the wine 
co-operative based in Montblanc in the Hérault, one of the largest of 
its kind in Europe, was headed by the town's mayor and MODEF 
vice-president, Emilien Soulié.(86) One should also remember the role 
of the Pernes co-operative in the establishment of the Vaucluse
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Federation.
The problem for MODEF is that its activists did not occupy the share of 
offices in co-operatives commensurate with the number of its supporters 
who belonged to co-operatives. This was a particularly severe limitation 
on MODEF influence in departments where unionism has traditionally been 
virtually indistinguishable from co-operation. This explains why MODEF 
has not had the kind of success one would expect in Midi departments 
such as the Hérault, and Aude and Gard.
Apart from the blocking action of the FNSEA, MODEF activists found 
themselves at a disadvantage in several respects. In the first place, 
their early hostility to the transformation of co-operation damaged 
their credibility as co-operative managers. Secondly, the fact that 
MODEF did not have the same resources to devote to the economic and 
managerial education of its activists as did the FNSEA meant that such 
activists were left to their own devices. Finally, once again, there 
was no systematic campaign to colonize the co-operatives with MODEF men.
Was this yet another example of the refusal to accept responsibility?
From the MODEF point of view, this can only be answered by another 
question - responsibility for what? Prepared to accept positions of 
authority in the small-scale co-operatives which remained at the service 
of the producers, MODEF had little incentive to involve itself in the 
large co-operatives in which the interests of the members were 
subordinated to those of the co-operative. Given its analysis of 
agricultural policy, acceptance of the changed role of such 
co-operatives was tantamount to accepting responsibility for the 
liquidation of the family farm. In a sense, the real act of demagoguery 
would have been to pretend that more farmer-orientated management would 
have made any difference. MODEF's attitude was therefore the result of
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a serious analysis of the role of co-operation rather than a symptom of 
congenital oppositionism.
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8. THE MUTUALITE SOCIALE AGRICOLE
This point becomes even clearer when one considers MODEF's role in the 
final part of the agri-complex, the social security system. With an 
ageing labour force and the increasing economic difficulties of 
agriculture, the Mutualité Sociale Agricole (MSA) came to the forefront 
of agricultural politics. By the late 1970s, the issue of social 
security had become one of MODEF's favourite themes. Like co-operation, 
the MSA presented both an opportunity and a threat. On the positive 
side, the MSA provided a very necessary service. But at the same time, 
the cost of the service provided yet another burden on farm incomes.
The structure of the MSA is very similar to that of the Credit Agricole. 
Each department has its own MSA Caisse. But unlike the Credit Agricole, 
there is a much greater democratic involvement in the MSA. The MSA is 
administered by an Executive Committee elected by the cantonal 
delegates, who are elected by the farmers. Through this, MODEF was able 
to secure participation in the administration of the social security 
system, and in one case, to obtain control of the MSA (the Landes). 
Neither did the degree of central direction exercised by the 
government-appointed director general of the Credit Agricole exist. 
Instead, government influence has been exercised indirectly by control 
of the subsidies necessary for the solvency of the local MSAs.
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Much of the resentment over the cost of social security derived from the 
regressive nature of the contributions structure. Contributions were 
levied on the basis of presumed rather than real income. Furthermore, 
the presumption itself was founded on the land register (registre 
cadastral) in which each parcel of land has been classified. 
Unfortunately for many small and medium-scale farmers, the register was 
notoriously misleading about the real income capacity of each farm. To 
make matters worse, the sliding scale of contributions was so 
constructed as to ensure that the farmer with twenty acres paid a higher 
level per acre than his counterpart with 200 acres.
MODEF's other major grievance against the social security system was the 
suspicion that it was being used by the government as a tool in its 
drive to reduce the number of farmers. With the government limiting its 
subsidies to the MSA, the departmental Caisses were obliged to raise the 
level of contributions. At the same time, the diminishing number of 
farmers had to support an ever increasing number of pensioners, and to a 
lesser extent, children. Some MODEF activists also came to believe that 
the government was also tightening the screws by transferring part of 
the cost of the health service from the health budget to the social 
security system.(87)
Since most of the problems arose from deliberate acts of policy by the 
government rather than direct economic pressures, MODEF made a firm 
distinction between the MSA as an institution and the policies imposed 
upon it by central government. Consistently supporting the MSA as a 
positive institution, MODEF activists could present themselves as 
cantonal delegate candidates with some success. Though in a minority in 
all the Caisses except the Landes, MODEF policy was not to contest the
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policies adopted by the majority. Instead, such delegates concentrated 
on the resolution of individual problems, i.e. obtaining more time to 
pay, holding up the bailiffs, etc. To the extent that collective action 
was undertaken in the field of social security, it was directed against 
the government rather than at the MSA itself. For example, when MODEF, 
in the summer of 1981, decided to protest against the level of social 
security contributions, it took pains to ensure that its protests were 
not seen as an attack on the MSA. In a letter to the president of the 
Vaucluse MSA, the MODEF Federation leader, Camille Fare, stated that:
Une action va s'engager dans les jours qui viennent. Elle ne sera 
en aucune façon dirigée contre le Conseil d'Administration de la 
MSA mais aura pour but de l'aider dans ses interventions auprès de 
la tutelle nationale afin d'obtenir les aides nécessaires qui 
permettraient d'équilibrer le budget des caisses.(88)
Because of this emphasis on the positive nature of the institution,
MODEF leaders went out of their way to ensure that their own most 
desperate supporters understood the benefits of the MSA and the 
responsibility of the government for the drawbacks. For instance, when 
one irate member of a group of MODEF demonstrators lobbying the Charente 
MSA in April 1981 proposed invading the building and throwing away the 
files, Raymond Mineau asked him who he thought would pay his mother's 
pension if the records were destroyed. The distinction between the MSA 
and its disadvantages was then made clear when the MSA president joined 
MODEF leaders in a delegation to the Prefecture to ask for government 
assistance to the MSA to permit it to postpone payment deadlines.
In the one Caisse controlled by MODEF, the Landes, the same principle 
was in evidence. Despite the accusations of demagoguery and 
irresponsibility which have been thrown at MODEF, the Landes MSA was 
competently administered in a way very similar to the MSA in other 
comparably deprived departments. The resolution of individual 
difficulties, however sympathetically handled, was not permitted to 
impinge upon the financial stability of the MSA itself. The obvious 
comparison is with the PCF municipal policy of constant denunciations of 
the limits imposed by central government coupled with competent 
administration within those limits.(89)
Unlike the cases which have been previously examined, the MSA met 
certain criteria which allowed MODEF to take such a nuanced view. The 
MSA provided an essential service in the maintenance of the family farm 
and therefore provided an antidote to the logic of the capitalist market 
and the consequent agricultural exodus. As such, it was a victim, 
rather than a beneficiary of government policy. These incentives 
encouraging MODEF to rally to the defence of the family farm were 
further reinforced by the democratic structure of the MSA which 
permitted MODEF to participate in such a defence.
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9. THE SOCIETES D'AMEMAGEMENT FONCIER ET D'ETABLISSEMENT RURAL (SAFERS)
The example of the SAFERs provides an illuminating case study of MODEF's 
attempts to resist the course of Fifth Republican agricultural policy. 
The Société d'Amenagement Foncier et d 'Etablissement Rural (SAFER) vas 
one of the major innovations of the reformist legislation of 1960-62.
The creation of the SAFER resulted from the desire to limit speculation 
in land and to pursue the government's objectives on the use of land and 
the creation of viable farms. To this end, the SAFER was supposed to 
limit the maximum and minimum size of farms, preventing excessive 
concentration and preventing the creation of new farms which would prove 
unviable. In order to achieve these objectives, the SAFER was given the 
power to intervene in land sales and to purchase the land itself. It 
then had to resell the land to the farmer or farmers most likely to put 
it to profitable use.(90) By the end of 1977, the SAFERs, of which 
there were thirty-one, had acquired 986,722 hectares and resold 849,600 
hectares to farmers.(91) Almost one farmer in ten had acquired land 
through the intermediary of the SAFERs.(92)
MODEF's hostility to the SAFERs predated their establishment in 1963.
The critique of the SAFERs was based on the implications which the new 
institutions had for the idealized view of "traditional" agriculture. 
Indeed, many of MODEF's most impassioned defences of private property in 
the land were put forward in the arguments employed against the SAFERs 
(see Chapter 5). In June 1960, MODEF pointed out the dangers it 
believed the proposed SAFERs embodied:
Les fameuses SAFERs prévues dans la même loi, raflant toutes les 
terres disponibles, sans payer de droit de timbre et 
d'enregistrement, afin de constituer des exploitations viables, 
c'est-à-dire de grandes exploitâtions.(93)
The other dimension of the critique was therefore the issue of the 
development of capitalism in agriculture. The SAFER was seen as just 
another method of eliminating the small and medium sector. This was 
made more explicit in a detailed analysis of the SAFERs published in 
October 1961. According to MODEF, the SAFERs would permit the state to 
intervene in matters which should be left to farmers themselves. Since 
the state representatives on the SAFER boards had the power of veto, 
they would be the real force in decision-making. Secondly, the financial 
resources of the SAFERs would allow them to outbid the small farmer on
the land market. If this was not possible, the SAFERs would still be
able to use their legal powers to make a compulsory purchase order. This 
would disrupt the free market in land and the rights of farmers to 
acquire and dispose of property as they saw fit. Furthermore, the power 
delegated to the SAFERs to hold the land they acquired for up to five 
years seemed to be highly suspicious. In the apocalyptic climate of the 
early 1960s, this was taken to mean that the government was prepared to 
allow land to lie fallow until it had reduced the number of farmers to 
that compatible with the existence of an entirely capitalist 
agriculture.(94)
The problem with the MODEF analysis was twofold. On the one hand, its
hostility to capitalist agriculture led it to try and defend the
indefensible. Choosing to defend the traditional concept of private 
property involved not only defending an old conception of farming but
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also old farmers. For those who had not yet acquired sufficient land, 
particularly the young, something along the lines of the SAFERs was in 
their interests. The only beneficiaries of the free market in land were 
the older farmers nearing the end of their career and wishing to dispose 
of their land. On the other hand, MODEF's exaggerated fears of the 
dangers of the SAFERs meant that it allowed the real dangers to go 
unchallenged.
Though MODEF appeared to have stumbled upon the truth at a very early 
stage, it was never reconciled to it. Whilst MODEF was preoccupied with 
defending the gains of 1789, the FNSEA was happily engaged in colonizing 
the SAFERs and their all-important technical committees. (The technical 
committees make recommendations about the disposal of land which were 
usually rubber-stamped by the SAFER boards.) MODEF was effectively 
excluded from the SAFER decision-making process.
Nevertheless, when the SAFERs carried out their first operations in 
1963, MODEF were quick to realize that FNSEA officials had benefitted 
from these operations. For instance, the Société d'Amenagement Foncier 
de l'Aveyron, Lot at Tarn (SAFALT) allocated land to the president and 
the general secretary of the Aveyron FDSEA. However, MODEF insisted 
upon the class rather than the clientelist aspects of such decisions:
Les SAFERs sont destinés à rafler les terres qui feraient si bien 
l'affaire des petits et moyens exploitants, et avec les terres à 
constituer les exploitations destinées à devenir demain de grandes 
exploitations industrialisées en accaparant les dépouilles des 
exploitants familiaux...(95)
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Since then, MODEF has constantly equated class and clientelism. For 
instance, ten years later, MODEF still argued that:
Les SAFERs ont ete crées... afin de permettre de concentrer dans 
les mains de quelques privilégiés, les terres abandonnées par les 
exploitants familiaux sous la pression de la politique de 
liquidation. C'est la raison pour laquelle les mieux-nantis ont en 
général la préférence et que les attributions se font dans un 
cercle fermé de petit copains, la copinerie étant une des tares non 
seulement de la politique agricole de la Cinquième République, mais 
aussi de la Cinquième République elle-même...(96)
In fact, there is little evidence to suggest that the SAFERs have been 
exceptionally favourable to large-scale agriculture.(97) But there were 
frequent cases of favouritism where land was allocated to less qualified 
candidates who also happened to be FNSEA members, and even more so, 
activists of the official union. This became so blatant that even a 
government as favourable to the FNSEA as that of Giscard and Raymond 
Barre was obliged to take action. The 1977 reform of the SAFERs 
included a clause forcing the SAFERs to give full publicity to their 
acquisitions and allocations.(98)
Just as the government had realized that SAFER clientelism undermined 
the policy of rationalization which they existed to promote, MODEF was 
also forced to come to terms with the clientelistic nature of the 
SAFERs. Though the class analysis remained the basis of the MODEF 
critique, more emphasis was placed on the problem of clientelism. In 
September 1976, an article in L'Exploitant Familial describing the 
operations of the SAFER covering Loire-Atlantique and Maine-et-Loire, 
the SAFER Loire-Océan, concluded:
Son role de réstructuration des exploitations n'est pas rempli et 
qu'au contraire on a l'impression qu'un copinage s'est installé 
autour de cette société anonyme et qui favorise les agriculteurs 
aux aguets des bons coup à opérer.(99)
Similarly, the Poitou-Charente SAFER vas criticized by the MODEF 
regional Federation. In an article entitled "La Copinerie 
primerait-t-il la loi", the Federation alleged:
En fait, cette commission cantonale, comme beaucoup de celles-çi, 
exclusivement composées des membres de l'UDSEA, s'est comporté 
comme une coterie faisant passer la copinerie au-dessus du bon sens 
et de la loi...(100)
Such a change of emphasis allowed MODEF to fight real battles instead of 
imaginary fears. One such case occurred in Beaumes-de-Venise in 1978. 
The SAFER's technical committee recommended that a farm should be 
allocated to the son of a local capitalist farmer in March 1978, against 
the wishes of the majority of the local farmers. The resistance built 
up by MODEF over the next few months obliged the SAFER board to take the 
unusual step of rejecting the technical committee report in favour of 
the solution advocated by MODEF and local farmers. The land was 
therefore divided between four local farmers whilst the farm buildings 
were allocated to the local wine co-operative.(101)
On the more general level, the switch from criticizing the existence of 
the SAFERs to contesting their methods also involved MODEF in making 
specific proposals for reform. Instead of challenging the need for a 
SAFER-type operation, MODEF argued for their replacement by more 
accountable bodies. The 1978 Programme included a proposal that the
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powers of the SAFERs be handed over to Departmental Land Committees. 
These committees, unlike the SAFERs, would have the power to let as well 
as sell land if the beneficiary of an allocation so wished. But the 
major proposed reform was the democratization of the institution.
Instead of the nominees of the official organizations, the Departmental 
Committees would be composed of directly-elected representatives of 
owner-occupiers, tenants and landlords. Agricultural workers and local 
government would also be represented. The central government would 
still have a delegate but the right of veto would be removed.(102)
In terms of winning widespread acceptance, this was a more realistic 
strategy. The principles of such a reform were accepted by both the PS 
and the PCF. Indeed, the Giscardian reform of 1977 was an indication of 
how much sympathy had been won for the principle of democratization. In 
effect, MODEF had, for once, moved from defence to attack, forcing the 
FNSEA into the defensive.
It is possible to draw a more general conclusion from the case of MODEF 
and the SAFERs. It is where MODEF has fought genuine battles over 
limited issues that it has achieved most in terms of protecting the 
interests of its supporters. When MODEF was obsessed by the threat to 
private property, a threat which never materialized, it had little 
effect on the course of agricultural policy. Only when it confronted 
the clientelistic practices of the FNSEA could it make a significant 
impact. Analysis was no substitute for action.
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10. DEMAGOGUES OR DEMOCRATS ?
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There are two common threads running through each of the cases 
considered here. On the one hand, there is the issue of democracy, on 
the other, the future of the family farm. MODEF's attitude to each 
organization and institution was dictated by two considerations - the 
degree to which MODEF was able to participate and the consequences of 
the organization or institution upon the family farm. Vhere there was 
no institutional barrier to MODEF participation and where it had a 
favourable view of the organization, MODEF could play a very active 
role. Where one or the other of these factors was absent, MODEF's role 
was limited. For instance, there was no institutional barrier to MODEF 
participation within the Credit Agricole, but the status of the bank, as 
a tightly controlled instrument of the policy MODEF was designed to 
resist, made such participation unattractive.
In no sense can MODEF activists be seen as an isolated group of 
individuals, devoid of any positive ideas and concerned only to 
criticize, obstruct and oppose. It is undeniably true that MODEF made 
errors and marginalized itself in certain areas, notably in the field of 
co-operation. On the other hand, there were cases where a negative 
attitude on MODEF's part reflected exclusion by the FNSEA and its allies.
It would also appear that MODEF arrived at a belated and partial 
awareness of the fact that ideology is no substitute for a solid network 
of institutional positions and the clientelistic networks which they 
permit. Some of the factors behind MODEF's reluctance to build such 
networks were identified in the last chapter but there is one more which 
has emerged in the course of this chapter. Given MODEF's critique of
the FNSEA, it was inhibited in attempts to rival the FNSEA. Though 
necessity obliged MODEF to come to terms with this consideration in the 
1970s its reluctance to become a mirror image of the FNSEA remained 
apparent in the 1980s.
Finally, there is the question of the role of MODEF as managers. To the 
FNSEA, MODEF may have appeared irresponsible and unfit to hold positions 
of authority in the agri-complex. This was, of course, a 
self-fulfilling prediction. By systematically excluding MODEF from such 
positions, there was no incentive for MODEF to operate in ways which 
would endear it to the FNSEA. At the same time, where MODEF has been 
strong enough to impose itself in such positions, there is no evidence 
to show that they were any less competent than the FNSEA. It would 
therefore appear to be the case that the view in which MODEF is seen as 
a kind of Poujadist revival is incorrect.
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CHAPTER 7 PARTY POLITICS AND PRESSURE GROUPS: MODEF AND THE LEFT
1. INTRODUCTION
The relationship between MODEF and the parties of the Left has been 
characterized in two equally extreme ways. On the one hand, for the 
opponents of MODEF the organization is merely a PCF front.(1) On the 
other, MODEF and its defenders claim that it has nothing to do with any 
political party whatsoever. According to MODEF, its existence and its 
programme are merely "l'extension de la volonté commune des exploitants 
familiaux de toutes conceptions politiques, philosophiques et 
religieuses qui composent le MODEF".(2)
Both these conceptions are polemical rather than based on serious 
analysis. The first sees politics and professional organization in 
terms of a conspiracy theory, the latter denies any importance to 
political parties as creative influences. This chapter deals with the 
reality behind the slogans.
Four interrelated areas have to be covered:
i) The political affiliations of MODEF supporters, activists and 
leaders;
ii) The nature of the connections between MODEF and the parties of 
the Left to which these political affiliations give rise;
iii) The effects of these connections upon MODEF's internal 
organization;
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iv) The way in which the policies of the parties in relation 
to MODEF have shaped the connections.
It will be shown that MODEF is, in fact, a highly politicized 
organization but one which cannot be reduced to the agricultural 
supporters of the PCF. To demonstrate this point, the contrast between 
professional and political behaviour is discussed in detail. Once this 
distinction has been established it becomes possible to understand 
internal political conflict within the organization.
The final part of the chapter deals with the role of political parties 
in determining MODEF's political practices. It will be argued that the 
parties have seen MODEF's potential electoral value as secondary to its 
cadre-forming role. The PCF, the PS and the MRG have all benefited from 
MODEF's role in recruiting and training competent rural leaders and 
potential candidates for public office.
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2. THE POLITICAL COMPOSITION OF MODEF
A distinction must be made between the leaders, activists, members and 
the electorate of MODEF. The closer one approaches the top level of the 
organization the more accurate the jibe about PCF domination of MODEF 
becomes. Yet even at the level of the Executive Committee this 
accusation is not entirely accurate.
Taking the electorate of MODEF first, the detailed analysis of the 
professional election results for the departments of the Charente and 
Vaucluse in Chapter 3 demonstrated that there is no doubt that MODEF has 
attracted more votes than those of the PCF. Furthermore the failure of 
MODEF when confronted with the FFA suggest that its electorate in 
departments where the FFA is absent contains a sizeable number of 
right-wing farmers. On the other hand there are a significant number of 
left-wing farmers, including members and sympathizers of the PCF, who 
are active in and vote for the FNSEA despite party and MODEF appeals to 
them to recognize that their real interests lie with MODEF. For 
example, many PCF members are active in the FDSEA of the 
Bouches-du-Rhône for material or political reasons, such as a belief in 
unitary organization.
This should not come as any surprise. Many writers have pointed out 
that there is no necessary connection between a farmer's professional 
choices and his political affiliations. Tavernier has described a 
classic case in the 1960s. "Les paysans de l'Ouest manifestent sur le 
plan syndical une hostilité d'une rare violence aux dirigeants de la Ve 
République et votent massivement pour leurs candidats à chaque 
consultation."(3) More specifically Tavernier has argued that many
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MODEF supporters are totally unconcerned by the number of PCF members in 
the leadership provided they attack agricultural policy in general and 
the EEC in particular.(4) Similarly Bastardie has found that the 
success of MODEF in the Corrèze had next to no influence on the 
electoral prospects of the PCF in the department.(5)
Two types of explanation of this dichotomy between political and 
professional behaviour cam be isolated. On the one hand there is the 
ignorance thesis, on the other the distrust thesis. Bodiguel argues 
that farmers are politically ignorant, avoid making unpleasant choices 
and therefore "se réfugient dans le vote traditionnel".(6) This 
argument is supported by Tarrow's evidence showing that farmers have 
very high levels of participation in elections and very low levels of 
continuous involvement in politics.(7) This can be interpreted to mean 
that farmers are more involved in elections but are also more ignorant 
of politics than are other sections of the electorate. There are 
several weaknesses in this line of reasoning. Firstly, there is the 
dubious assumption of ignorance on the part of farmers. As farm prices 
and incomes are determined by the state, they are more likely to be 
aware of government policy than other classes. Secondly, there is the 
even more dubious assumption that because one is a member of a political 
party, one is necessarily better informed than non-members. Even in the 
party which places most emphasis on political education, the PCF, a 
casual conversation reveals that the party activist often spends too 
much time being active to have time to inform himself.(8) Finally, the 
fact that rural politics are conducted on a small-scale basis - the 
commune or the canton - means that informal participation in politics 
may be much more important than participation in organizations.
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The distrust thesis is even weaker. It depends on the notion that 
fanners are prepared to entrust the defence of their professional 
interests to people whom they would never trust with political power. 
This involves an incredibly dubious assumption that farmers are more 
concerned about the abstract concerns of national politics than with the 
franc in their pocket. Alternatively, one is asked to believe that 
farmers have doubts about the people whom they depend on for the defence 
of material interests. Perhaps the weakest link in this argument is 
that the PCF has often done better in national rather than local 
elections.(9) This argument is apparently contradicted by the presence 
of left-wing activists in the FNSEA. This would suggest that some 
farmers are willing to trust the defence of their economic interests to 
people whom they would not touch politically with a barge pole. This 
argument has several flaws. In the first place, there is the problem of 
the nature of FNSEA membership. As has been seen in previous chapters, 
belonging to the FNSEA is often more or less compulsory. Even without 
the element of compulsion, the majority position of the FNSEA may lead 
activists to prefer to agitate amongst the FNSEA majority rather than 
with the MODEF minority. Secondly, the separation of the leadership and 
service roles means that a farmer may join the FNSEA for purely material 
benefits without having any feeling of political loyalty towards the 
leadership. Finally, the less partisan image of the FNSEA permits a 
greater gap between politics and professional organization. The 
existence of a large minority opposition in the FNSEA shows that these 
left-wing activists do not even trust the leadership to defend their
economic interests.
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In this case it seems that the simplest explanation for this dichotomy 
has been overlooked, probably as a result of academic arrogance towards 
simple explanations. Not only is professional organization and party 
politics conceptually distinct but there is also a practical distinction 
made by farmers themselves. These are two different modes of activity 
with different objects. A Polish rural sociologist has remarked that 
peasant agricultural economy is marked by "la double empreinte qu'elle 
porte d'un fort individualisme à l'égard de l'extérieur et d'un 
collectivisme interne rigoureux".(10) This can be extended to the 
politics of the more modernized agriculture of France.
Professional organization is concerned with the defence of short-term 
material interests and with maximizing the income and wealth of farmers. 
Therefore there is a premium on unity of farmers as a whole against 
everyone else. In MODEF's case, there is a difference in that they 
argue that the real division is within agriculture, between the small 
and medium-scale sector and the larger enterprises. But since these 
small and medium-scale farmers are divided politically, there is a 
premium placed on professional unity amongst these farmers against the 
large-scale farmers. An "internal collectivism" is imposed in the face 
of the enemy.
Party politics, whether local or national, is concerned with long-term 
interest articulation. Rather than concentrating on short-term gains, 
party politics is interested in the continuation or transformation of 
the existing conditions of reproduction of the economy. Though farmers 
have an interest in such affairs, they are usually less pressing, so the 
necessity of collective action gives way to more individual 
appreciations.
This perspective allows us to see that the contradiction between 
professional and political behaviour is a false one. In concrete terms, 
a farmer may vote for MODEF in the hope of forcing the government and 
its supporting classes to make short-term concessions. In political 
elections he can continue to support the Right since he believes that
the existence of his type of agriculture depends on the presence of the
Right in power. Very crudely, in professional terms he may be concerned 
with the encroachments of capitalism in agriculture, in political terms
with the encroachments of the USSR. As MODEF itself has pointed out
several times, the issues at stake in political elections are much wider 
and can therefore legitimately give rise to a wider range of responses 
than professional elections.
Finally, there is widespread historical evidence available to show that 
those who wish to gain limited reforms find a useful ally in 
revolutionaries. The revolutionary serves as a truncheon in the hands 
of the reformist against his conservative opponents. As Sean O'Faolain 
has described politics in a predominantly agricultural country - 
Ireland: "never once did any constitutionalist win one of those gradual 
reforms without the Rebel as the real force behind him".(11) This 
dualism has reached its most sophisticated and self-conscious 
manifestation in Brittany where the biographers of Alexis Gourvennec 
have described the activities of his troops in the following terms:
"même au plus fort des bagarres,... ils ne seront jamais des 
révolutionnaires. Tout au plus des réformistes qui ne négligent pas 
l'arme du baton et du pavé...”.(12) In this respect MODEF's membership 
is a fairly accurate reflection of the electorate so this analysis also 
applies to them. This is particularly so when one remembers that 
membership of MODEF may entail little more than attendance at an annual 
meeting and the payment of a small subscription.(13)
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However, when one looks at MODEF activists the story is very different. 
Despite the official view that MODEF contains farmers of all political 
persuasions, most departmental leaders admit that only the Left are 
actively involved in MODEF. Those who deny this base their argument on 
the presence of Catholics in MODEF. The changing nature of French 
Catholicism seems to have passed them by. Indeed, in one case given as 
an example the Catholic in question turned out to be a member of the PCF 
as well.
Tavernier also noted that the gap between the professional and 
political behaviour of farmers as a whole disappears in the case of the 
activists.(14) As well as the obvious point that political activists 
are more likely to make apparently more coherent decisions, there are 
two more important points. Firstly, an individual who devotes a great 
deal of his time to MODEF is more likely to attribute greater importance 
to professional considerations when making political decisions such as 
voting for Presidents and deputies. Secondly, since MODEF was set up in 
its early days by members of left-wing parties, there is an informal 
self-perpetuating process of socialization at work.
Departmental leaderships give a distorted view of the activists.
Members of the PCF hold more positions of responsibility than their 
presence in the organization as a whole suggests. Some qualifications 
must be made. Firstly, this is as much a result of necessity as design 
since PCF members are disproportionately willing to accept such 
positions. Secondly, the situation varies from department to 
department. In the Charente where the MODEF Federation is a tripartite 
alliance of MRG, PS and PCF, positions have been more widely distributed 
than in a department such as the Vaucluse. In the latter department the 
major political dividing line in farming politics is through the PS
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rather than through the centre. Since MODEF is an alliance between the 
PCF and the anti-Defferre-Duffaud socialists, the PCF has been in a 
stronger position. Finally, the situation began to change after 1978 
and the attempts of certain MODEF leaders to align MODEF with the PCF 
against the PS. PS leaders and activists of MODEF began to organize 
themselves more effectively and to demand their fair share of 
responsibilities.
The PCF presence is most apparent at the national level. In the 
National Council elected in February 1982, independents held twenty per 
cent of the seats, the PS twenty-five per cent, the MEG ten percent and 
the PCF forty-five per cent. This allows MODEF to claim that members of 
the PCF are in a minority in the leadership. However, this is illusory 
since the independents are almost all sympathizers of one party or 
another and would therefore provide the extra votes needed for a 
majority. On the other hand, the possibility of an arithmetical 
majority is not particularly important because of the requirement 
discussed in Chapter 4 to search for a unanimous decision.
Similarly an equilibrium is maintained in the Executive Committee with a 
sufficient number of PCF sympathizers to guarantee a majority, if one 
were ever needed. More importantly, the PCF is over-represented in the 
higher positions in the Executive. For example, in 1982 PCF members 
held the only full-time president post, the general secretary's position 
as well as those of treasurer and assistant general secretary. 
Furthermore, all the full-time elected officials of the organization 
were members of the PCF. Of most significance, however, is the fact 
that the two men who held the key organizational post of general 
secretary since the foundation of MODEF have been members of the PCF.
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Nevertheless, the significance of these facts should not be 
over-estimated. As has been seen already, the apparatus is very weak. 
In 1982, the full-time elected officials of the organization totalled 
four and a half. Secondly, the search for unanimity precludes the PCF 
from extracting the maximum benefit from its numerical force. PCF 
members of the leadership are very sensitive to the charges of party 
domination. They have an ideological committment to unity and a 
material interest in carrying their supporters with them which inhibits 
the use of their strength. Finally, the political tendencies present 
within the leadership do not act as a block. This conclusion is drawn 
from interviews with members of the leadership from all political 
parties - none of whom believe or act as if the others act as one unit. 
Neither do they prepare their positions before official meetings.
If the equation between MODEF and the PCF were as valid as critics of 
MODEF would have us believe, and if the evidence above has more 
significance than has been argued, one would expect MODEF to be saying 
more or less the same things as the PCF. It is to this comparison 
between the ideology of MODEF and the parties of the Left that we now
turn our attention.
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3. THE IDEOLOGICAL LINKS OF MODEF, THE PCF AND THE PS
"Le MODEF présente un programme identique, pour l'essentiel, à celui du 
parti communiste".(15) Is this judgement accurate? To decide it is 
first necessary to examine PCF ideology and programmes and to analyze PS 
attitudes in this matter. It is possible that much of MODEF's programme 
is not a result of its links with the PCF but is part of a heritage 
shared by the entire Left. This analysis is based on a comparison of 
MODEF's position as described in Chapter Five with the PCF position as 
expounded in Les Communistes et les Paysans and Quelle Agriculture pour 
la France, and the PS position expressed in the document L'Agriculture 
et ses Travailleurs.(16)
In fact MODEF and PCF ideologies differ considerably more than their 
programmes, though not as much as they differ from the PS position. In 
Chapter 5 the main characteristics of MODEF ideology were isolated: 
idealization of the past, the respect for property, its attitude towards 
progress and its nationalism. The PCF shares MODEF's idyllic conception 
of the past before capitalism developed in agriculture. "Autrefois la 
famille paysanne, malgré ses nombreux enfants, pouvait tant bien que 
mal, vivre sur elle-même".(17) The egalitarian village community has 
been killed off by the development of capitalism in the countryside. 
Rather than being pleased with the "rescue from the idiocy of rural 
life", the PCF laments the fact that the sons and daughters of farmers 
are forced into the factories and towns. Though Francois Mitterrand has 
idealized his rural childhood, his party agricultural specialists do not 
share his views.(18) But rather than engage in the task of 
de-mystification the PS agricultural experts prefer to ignore the past - 
envelopping it in a silence which implies disapproval.
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As one interested party has argued, the French Left has a curious 
blindness in relation to the past:
Si la conscience du conservateur arrête le passé et la conscience 
de l'utopiste réifie l'avenir, la conscience de gauche peut saisir 
le présent dans sa dimension dynamique, totalisante dès lors 
qu'elle fonctionne dialectiquement. Mais la fonction dialectique 
se fige: la fausse conscience surgit, et avec elle, la regression 
dans un passé mythifié ou le saut dans un avenir idéalisé.(19)
In this context, MODEF and the PCF are the conservatives, happy in the 
"celebration du bon vieux temps... L'âge d'or est dérrière nous".(20)
The PS can be seen as utopian for its failure to take account of the 
past and its influence on the present.
In the case of the defence of property all three organizations have 
different views. For MODEF private property is an essential element in 
their conception of agriculture. "L'agriculture doit se développer sur 
la base de l'exploitation familiale, dans le respect de la propriété 
paysanne".(21) Private property is a positive value. For the PCF, if 
private property is not regarded as a positive value, it is considered a 
fundamental political reality which cannot be altered. Its motives in 
supporting private property are not the same as those of MODEF. They 
are more a reflection of the political need to pre-empt right-wing 
accusations about Communist designs on private property than based on 
immediate economic interests. For this reason, it is an even more 
vigourous defender of private property than MODEF. Pointing out quite 
rightly that the economic cost of farmer ownership of the land is
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enormous, the PCF insists that, nevertheless, this attachment must be 
accepted:
L'histoire lègue ainsi un lourd fardeau à la France de demain.
Aucun raisonnement économique ne pourra prévenir, en effet, contre 
l'attachement des Français et des paysans à la propriété privée de 
la terre. Ils y associent la notion d'indépendance et de liberté, 
d'autant plus qu'il s'agit presque toujours d'un bien acquis bout 
par bout, à force de travail et de sacrifice.
L'avenir doit être pensé à partir de ces réalités françaises dont 
il faut accepter la rançon tout en cherchant les voies permettant 
d'en réduire le coût pour les paysans comme pour l'économie de la 
nation.(22)
It is interesting to note that this argument contradicts MODEF's idea 
that private property could be the most efficient way to organize 
agriculture. The PCF at least has the virtue of honesty. The PS view 
is very different. The PS document opens with the proposal to "remettre 
en cause la notion de chef d'entreprise".(23) Basically the PS believes 
that the only way to remove the financial burden of land ownership from 
the farmer's back is to separate the right to farm the land from the 
right to own it. The fact that MODEF's polemic with the PS in the 
pre—Presidential election period in 1981 concentrated on this question 
demonstrates most clearly the gap between the "modernist" ideology of 
the PS and the more traditional conceptions of MODEF.
As far as nationalism is concerned, it has already been shown (in 
Chapter 5) that MODEF's nationalism is not an aggressive one. The
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nationalism of the PCF is much more virulent. One minor example can be 
seen in Les Communistes et les Paysans where Marchais and Clavaud talk 
of the presence of immigrants in the agricultural labour force in terms 
which imply that they regard this as a problem. (24) MODEF, on the other 
hand, does not find this an issue on which it is necessary to take 
sides. Whatever the personal views of MODEF members and officials about 
immigrant workers (and in this respect MODEF members are a fairly good 
cross-section of French society), these workers present an advantage in 
that they are prepared to work harder for lower wages than Frenchmen 
would accept. They are also less likely to be unionized and able to 
challenge their employers. This is not to argue that MODEF farmers are 
racist, it is simply to recognize that they have an objective interest 
in a hard-working compliant labour force. In other words, "l'argent n'a 
pas de couleur”. More importantly, MODEF is less interested in 
conquering new markets than the PCF, preferring to concentrate on the 
protection of domestic markets. Whereas MODEF usually emphasizes the 
deleterious effects of agro-business activities on agriculture, the PCF 
emphasizes the consequences to the nation as a whole in nationalist 
terms:
Dans la mesure même ou 1'interdépendence s’accentue entre 
l'agriculture et les autres branches de la production alimentaire, 
une semblable evolution revient à placer peu à peu notre 
agriculture sous la coupe du capital cosmopolite et à faire 
dépendre l'approvisionnement du pays du bon vouloir et des intérêts 
des monopoles et des pays étrangers. ( 25)
We have the curious paradox of a farming organization talking in terms 
of class whilst the self-proclaimed party of the working class obscures
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the class divisions within French society. In the pursuit of interest 
aggregation, the PCF neglects to mention that these monopolies are 
sometimes French, e.g. BSN, or that the largest supplier of agricultural 
machinery in France is the party's favourite firm, the nationalized 
Régie Renault.
In some respects the PS position is closer to the MODEF one than is the 
PCF. The PS points out the fallacy in the Giscardian idea of 
agriculture as "le petrôle vert”.(26) On the one hand, currency 
fluctuations and the monetary compensation amounts of the 1970s have led 
to unfair competition, on the other the expansion of world markets has 
been limited. The PS and MODEF view of foreign trade is very similar. 
Whilst MODEF demands the "développement des échanges économiques avec 
tous les pays (a euphemism for the Soviet Union in particular) sur la 
base des avantages recriproques", the PS argues that reforms must be 
made to ensure that "le commerce internationale ne se fasse de manière 
anarchique et sous le contrôle des multi-nationales”.(27)
Michael Charzat has made an interesting distinction between two types of 
nationalism:
Toute réprésentation qui ignore ou brouille la structure de classe 
de la société en affaiblissant la conscience de classe relève du 
nationalisme; toute réprésentation qui ne dissimule pas le 
caractère antagonique des rapports de production est nationale.(28)
On the one hand, there is a nationalist PCF, on the other a national PS 
and MODEF. However, the EEC is the great bone of contention between 
MODEF and the PS. If MODEF's absolute "No" to the extension of the EEC
could be considered to be compatible with the PS "Oui mais" as long as 
both remained part of the opposition, their attitude to the EEC is very 
different. For the socialists, the EEC is a step forward. Its problems 
must be overcome in a way conducive to further European unity. For 
example, the PS sees no solution to problems of agricultural marketing 
except in a European context. MODEF, on the other hand, sees the EEC as 
a necessary evil. The interests of French farmers must be placed before 
any abstract political idea such as European unity.
Finally, on the question of agricultural modernization and the relations 
between agriculture and the rest of the national and international 
economy, there are substantial differences of opinion. Whilst MODEF 
argues that "la recherche par les exploitants d'un revenu et d'avantages 
sociaux identiques à ceux des autres travailleurs—  ne doit pas faire 
sous-estimer la spécificité de l'agriculture" and defends the 
traditional values of personal responsibility and private property, the 
PCF is more concerned with the analysis of the place of agriculture in 
the economy.(29) It stresses the fact that: "La crise agraire s'aggrave 
et elle ne peut reçevoir de solutions détachées de celles commandées par 
la crise générale de la société".(30) The PS goes further. One of its 
major aims is to "casser l'individualisme et le corporatisme" with the 
intention "de rédonner à l'agriculteur sa place de travailleur avec les 
mêmes droits, les mêmes devoirs, les mêmes garanties".(31 )
The PCF has a less ambiguous attitude to modernization and progress. 
Instead of the MODEF argument that technical innovation may have 
undesirable social effects and is therefore not an end in itself, the 
party looks at the problem from a different angle. Modernization is a 
desirable end in itself, but it is frustrated by the present economic
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order. The forces of production have come into conflict with the 
relations of production:
L'élimination des paysans aboutit à une substitution de travail 
industriel au travail paysan, ce qui signifie que nous arrivons à 
l'épuisement des possibilités de la modernisation au sein des 
structures actuelles et à un blocage structurel des conditions de 
production.(32)
In fact the PCF is as often criticized on the Left for its "confiance
sans réserve dans le Progrès avec un P majuscule__" as it is by the
Right for its defence of outmoded sectors of the economy.(33)
Though MODEF and the PS are in agreement in denouncing 
"l'industrialisation anarchique" or "l'industrialisation à l'outrance", 
their paths soon diverge.(34) The PS has a much more Malthusian 
position on the possibilities of technical progress, market growth and 
the productivist conceptions which have governed agricultural policy 
under the Fifth Republic, such as the excessive use of machinery, 
fertilizers, animal feedstuffs, pesticides, etc. It also emphasizes the 
dubious possibilities of growth in export markets.(35) MODEF, on the 
other hand, thinks that it is in the national interest that farmers are 
"de gros consommateurs de carburants, d'aciers et fontes, de tracteurs, 
de machines, de véhiculés utilitaires, de produits chimiques, 
engrais..." etc.(38) and emphasizes the potential contribution 
agriculture could make to the balance of payments.
Turning our attention towards the specific demands and proposals of the
three organizations, there is a wide range of agreement between the PCF
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and MODEF. If one compares PCF policy on such matters as the SAFERs, 
selective state aid, the inadequacy of the retirement scheme and the 
dangers of producer groups with MODEF's programme, they are virtually 
identical.(37) The only real difference that one can find between the 
PCF and MODEF is one of emphasis. Whilst MODEF attaches primary 
importance to prices, the PCF sees price policy as only one issue 
amongst others. It concentrates on the structure of the farm, the 
development of co-operation and social policy.(38)
There is also a substantial range of agreement between MODEF and the PS. 
On issues such as the development of co-operation, rural development, 
the installation of young farmers, state aid for investment, etc., there 
is little difference. But there are four major areas of controversy.
The first is perhaps the most important in the long run. Whilst both PS 
and MODEF recognize the need to organize agricultural markets, there is 
a conflict over how this is to be done. Both agree that product boards 
should be set up to regulate markets, but whilst the PS wishes to 
organize these on a European level, MODEF feels that they should be 
national bodies, particularly since MODEF see other European farmers as 
the main problem. However, since other European countries have failed 
to display any interest for this proposal, the PS government has been 
forced to implement it within national boundaries, thus postponing a 
showdown with MODEF. Another problem remains, the limits of the powers 
given to the product boards. The PS intends them to intervene in the 
regulation of production as well as markets, an issue on which MODEF is 
itself divided.(39)
Secondly, there is the matter of pricing policy. Since the PS 
recognizes the existence of surpluses, it proposes price guarantees for
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limited quantities - quotas set at a level sufficiently high to 
guarantee the income of the small and medium-scale sector. But as MODEF 
rejects the idea that surpluses exist, all production must be guaranteed 
a minimum price. For this reason it is also opposed to the PS idea of a 
new price structure reducing subsidies on the most and protected 
products and using the money made to subsidize the underprivileged 
products. Finally the major difference between the two organizations the 
fact that the PS does not see pricing policy as an important way of 
raising the standards of living of the majority of farmers. According 
to the PS, price increases without reforms in production, farm structure 
and marketing are self-defeating - merely increasing class 
differentiation and inequality within agriculture.(40)
Thirdly, social security is a source of controversy. Both PS and MODEF 
are agreed on the need to reform the absurdly inegalitarian system of 
contributions, and to eventually merge the MSA with the standard system. 
But they differ on the basis on which to fix contributions in the 
reformed system. MODEF wishes to retain the present method based on the 
"revenu cadastral" but calls for the revision of the land register and a 
change in the contribution scales. The PS, however, wishes to base 
contributions on real income, hence its insistence on the need for the 
"transparency of incomes". This is the real foundation of MODEF's 
disagreement since it would involve compulsory accounts for all farmers. 
MODEF claims that its opposition to compulsory accounts is based on the 
cost but it is more plausible that the real concern is with the greater 
knowledge which officialdom would gain of the real state of the finances 
of agriculture in general and the individual farmer in particular.
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The final source of controversy is also the least genuine. In early 
1981, MODEF's general secretary launched an attack on PS proposals on 
property rights and the SAFERs.(41) Despite this polemic, it is clear 
that the proposals of MODEF and the PS are not vastly different. MODEF 
proposes long-term leases, the PS outbids them by proposing working 
lifetime leases. Both agree on the need to stop speculation in land and 
to exert greater control over the use to which land classified as 
agricultural is put. The pressures of the market must be restricted in 
order to allow young men to enter the profession and prevent outsiders 
gaining undeserved positions of power over working farmers. The tool of 
this policy is to be the "Offices Cantonaux" (PS) or the "Commissions 
Foncières" (MODEF). MODEF and PS proposals on the powers and 
composition of these bodies are identical. MODEF has even accepted that 
the new "Commissions" should, unlike the SAFERs, have the power to let 
as well as to sell the land they acquire. Despite this identity of 
views, the conflict blew up - showing that general philosophical 
differences can stir up as much trouble as differences over concrete 
proposals.(42)
Having completed this discussion of the differences and similarities 
between MODEF, the PCF and the PS, two questions must be asked. How do 
these differences arise and what significance should be attached to 
them? MODEF's ideological differences with the PCF are largely a matter 
of emphasis, arising from the fact that the organizations have different 
functions. The party’s role as the "spokesman of the discontented" 
forces it to attempt to reconcile.the different demands of its various 
clienteles.(43) Instead of reacting against the uncomfortable positions 
of particular categories, it attempts to explain to them why they find 
themselves in such a position, and that the satisfaction of their 
grievances depends on the satisfaction of the grievances of the other 
victims of capitalism. This leads the party to place much greater
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emphasis on an overall economic and political analysis rather than on a 
catalogue of socially desirable objectives. Whereas MODEF can quite 
successfully put forward a list of demands without any real concern for 
the possibilities for, or the consequences of, their realization, the 
party cannot do this. Its interest articulation role means that limits 
are placed on its ability to be all things to all men, since such an 
attitude involves abandoning interest articulation in favour of random 
protest. The party is therefore obliged to adopt positions which may 
involve more them one of its clienteles whose interests may diverge - in 
which case the party is condemned to dissatisfy one of them. For 
example, the concern expressed about the presence of foreign 
agricultural labourers may be irrelevant or even inimical to the 
interests of MODEF members, but appeals nevertheless to French farm 
labourers who see their efforts to organize in order to profit from a 
situation of relative scarcity undermined by the influx of foreigners. 
The effect on PCF ideology produced by this constant search for a 
synthesis of potentially conflicting interests has been well described 
by Georges Lavau:
Dans une large mesure, le PCF suit les idees dominantes mais sans 
s'y conformer tout a fait. 11 tient compte du sens commun et tente 
de le corriger sans s'y opposer directement, mais sans se contenter 
de le reproduire.(44)
MODEF does not feel such pressures from its members and potential 
members. If it has to make the occasional gesture towards the idea of 
national interest rather than the class-based arguments it habitually 
uses, this is imposed on MODEF by its desire to influence government and 
by the political education its activists receive in political parties.
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In fact, MODEF explicitly rejects any attempt to weaken the class nature 
of the organization. MODEF is happy to put forward demands and allow 
parties and governments to deal with the responsibility of deciding 
whether or not such proposals can be accommodated. "Nous ne sommes pas 
un parti politique qui aspire être au gouvernement".(45)
This is only part of the story. Political parties do not want to 
abdicate their responsibility for interest articulation to class or 
sectional organizations. This is as true of the PS as it is of the PCF, 
as shown by Francois Mitterrand's attacks on the Confederation Française 
Démocratique du Travail (CFDT) leaders who "rêve de faire du parti 
socialiste la courroie de transmission de la CFDT".(46) The PCF has 
been even more systematic in limiting the pretensions of sectional 
organizations. Since the mid-1950s when the CGT "Programme pour une 
économie de paix, d'indépendance nationale et de progrès social" was 
sabotaged by the PCF, the party has never allowed its members in other 
organizations to promote such global programmes, since this type of 
approach undermines the necessity and the possibility of the party 
exercizing its self-proclaimed leading role.(47)
The similarities between MODEF and PCF proposals can be interpreted as 
the result of the heavy PCF presence in the apparatus of the 
organization. If this is accepted there are still two competing 
explanations. Is it the case that MODEF policy is dictated by the PCF? 
Or is PCF agricultural policy heavily influenced by MODEF? As one MODEF 
leader argued about the programmatic similarities: "Autant dire que la 
politique du PCF c'est la politique du MODEF".(48)
3 7 1
The evidence suggests that the latter is the case. Firstly, the concern 
of MODEF to safeguard its unity precludes the PCF group from imposing 
its policies on the organization. Secondly, the example of the 
respective attitudes of MODEF and the PCF to private property in the 
land seems to indicate that PCF is following MODEF with a reluctant 
endorsement of traditional property rights. Lastly, the leadership of 
MODEF includes some of the PCF's most experienced and competent 
agricultural leaders, who participate in the work of the Central 
Committee's agricultural committee and therefore play an important role 
in PCF policy-making. Paradoxically, the party which attributes to 
itself the leading role as the representative of the industrial working 
class to some extent tails the representatives of farmers despite the 
fact that they are considered junior partners.
As to the importance of the differences which exist between MODEF and 
the PCF, they are not so acute as to provoke any open conflict between 
the two organizations, except in the unlikely event of the Ministry of 
Agriculture being placed in the hands of the PCF. If the PCF ever 
became responsible for the implementation of agricultural policy, the 
greater emphasis which the party places on the role of agriculture 
within the national and international economy compared to MODEF's 
emphasis on social demands would take on a much greater significance. 
This is, of course, nothing new. The strain between the PCF's sectional 
defence role and its role as a political party seeking political power 
has always presented problems for the PCF in periods of government and 
"responsible opposition", the Renault strike of 1947 being classic 
example.(49)
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The PS differences with MODEF can be explained in terms of factionalism 
amongst the agricultural leaders of the PS. The similarities can be 
explained by electoral considerations. The divisions within the 
agricultural sections of the PS reflect the divisions within 
agriculture rather than the political factions within the party as a 
whole. Three positions can be identified - the FNSEA-SFIO tradition, 
the Breton FNSEA opposition and a MODEF post-Epinay PS wing.
Agricultural policy-making in the PS has been dominated in recent years 
by the Breton wing led by Bernard Thareau. The ideology of this group 
bears the traces of the legacy of the PSU and Paysans-Travailleurs.
Their position has been strengthened by their alliance with the 
socialist technocrats with professional or intellectual interests in the 
agricultural economy as a whole led by Pierre Joxe. MODEF leaders in 
the PS have had to fight a constant battle to gain legitimacy within the 
party, and to make the party aware that MODEF was not simply a satellite 
organization of the PCF. In fact, these men played a major role in 
overcoming the initial reluctance of the Mauroy government to recognize 
MODEF in June 1981.(50)
As we have seen, the practical proposals put forward by both 
organizations are more similar than their general perspectives. There 
are two aspects of this contradiction. From the PS point of view, its 
general analysis represents a ritual sacrifice to the unholy alliance of 
Breton farmers and Parisian technocrats. Its concrete proposals are 
dictated by the more prosaic concerns of "le socialisme viticole" and 
the electoral prospects of the deputies of the Ariege and the Aude. 
Similarly MODEF genuflects to an ideology whose emotional power 
increases with its growing irrelevance. In framing its concrete 
proposals, it has to blaspheme.
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How important are these differences? There are two aspects to this 
question; the relations between the PS and MODEF, and the consequences 
of these on the internal affairs of MODEF. Until the advent of a PS 
government in 1981, the main problem for MODEF was that the weak 
connection with the PS tended to support accusations of PCF domination. 
The internal consequences were limited by the nature of the MODEF 
decision-making process and its emphasis on unity.
Given the ideological differences between MODEF and the PS, is it the 
case that farmers who are members of both organizations are suffering 
from schizophrenia? The evidence inspires a negative answer. Firstly, 
there is the long established tradition of unanimous decision-making 
within MODEF which attempts to reconcile potentially conflicting 
interests. Secondly, as has already been argued, there is no necessary 
connection between political and professional behaviour, and a farmer 
may be a member of the PS for reasons which have nothing to do with 
agriculture. More importantly, the PS is a much less politically 
homogeneous and disciplined party than the PCF. The official existence 
of factions and their ability to criticize and attempt to amend party 
policy means that it is impossible for a party member to internalize 
these policies as profoundly as a member of the PCF. In other words, PS 
policy is less sacred to its members. It should be noted that the MODEF 
presence in the PS is a political cross-section of the party. They are 
not necessarily those most favourable to collaboration with the PCF 
since they are to be found in all the factions of the PS - Mitterrand, 
CERES (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Socialistes), Rocard,
Mauroy.(51) The only thing that they can be said to have in common is a 
belief that no effective agricultural opposition to the FNSEA can be 
established without the co-operation of the PCF. Finally, the
experience of the majority of PS members in MODEF has led them to place 
loyalty to MODEF before their political loyalties. In the majority of 
cases, these activists were members of MODEF before joining the 
post-Epinay PS. They did not experience the anti-Communist obsession of 
the SFIO. In fact, even those who were members of the SFIO tended to 
associate themselves with opposition tendencies favourable to 
collaboration with the PCF. For example, one of the leading socialist 
members of MODEF was a member of the Poperen tendency in the SFIO. The 
geography of MODEF implantation is revealing. The two strongest 
Federations, the Landes and the Charente, are in departments with which 
Mitterrand has had a long personal connection. Indeed the Mitterrand 
stronghold of the Nièvre is also the home of a powerful MODEF 
Federation. On the other hand, in the the further one moves away from 
Marseille, stronger MODEF becomes. Similarly, the connection MODEF 
weakness and the presence of Henri Duffaud in Avignon area has already 
been noted.
4. MODEF'S POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS
So far it has been established that MODEF is a highly politicized 
organization with a large proportion of its activists also involved in 
the political parties of the Left. Similarly, it is clear that the 
ideology and programme of MODEF can be placed in the context of the 
socialist movement in France. In Chapter 4 it has been shown how and 
why economic interest organizations such as MODEF have become 
politicized. The next part of this chapter is therefore concerned with 
the exact nature of the political interventions of MODEF.
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Despite constant disclaimers by the leadership, it is clear that MODEF 
does, in fact, intervene in political questions beyond the agricultural 
field. If it is true that MODEF rarely takes a position on contemporary 
political issues, it is equally rare that it fails to intervene in an 
electoral period. For example, the Algerian war merits little more than 
a passing reference in L'Exploitant Familial of the period. The few 
political comments stand out by their rarity, such as the contrast made 
in the early 1960s between the government's willingness to spend heavily 
on the construction of the nuclear strike force, and its reluctance to 
assist farmers who were victims of natural disasters; or the article 
condemning the sacking of Jacques Bidalou by the Conseil Supérieur de la 
Magistrature in early 1981.(52)
However, this discretion is much less in evidence where elections and 
referenda are concerned. Though MODEF has never actively supported the 
PCF, in every Presidential and Parliamentary election since its 
foundation MODEF has adopted a line compatible with that of the PCF.
The same applies to the various referenda of the Fifth Republic. On the 
other hand, strict silence has been maintained in cantonal and municipal 
elections. This is due mainly to the fact that MODEF leaders and 
activists will be found on opposing lists - either party lists or the 
"listes de racolage" so favoured in many rural communes. In order to 
maintain the unity of its local organizations, it must avoid taking 
sides. Even so, MODEF leaders admit that local elections create a great 
deal of tension in local branches.(53)
In its electoral interventions, MODEF has attempted to have its cake and 
eat it. It begins by denying any intention of calling upon its 
supporters to vote one way or another. It simply points out that a vote
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for the Right is a vote against their own interests. This is the 
fundamental policy which alters only in detail according to particular 
situations. MODEF's first effort to exercize some influence on voting 
behaviour occurred early in its existence. For the referendum of 
January 1961, MODEF adopted a similar position to that of the PCF. For 
MODEF, the Algerian issue was secondary; the referendum was really about 
de Gaulle's need to secure a vote of confidence for his pro-monopoly 
policies. Quite apart from the sectarian "politique du pire", such an 
attitude speaks volumes on the capitulation of the French Left to 
imperialist ideology:
Il est de notre devoir de signaler que de toute façon le nombre de 
ceux qui auront fait confiance au chef de l'Etat le 8 janvier et de 
ceux qui s'y seront opposés entrera sérieusement en ligne de compte 
dans la conduite de l'ensemble de sa politique du plan de 
liquidation de l'exploitation familial.(54)
In October 1962 a similar analysis was made of the referendum on the 
election of the President by universal suffrage:
Le Mouvement estime que ce n'est pas dévier de la ligne qu'il s'est 
tracée qui consiste à limiter son activité aux seules questions 
professionnelles que d'attirer l'attention des exploitants 
familiaux sur l'extrême gravité de la décision qu'ils auront à 
prendre... Renforcer les prérogatives du chef de l'Etat revient à 
donner des armes nouvelles aux ennemis de l'exploitation familiale, 
à diminuer l’efficacité de notre lutte...(55)
377
In MODEF's view there is no contradiction in these two statements since 
there is no formal call to oppose de Gaulle, just an explanation of the 
consequences of supporting him - even if this explanation adds up to a 
not very subtle hint.
Not wishing to compromise itself further, MODEF allowed the 1962 
parliamentary elections to go unmentioned. But the 1965 Presidential 
election confirmed that MODEF's attachment to apoliticism was not very 
profound. The issues of L'Exploitant Familial in the months preceding 
the election resounded with denunciations of the outgoing head of state 
at every opportunity. In October 1965, Mineau wrote:
plus nombreux seront ceux qui, le 5 décembre, rendront la monnaie 
de sa pièce à celui qui est le chef d'orchestre de leur 
liquidation, plus il y aura de chances d'échapper à cette 
1iquidation.(56)
In November, the National Council issued the following statement:
Le MODEF estime donc rester fidèle à ses buts en appelant la 
paysannerie française familiale à saisir l'occasion de la prochaine 
election présidentielle pour exprimer son désaveu de la politique 
agricole poursuivie depuis 1958 sous l'inspiration et l'autorité du 
Chef de l'Etat - à se prononcer pour une politique économique et 
sociale démocratique basée sur la sauvegarde des intérêts des 
exploitants familiaux.(57)
The logical conclusion was the unambiguous call issued by the Executive 
after the first ballot to vote Mitterrand:
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Les exploitants familiaux qui veulent condamner une fois de plus 
cette politique de destruction de l'exploitation familiale n'ont 
d'autre moyen que de voter pour le candidat de l'opposition - M. 
Mitterrand.(58)
Before jumping to the conclusion that MODEF represents "un appendice 
electoral du PC”, one must remember that this was not only the position 
of the PCF but also that of the SFIO. Furthermore, hostility to de 
Gaulle had grown to such an extent in agricultural circles that 
virtually every agricultural organization - led by the FNSEA - called 
upon its members not to support de Gaulle.(59)
In 1967 there is a surprising gap. Nothing is said of the 1967 
Parliamentary elections except for an expression of rejoicing for the 
relative defeat of the Right. The reasons for this abstention appear to 
have been primarily practical rather theui ideological. February 1967 
was also a period of professional elections to the Chambers of 
Agriculture. It was considered more important to concentrate on the 
professional elections and to maximize support by maintaining a 
non-partisan approach rather than risk falling between two stools by 
attempting to further the interests of the PCF and Federation de la 
Gauche Démocratique et Socialiste (FGDS) candidates.
The 1968 elections saw the repetition of a now familiar pattern:
Le MODEF, organisation professionnelle groupant des exploitants 
familiaux de toutes opinions, n'a pas à intervenir dans votre choix 
entre les candidats. Par contre, il est de son devoir de vous 
mettre en garde contre les mauvais coups qui se préparent...
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Aujourd'hui dans votre intérêt, il est du devoir du MODEF de dire, 
dans l'immédiat, votre bulletin de vote constitue l'arme la plus 
efficace contre une nouvelle aggravation de vos difficultés,(60)
The logic of this statement is one of support for the candidates of the 
Left. 1969 saw a divided Left. MODEF's position was fairly openly 
aligned with that of the PCF, but with no declarations of support for 
the party. The referendum on the reform of the Senate was attacked 
ostensibly on professional and organizational grounds rather than in 
political terms. For MODEF, de Gaulle's proposals would remove the 
distinction between political and economic representation by mixing 
elected politicians with pressure group leaders in the same political 
Assembly. Agriculture in general would be under-represented (in 
contrast to the unreconstructed Senate) and MODEF in particular would be 
excluded. But in the same issue of L'Exploitant Familial, Mineau again 
returned to a political line of argument against the referendum:
Une majorité importante des "Ouis" constituera une approbation de 
l'ensemble de la politique du gouvernement, y compris de sa 
politique agricole. Un nombre très important de "Nons" ne peut que 
créer de sérieuses difficultés à la réalisation de la 2e étape du 
Plan Boulin, et une majorité de "Nons" signifie la mise en échec du 
plan et un coup très dur à toute politique de destruction des 
exploitants familiaux.(61)
In May 1969, MODEF once again deviated from its usual policy of only 
adopting a line acceptable to the Left as a whole by following the PCF 
"bonnet blanc, blanc bonnet" attitude to the second ballot. Refusing to 
distinguish between Pompidou and Poher, MODEF simply stressed the need
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to continue its purely pressure group activity without reference to the 
election results. However, it is also necessary to point out that 
Duclos was not given any preferential treatment on the first ballot 
either - a complete contrast with the behaviour of the CGT.(62)
The 1972 referendum on British entry saw MODEF attack the government's 
actions once again. Despite the fact that a strong case in favour of 
rejection could have been made on purely agricultural grounds, MODEF 
criticisms again centred on the political aspects of the referendum as a 
vote of confidence in the government. (63) Despite the fact that the PS 
and the PCF were divided between abstention and rejection, this 
politicization of the issue by MODEF in fact helped to maintain unity 
within the organization. Opening up a debate on the Common Market 
itself could have had more profound consequences on the organization.
The 1973 Parliamentary elections saw MODEF make the same disclaimer 
about political involvement, and the same violation of this principle, 
with another contrast between Left and Right unfavourable to the 
latter.(64) Despite the fact that MODEF refused to approve the 
Programme commun, and merely confined itself to making a statement 
saying that the Programme commun contained many proposals which would be 
acceptable to MODEF, MODEF effectively supported the parties of the Left 
once again.
1974 saw the high point of left-wing unity, and MODEF's most direct 
commitment to the Left. The joint candidate of the Left was given 
wholehearted support:
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L'election de M. Mitterrand à la présidence de la République 
signifie à coup sûr et dans les délais les plus brefs des prix 
rénumerateurs et garantis, une aide efficace à ceux qui en ont le 
besoin, le développement de l'exploitation familiale par 
l'interdiction des cumuls et par des facilités à l'accéssion à la 
propriété... C'est pourquoi le MODEF appelle tous les petits et 
moyens exploitants sans exception, à voter et à faire voter pour M. 
Francois Mitterrand.(65)
For the first time, the emphasis was not on stopping the Right and the 
pursuit of their malevolent aims, but on the positive benefits to be 
expected from the hands of a PS-MRG-PCF government. This is the only 
case where MODEF has thrown all caution and rhetorical precautions to 
the wind. The only explanation lies in the wave of enthusiasm and the 
almost messianic expectations created by the Union of the Left and the 
Programme commun in the election period, and the firm conviction that 
Mitterrand would win. The risk involved in associating itself so 
clearly with the Left was outweighed by the potential advantage of 
recognition by the newly-elected President.
These hopes and this clarity were dashed by the break-up of the Union of 
the Left in September 1977. The open enthusiasm of 1974 gave way to 
more double talk. By 1978 MODEF had retreated. In an editorial of 
L'Exploitant Familial immediately preceding the 1978 Parliamentary 
elections, Alfred Nègre was highly critical of the Right, but ended his 
article in a way which underlined the internal conflicts in MODEF 
provoked by the end of the Union of the Left. He concluded: "Le 
programme national du MODEF est suffisament explicite pour que dans la 
période électorale qui s'ouvre, il ne soit besoin d'autre
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précision".(66) At this time, MODEF was concerned about avoiding the 
fall-out from the explosion of Left unity, and hence avoided taking 
sides for or against the competing parties of the Left. This evasive 
position clearly illustrated the balance of forces within MODEF - the PS 
and PCF groups each being too strong to allow the other to inpose their 
line, and too weak to inpose their own.
By 1981 the balance of forces had changed in favour of the PCF. The 
official line remained as evasive and despairing as in 1978. "Le MODEF 
ne prendra pas position pour un candidat ou un autre".(67) But there 
were two new elements. Firstly, although Frederic Lindenstaedt had begun 
to warn that MODEF had placed far too much emphasis on elections 
immediately after the break-up of the Union of the Left, this attitude 
had not yet won acceptance before the 1978 elections.(68) By 1981, 
Lindenstaedt's grim warnings had a much greater acceptance within the 
organization:
Nous avons trop misé sur les elections et pas assez sur la lutte 
revendicative qui devait les accompagner. Il faut inverser les 
proportions. On ne nous apportera pas l'indispensable changement 
de politique agricole sur un plateau d'argent.(69)
For this attitude to become dominant within MODEF, several things were 
necessary; another electoral defeat for the Left in general and the PCF 
in particular was in store, the split between the parties of the Left 
made activists of these parties realize that a Left government was not 
an overnight panacea as was felt in 1974, a belief that union activity 
could be conducted effectively against a right-wing government emerged, 
and the weight of the PCF within MODEF had increased. The second new
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element demonstrates this last point conclusively. Apart from a general 
increase in the influence of the PCF discussed below, there was a major 
change at the top of the MODEF hierarchy. Raymond Mineau handed over 
his post of general secretary to a more openly partisan member of the 
PCF, Frederic Lindenstaedt. From this position, Lindenstaedt was able 
to push the organization more towards alignment with the PCF than the 
official neutral line of the organization tended to suggest. For 
example, he was able not only to launch a polemic against PS views of 
property rights, but also to attack all the major candidates and their 
associates, except for Georges Marchais, because of their attitude 
towards the EEC.(70) If in the past MODEF had previously aligned itself 
with the PCF, it was the first time that it had openly attacked the PS. 
Perhaps fortunately for MODEF, this increasing political association 
with the PCF was checked by the victory of Mitterrand, his insistence on 
a governmental alliance with the PCF, and the PCF's about turn on the 
class nature of Mitterrandism.
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5. INTERNAL CONFLICT
The last few paragraphs help to explain why MODEF has limited its 
political concerns in the past. The overriding concern for unity up to 
1977 inhibited overt politicization of the organization. It remains to 
analyze the extent and the causes of the conflicts created by the end of 
the Union of the Left.
Until 1977 the only significant split in MODEF was a breakaway led by a 
group of farmers in the Aube. Even this remained relatively unimportant 
for MODEF since these farmers had joined MODEF more in order to attack 
the FNSEA than to support MODEF policies. Despite all efforts, it was 
impossible to retain them within the organization. One should note, 
however, that they were not expelled, they left of their own free will. 
The political deadlock of September 1977 was to mark a turning point in 
the hitherto relatively untroubled history of MODEF's internal life. It 
is clear that the rise of MODEF coincides with the development of the 
Union of the Left - from the first tentative noises of the late 1350s 
and early 1960s to the crescendo of 1974. Indeed, it is possible to 
regard MODEF as a precursor and path-breaker for the Union of the Left 
as a whole. Despite declarations of war-like intent from party 
leaderships, the activists in rural areas have been engaged in constant 
co-operation. To some extent this can be explained by the face-to-face 
nature of agricultural politics, and the almost schizophrenic attitude 
to the idea of "1'unite paysanne" - combatting it in practice whilst 
denouncing violations by opponents. But as Denis Lacorne has pointed 
out, it is downright misleading to view even the PCF as a monolith:
un système d'action périphérique qui__tient le plus grand compte
de circonstances et de situations locales, apparemment peu 
compatible avec une logique impérative de type léniniste.(71)
Indeed, one could go so far as to argue that at times the PCF has 
survived because its national directives have been ignored or 
transformed in practice by local militants. This helps to explain why 
the damage created by the break-up of the Union of the Left in September 
1977 was not as disastrous as it might have been. Nevertheless, the 
demoralization and division within MODEF had significant effects.
Firstly, as MODEF has always strongly insisted on the need for political 
change, the throwing away of such hopes in 1977 was particularly 
demoralizing. This forced the leadership to place greater emphasis on 
the need for, and the possibilities of, purely union activity. Though 
this was beneficial in the long-term by reducing the illusions held 
about the benefits of a left-wing government, in the short run it 
represented such a major U-turn that it was bound to create cynicism 
within MODEF. Secondly, the wider political quarrels between the 
parties and activists of the parties could not help but intrude into 
MODEF's deliberations. It was impossible to entirely prevent 
individuals carrying over their political differences into union 
discussions. This had two consequences; on the one hand, a certain 
number of PS members of MODEF dropped out - usually quietly, without 
launching an attack on MODEF or defecting to the FNSEA. The most 
prominent of these was Georges Sutra in the Hérault, once a member of 
the MODEF Executive Committee, and elected to the European Parliament on 
the PS list in 1979. On the other, MODEF suffered in electoral terms, 
since it admits a decline of four per cent in the number of MODEF votes 
cast in the 1979 professional elections by comparison with 1974.
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le PCF est parfaitement capable d'innover en adoptant avec succès
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The importance of local and regional leadership in limiting or creating 
further damage is shown by the fact that conflicts were much more severe 
in certain departments than in others. For instance, the Charente 
Federation weathered the storm relatively successfully, whilst the 
sectarianism which developed in the Vaucluse was enough to lose the 
MODEF Federation the Chamber of Agriculture seats at Apt and Orange, the 
latter having been held since 1964. Not only did PS activists quit 
MODEF, but the PCF leaders of MODEF also refused to respect the 
tradition of political balance on election slates.(72) While these 
differences can be accounted for, to some extent, by the differing 
political traditions of the Charente and Vaucluse, the key difference 
appeared to be the nature of the local leadership. The PCF members in 
the Charente leadership, led by Raymond Mineau, were, and are, much less 
involved in the departmental leadership of their party them are their 
counterparts in the Vaucluse.
At the national level, 1978 saw a change in the style of leadership to a 
much more overtly political stance - a change which coincided with the 
division of the Left. At MODEF's 1978 Conference the key post of 
general secretary was transferred from Raymond Mineau to Frederic 
Lindenstaedt.(73) To a large extent, the differences in style of 
leadership are a result of their differing personal histories. Mineau 
is the technical expert of MODEF, whose whole working life has been 
devoted to agricultural unionism since he became the administrative 
officer of the FDSEA of the Charente in 1947. Though his union career 
involved him in many political battles with the FNSEA leadership, they 
were not conducted in an explicitly political way. Finally, his base, 
the Charente, is a department where the Left have, until recently, been 
in a minority. A much greater discretion was called for on his part
387
when dealing with the farmers of the department. Frederic 
Lindenstaedt's career, on the other hand, has not been entirely involved 
in agriculture. Secretary-general of the Lot-et-Garonne Tenants and 
Sharecroppers Federation, and involved in the setting up of MODEF in the 
1950s, he became secretary of the Lot-et-Garonne PCF Federation. Given 
the fact that the department has a much stronger leftist tradition, 
particularly amongst the farmers who provided Renaud Jean and the CGPT 
with their support, it is easily understandable that Lindenstaedt should 
see his job in a much more overtly political light.
These differences in style can be seen clearly if the pre-electoral 
period for the 1978 Parliamentary elections is compared with the 1981 
Presidential election. In October 1977, Mineau pointed out in fairly 
neutral terms the dangers presented by a left-wing government:
Si un gouvernement de la gauche élu sur les promesses du Programme 
commun de la gauche essayait de maintenir meme partiellement 
l'austérité présente, il en résulterait un mécontentement tel qu'il 
pourrait être exploité par les actuels tenants du pouvoir non 
seulement pour y revenir en force mais pour essayer de s'y 
maintenir par tous les moyens.(74)
This was obviously an attack on the PS but it was a veiled one and there 
were no direct allegations against the PS. In 1981 Lindenstaedt was 
much more explicit. As we have seen, he denounced the socialist 
proposals concerning the "offices fonciers". But the language employed 
had nothing of the objectivity of Mineau in 1977. "Veut-on avec les 
offices fonciers se donner un air révolutionnaire mais en ne tordant pas 
un cheveu aux cumulards, gros possédants ou aux banques".(75) Similarly
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he concentrated on the question of the extension of the Common Market, 
isolating three categories of Presidential candidates: the "Yes more or 
less" ("Vous pouvez tranquillement les rayer"), the "Yes buts" ("ces 
garanties ne sont qu'un trompe l'oeil. Vous ne pouvez pas donc suivre 
non plus cette catégorie de candidats"), and finally the "categorie Nos" 
("Vous pouvez leur faire confiance pour défendre vos intérêts 
d'exploitants familiaux et l'agriculture française").(76) Perhaps the 
most sectarian attack was to argue, on the basis of a Nouvel Observateur 
flight of megalomania, that Mitterrand intended to make Claude Cheysson 
his Prime Minister. This was accompanied by a list of Cheysson's 
responsibilities in the EEC's attacks on French agriculture.(77)
The real difference between the two men is in their conception of the 
relations between parties and unions. Mineau has always acted as if 
MODEF has an important role to play in defending immediate economic 
interests, and in so doing allows its members to draw the obvious 
political conclusions. Lindenstaedt, on the other hand, acts as if 
political change is the primary objective of MODEF, and that there must 
be a much more assertive campaign of politicization if any political 
benefits for the PCF are to be gained from MODEF. Rather than sit back 
and let the members and activists draw their own conclusions, it is 
necessary to explain what these conclusions should be.
The great problem for the Lindenstaedt strategy is that greater 
politicization and identification with one particular party also brings 
about greater political differentiation. Instead of a vague populist 
idea of the Left as an undifferentiated whole, its policies have to be 
dissected and explained in detail. But in doing so, it is virtually 
impossible to avoid aligning oneself with a particular party. Even if
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journalistic excesses are avoided (which they are not), such a strategy 
leads MODEF, or at least its general secretary, to be seen to be 
supporting the PCF. For example, pointing out the presence of such 
ambiguous characters as Claude Cheysson and Edgard Pisani in the 
entourage of Francois Mitterrand was merely a statement of fact. Posing 
the question of the suitability and reliability of such people for 
reforming agriculture in a socialist direction was at the same time a 
genuine question, and a polemical attack on the candidate of the PS.(78)
The evolution of MODEF's attitude to the Common Programme signed by the 
PS, the MRG and the PCF in 1972 provides a clear example of how MODEF's 
internal history has followed that of the Union of the Left. Unlike the 
CGT, MODEF refused to give a formal endorsement to the programme. 
Nevertheless, it welcomed the agreement with open arms:
L'examen du Programme commun de gouvernement établi par les partis 
socialiste et communiste fait ressortir de nombreux points de 
convergence avec le programme national du MODEF... Entre le 
Programme commun et celui du MODEF n'apparait aucune opposition 
notable d'autant plus que la réference en maintes occasions à la 
consultation des intéressés laisse présager de larges possibilités 
de negotiation....(79)
But when the Union of the Left broke down this confidence evaporated. 
Going further than the PCF, who denounced the PS for reneging on its 
commitments and swinging to the Right, MODEF's general secretary argued 
that some of the Common Programme was unacceptable anyway. As we have 
seen already, this criticism was based on the issue of property rights. 
Lindenstaedt claimed that MODEF had severely criticized the "office
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foncier" proposal when it was first adopted in 1972. However, since no 
such criticisms were made publicly in 1972 it seems that the motives 
behind this quarrel had more to do with party politics than with the 
formal concerns of MODEF. It was an attempt to outflank the PS, 
contrasting it unfavourably with the PCF, by stressing the more 
conservative aspects of MODEF ideology. This was so clear that the PS 
members of the leadership revolted against the facade of unanimity and 
forced a vote for the first time in years.
The socialists in the MODEF leadership seem to have shared Francois 
Mitterrand's explanation of the behaviour of the PCF in the 
pre-electoral period. "Le PC n'a qu'une pensée: le premier tour des 
presidentielles et son rang par rapport au PS. Cette obsession le 
poujadise".(80) According to one leading socialist in MODEF, the 
behaviour of the PCF MODEF leaders was merely a temporary aberration - a 
panic-stricken response to Georges Marchais' low standing in opinion 
polls. Once the elections had passed, the communists would, it was 
believed, return to their normal selves.(81) This appears to have been 
the case. Without the pressure of the elections, and with the 
realization that such overtly partisan behaviour was counter-productive, 
the concern with the unity of the organization again became predominant. 
Indeed the socialist and non-communist response to the increasing 
politicization was surprisingly muted. There was little open conflict 
whilst dissidents generally left quietly.
There was, nevertheless, a PS attempt to undermine MODEF by setting up 
an alternative organization. The MONATAR was intended to play the saune 
role for the PS which it was presumed that MODEF was fulfilling for the 
PCF. Based on a misconception of the complexities of the political and
391
personal alliances involved in MODEF, this was doomed to failure. This 
plan, hatched in the over-fevered imaginations of the party's 
agricultural experts, proved a disaster. On the one hand, socialist 
farmers were suspicious, since it would have been much more of a 
satellite organization of the PS than MODEF is of the PCF. On the other, 
many socialists within MODEF do not accept that it is dominated by the 
PCF. There was, therefore, no need to quit an established organization, 
within which they occupied positions of influence and responsibility, to 
create an untried and even more politicized union. It is apparent that 
many MODEF socialists are not convinced of the competence and knowledge 
of the party's agricultural experts.(82)
To a large extent, MODEF's survival was a result of the existence of 
certain loyalties which cut across party lines, of the conscious efforts 
of many national and departmental leaders, and of the convenient lack of 
interest in politics amongst its membership. In Chapter 2 it was argued 
that the Resistance was an essential pre-condition for the creation of 
MODEF. The contacts and friendships established during the Resistance 
not only permitted the creation of MODEF but safeguarded its existence 
from the perils of political polemics. Many MODEF activists of the 
Resistance generation have more in common with their union colleagues of 
other parties than they do with younger members of their own parties.
For instance, in interviews with leaders of the Charente Federation, 
many offensive remarks were made about the other parties of the Left, 
but Resistance friends were excluded from the general condemnation.(83)
MODEF has always argued that political parties and unions are two 
distinct types of organization, involving distinct types of language and 
practice. Obviously, to the extent that professional organization is
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concerned with putting pressure on the state, this dichotomy is violated 
in practice and can never be more than a moral imperative. But there is 
a definite sense within MODEF of the limitations on the acceptable 
subjects for discussion and, more importantly, on the way in which they 
can be discussed. This line was drawn by one MODEF leader in the 
Charente as the distinction between "la politique économique" and "la 
politique politicienne".(84) The former relates directly to 
agriculture and its problems, and is therefore a legitimate object of 
MODEF's attention, whilst the latter is concerned with the ephemera of 
day-to-day politics, which are considered not only as a waste of time 
but also as a source of disruption. It is, of course, impossible to 
define rigidly into which category a particular issue falls. But it 
provides a rough standard by which to judge the receivability of an 
issue, and the acceptability of individual behaviour. Violators of the 
code are swiftly brought to heel, since not only do they endanger the 
unity of the organization in general but they also inhibit the search 
for unanimity on specific issues which is a hallmark of MODEF.
This self-imposed censorship is perhaps Raymond Mineau's greatest 
contribution to the development of MODEF, even more important than his 
tireless organizational work since 1959. It is no accident that the 
Federations furthest removed from his influence, those in the 
south-east, were the ones which experienced the greatest problems during 
1977-81. Within the Charente Federation, he is unanimously regarded as 
the man who ensured that the Federation escaped relatively unscathed, 
through his determination to prevent political arguments of any 
sort.(85) For instance, during a lobby of the Charente MSA and its 
president, Mineau personally brought to order a MODEF leader who tried
to politicize the discussion by blaming multinational capital for the 
problems of the MSA. Another MRG MODEF leader claimed that in the 
thirty-five years he had known Mineau he never had a political 
discussion with him. (86) It is largely due to this apoliticism that 
MODEF was transformed from a grouplet into a national organization 
capable of weathering the political vicissitudes of the Left, and into 
an established organization capable of outliving its founders.
The other side of the story is the lack of interest in politics, and 
particularly in party politics, prevalent not only amongst the members 
and supporters but also amongst the activists. The clientelistic nature 
of MODEF support has helped to put a brake on political conflict within 
the organization. A great deal of the work of MODEF's local leaders 
consists of sorting out individual problems, so there is a natural 
tendency to neglect political argument. Since MODEF leaders derive their 
legitimacy more from their role as social workers rather than as 
political theorists, they are constrained by their supporters to avoid 
political discussions; otherwise they risk alienating the latter through 
boredom, or by attributing to themselves a political competence which is 
not recognized by local farmers. Furthermore, MODEF activists themselves 
are not necessarily interested in national politics. Not only do party 
members spend very little time talking about such matters, but rural 
politics is often a politics of personalities, immediate interest and 
ritual denunciation of those who belong to another clique. It is not so 
much ignorance which is at work, but the expression of a positive 
distaste for national party politics.
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Finally, there is one other element which helped to limit the damage.
The increasing politicization under the leadership of Lindenstaedt 
brought about its own remedy. Socialists within MODEF began to use their 
numerical strength to greater effect in order to extend their influence 
within the organization. In some places, the PS over-reached themselves 
in a concerted effort to impose its members in MODEF leadership 
positions - an effort so overt that it was blocked by the PCF and non-PS 
leaders. This was the case in the Vaucluse and in the FNJ Federation in 
the Charente.(87) The defeat of such attempts led some of those 
involved to drop out of MODEF. However, the majority of MODEF 
socialists were aware that to try and play the PCF at its own game was a 
re^:pe for disaster, splitting the organization but without taking 
control of the remains. An intermediate position was established. 
Whereas in the past the political composition of national, departmental 
and local leaderships was not considered a priority, a realization grew 
that political balance between PCF, PS, MRG and non-aligned must be 
maintained at all levels, particularly in the departments and communes. 
The classic example of the crystallization of tendencies within MODEF is 
the setting up of the political triumvirate, consisting of presidents 
belonging to the PS, the PCF and the MRG, to head the organization in 
1978. The net result of the PCF attempt to increase its influence 
within MODEF was to weaken its position by over-reaching itself, thus 
coming to occupy a less uncontested position in the leadership than 
when it was more discreet.
One aspect of MODEF's politicization which must be mentioned is the fact 
that throughout the 1970s, the political ambitions of MODEF leaders of 
all parties have been encouraged. The logic behind this is that it is 
much harder to accuse MODEF of being a PCF satellite if it can point to
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the presence of elected representatives of other parties in its 
leadership. For example, the MRG president of the Charente Federation 
admits that this was one of the considerations which led him to become a 
conseiller general.(88) This strategy had two unexpected advantages for 
the post-Union of the Left MODEF . On the one hand, political energies 
are channelled outwards. On the other, party members within MODEF are 
forced to moderate their behaviour, since they have to appeal to all 
sections of the Left in their search for election or re-election. A PS 
conseiller general dependent on PCF and MRG votes for his re-election 
would be more wary of upsetting his MODEF colleagues than the 
rank-and-file party activist.
6. THE PARTIES AND MODEF
MODEF always made a formal show, until the late 1970s, of maintaining 
relations with all parties. MODEF has met with the parliamentary groups 
of each party. In practice, MODEF is much closer to the parties of the 
Left and to the PCF in particular. The parties of the Right have had a 
somewhat ambiguous attitude to MODEF. Though right-wing governments 
persistently refused to recognize MODEF, there have been meetings 
between MODEF delegations and right-wing Parliamentary groups.(89) Some 
centre-right deputies have seen no harm in talking to MODEF, since they 
realized the dangers involved in equating MODEF with the PCF. This is 
the sort of argument which can quickly become self-fulfilling. To 
dismiss MODEF and, by extension, the legitimacy of its concerns, was to 
risk driving the discontented farmer into the hands of the PCF. The 
attempt to accommodate MODEF has been limited, both sides having few
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illusions about the motives of the other. If MODEF ever had any 
illusion about its potential influence on the parties of the Right, this 
was dispelled in 1969. MODEF was particularly galled by the refusal of 
Jacques Duhamel, the Minister of Agriculture, to continue the 
discussions begun by Jacques Duhamel, the president of the Progrès et 
Démocratie Moderne parliamentary group.(90) For MODEF, such liberal 
double talk was worse than the kind of overtly hostile diatribe received 
from a right-wing Loiret deputy:
Mais autant je suis résolu à agir, autant que je ne suis pas mûr 
pour appuyer la propagande communiste... il faut vraiment une 
certaine dose des adhérents du MODEF pour attendre le salut des 
communistes alors que la première chose qu'ils font en prenant le 
pouvoir, c'est d'abolir la propriété.(91)
The prevalence of this conspiracy theory of politics - that all protest 
is inspired by the PCF - is characteristic of the Giscardian arrogance 
which prevented the Right from expanding its audience as it had done up 
to and including 1974. MODEF drew the conclusion that even a simulated 
dialogue was no longer possible when it decided not to bother sending a 
questionnaire to right-wing deputies, since they had already made their 
attitude clear by supporting the government.(92)
The position of the PS has been of more concern to MODEF. The most 
striking thing about the PS attitude to agriculture was the complete 
absence of a position on farmers’ unions.(93) Except for the 
denunciation of the political role of the FNSEA leadership, there was no 
preference given to any agricultural organization. Indeed, unlike the 
PCF, there was not even any insistence on the need for farmers to belong 
to a union at all. PS literature contented itself with analysis of
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right-wing policies, its own counter-propositions and the need to join 
and support the PS. Changes in agricultural policy were to be 
engineered through the election of a socialist government. Once again, 
this is an example of the way that the Left in France underestimates the 
possibilities of unions. This can be seen as a reflection of the 
weaknesses of unionism, which is itself a function of this lack of 
confidence. More importaintly, it represents a reaction against the 
exaggerated claims of the syndicalist tradition, and the need to 
legitimize the primary rolw of the party. The party is seen as the 
legitimate source of authority. Intermediary groups groups are seen as 
obstacles, problems to be neutralized rather than potential allies.
This is the gist of Mitterrand's criticisms of the CFDT. This kind of 
party Jacobinism leads some of the PS to prefer a disorganized 
opposition to an organized ally capable of making its own demands on a 
socialist government.(94) In the case of the farmers, their ambiguous 
class position only seems to heighten the distrust - a distrust which 
has existed in certain parts of the socialist movement since its 
birth.(95) The low status of unionism also reflects and justifies the 
weakness of the PS outside the purely political sphere. With exceptions 
such as Lille and Marseille, PS activists have not been present in the 
wide range of social, cultural, and only marginally political 
associations which provide a party with a sufficiently firm basis to 
withstand major political and electoral setbacks.(96) It is only 
recently that the PS has begun to think seriously about this problem.
But given that most of this thinking has been done by the Rocardian 
minority, there is resistance to accepting this fact.(97) Finally, the 
PS faced a practical problem. The limited number of its activist 
farmers were widely dispersed in the various organizations. Explicit 
support, for instance, given to a presence in the FNSEA would alienate
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the MODEF members in the PS and vice versa. In order to maintain its 
clienteles, the party was constrained to silence on this question.
Unfortunately for the PS, this absence of a policy did not prevent it 
from intervening in a haphazard and often counter-productive way. The 
best example was its ill-considered attempt to set up its own satellite. 
But normal PS procedure was to launch its individual members into orbit 
in the leadership of the competing unions in a completely unco-ordinated 
way. The way in which individual Federations and activists were left to 
their own devices had some unfortunate results. A particularly 
incompetent move was made by the Vaucluse PS Federation in 1976. Just 
before the Chamber of Agriculture elections, the Federation issued a 
statement calling on farmers to support the candidates in each list who 
happened to be socialists. Since this meant splitting one’s vote 
between MODEF and the FDSEA, bocn organizations were highly offended.
The PS was made the villain of the piece, accused of politicizing 
elections where such considerations are theoretically out of order. The 
fact that these elections were highly political did not excuse the PS 
for making such an open intervention. This allowed the PCF to present 
themselves as the defenders of independent unionism, and to strengthen 
their position within MODEF, whilst the FDSEA socialists were undermined 
in the eyes of their colleagues.(98)
The PCF’s attitude to MODEF, is of course, the most important question. 
It has already been seen in Chapter 2 that the party has not given 
all-out support to MODEF. Though MODEF has enjoyed close relations with 
the PCF parliamentary group, with Andre Soury (deputy for Confolens) in 
the Assembly, and Louis Minetti (senator for the Bouches-du-Rhône) in
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the Senate effectively seen as spokesmen for MODEF, there is a large 
area of doubt about how seriously the PCF takes agriculture in general 
and MODEF in particular. All the signs indicate that the PCF devotes 
little time or interest to agriculture. If PCF literature encourgaes 
farmers to join unions, and in particular MODEF, the party makes little 
effort in practice. Even party members can be found in FDSEAs who are 
locked in a bitter conflict with MODEF. Furthermore, senior MODEF 
officials have complained privately about the lack of support which the 
PCF gives them. They feel that the PCF could provide more assistance in 
helping MODEF with organizational tasks without jeopardizing the 
independence of MODEF. Similarly, the party press is not particularly 
active in prosecuting the claims of MODEF. Articles about agriculture 
in L'Humanite are as rare as they are in the rest of the national press. 
Other parts of the party press are no less happy to ignore agriculture. 
For instance, there was no full-length article on agriculture in 
Economie et Politique between 1976 and 1982. Even in Cahiers du 
Communisme, which had a better record in the past, articles on 
agriculture became progressively rarer. Most of these articles consist 
of party analysis of the agricultural crisis, and proposals for its 
resolution. Robert Jonis' article on the Gard is exceptional in that it 
deals with the concrete problems of organizing in agriculture. Indeed 
the article itself stresses how agriculture has fallen into neglect 
within the party.(99)
Michel Rocard once accused the PCF of treating farmers as "une force 
d'appoint".(100) This is most clearly indicated by the role which 
farmers and MODEF members play in national party positions. No MODEF 
member sits on the Central Committee. But more significantly, of the 
eighty—eight deputies elected in 1978, only Andre Lajoinie (Allier),
Andre Soury (Charente), Hubert Ruffe (Lot-et-Garonne) and Andre Tourne 
(Pyrénées Orientales) had been farmers at some stage in their careers. 
Only three others, all former agricultural labourers, Pierre Girardot 
(Alpes de Haute Provence), Paul Balmigère (Hérault), and Jacques 
Chaminade (Corrèze) had any connection with farming.(101) When one 
considers that at least a quarter of the eighty-eight seats were in 
essentially rural constituencies, one sees the imbalance between 
farmers' support for the PCF and the interest of the PCF in farmers as 
activists and leaders.
Within the PCF agriculture has been left to party specialists and the 
activists who happen to be farmers. The existence of La Terre, and the 
greater place given to agriculture in La Marseillaise and L'Echo du 
Centre, are judged adequate compensation for the gaps in mainstream 
national publications. This is, of course, nothing new. Renaud Jean was 
obliged to spend a large part of his time convincing his comrades that 
his efforts, and those of the CGPT, were ideologically acceptable and 
politically worthwhile.(102) What is new is that this partition between 
the farmers and the rest of the party has coincided with a strategy of 
Left Union designed to unite all categories of the exploited and 
oppressed against state monopoly capitalism.(103) Though one cannot 
deny the value of La Terre to the party, such reliance on it seems a 
curious way to cement the worker-farmer alliance.
Michel Rocard attempted to explain this division in the PCF in the 
following way:
U O  1
Pour le PCF, l'agriculture reste une activité secondaire, et la 
paysannerie un milieu iréeductiblement attaché à des valeurs 
bourgeoises telles que la propriété... La revolution socialiste 
sera faite par la classe ouvrière, et les petits paysans n'y auront 
leur place que s'ils acceptent d'y jouer le rôle de force 
d'appoint...(104)
This explanation is untenable for three reasons. When accusing the PCF 
of defending the bourgeois values of farmers, one has to be aware of the 
possibility that the PCF is using the farmer to justify its own 
bourgeois values. Secondly, the PCF effectively abandoned revolutionary 
politics in 1944 ands did so formally in the mid-1960s. It is therefore 
doubtful that the concept of socialist revolution influences the conduct 
of the party. Finally, the PCF appeals to all its non-working class 
clienteles in terms of their own self-interest, rather than in terms of 
an altruistic desire for political change.
It is this last factor which provides the key to the explanation of the 
partitions within the party. Since the primary concern of the party in 
the Fifth Republic has been the defence of particularistic interests, 
these divisions are necessary to prevent the various audiences 
suspecting that their short-term interests may be contradictory.(105) 
Furthermore, there is a conflict between the defence of short-term 
interests, and the strategy of long-term unity of the exploited. This 
is the old dichotomy between reform and revolution, but with the PCF on 
the reformist side of the divide. Given the intense but partial 
politicization of the section of the working class organized by the PCF, 
it is hardly surprising that the defence of its immediate interests 
prevails and its leaders are the ones to take up leadership positions in
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the party. "Le PCF a donc hérité de cette mentalité patrimoniale qui 
réfuse les risques d'une conquête pour préserver l'acquis".(106) But in 
the context of a deepening economic crisis, the conflict between the two 
aspects of the strategy increases. To safeguard itself, the PCF has to 
retreat towards its "forterêsse assiégée".(107) Its role becomes 
restricted to "le parti qui défend les intérêts de la classe ouvrière 
dans le système tel qu'il est".(108) The influence of the agricultural 
wing of the party therefore declines. It was such considerations which 
put paid to the abortive "union du peuple de France". Quite simply, 
according to Jean Rony, the working class would not accept such class 
collaboration, since it hindered it in the pursuit, or defence, of 
short-term interests.(109)
The lack of attention which both the major parties of the Left pay to 
MODEF indicates that MODEF's importance to them, if any, is not 
primarily electoral. If that were the case, MODEF leaders would have a 
much greater role to play within parties, instead of being confined to 
specialist committees as they have been. In fact, MODEF serves as a 
reservoir for both the PCF and the PS, and to a lesser extent, the MRG - 
a reservoir of political talent for departmental leadership positions. 
MODEF provides its activists with the indispensable political skills of 
organization, public speaking, etc. Once this has been done, the 
parties can use their most prominent members in MODEF for their own 
purposes. At one level, MODEF helps to train party cadres for 
leadership of the departmental Federation. The picture is more complex 
in the PS, where factionalism abounds, but in any department with a 
significant MODEF Federation, there are MODEF leaders in the Federal 
Committee of the PCF. Examples include Raymond Mineau in the Charente, 
Camille Fare and Georges Sabatier in the Vaucluse, along with other
leading MODEF officials in the Côtes-du-Nord, Landes, Bouches-du-Rhône, 
etc. Similarly, where the MRG represent a significant minority of 
farmers, MODEF leaders are to be found in the leadership of the MRG 
Federation. For example, in the Charente, one of MODEF's vice 
presidents became vice president of the MRG Federation whilst MODEF's 
president served as Michel Crépeau's official representative in the 
department during the 1981 Presidential elections. Whilst these 
officials are not directly nominated by MODEF, they do ensure that the 
concerns of MODEF are made known to a wider audience, and that the 
leaders of MODEF are integrated into the political life of the 
department.
More importantly, MODEF helps to train potential elected 
representatives. In the early days of MODEF, its leaders tended to be 
established elected representatives, such as conseillers généraux, 
mayors and assistant mayors. For example, one of MODEF's founding 
members - Marcel Sintas in the Landes - was already a mayor and 
conseiller général and only lost his seat on the Conseil Général in 
1982. The original leadership of the Charente Federation included a 
large contingent of mayors and assistant mayors from villages such as 
Ste-Sévère (Jarnac), Boutiers St. Trojan (Cognac-Nord), Vindelle 
(Hiersac), Baignes (Baignes) and Exideuil (Chabanais). (110) As time 
wore on, younger men emerged to take over MODEF. During the 1970s there 
was an increasing tendency for people who had made their reputation in 
MODEF to stand for political office. Of the three national presidents 
of MODEF, only Mineau has never stood for political office. His 
socialist colleague Henri Dofny was conseiller général for Castelnaudary 
in the Aude between 1976-1982, whilst the MRG Pierre Desigors was a 
mayor and conseiller général in the Eure. Of the remainder of the
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national leadership, many have held local political office. André 
Cantiran was elected as an assistant mayor in the Landes, and was the 
"suppléant" to the PS deputy between 1973-78. Emilien Soulié has been a 
long-serving mayor of Montblanc in the Hérault, whilst the treasurer 
Franck Marcade is a mayor and conseiller general for Pouillon in the 
Landes. Departmental leaderships follow the same pattern. In 1976-79, 
two of the four farmers elected to the Charente Conseil Général were 
MODEF leaders. MODEF's president was elected for the MRG in the canton 
of Hiersac, whilst a socialist vice president beat the sitting 
deputy-mayor at Cognac-Sud. Unsuccessful candidates included MODEF 
members of the PS at Villefagnan, and of the MRG at Rouillac. The great 
political success story of MODEF in the department is, of course, the 
PCF deputy for Confolens, Andre Soury, a former member of MODEF. In 
other departments a similar situation exists. In the Vaucluse, the two 
most prominent MODEF leaders became mayors and conseillers généraux 
during the 1970s. Georges Sabatier became mayor and conseiller général 
for Bollène, a largely working class town of 10,000 inhabitants, whilst 
Camille Fare was elected mayor and conseiller général for 
Beaumes-de-Venise. Georges Sabatier was also the "suppléant" of Fernand 
Marin, the PCF deputy for Orange until 1981. Indeed, of the three PCF 
candidates in June 1981, two had MODEF "suppléants" - Sabatier at 
Orange, and Rene Richaud, mayor of Goult, in the constituency of 
Carpentras. Finally, slightly further south, a MODEF leader became 
mayor of Noves, the "suppléant" for the constituency of Arles, and 
unsuccessfully contested the cantonal elections of 1982 in the heart of 
"la Vendée provençale" -Chateaurenard.
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This list could be extended indefinitely, particularly with the much 
larger numbers of mayors in the ranks of MODEF. The important point to 
make is that there is a process of "cross-legitimation" at work.
Lacorne has used this concept to explain the relations between PCF 
mayors and their party. "La réussite de l'élu renforce la légitimité du 
parti... la caution du parti renforce l'autorité du militant".(111) This 
is precisely what happens with MODEF. The political success of its 
leaders lends the organization greater credibility and provides it with 
a wider audience, whilst this success is dependent on the credibility 
and notoriety such leaders gain from their position in MODEF.(112) This 
suggests that, despite the abuse of right-wing governments, MODEF itself 
has a certain degree of popular legitimacy.
This also demonstrates that MODEF is not a group of people alienated 
from the political system. In fact, many of its members participate 
extensively in the elected apparatuses of the state. To the extent that 
they are alienated from the political system, this stems from their 
exclusion from the more powerful technocratic and administrative 
agencies. This exclusion is not a subjective refusal to participate, but 
a reflection of the class aspect of these agencies which limits the type 
of people whose involvement can be accommodated.
It should not be assumed that the political emergence of MODEF leaders 
into elected office is entirely to MODEF's advantage. On the positive 
side, these office holders are able to facilitate MODEF's work. For 
example, a MODEF leader who also chairs the Agricultural Committee of 
the Conseil Général can ensure that the MODEF Federation receives a 
grant. Furthermore, their offices provide them with a platform where 
what they say is taken more seriously precisely because they have been
legitimized by election. On the negative side, there is the problem of 
overt politicization, and explicit identification with the parties of 
the Left which has already been discussed. Perhaps more importantly, 
such political successes create a manpower problem for MODEF. If it is 
possible to be a mayor of a small rural commune, or even conseiller 
général, and to remain active in MODEF, this becomes virtually 
impossible for someone elected in even small towns such as Bollène 
(10,000 inhabitants) or Noves (6,000). The mayors of these towns found 
themselves to be so occupied by these posts that they had to abandon 
their MODEF positions. The danger that its most prominent leaders will 
be hi-jacked by the parties is a real one.(113) Given the relative 
priority accorded to the parties, all MODEF can really hope for is that 
such people will have prepared their successors before they move on to 
higher things. There have been signs that this problem is beginning to 
be seen as such with MODEF leaders restraining any political ambitions 
they might have. For example, one of MODEF's leaders in the Vaucluse 
withdrew from the united Left slate between the two ballots of the 1977 
municipal elections of Apt in order to avoid becoming deputy mayor.(114)
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7. CONCLUSION
Given the evidence, it is impossible to equate MODEF with the 
agricultural wing of the PCF. A satellite organization which cannot 
openly support its alleged parent body is not much of a satellite. On 
the other hand, given the presence of so many PCF activists in MODEF, 
particularly amongst its leaders, it would be surprising if MODEF’s 
operations did not resemble those of the PCF. Apart from the 
ideological similarities which have already been discussed, there are 
two major convergences with the PCF. The first is the emphasis on a 
defensive strategy, to defend what has been rather than to create what 
might be.(115) The other is the clientelistic nature of MODEF's own 
behaviour, and the way in which the PCF deal with their electorate as 
individuals :(116)
L'élu joue un grand rôle pour soulager la peine, la misère 
notamment des plus humbles. Il est exaltant d'aider les pauvres, 
les diminués, ceux qui ont le plus besoin de nous, ceux qui mettent 
en nous tout leur confiance
Written by a former worker, and Politbureau member, this sentiment has 
been expressed innumerable times by MODEF leaders.(117)
It is interesting to contrast MODEF with another organization widely 
regarded as a PCF satellite - the CGT. Both have normally insisted upon 
political change as the only way in which the long-term interests of 
their supporters can be safeguarded.(118) This, of course, involves 
accepting the ultimate leadership of a political party - the PCF. Both 
avoid treading on the party's toes by refusing to take initiatives for
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which the PCF feels it ought to be responsible. Thus policy proposals 
are not accompanied by costing, neither are they placed in order of 
priority. Where they cannot or do not wish to openly align themselves 
with the PCF, they are careful not to adopt positions which would 
contradict those of the party.(119)
It is here that the similarities stop. Despite the populist rhetoric of 
the Union of the Left or the "Union du peuple de France", the industrial 
working class is the predominant force within the PCF. Unlike those of 
the CGT, MODEF leaders are not also national leaders of the PCF. The 
relative lack of interest in MODEF displayed by the party, and the 
consequent exclusion of MODEF leaders, permits MODEF a greater autonomy. 
It should, of course, be remembered that this autonomy is also due to 
the fact that MODEF supporters demand such freedom from political 
constraints. The fact that this autonomy is genuine is best demonstrated 
by the contrast between the behaviour of the leaders of the CGT and 
MODEF during the 1977-1981 state of open warfare between the parties of 
the Left. The infrequent and veiled attacks made by MODEF leaders on 
the PS paled into insignificance when compared to the shock tactics of 
Georges Seguy and Henri Krasucki. The total anti-PS commitment of the 
CGT leadership throws a great deal of light on the relative independence 
of MODEF, and on the differing role which the two organizations play 
within the politics of the Left. The main political role of the CGT is 
one of electoral mobilization on behalf of the PCF. MODEF has a much 
less important but much more elitist role - the recruitment and training 
of rural leaders for the parties of the Left.
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CHAPTER 8 RESISTANCE TO CORPORATISM: MODEF AND THE STATE
1. INTRODUCTION
The last chapter revealed that MODEF is deeply involved in certain parts 
of the political process. Generalizations about MODEF activists as 
political alienates have been shown to be untenable. The evidence above 
suggests that efforts to explain agricultural protest as a protest 
against the state itself must be abandoned in favour of the approach of 
certain historians and political scientists who emphasize the high level 
of political participation amongst farmers.(1)
Given this starting point, this chapter will be concerned with the 
detailed examination of the response of the state and its constituent 
parts to MODEF and MODEF's attitude to the various parts of the state 
apparatus. On the first point, the non-neutrality of the state, and in 
particular of the components of the state and their relative strengths, 
will be demonstrated. On the latter, it will become evident that MODEF 
does not have a global Poujadist-style hostility to the state in all its 
manifestations but that its attitude depends on its appreciation of the 
class content of particular arms of the state.
The final section will be concerned with the theoretical implications of 
the example of MODEF and the French state for the analysis of pressure 
groups in general. It is of particular interest in answering the 
question of why corporatist institutions have had such little success in 
France.
2. THE STATE VERSUS MODEF
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The official attitude to MODEF crystallized after the Presidential 
election of 1965. Though no love was lost between MODEF and the 
Gaullist government, Edgard Pisani remained the only Minister of 
Agriculture to meet MODEF (voluntarily) until the accession to office of 
Edith Cresson in May 1981. This unusual attempt at conciliation by 
Pisani can be explained as at result of his awareness that the 1964 
Chamber of Agriculture elections had demonstrated that MODEF's audience 
was wider them that of the PCF emd it had indeed made substantial 
inroads in right-wing strongholds such as the Vendee. Of particular 
importance was the position of the FNSEA. In more or less open 
opposition to Pisani, its protests against the violation of its monopoly 
went unheeded. Pisani had no more goodwill left to lose. (2)
However, this brief interlude of liberalism soon gave way to a more 
rigidly hostile approach. For some fifteen years each successive 
Minister of Agriculture denounced MODEF as a PCF front and denied, 
despite all the evidence to the contrary, its representativity. MODEF 
was to be surrounded by a cordon sanitaire in order to prevent the 
spectre of communism from spreading throughout the countryside.
Three typical examples of the official attitude from the three 
tendencies of the right follow. In 1969, the centrist Jacques Duhamel 
denied a MODEF request for a meeting. "Je ne puis aujourd'hui étendre 
mes consultations à d'autres organisations dont le caractère 
représentatif au plan national et strictement professionnel n'est pas 
démontré".(3) Three years later, Jacques Chirac characteristically 
launched a particularly virulent attack on MODEF:
Il s'agit là d'une cuistrerie qui dépasse toutes les bornes. Il
est scandaleux qu'une organisation qui se réclame d'une philosophie
collectiviste, prétende défendre autrement que par esprit tactique, 
l'exploitation familiale.(4)
Finally, the Giscardian Christian Bonnet stated firmly in 1975:
dans le domaine des organisations professionnelles agricoles comme 
dans celles des syndicats ouvriers, la réprésentativité ne se 
décerne pas: elle se constate. Il existe des organismes tenus 
réprésentatifs sur le plan national, d'autres qui ne le sont pas. 
Tel était hier, tel demeure aujourd'hui le cas du MODEF.(5)
The attitude of these guardians of the Fifth Republic is a perfect 
example of the old proverb - "None so blind as he that will not see".
In election after election, MODEF has demonstrated its ability to secure 
a significant proportion of the vote in professional elections, despite 
the great imbalance in the means available to MODEF and those of the 
FNSEA. As MODEF loses no opportunity to point out, it secures a greater 
proportion of the vote than does either Force Ouvrière (FO) or the 
Confederation Française du Travail Chrétienne (CFTC) in industrial 
elections.(6) This double standard suggests that the non-recognition of 
MODEF was basically a political decision rather than one based on any 
objective legal or administrative criteria. The reasons behind this 
policy are of three types; differences of political culture, partisan 
electoral concerns, and the corporatist alliance between the governments 
of the Right and the FNSEA.
MODEF operates in a different sub-culture from the Ministers and 
administrators with which it is confronted. MODEF is an integral part 
of the "representative" sub-culture, a sub-culture relegated to the 
background by the dominant "technocratic" ethos of the Fifth Republic.
MODEF's values are almost diametrically opposed to those of officialdom. 
On the one hand, MODEF is committed to the idea of mass participation in 
political life. On the other, the state is staffed by people who 
believe that their expertise makes them the best qualified to make 
political decisions. Grémion has pointed out how civil servants have 
come to believe that they are the only people able to make rational 
decisions.(7) In fact this technocratic attitude extends from activists 
to cover elected representatives. According to Chevallier, the Ecole 
National d'Administration (ENA) has played a major role in bringing top 
civil servants around to the view that:
la décision... est une véritable science qui ne peut plus être 
abandonné au caprice et à l'arbitraire des élus, qui n'ont ni la 
hauteur de vues, ni la liberté de jugement, ni la compétence 
indispensables pour se prononcer en connaissance de cause.(8)
A similar dichotomy exists between MODEF's emphasis on the need for 
accountable leaders and the technocratic concern with efficiency.
Instead of slow decision-making processes allowing for consultation and 
negotiation, private sector management techniques have been widely 
adopted by the Fifth Republic administration.(9) According to 
Peyrefitte, this has been legitimized by the argument that "il ne 
convient pas de compromettre l'autorité de l'Etat dans des discussions 
d'où elle ne peut sortir qu'affaiblie". (10)
Thirdly, there is a gulf between MODEF's emphasis on practical knowledge 
of concrete situations and the state's concern with formal education and 
universally applicable rules. Crozier has pointed out the liking of 
administrative bureaucracies for formal and impersonal rules whilst 
Samuel Beer has described the difficulties which diversity of situations
creates for "technocratic centralism and its rationalist assumptions on 
universality".(11)
Finally, MODEF's ideology has been characterized by a concentration on 
social questions and the defence of existing rights. The Fifth 
Republic, on the other hand, has been mainly concerned with economic 
problems and particularly with the pursuit of economic growth. Once 
again Chevallier's article helps to throw light on official hostility to 
MODEF:
Le discours de fonctionnaire se caractérise par un schéma 
d ’opposition dichotomique, manichéenne, entre passé/avenir, 
traditionnel/moderne. Alors que le passé était auparavant porteur 
des valeurs fondamentales de la société, qu'il fallait à tout prix 
sauvegarder, il n'est plus jamais évoqué positivement: il 
n'apparait que comme un frein qu'il faut débloquer, facteur de 
retard qu'il faut neutraliser.(12)
The consequence of these cultural differences meant that any meaningful 
participation by MODEF was impossible. Leaving aside substantive 
differences over policy, participation by MODEF in decision-making was 
ruled out because of the lack of a mutually comprehensible language.
Since MODEF could not make any contribution which would make sense to 
ministers and officials, their presence was not only superfluous but 
also downright disruptive. The example of the Plan supports this point. 
Even where the political balance of forces is such that oppositional 
organizations like the CGT are invited to participate in 
decision-making, their presence is either marginal or disruptive. In 
the words of Stephen Cohen: "The trade unionists feel like interlopers 
in some club or family meeting. Their presence is cheerfully tolerated.
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But they do not participate".(13)
Similarly, since MODEF are seen as representatives of the past, they are 
regarded as an expression of the problems caused by modernization of 
agriculture rather than as an organization with the potential to assist 
in resolving these problems. In practice, as Chevallier argues, this 
leads the state to "s'engager aux côtés des groupes économiques et 
sociaux dont l'action peut contribuer à atteindre l'objectif de 
transformation et de modernisation".(14) This last point leads on to a 
consideration of the class divisions which 'underpin' the mutual 
hostility of MODEF and the state. At the more sophisticated level of 
analysis, writers such as Poulantzas and Offe have tried to analyze the 
role of the state in terms of the interests which it serves.(15) In the 
literature quoted above, it has been generally accepted that the prime 
objective of the state under the Fifth Republic has been to ensure 
economic growth within a capitalist framework. But in pursuing economic 
growth, the interests of each class differ from others. Whilst the 
promoters of growth may gain, those who have to do the growing may not 
be quite so enthusiastic since they may gain little or even find their 
existence undermined - as in the case of many farmers. Obviously such 
divergent interests militate against negotiation and compromise.
But the factor which closed and bolted the door against any 
accommodation with MODEF was the secondary conflict between MODEF and 
the individuals who staff the state. Though the instrumentalist 
approach of writers such as Miliband and Birnbaum has been much 
maligned, particularly and paradoxically by those who stress the 
"relative autonomy of the political", it is of value in explaining the 
case of MODEF.(16) The differences in class interests have been 
accentuated by the ideological gap arising from the confrontation of a
highly-educated,self-perpetuating, Parisian elite of politicians and 
administrators and a less educated group of part-time provincial 
activists.
Technocratic Jacobinism and provincial populism have never been able to 
achieve a compromise. The false clarity of the ideology held by 
officialdom and MODEF led them to stress the differences and neglect the 
possible areas of compromise. For the former, compromise involved 
setting a dubious precedent, for the latter, compromise meant betrayal. 
Each over-estimated the other's strength. For the state one compromise 
meant a capitulation, for MODEF the state was too strong for it to be 
obliged to compromise on any essential issues. As an example of the 
uselessness of the structural-functionalist approach, French politics is 
particularly illuminating. The aspects of its political culture which 
have been most heavily emphasized have been those which encourage class 
conflict, by stressing differences and grand designs rather than the 
day-to-day political give-and-take which was the dominant religion in 
other advanced democracies during most of the post-war period.
MODEF's close association with the Left in general, and the PCF in 
particular, ensured that the policy of government and administration 
towards MODEF would be formulated with partisan considerations in mind. 
The belief that MODEF was merely the PCF under a less disreputable guise 
was convenient for Ministers and officials. The strategy of 
ghettoization of the PCF was extended to include its satellite 
organizations, of which MODEF was deemed to be one. This ghettoization 
policy was essential for right-wing hegemony by helping to prevent an 
effective political challenge from the Left. In refusing to recognize 
the legitimacy of the PCF, as an actor in the political system, whilst 
at the same time permitting the non-communist Left to act as a dynastic
opposition, the Right was able to drive a wedge between the communist 
and non-communist Left, a wedge deeper than their political differences 
alone could have created. It has already been seen in Chapter 6 how 
socialists and other potential dissidents in the FNSEA were encouraged 
to isolate themselves from the PCF.
With the growth of the Union of the Left in the 1970s, official 
intransigence towards MODEF was confirmed. To legitimize MODEF by 
recognition was to begin to recognize the legitimacy of the Union of the 
Left an an alternative government, and the Common Programme as an 
alternative political and economic strategy - a step which most of the 
Right assiduously avoided even after the 1981 elections. In effect, 
MODEF was a (not entirely unwilling) pawn in the conflict between the 
apparently eternal right-wing majority and the Left addicted to 
opposition. In this way, the identification of MODEF with the PCF 
became something of a self-fulfilling prediction whilst MODEF ensured 
that its accusations about government unresponsiveness were justified.
Finally, if the resolve of Ministers weakened, the FNSEA was there to 
encourage them. Any backsliding on the part of governments on the 
question of the FNSEA monopoly was greeted by howls of outrage from the 
leadership of the FNSEA. In Chapter 6, the importance of the monopoly 
of representation as a mechanism of control has been described. Even 
after the defeat of the right-wing allies of the FNSEA leadership in 
1981, it attempted to blackmail the government into maintaining this 
monopoly. In June 1981, Francois Guillaume threatened not to attend the 
Annual Agricultural Conference if MODEF was invited.(17) This 
particular threat was not carried out but the new-found militancy of the 
FNSEA was partly inspired by the leadership's need to prove to the 
Mauroy government that it was the real force in agricultural
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politics.(18)
The official boycott of MODEF was faithfully reflected by television and 
radio. Their policy was to ignore MODEF rather than attack it, since to 
attack MODEF would be to give it publicity which it could not gain by 
its own means. Implicitly, the heads of radio and television accepted 
the existence of widespread contempt for their institutions. To attack 
an organization such as MODEF was to risk giving it greater credibility 
and legitimacy. This attitude involved ORTF and its successors in some 
ridiculous incidents. In 1969, Alfred Nègre made a brief appearance on 
television to denounce the Mansholt Plan. The consequent attacks on the 
ORTF from the FNSEA and right-wing politicians, with Interior Minister 
Raymond Marcellin at their head, meant that the ORTF took a more prudent 
line in future. When the Boulin Plan was published later that year the 
ORTF was forced to look for an opponent in order to give its coverage 
credibility. Obliged to ignore MODEF, they decided to kill two birds 
with one stone. By inviting Jean Doumeng, the ORTF found an opponent 
and at the saune time maunaged to identify MODEF with the PCF in general 
and its leading capitalist in particular.(19) By using such a strategy, 
MODEF were kept off the screens for over a decade. Alfred Nègre's 
appearaunce on television was not repeated until June 1981. As one MODEF 
official put it: "J'avais l'impression de militer dans une organisation 
clandestine".(20)
This censorship was somewhat mitigated by the creation of FR 3 and its 
regional stations. In general, agricultural news has been left to the 
regional news services. Since these programmes are aimed at local 
audiences with some knowledge of the issues and personalities involved, 
they are obliged to be more responsive in order to maintain credibility. 
Therefore with sufficient insistence and perseverance, MODEF leaders
were usually cible to appear on regional programmes in those regions 
where MODEF was most organized. As Mineau put it: "Si j'écris quatre 
pages d'insultes au directeur, je peux passer à FR 3 
Poitou-Charentes".(21)
Once again the situation changed after May 1981. MODEF leaders were 
approached to appear in news programmes. However, dissatisfaction 
remained. On the one hand, the leadership criticized Federations who 
did not make the most of the opportunities available to them. On the 
other, certain regional stations were criticized by some MODEF leaders. 
Indeed Emilien Soulié argued at the 1982 Congress that recalcitrant 
stations should be occupied in protest at the failure to provide 
balanced coverage. The case of television is instructive for the way in 
which it exposes a gap between official hostility and boycott at the 
national level, and the reluctant contacts at the regional and 
departmental level. Despite the attitudes of successive Ministers and 
Parisian technocrats, in some departments MODEF is too strong to be 
permanently ignored. The Direction Départementale de l'Agriculture 
(DDA) official who argued that "Le MODEF n'est pas réconnu, donc il 
n'existe pas" was demonstrating an excessive loyalty to his 
superiors.(22) In fact there was a distinction between the political 
and technical administrators. Prefecture officials were much more wary 
of making such provocative statements. In the majority of departments 
MODEF was received by the prefect at one time or another. Though MODEF 
Federations had no systematic right of access to the prefect or his 
assistants, they were usually able to secure a meeting to discuss 
particular urgent issues, by organizing a small demonstration outside 
the Prefecture if necessary.(23)
The reason why prefects violated national policy was not due to the
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caprices of these representatives of the state but lay in their 
overriding duty to preserve public order and to secure the re-election 
of their masters. By agreeing to meetings with MODEF, prefects acted to 
defuse tensions and to appear to be doing something about the 
grievances. Secondly, where prefects realized that the supporters of 
MODEF were not simply the electorate of the PCF, they acted in order to 
avoid driving these supporters into the arms of the PCF. This would 
explain why prefects in departments such as the Ile-et-Vilaine, 
Indre-et-Loire, Cantal and Lot, not noted for rural radicalism, met 
MODEF leaders.(24)
The presence of MODEF leaders in the political and agricultural life of 
the department accounted for the necessity of such meetings and also 
provided the pretext. Rather than violate the letter of national 
instructions, create an embarrassing precedent and alienate the FNSEA, 
prefects were able to find ingenious legal fictions to justify meetings 
with MODEF. For example, the prefect of the Charente pretended to 
receive M. Raymond Mineau, member of the Chamber of Agriculture, rather 
than the general secretary of MODEF. Similarly, the prefect of the 
Vaucluse had no problems in welcoming the mayor-conseiller général of 
Beaumes-de-Venise and chairman of the Agriculture committee of the 
Conseil Général.
If there was de facto recognition of MODEF by the political 
administration, the absence of de jure recognition allowed the technical 
administration, the Direction Departmentale de l'Agriculture (DDA), to 
more or less ignore MODEF. Not so concerned with public order as much 
as with orderly decision-making in conjunction with the FDSEA, the 
Chamber of Agriculture, the CDJA, etc., the DDA had no interest in 
letting MODEF participate in the decision-making process. Concerned more
with the modernization of agriculture than with preserving electoral 
majorities, MODEF was merely a troublemaker with nothing to offer from 
the point of view of the DDA. MODEF was therefore excluded from the 
various committees in which the FDSEA was represented.
This represented a substantial obstacle to MODEF's effectiveness. As 
FNSEA officials are fond of pointing out, the way in which a law or 
Ministerial decree is implemented in each department is often more 
important than the law or decree itself. It is precisely in these 
committees from which MODEF was excluded that the method of 
implementation was decided. This meant that MODEF was always forced to 
react to decisions after they were taken, rather than take the 
initiative in proposing what sort of decisions ought to be made. The 
demonstrations outside prefectures were therefore an admission of 
weakness rather than signs of strength.
This exclusion was self-perpetuating for precisely the same reasons that 
MODEF experienced difficulty in dealing with civil servants at the 
national level. Being outsiders, and believing that under the 
governments of the Right they would remain on the outside, MODEF 
naturally concentrated on breaking down the walls rather than opening 
the door. This involved a rejection of the type of incrementalist 
bargaining pursued in these committees, which in turn meant the 
continued exclusion of MODEF as a pre-requisite of their functioning.
That the style of politics as well as the substance of policies was in 
question has been demonstrated by MODEF's position under a PS 
government. Even with a government more sympathetic to MODEF's aims, 
MODEF found it difficult to change its style from one of more or less 
political agitation to one of industrial negotiation. MODEF discovered
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that it had far too few activists trained to master technical dossiers 
and with expertise in bureaucratic infighting. Up until 1981, the 
emphasis was, of course, on the skills of agitation and leadership and 
on the ability to successfully lead one’s fellow fanners into protest 
activities.
The one outstanding example of an institution where MODEF was allowed 
to participate is the BNIC. Two MODEF officials, the vice-president of 
the Charente Federation and the president of the Charente-Maritime 
Federation, were appointed to the BNIC by the government. Members of 
the BNIC are not nominated by their organization, nor are they 
considered to be representatives of their organization by the state or 
their organization. They are chosen for their individual expertise to 
represent certain categories represented in the BNIC, e.g. farmers, 
merchants, etc. As one would expect, the MODEF nominations were 
contested by the FDSEAs concerned but to no avail.(25)
What is the explanation for this breach of the FNSEA monopoly? MODEF 
itself claimed that its men were appointed simply because of the balance 
of forces in the Cognac area. Since there was not even a semblance of 
democratic legitimacy surrounding the BNIC, the only way to secure such 
legitimacy for its decisions was to make sure that all the farm unions 
were represented. If the large number of MODEF supporters in the region 
regarded the decisions of the BNIC as illegitimate and refused to be 
bound by the discipline imposed by the BNIC, the result would be chaos. 
Yet the same argument could have been applied in many other cases where 
the FNSEA monopoly of representation remained intact.
A more plausible explanation is that the presence of MODEF leaders in 
the BNIC was a kind of Machiavellian experiment with two objectives.
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Firstly, by involving MODEF leaders in decision-making either the 
organization would have to play a more "responsible" role which would 
force it to police its own supporters or repudiate its members in the 
BNIC. Secondly, if such a crisis within MODEF were to be created, the 
possibility of detaching the non-communists from the PCF members of 
MODEF might occur. In this light, the fact that, of the two MODEF 
appointees, one was a leader of the Charente MRG Federation and the 
other was not identified with any political party seems to be more than 
a coincidence.
Unfortunately for the government, this strategy was not particularly 
successful. In the first place, the MODEF appointees were the wrong men 
on whom to base a split since both had a deep ideological and personal 
commitment to MODEF. In this respect, these two leaders faithfully 
reflected the nature of the links between MODEF leaders of different 
political allegiances. Secondly, the organizational structure of MODEF 
is sufficiently flexible (or put another way, so weak) that a difference 
of opinion between the representatives and the rest of the organization 
could be easily blurred. Thirdly, the fact that MODEF had only two 
seats, and virtually no allies, meant that the MODEF representatives 
were free to be as "irresponsible" as they wished in most cases, since 
they could be certain of being outvoted in any case. Finally, in recent 
years the offensive of certain Cognac merchants such as Remy Martin, and 
the larger growers of the top quality brand Champagne zone around the 
canton of Segonzac, against BNIC regulation of the market meant that 
MODEF's role was limited to a purely defensive one. Most of the efforts 
of its representatives were devoted to defending the quota system and 
price levels whilst attempting to ensure that Cognac merchants abide by 
BNIC decisions - all issues on which MODEF activists were unlikely to 
quarrel amongst themselves.
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Governments have not always been so subtle in dealing with MODEF. 
Repression is too strong a word to use for two reasons. On the one 
hand, repression was precluded by the policy of ignoring MODEF - since 
repression itself involved de facto recognition. On the other hand,
MODEF, through ideology and financial necessity, took care to avoid 
placing themselves in situations where injuries, jailings and fines were 
likely to result. For example, despite ferocious and offensive 
criticisms of governments and the FNSEA, L'Exploitant Familial has never 
been sued for libel.
There was, nevertheless, what one could call administrative harassment.
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the petty nature of such 
harassment. In 1967, when MODEF had finally purchased its national 
headquarters in Angoulême, one of the first letters which the new owners 
received was an official order stating that the building was unsafe and 
unfit for human habitation. In order to avoid demolition, MODEF had to 
find a relatively large sum (in MODEF terms) of money within a matter of 
weeks in order to restore the building.(26) Similarly, when the 
Côtes-du-Nord Federation was formed, the Prefecture refused to accept 
its registration, claiming that they had to register at the town hall of 
every commune in which a branch had been set up.(27)
More serious was the use of the judiciary. Two cases are worth 
attention. The first was a classic of Peyrefettian judicial farce. In 
1979, the President of the FNJ of the Charente-Maritime was charged 
under a Vichyite law with "defacing the countryside". The alleged 
offence was putting up posters on trees announcing a MODEF fete, a 
standard practice for many organizations in rural France. The threat 
degenerated into farce when it was discovered that the "law" had been
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repealed before the alleged offence had been committed.(28)
The most serious attack on MODEF came in November 1978 when Raymond 
Mineau and Jean Leonard, the president of the Charente Federation, were 
charged with "violation du lieu public et de violence a l'egard du 
fonctionnaire charge de service public". The peculiarity of this charge 
was that it was made two years after the event - a demonstration and 
occupation of the Angouleme tax office. The energies of MODEF were 
diverted from the battle raging at the time with the BNIC over 
production quotas and uprooting of vineyards to the defence of its 
leaders facing serious criminal charges.(29) According to Raymond 
Mineau, however, this was not a deliberate political decision to divert 
MODEF from primary issues but a result of the appointment of a new 
prefect. New to the department, he was misled by senior civil servants, 
seeking revenge on MODEF for years of insults and harassment, into 
under-estimating the strength of MODEF in the department and its ability 
to mobilize support for its leaders. He was therefore persuaded to 
instigate the charges against Mineau and Leonard. After several 
hearings and postponements, matched by demonstrations showing the 
strength of feeling of MODEF supporters, the Angouleme Two escaped with 
moderate fines and suspended sentences.(30)
3. MODEF’S VIEW OF THE STATE
In Chapter 4 it was explained why MODEF places so much emphasis on the 
state as the major target of its activity. Here we are concerned with 
MODEF's attitude to particular parts of the state such as the executive, 
the legislature and the administration. Although there has been a great 
deal of debate and analysis on the class nature of the state, there has
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been surprisingly little on the class relations of particular parts of 
the state. Explicit statements have usually been couched in general 
terms such as Poulantzas' view: "the power concentrated in an 
institution is class power".(31) The nature of each part of the state 
depends on the balance of forces between classes. On the other hand, 
more concrete studies tend to ignore the problem or state it only in 
implicit terms.
Pisani has given a rare example of an explicit non-Marxist view of the 
class nature of state apparatuses. He makes clear the link between the 
problems of agricultural modernization, rationalization of local 
government and the reform of the administration. ( 32) Other writers have 
suggested implicitly the connection between the farm , the structure of 
the state and local power relations. For example, Medard points to the 
key role of rural mayors as mediators between citizens and 
administrators. The political position of the mayors rests on the 
dependence into which administrative impersonality and complexity throws 
his constituents.(33) Similarly, Chevallier has shown how the 
technocratization of the civil service has led to a transfer of power 
from elected representatives to the representatives of big business.(34)
Two exemples specific to agriculture are worthy of attention. The first 
is the case of the Finistère and the Landerneau co-operative whose 
existence and internal organization was designed to maintain peasant 
passivity. Once wider participation was tolerated in the 1950s, the 
strategy of control broke down.(35) From the perspective of the 
individual farmer, the non-neutrality of individual components of the 
state is revealed by the refusal of pied noir capitalist farmers to take 
up positions in local government offered to them.(36)
In fact there is a great deal of evidence to suggest that agricultural 
organizations and farmers have been aware precisely of what has been at 
stake in the various constitutional reforms of the Fifth Republic. Any 
changes of state structure are likely to change the way in which 
decisions are made and therefore affect the outcome of decisions.
Tavernier has pointed out the CNJA's isolation in approving the early 
Fifth Republic: "Seul un regime autoritaire pourra briser les 
résistances, annihiler les réactions des féodalités économiques et 
promouvoir une organisation rationnelle du monde agricole".(37) For the 
same reason the CNJA was the only agricultural organization to support 
the idea of strong regional authorities "capables de battre en brèche 
les vieilles relations de clientèle départementales".(38) Obviously, 
"l'attachement profond des élites locales au cadre départemental" shared 
by the other agricultural organizations was based precisely on the 
desire to maintain these clientelistic networks.(39) Finally, the 
hostility towards Pisani's efforts to transform the Ministry of 
Agriculture from "le Ministère de l'Intérieur des ruraux" into a 
modernizing force by administrative reform can be explained by the same 
reasons.(40)
This attachment to traditional forms of the state is prevalent in MODEF.
Many MODEF leaders reveal themselves in conversation to suffer from 
nostalgia for the Parliamentary regime of the Fourth Republic. There 
are two obvious material reasons underpinning such nostalgia. On the 
one hand, until 1981 the Fifth Republic was identified with the Right.
On the other, the influence of agriculture in the running of the country 
has been much reduced since 1958. But beyond such direct reasons, there 
is also the deep distaste of many militants on the Left for the very 
idea of a Presidential regime. Since one-man rule has been a 
prerogative of the Right since the days of Napoleon, the extensive
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powers of the President offend all their egalitarian and democratic 
predilections.
Of course, as the new regime established itself and became more and more 
secure, MODEF was obliged to take account of the fact that the 
institutions of the Fifth Republic, if not the occupants of its offices, 
had won widespread acceptance even in the electorate of the Left. They 
were therefore obliged to come to terms with the domination of executive 
and administration in the political system. Once the gap between the 
preferred and the real had been recognized, MODEF was led to adopt an 
increasingly opportunist strategy, particularly after 1967.
Until 1964, MODEF's strategy was based on direct action such as road 
blocks and demonstrations outside prefectures. This was seen as the 
only way in which to influence a government which refused to take into 
account the demands of MODEF and its supporters. As Alfred Negre put 
it: "Car dans ce pays privé de Parlement... il ne reste à tous ceux qui 
souffrent du mépris dans laquelle une oligarchie financière les tient, 
qu'à se faire respectés par une action directe".(41)
This strategy depended on a sometimes exaggerated emphasis on the 
uselessness of Parliament under the Fifth Republic. For instance, when, 
in July 1961, MODEF organized a series of demonstrations outside the 
prefectures, this was justified in the following terms: "Il ne peut être 
question maintenant d'orienter les manifestations en direction des 
députés auxquelles l'actuelle Constitution a enlevé pratiquement tous 
les pouvoirs".(42) The message was frequently repeated:
Nous n'avons plus d'autre solution efficace que de nous en prendre
directement à ceux qui détiennent le pouvoir, car avec le régime
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actuel, nous ne pouvons plus envisager de mettre le gouvernement à 
la raison par l'intermédiaire des parlementaires, ceux-çi étant 
réduits au rôle de figurants.(43)
Indeed so strong was this feeling that Parliament was merely a rubber 
stamp that it sometimes seemed that MODEF had no hope of seeing its 
efforts succeed as long as the Fifth Republic continued in existence. 
Alfred Nègre was quoted as saying: "Mais le jour où ce développement 
harmonieux de notre économie se fera dans le respect de tous, soyez bien 
persuadés, Messieurs, que le soleil ne se lèvera pas dans ce pays sur un 
régime présidentiel".(44)
Given this analysis, no opportunity was lost to denounce the 
presidential characteristics of the Fifth Republic and the extension of 
the powers of the President. MODEF therefore felt justified in 
intervening on such political questions as the referendum on the 
election of the President by universal suffrage. The defence of 
agriculture and the family farm justified a call to : "réfuser 
l'aggravation du pouvoir personnel et de lutter pour l'institution d'un 
régime démocratique où le pouvoir appartiendra aux élus du peuple".(45)
Precisely because this appeal fell on deaf ears, and the proposed reform 
was adopted by an overwhelming majority, MODEF began to revise its view. 
A  more nuanced attitude to the regime was necessary. The first sign of 
change dates from July 1962 when MODEF demanded that deputies vote 
against the Pisani Loi complementaire - an admission that the deputies 
had at least the theoretical powers to do so.(46) But nothing much came 
of this. It was only in November 1964 that MODEF first organized a 
campaign directed towards Parliament. MODEF mobilized its supporters to 
pressurize deputies about to decide on a censure motion against the
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government. Though the censure failed, the government's normal majority 
was significantly reduced after deputies faced demonstrations organized 
by the FNSEA and MODEF. In many cases, deputies had to flee into the 
arms of the police to seek protection from their irate constituents.(47) 
The conclusion that MODEF drew from this episode is that, though the 
regime represented a menace to the family farm. Parliament could be used 
as a weak link in its armour in order to delay or prevent implementation 
of legislation considered dangerous.
The main reason for this change of strategy was the Gaullist victory in 
the 1962 referendum and elections. It became clear that de Gaulle had 
made the transition from crisis to stable politics without undermining 
his own position. For MODEF to adopt a strategy of confrontation 
against this very popular regime would be unproductive. A more long 
term and more complex strategy had to be elaborated. MODEF itself had 
to make the transition from crisis to stability.
Closely related was the realization that permanent mobilization of 
farmers was impossible. Although farmers took longer to lapse into 
quiescence than any other social group after the Algerian War, the high 
levels of political mobilization of the 1958-1962 period could not be 
sustained indefinitely. As the "heroic" period of the Fifth Republic 
ended and the country settled down into the boredom described in a 
famous Le Monde article, new forms of action had to be found.(48) The 
war of manouevre, involving large-scale militant protests mobilizing 
thousands of farmers prepared to clash with the CRS, gave way to a war 
of position.
For once, necessity coincided with opportunity. Once the crisis period 
was over, it became clear to what extent the Fifth Republic had
revolutionized the political system and to what extent change was 
superficial. As the darkness cleared, the spectres inspired by Gaullism 
disappeared. On the one hand, it was by now evident that the 
apocalyptic accusations of Gaullist dictatorship or fascism were much 
exaggerated. De Gaulle's denial of dictatorial designs in his 
investiture speech as last prime minister of the Fourth Republic had 
been confirmed. Though the Constitution and his own dominance over his 
supporters gave him the power to act in a highly authoritarian manner, 
the fact remained that the dominance of the executive depended not only 
on its political and institutional advantages, but also on the voluntary 
subordination of the Parliamentary majority. Indeed, if Parliament had 
less influence on the composition and policies of the government, 
universal suffrage was more important than ever. Gaullist governments 
were far more dependent on securing a popular mandate than the average 
Third or Fourth Republic government.
Deputies therefore still had a legitimate role in the political system. 
In the provinces, the new deputies of 1958 who wished to retain their 
seats had to become involved in the local political networks. Indeed 
given their limited power at the national level, their involvement in 
local politics became even more important. ( 49) At the same time, the 
increased strength of the Left in Parliament after 1962, and, even more 
so, after 1967, gave MODEF greater possibilities of securing a hearing. 
Not only did more socialist and PCF deputies imply a more receptive 
audience for MODEF but right-wing deputies also had to take more notice 
of their constituents. This appreciation of the situation was made 
quite explicit by MODEF. Mineau wrote: "dans les batailles importantes 
il est maint député inconditionnel ou rallié, qui pensera avec angoisse 
à ses frères d'armes victimes de l'hécatombe du 12 mars 1967 et qui aura 
tendance à 'se planquer'".(50) Therefore there was reason "pour estimer
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que les travaux de la nouvelle Assemblée auront plus d'importance que 
ceux de la précédente et que notre action pourra y obtenir des échos 
favorables".(51)
This showed clearly the links between MODEF's strategy as a pressure 
group and the underlying political motivations of its leaders. On the 
one hand, Parliament was identified as the weak point through which the 
government quarantine of MODEF could be circumvented. Individual 
deputies were more vulnerable than the government as a whole. But it 
was precisely the presence of the Left in Parliament which made it an 
attractive target. Through meetings with Parliamentary groups of all 
shades, some legitimacy would be given to MODEF. But to the extent that 
MODEF created its own legitimacy in the countryside, this would rub off 
on deputies seen to be favourable to MODEF, i.e. those of the PCF and 
the FGDS. The parties of the Left stood to gain more from this mutual 
recognition.
Since 1967, MODEF's strategy has been based on the return to a political 
system founded on the Trinity of minister, prefect and deputy.
Obviously, the balance of power and the nature of the relationship 
between each part of the state has changed, but MODEF has not analyzed 
exactly what the changes have been. Its strategy has been essentially 
opportunist.
Frederic Lindenstaedt described the position of MODEF towards Parliament 
in the following terms:
C'est vrai que les députés ont peu de pouvoir. Mais çela ne doit 
pas nous empêcher d'avoir une activité en leur direction. Mais ce 
qu'on veut surtout dire, c'est qu'il ne faut pas en attendre des
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miracles... Il ne faut pas se faire des illusions mais il faut 
profiter de cette possibilité qui existe d'influencer sur et de 
discuter avec les parlementaires.(52)
Nevertheless, despite such lack of confidence in the capacity of 
Parliament to bring about any changes, MODEF has often posed as the 
defender and admirer of Parliament. In April 1967, MODEF called on 
deputies to stand up for their rights and refuse to grant the Pompidou 
government emergency powers to legislate by decree.(53) Similarly, it 
opposed the plain to reform the Senate in 1969 and to reduce the 
influence of elected representatives in the political system. (54)
Such a policy was dictated by political tactics rather than by 
principles. Such appeals were designed primarily to embarrass the 
deputies of the right. Raymond Mineau revealed the real motives in 1972 
when he suggested that deputies were hiding behind the constitutional 
restraints on their powers to support the government, whilst pretending 
to their constituents that they opposed the most objectionable aspects 
of agricultural policy. For this reason, deputies had to be encouraged 
or pressurized to use their limited powers to the full or face the 
electoral consequences:
Si ce réfus de réduire la TVA est maintenu par le Sénat et si alors 
la majorité des députés ne change pas d'attitude, nous n'aurons... 
d'autre moyen d'obtenir l'augmentation des prix agricoles qui nous 
est indispensable que le balayage impitoyable, lors des prochaines 
elections legislatives, de la majorité des députés qui ont pris 
cette responsabi1i té...(56)
Rather than formulate a theory of where and how to apply pressure to the
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state in order to win concessions, MODEF concentrated on mobilizing its 
members to educate them politically by example. Given its pessimistic 
evaluation of the possibility of influencing the policies of right-wing 
governments, it was more important to make farmers recognize the 
intransigence of the Right. But at the same time, the requirements of 
MODEF as an organization meant that it had to have some recognizable 
achievements to its credit in order to maintain its audience. Faced 
with these almost contradictory pressures, MODEF depended on ad hoc 
inprovisation. It simply appealed to or protested against the 
institution or individual office holder seen as responsible for or 
capable of resolving a particular problem. Any opportunity was seized 
to mobilize its members against deputies, ministers and prefects.
Parliament provided the easiest target for protest at a national level 
since it had to submit itself for re-election at regular intervals. 
Indeed this importance of Parliament to MODEF as a target of protest and 
intermediary between MODEF and the executive helps to explain one of the 
major differences in strategy between MODEF and the CGT. Whereas the 
CGT (at least after 1968) took the view that excessive class struggling 
is bad for the prospects of the Left and did its best to establish 
pre-electoral truces in industrial relations, MODEF pursued the contrary 
policy. Since the CGT had permanent dealings with the government and 
administration, and had a direct opponent in the employers, the 
organization could afford to withdraw into the background temporarily 
without too much difficulty. But for MODEF, elections provided a rare 
opportunity to mobilize its members and to pressurize deputies. In July 
1972, faced with the threat of early elections, Mineau argued that:
Nous n'avons pas à être retenus par de telles considérations...
Nous poursuivrons l'action enterprise sans aménagement aucun, nous
lancerons toutes actions qui s'avéront alors nécessaires...
Pourquoi limiter notre décision à ce seul cas et ne pas généraliser 
à toutes les elections lorsque les intérêts importants des 
exploitants familiaux sont en jeu__(56)
After coming to this conclusion, MODEF considered elections to be a 
good time for pressurizing parties and deputies, since the outgoing 
government would be prepared to indulge in some bribery and make 
extravagant promises which could be used to discredit them at a future 
date.(57)
In effect, Parliament was the only national political focus for MODEF 
until 1981. MODEF's dealings with deputies and senators were on two 
levels. MODEF officials had more or less regular meetings with the 
leaders of all parliamentary groups. It was nevertheless evident that 
contacts with the groups of the Left, and of the PCF in particular, were 
more systematic and more useful in relaying MODEF concerns into 
Parliamentary debates. The contacts with the right-wing groups 
benefitted MODEF only in terms of securing greater legitimacy. Such 
meetings involved a de facto recognition by the Right that MODEF was a 
legitimate professional body rather than a PCF-dominated political 
association. Similarly, MODEF was sometimes invited to present evidence 
to Parliamentary committees, as in July 1970, when Mineau argued against 
a proposed bill designed to attract urban capital into agriculture.(58)
The other type of contact between Parliament and MODEF was less formal - 
the mass demonstration outside the Palais Bourbon. Given the sacrifices 
of time, money and energy which such national demonstrations entail, 
they were few and far between, usually timed to coincide with 
Parliamentary debates of major importance to farmers, such as the
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discussion on the entry of Greece into the EEC.
Apart from one meeting with Pisani in 1965, contact between MODEF and 
national government and administration was almost non-existent until 
1981. Despite frequent efforts to break the boycott by attempts made to 
meet successive Ministers of Agriculture, MODEF complained bitterly that 
they were never received except by the concierge. Contacts remained 
unofficial, or indeed bordered on illegality. For example, in 1978, 
Raymond Barre visited the Vaucluse. His visit was interrupted when he 
was surrounded by a group of MODEF activists and forced to discuss the 
problems of agriculture in the Vaucluse and Bouches-du-Rhône for over an 
hour before being liberated. (59) Similarly in January 1981, Pierre 
Mehaignerie, mayor of Vitré in the Ile-et-Vilaine as well as Minister of 
Agriculture, was unpleasantly surprised when his office was invaded one 
Saturday morning by a group of MODEF leaders and officials.(60) The 
most spectacular of these occasions occurred in 1977 when over 200 MODEF 
members invaded the Ministry of Agriculture itself.(61) But despite the 
importance which the question of official recognition held in the eyes 
of MODEF and the efforts which it made to achieve this goal, its 
commando-style tactics had little effect on the state, or on the 
determination of governments not to recognize MODEF. Such actions, 
however, had a much greater resonance within MODEF since they 
contributed substantially to raising the morale of the activists and 
supporters.
In the departments, the position was reversed. The executive, rather 
than the deputies, was the normal target of MODEF activity. It is one 
thing to organize a demonstration outside the Palais Bourbon, another to 
demonstrate against individual deputies. To protest against a decision 
of Parliament means a diffuse attribution of responsibility for a
particular problem. It is not necessary to make explicit precisely 
against which deputy or group of deputies one is protesting. Due to the 
paradox that, where the individual deputy is most influential (i.e. in 
the department) he has no official status in the local political system, 
the deputy does not provide am institutional focus for protest. This 
means it is impossible to separate an attack on the deputy from an 
attack on his person and party. To avoid explicit partisan 
identification, MODEF had to approach deputies in an indirect manner.
On the one hand, since relations with the deputies of the Left were 
usually fairly good, MODEF had little need or desire to pressurize 
them. But with the deputies of the Right, MODEF had a much more 
difficult relationship. The usual tactic was to appeal to them, without 
illusions, to use their influence to protect the interests of their 
farming constituents. By failing to do so, they exposed the reality of 
their collaboration with the government and discredited themselves in 
the eyes of farmers. MODEF was simply able to sit back and let the 
deputies of the Right spread MODEF "propaganda by deed".
The consequence of this political inhibition was that MODEF pressure was 
generally directed towards the prefect. As the representative of the 
government, the prefect provided a natural target for those wishing to 
protest against the policies of the government. The Prefecture as the 
physical manifestation of state power in the department was the natural 
place to protest. Finally, the fact that the prefect was as much of a 
politician as an administrator made him the perfect foil for a pressure 
group, such as MODEF, which emphasized its disagreement with the general 
political direction of government policy rather than with specific 
decisions.
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In fact, MODEF's attitude to the different institutions of the state was
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the mirror image of those institutions' attitude to MODEF. Just as the 
technical administration boycotted MODEF rigorously, MODEF ignored it, 
except for special cases when the local tax administration became a 
source of discontent.(62) As we have seen, the Prefecture had more 
contact with the MODEF Federation than did the DDA. Similarly, MODEF's 
stress on political change led the state to regard MODEF as a political 
association rather than as a professional organization. This accounts 
for the fact that the official in each department most informed about 
the activities and policies of the MODEF Federation was not the head of 
the DDA, but the local chief of the Renseignements Generaux.(63)
The perception of the state held by MODEF and the perception of MODEF 
amongst officialdom proved not only mutually reinforcing but also 
self-perpetuating. As MODEF was denied recognition as well as 
representation in the network of official committees, MODEF was left 
with little choice but to direct its efforts towards the political head 
of the local administration rather than towards his technical 
subordinates. Equally, MODEF's view of the state meant that it made 
more sense to go directly to the prefect whilst, at the same time, the 
political nature of its discourse prevented technical administrators 
from dealing with it.
As has been seen in earlier chapters, MODEF activists play an important 
role in the agricultural organizations and in political life. Yet MODEF 
failed to capitalize on this implantation to invest the network of 
official committees. It is clear that if more of its activists 
participated in these committees as representatives of other 
organizations, MODEF itself would have had much greater influence than 
that entailed by the occasional meeting with the Prefect. The FNSEA 
barricades could not have remained so firm if MODEF had made a serious
effort to undermine them. This failure can largely be explained by 
MODEF's view of the Fifth Republican state and its agricultural policy.
Since agricultural policy under the Fifth Republic was so inimical to 
the interests of the family farm, it was necessary to reverse and 
transform rather than modify these policies. Given the fact that the 
state was in the hands of autocratic technocrats who had sold their 
souls to monopoly capital, changes introduced by pressure exerted on the 
state and para-statal apparatuses could only be minor modifications.
The greater influence on decision-making one could expect from a 
strategy designed to win such positions could not compensate for the 
discredit which participation would create in the eyes of many of its 
supporters. MODEF's apocalyptic view of agricultural policy led it to 
over-estimate the strength of the executive and administration, and to 
under-estimate the resistance and resilience of farmers faced with 
policies designed to push them out of the industry. In consequence, the 
only way in which significant concession could be won was through 
protest and direct action. Or, as it was put in 1969: "L'action est 
autrement plus efficace que les démarches".(64)
The reader will have noticed that the creation of a new level of 
government and administration, the region, has not been mentioned until 
now. This gap, or delay, is a direct reflection of MODEF's attitude to 
the region. At the same time, MODEF's view on the region is indicative 
of its views of how the state ought to be organized. In the chapter on 
MODEF's internal organization, its failure to even begin organizing at 
the regional level until the late 1970s has been described. This was 
due not only to the material difficulties which the creation of regional 
structures would have involved, but also because of hostility towards 
and suspicion of the region itself.
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Basically, the regionalization decrees of 1964 and 1972 were 
unacceptable to MODEF because they represented a transfer of power from 
elected politicians to the administration. As Grémion and Worms soon 
pointed out: "l'action régionale reste essentiellement du ressort du 
seul appareil administratif".(65) However, the consultative procedures 
established by the regions gave greater influence to the modernizing 
economic elites, which helps to explain the devotion of the CNJA to the 
regional reforms and the readiness of the FNSEA to secure the advantages 
of participation.(66) On the other hand, this inspired the resistance 
of departmental political elites, of which many MODEF leaders formed 
part, whose positions were undermined. In the words of Grémion and 
Worms: "C'est dans le cadre départementale que la majorité des élites 
locales peuvent avoir accès à l'Etat, donc du même coup faire preuve 
d'efficacité auprès de leur mandants..."(67) A similar concern underlay 
the hostility of the opposition parties to the 1964 reforms which they 
saw as a way of circumventing their power in the elected state 
apparatuses.(68)
MODEF's grievances against the regions were made explicit during the 
1969 referendum campaign. Apart from MODEF's own exclusion from the new 
institutions, its criticisms of the proposed regional and Senate reforms 
confirm the above analysis. The proposals were criticized because of 
the greater prominence which they would give to the representatives of 
industry and for disturbing the rural-urban imbalance in the Senate.
This obviously implied that giving greater power to industry and the 
modernizers would be detrimental to agriculture and the interests of the 
majority of farmers. Even more revealing was the condemnation of the 
fact that representatives of economic organizations would be associated 
with political decision-making. The implication was that MODEF felt
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happier keeping such decisions in the hands of elected politicians who 
would be more susceptible to popular pressure and democratic control. (69)
Once, again, MODEF failed to make the most of the possibilities created 
by the existence of the region. The fact that the region was a level of 
government insulated from popular pressure was something of a 
self-fulfilling prediction. To ignore the region was to allow the 
region to ignore its citizens. Tarrow has identified three types of 
regionalism. The first is a set of policies for regional development 
whilst the second is an ideology justifying the right and need for the 
central government to intervene and implement such policies. The third 
is described as "an organizing framework for peripheral defence".(70) 
Obviously for MODEF the first and second types of regionalism were 
unacceptable. Since regional policy, in the eyes of MODEF, was designed 
to eliminate more and more farmers, it had to be resisted, and, by 
extension, any ideology justifying such policies had to be challenged. 
But MODEF threw out the wheat with the chaff. Regionalism as an 
ideology of defensive mobilization against central government, or the 
region as a focus for protest, never entered into MODEF's calculations - 
a neglect all the more surprising when one realizes how easily regional 
institutions inspired by central government have been hi-jacked for this 
purpose.(71)
The root cause of this failure has been implicit in this chapter - 
MODEF's deep distaste for bureaucratic politics, and its emphasis on the 
republican tradition of democratic politics. This provides a major 
stumbling block for those who would like to equate MODEF with Poujadism. 
Stanley Hoffmann described Poujadism as "une nostalgie d'un âge d'or où 
les petits Poujades cultivaient leur jardins dans leur petit village, 
sans aucun contact avec l'Etat".(72) But in the case of MODEF, one
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finds not a hostility towards the state as such, but towards particular 
parts of the state and their presumed links with the enemies of MODEF, 
such as big business or the FNSEA. Similarly, where the Poujadists 
demonstrated a hostility towards deputies as a class which led them to 
present their own candidates under the slogan -"Sortez les sortants", 
MODEF has only criticized deputies for supporting policies considered 
detrimental to agriculture. MODEF never regarded deputies as inevitably 
corrupt. The most striking contradiction between Poujadist and MODEF 
views of the state is the gap between the Poujadist programme and the 
views of MODEF described in this chapter. Whereas Poujade proposed the 
transfer of powers over economic policy-making to the Chambers of 
Commerce, Chambers of Agriculture, etc., MODEF has resisted all such 
efforts. Poujade proposed a quasi-Presidential regime. MODEF was 
bitterly hostile to the granting of effective powers to the President 
and the loss of Parliamentary sovereignty.(73) In fact MODEF lives in a 
much more sophisticated mental universe, analyzing politics and the 
state in terms of class, than did the Poujadists with their moralizing 
discourse based on the concept of the shop-keeper as "l'épine dorsale de 
la nation".(74)
4. MODEF AND THE P.S. STATE 1981 - 1982
The victory of Francois Mitterrand and the appointment of Edith Cresson 
as Minister of Agriculture was quickly followed by official recognition 
for MODEF. In early June 1981, MODEF was officially received by a 
Minister of Agriculture for the first time since 1965. Due to the 
stance of MODEF, and particularly of its general secretary, in the 
months leading up to the Presidential election, there was some doubt 
whether this recognition would be obtained so readily. But due to some
energetic lobbying by the socialist leaders of MODEF, MODEF's less than 
wholehearted support for Mitterrand's candidature was overlooked and 
MODEF emerged from quarantine.
The new government had two incentives to accord MODEF official status.
On the one hand, it was the only agricultural organization to openly 
support Mitterrand, even if it had waited until after the first ballot. 
Furthermore, even if the PCF and its members in MODEF were suspicious of 
the new government they had no choice but to support the PS government. 
This meant that the PS had at least a short term interest in 
strengthening the hand of MODEF by granting it representative status.
The second reason was the concern of the government to undermine the 
FNSEA's monopoly. One way in which this was done was by restricting the 
contacts between the administration and the FNSEA.(75) MODEF provided 
another possibility. By legitimizing MODEF, the government could expect 
either to wean away farmers from the FNSEA, or make its right-wing 
leadership more amenable to a greater socialist presence in the national 
leadership. Recognizing MODEF, along with the FFA and Paysan 
Travailleur, was perhaps a means of intimidation by preparing a possible 
"stratégie de rechange".
However, after a year of PS-PCF government, this recognition remained 
partial. If MODEF had meetings with Edith Cresson and her advisors, it 
had not received the Presidential seal of approval in an official 
audience at the Elysée. Similarly, though it had been invited to the 
Annual Agricultural Conference, it had yet to enjoy the close 
relationship and permanent participation from which the FNSEA benefitted 
under the governments of the Right. This position was reflected in the 
departments. Though MODEF enjoyed fairly free access to the Prefects, 
its contacts with the technicians of the administration remained limited.
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The problem which MODEF's new position under a left-wing government 
raised were discussed at the 1982 Congress in Montrueil. In R.
Gondran's report, much emphasis was placed on the need to gain full 
recognition. Since the administration would not go out of its way to 
encourage MODEF to participate, recognition had to be established in 
each department. In a parody of Christian Bonnet, he pointed out that:
La reconnaissance ne se décrète pas, elle se gagne. Elle doit se 
gagner à tous les niveaux, il est indispensable que sur le plan 
régional, departmental, local, là aussi on fasse le maximun. Il 
faut se battre.(76)
Much of the report was devoted to an analysis of the attitude MODEF 
should take towards the government. The new situation obviously meant 
difficulties in adapting to a new, more co-operative, relationship with 
government. The fact that many activists had spent many years in a 
purely oppositional role, but now shared responsibility for bringing the 
new government to power, meant that loyalties were likely to be divided. 
Gondran identified three positions within the organization on the 
relationship between MODEF and the new government, all of which he 
rejected as mistaken. These potential strategies were as follows:
Doit-on combattre le gouvernement du changement comme on combattait 
n'importe quel gouvernement chiraquien ou giscardien? Ou doit-on 
ménager le gouvernement actuel parce que nous avons contribué à le 
mettre en place? Ou encore, doit-on, de crainte de se tromper, 
adopter une attitude d'attente de l'arme au pied.(77)
The solution at which the leadership arrived was only partially
convincing. Recognizing that MODEF's role had to change with the 
changed situation, it argued that MODEF must not remain an organization 
mainly concerned with protesting against the government and putting 
forward policies which had little chance of acceptance. Under a 
government of the Left, MODEF had to play a more constructive role since 
it could seriously expect some of its proposals to be put into practice. 
The new MODEF would be a "un syndicat d'action de lutte pour la défense 
de nos revendications", but, at the same time, "nous voulons nous 
considérer comme une force de proposition auprès de la nouvelle 
majorité".(78)
Not only did MODEF categorically reject the idea that it should be "une 
courroie de transmission" for the government, but it also emphasized the 
need to continue in its role as "un syndicat de lutte".(79) But since 
the government is so heavily involved in the agricultural economy, both 
through its own policies and the CAP, the problem arose of how to 
continue such actions without coming into conflict with the government. 
This issue was avoided through a deft sidestep by arguing that the 
activities of MODEF were not designed to put pressure on the government, 
but to assist it to overcome entrenched capitalist resistance to change. 
The action of the Hérault Federation in occupying a freighter in the 
port of Sète in July 1981 and destroying its cargo of wine became the 
classic justification for such a strategy.(80) This display of anger 
gave the government the pretext to inpose stricter import controls on 
Italian wines, a decision which even MODEF admitted was on the verge of 
European legality.(81) Whether Pierre Mauroy and Edith Cresson were 
quite so grateful for this unofficial assistance was doubtful.
Two main considerations determined this strategy. Firstly, the
influence of PCF members in MODEF can be detected. Suspicions about the
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willingness of the PS to act effectively to implement their policies 
meant that pressure had to be kept up on the government. More subtly, 
such a strategy permitted MODEF to combine the benefits gained from its 
links with the new government with the rewards to be gained from the 
leadership of popular protest. On this basis, even the socialists in 
MODEF could be induced to maintain a militant stance.
The other very pressing factor in the rejection of the transmission belt 
strategy was the new-found militancy of the FNSEA. Since the victory of 
Francois Mitterrand disrupted the government-FNSEA alliance, the FNSEA 
was free to abandon its policing role. Given the problems which many 
farmers faced, the FNSEA had no difficulty in directing discontent 
against the new government. Graphic examples include the rough 
treatment of Edith Cresson at the hands of Norman farmers and the 
thousands of farmers who congregated in Paris in February 1982. It was 
impossible for MODEF to permit the FNSEA to mobilize opposition without 
competition. Not only would MODEF suffer in the permanent competition 
for members and votes but the pressure exerted by the FNSEA on a 
hesitant government could secure the re-establishment of the FNSEA 
monopoly of representation. In this competition, MODEF could make 
itself of value to the government by directing protests away from it 
towards other targets, such as importers or the EEC. It was not an 
accident that the first serious demonstration which MODEF launched 
against the European Commission and Council of Minsters took place in 
Brussels in early 1982.(82)
Though official recognition was an undoubted benefit for MODEF, 
particularly in raising the moral of its activists, the existence of a 
left-wing government dominated by the PS presented MODEF mainly with 
problems of adaptation. Most of the difficulties were not insuperable
political or intellectual divisions. Rather they were questions which 
could only be resolved in practice. The major danger would be that if 
and when the PCF leaves, or is excluded from, government, the bitterness 
amongst the activists of the Left could be such that MODEF would be 
strained to breaking point by divided loyalties. It would be ironic if 
the downfall of MODEF was brought about by the consequences of an 
electoral victory which it had done so much in the countryside to 
facilitate.
The final difficulty is over the substance of PS policy. In the first 
year criticism concentrated on the pace rather than the direction of 
change. Disagreements over details made itself evident but only two 
potential sources of serious friction arose. The Product Boards set up 
by the government provided a potential source of uncertainty since MODEF 
was unsure that the Boards would be effective and competent (given the 
state of many product markets it would be extremely difficult to make 
things worse) and that the composition of the Boards would be 
acceptable. MODEF was, of course, determined that it should be 
represented and that the Boards should not fall into the tender care of 
the FNSEA. But since no principles were involved, agreement seemed 
possible.
The other major policy problem was the question of the extension of the 
Common Market to Spain and Portugal. For MODEF this is the issue which 
overrides all others. Since it thinks that its support depends on its 
uncompromising hostility to the extension of the geographical and 
political limits of the EEC, it would have no choice but to enter into 
open confrontation if the government were to submit to pressure from 
industry, pro-EEC elements, and its European partners to open the door 
to Spain. But, for MODEF, a split with its government on this issue
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would be preferable to the results of a breakdown of the PS-PCF alliance 
since the entire organization would enter into opposition. Indeed the 
sense of betrayal felt by the socialists in MODEF would probably propel 
them to the forefront of the opposition.
5. MODEF AND THE DEBATE ON CORPORATISM
MODEF's relationship with the state has implications for theories of 
pressure group politics in general, and the theories of corporatism 
which have become popular in recent years. The evidence presented in 
this chapter and in Chapter 6 obviously shows pluralist theories of 
pressure groups to be inapplicable. Phillippe Schmitter defines 
corporatism as:
a system of interest representation in which the constituent units 
are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, 
non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and functionally 
differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) 
by the state and granted a deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing 
certain controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports.(83)
This system of pressure group politics has been variously 
described as a strategy designed to control the potentially 
destructive elements of the population in which 
"trade-unions become the agencies of social control...", or 
simply as an efficient way of organizing the political 
decision-making process.(84)
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Lehmbruch has identified France as one of the western European countries 
in which corporatist institutions have been least prevalent.(85) But at 
the same time, as Schmitter has pointed out, agriculture is one of the 
sectors of policy-making most favourable to the emergence of corporatist 
structures. As we have seen, France is no exception.(86) However, the 
French case is complicated by the existence of MODEF. Around 
twenty-five per cent of the agricultural population has consistently 
refused to endorse the FNSEA-government link, a percentage which limited 
the extent to which the FNSEA was able to co-operate with the state. 
MODEF therefore provides an example of how corporatism has been limited 
in agriculture and allows certain insights to be gained into why such 
practices have been absent in other spheres of policy-making.
Three factors have inhibited popular support for corporatist practices 
and institutions. Firstly, there is the problem of class consciousness, 
the nature of which is reflected by MODEF's ideology. France is often 
taken to be a case of a country whose Left is strongly class-conscious. 
This impression has been reinforced by the contempt with which the 
French Left regard ideas such as the British Social Contract, and the 
hostility of the PCF to Italian initiatives such as the "historic 
compromise".
A close examination reveals that MODEF, along with most other pressure 
groups associated with the Left, does not make a sufficient distinction 
between short and long-term interests to permit it to sacrifice 
short-term interests for long-term goals. This would suggest that the 
Left in France is not an acutely class conscious alliance of white 
collar workers, manual workers, farmers, etc., but a Federation of group 
interests. There is a teacher consciousness, a civil service
1*1*9
consciousness, an engineering worker consciousness, etc. Whilst each 
group is primarily concerned with its own interest, each has sufficient 
political awareness to realize that its interests are best protected if 
other interests are pushing in the same direction. It is a marriage of 
convenience rather than of love. United by a mutual enemy rather than 
mutual attraction, the lowest common denominator of this alliance is the 
idea that the bosses and the state are to blame.
This type of category consciousness helps to explain the block placed on 
corporatist organization by the consequences of collaboration between 
leaders and the state. This is a process which has been well 
documented. Crouch argues that "the central problem of corporatist 
organization is the arbitrariness and partiality of its representation 
and the unresponsiveness to popular control of its elites".(87) This 
means that such pressure groups have great difficulty imposing 
agreements on their members. Since the qualities required of the 
leadership are no longer those necessary to protect the interests of 
their members but rather to impose discipline on them, "the legitimation 
and union action which the state needs de-legitimizes the union 
leadership in the eyes of the base".(88) Panitch explains the 
instability of corporatist relationships by the fact that pressure 
groups are indeed obliged to be responsive to their members.(89) Indeed 
the rise of MODEF is a classic illustration of this problem, its growth 
reflecting the development of the close relationship between the FNSEA 
and the state. Bagès' studies of the Gers also points to the same 
conclusion, where "1'apathie ou se réfugie la masse paysanne dans les 
périodes calmes ne traduit-elle pas le refus d'une politique syndicale 
de "concertation" permanente..."(90)
The final inhibition relates to these two. Just as corporatist
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institutions are unstable, so is a strategy of permanent militancy.
Most mobilizations tend to subside as suddenly as they arise and so 
organizations based on a militant strategy remain activist rather than 
mass organizations. This reduces their ability to speak for, and 
bargain on behalf of, people they claim to represent. Correctly 
rejecting the explanation that corporatist practices are limited in 
France because of the ideological intransigence of pressure groups, 
Lehmbruch uses this weakness of pressure groups as his own 
explanation.(91) This is certainly true but if one stops here, as 
Lehmbruch does, one becomes the academic equivalent of the judge who 
blames the rapist's victim.
As we have seen, MODEF's lack of participation in decision-making has 
been the result as much of official intransigence and administrative 
hostility as of MODEF recalcitrance. Not only has MODEF constantly 
tried to gain official recognition but it has always treated the state 
as its most important interlocutor. Since the advent of a socialist 
government, its favourable attitude to negotiation and participation in 
decision-making, including the High Mass of agricultural corporatism - 
the Annual Agricultural Conference - has been clearly demonstrated.
The role of the state in rejecting corporatist strategies of 
accommodation reveals the fallacy in the argument of those who argue 
that such strategies are designed to de-politicize the members of the 
groups involved.(92) Since corporatist arrangements operate on the 
basis of incremental bargaining, it is assumed that they are designed to 
limit class conflict and consciousness. However, such a view is almost 
a mirror image of the liberal view of politics as negotiation and 
compromise.(93) Only overt class conflict is regarded as political. By 
such a restrictive definition, one is able to fulminate against other
types of politics in normative terms dressed up in scientific clothing.
What is really at stake in corporatist strategies is not the attempt at 
de-politicization, but rather the creation of a specific type of 
politics and class consciousness. As we have seen, narrow group 
consciousness inhibits corporatist practices as does a revolutionary 
socialist class consciousness. What is needed is social democratic 
class consciousness. An awareness of class interests beyond the group, 
and the acceptance of the necessity to sacrifice group interests to 
promote the interests of the class, has to be coupled with the belief 
that such interests can be defended by co-operating with other classes. 
Such a social democratic consensus has been absent in France.
The state and its officials have been as hostile to such a consensus as 
the irate citizens who are usually blamed. Schmitter has pointed out the 
link between the way in which the capitalist system is reproduced in a 
particular country and the way in which interests are represented and 
accommodated.(93) In post-war France, a curious synthesis has emerged - 
social technocracy. The economic and social policies characteristic of 
social democracy have been pursued whilst the political aspects of 
social democracy have been rejected. One of the main functions of the 
state in the reproduction of capitalism is sustaining the legitimacy of 
the socio-economic system over which it presides. During the formative 
years of the Fifth Republic, responsibility for the creation and 
maintenance of legitimacy was divided between the state apparatus and 
the Head of State. The apparatus concentrated on economic development, 
both in direct accummulation through nationalized industries and state 
intervention to help private sector accummulation. Popular consent was 
gained by an American-style high wages-vs-good behaviour strategy, a 
strategy supplemented by the indigenous tradition of the "patron de
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choc". But general political legitimacy was delegated to one man, de 
Gaulle.
This interpretation is sustained by two very interesting examples. The 
first is the coincidence between the departure of de Gaulle and the 
closest thing to corporatism the Fifth Republic has seen - the 
"Nouvelle Société" of Chaban-Delmas. No longer could the regime depend 
on the direct appeal to the nation of a charismatic leader. A more 
institutionalized approach seemed necessary, one which took into account 
the importance of intermediaries. Secondly, the fact that agriculture 
is the field in which corporatist-style politics have been pursued most 
systematically is revealing. Given the need to conciliate farmers 
because of their electoral importance, and being incapable of 
guaranteeing high agricultural incomes, the state was left with little 
alternative but to try to control farmers through the medium of the 
FNSEA.
The emphasis on the role of the state apparatus in legitimation through 
economic success explains the reluctance to allow groups such as MODEF 
to participate in decision-making. The description of the state's 
attitude towards MODEF in the early part of this chapter is reminiscent 
of Offe's "purposive-rational" state governed by a St. Simonian 
technocracy. Problems, particularly economic ones, can best be resolved 
by leaving them to experts. Organizations like MODEF are guilty on two 
counts - lack of expertise and determination to politicize problems 
which are basically administrative or technical.(95) This also helps to 
explain the technocratic nature of French planning.(96)
Ironically, the technocrats have often done their best to inadvertently 
promote exactly the kind of politics they affect to despise. The
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official discrimination against MODEF and other dissidents within 
agricultural organizations ensured that the corporatist alliance with 
the FNSEA would be restricted. Excluding MODEF on the basis of the 
political orientation of its leaders, rather than on the policies which 
it put forward, created two limitations on the co-operation of the 
FNSEA. In the first place, the exclusion of MODEF on partisan and 
ideological grounds implied that there was a partisan and ideological 
similarity between the government and the FNSEA. This meant that 
conflict in agriculture would be on ideological and party lines rather 
than by product or region, divisions which could have been reconciled 
with greater ease. Secondly, the exclusion of MODEF gave it complete 
freedom of action to denounce any FNSEA-government compromise, to 
capitalize on the discontent aroused by such compromises, and aggregate 
the grievances without too much concern for consistency or cost.
Finally, there is the question of the state's response to the weakness 
of pressure groups. Though this is an obvious area of interest, hardly 
anyone has bothered to discuss it. The fact that the state takes 
advantage of such weakness to ignore interests which may be inconvenient 
for the state has only been mentioned explicitly in a recent article by 
Panitch and is implicit in Schmitter's discussion of capitalist 
resistance to corporatist institutions.(97) The cat and mouse treatment 
which MODEF has received at the hands of the state is a classic example 
of this simple, but apparently inconvenient, virtually "iron" law of 
politics.
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CONCLUSION THE IMPACT OF MODEF
When MODEF's founders gathered together in Toulouse in 1959, they viewed 
the future of French agriculture with some trepidation. The family 
farm, they believed, was doomed to disappear shortly unless the 
direction of agricultural policy was changed. MODEF's success, or lack 
of it, in this respect is the final question which must be considered.
In a sense, MODEF's continued existence at the end of the period under 
consideration represented both a victory and a defeat. For the 
pessimist, the fact that MODEF still existed after twenty-three years 
was indicative of the success of the alliance between the state and the 
FNSEA. Despite the dangers of this alliance for the non-capitalist 
sector, the leadership which presided over the contraction of the 
industry remained in place, with the continued support of the mass of 
its victims. For the optimist, MODEF's continued existence showed the 
resilience of the family farm. Though one million farms disappeared 
during the first twenty years of the Fifth Republic, enough remained to 
ensure that a significant non-capitalist sector continued to be a 
constraint on agricultural policy-making. The process of elimination 
had been much slower than had been predicted in the 1960s. The 
continued existence of the family farm demonstrated both the impact of 
MODEF on agricultural policy and provided the social basis for MODEF 
itself.
One interesting indication of the success which MODEF had is to be found 
in the linguistics of agriculture. Despite the modernizing discourse of 
the FNSEA, and the attempt to popularize the concept of the farmer as a 
"chef d'entreprise", more traditional terms such as "l'exploitant", "le
cultivateur" and even "le paysan" were still in more frequent usage them 
terms with capitalist connotations. Despite the constant flow of 
premature obituaries, the family farm, however much modernized, still 
lives on.
When challenged about the success of their efforts, MODEF leaders and 
activists made a common response. Recognizing their limitations, and 
faced with the obvious fact that Fifth Republican agricultural policy, 
under the successive governments of the Right, continued on its 
inexorable course, the most frequent reply was that: "Le MODEF a empêche 
beaucoup de choses de se faire". MODEF, therefore, fought a rearguard 
action, concentrating, as its name suggests, on defence. For MODEF, 
success was defined in purely negative terms, since the prevention of 
the liquidation of the family farm was its prime objective. That this 
was a restrictive factor on the ability of MODEF to take the initiative 
was not often perceived. The demoralizing consequences of defensiveness 
were limited by the fact that even such negative victories were 
substantial achievements in their own right.
In this defence, MODEF adopted two complementary strategies; one based 
on resolution of the collective grievances of the profession; the second 
based on overcoming individual difficulties. In the first place, MODEF, 
as an organization, concentrated on a global and highly politicized 
critique of agricultural policy. By constant agitation and protest, it 
was hoped that governments would be induced to come to terms with the 
continued existence of the family farm. At the same time MODEF 
attempted to galvanize the FNSEA into leading the resistance to the 
state. By competing for support with the FNSEA, MODEF seeked to limit 
the collaborationist tendencies of the FNSEA, by setting limits beyond 
which this collaboration could not go.
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MODEF activists often claimed that even if the organization was not 
recognized, it was heard. By providing a focus for opposition and an 
alternative leadership, MODEF obliged the government and the FNSEA to 
implement their policies more cautiously them would otherwise have been 
the case. As a result, if MODEF had little influence over the contents 
amd objectives of agricultural policy, it exerted an influence on its 
timing. From the point of view of the individual farmer, this could 
sometimes eunount to the the seune thing, as timing of policy changes 
could affect the financial stability of the farm.
Paradoxically, MODEF was more successful with the second strategy. 
Despite its official emphasis on collective action against the state, 
MODEF, as a group of individual activists, concentrated on resolving 
individual difficulties. Despite its official reluctance to engage in 
such clientelistic practices, it was unable not to do so, if it was to 
achieve any substantial degree of support. The traditional role of 
agricultural unionism as a dispenser of services was simply too strong 
to be ignored.
Ironically, not only was the social work function of the organization 
vital as a means of attracting support, it also did more to defend the 
family farm than the more abstract politicized campaigns. Certain 
MODEF activists perceived this, but it was a view which was rarely 
openly admitted. The cumulative effect of negotiating solutions for 
individual, or small groups of, farmers (e.g. negotiations over weather 
damage compensation, dealing with tax problems, etc.) effectively 
counteracted the impact of agricultural policy. But, from the MODEF 
viewpoint, the difficulty was that such a strategy boiled down to 
putting a human face on the government's policy.
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Such a situation points to the responsibility of MODEF's ideology for 
some of the organization's practical limitations. The defensive 
strategy, for instance, was deeply rooted in MODEF's contrast between 
the idealized past and the all too difficult present. Concentrating on 
the former at the expense of the latter, MODEF was led to oppose rather 
than propose the future. That the opportunities to put forward 
alternative policies were there was demonstrated by the case of the 
SAFERs. As the reactionary hostility to the SAFERs manifested by MODEF 
in the 1960s gave way to the progressive reformism of the 1970s, MODEF 
began to have a more significant inpact on policy, securing support for 
its proposal from the parties of the Left and even obliging the 
Giscardian regime to make reforms.
Similarly, the egalitarian emphasis and the activist philosophy gave 
rise to a half-hearted clientelism. De facto recognition of clientelism 
was combined with de jure hostility, ensuring that such clientelism 
remained on am individual basis rather them on an organizational scale. 
Not only did this present MODEF with the problem of electoral support, 
it also allowed the FNSEA a free hand in its single-minded pursuit of 
the objective of bringing the entire farming population and the 
agri-complex under its control.
There is, of course, another less explicit role played by MODEF. Though 
not part of its formal programme, the ideological and political 
connections of its leadership and many of its activists meant that MODEF 
was an expression of the Left in agriculture. These ties, plus the fact 
that MODEF never concealed its belief that political change was 
necessary to safeguard the future of the family farm, meant that it 
served am importamt role in furthering the fortunes of the Left in the 
countryside.
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In many respects, MODEF conformed to the pattern of party-interest group 
relations seen between the parties of the Left and such groups. The 
classic case is, of course, the PCF-CGT connection. If one makes a 
comparison between MODEF and the CGT, one finds the same emphasis on 
political change, the primacy of the political party and the same 
blurring of the distinction between politics and economics.
Nevertheless, MODEF created a strategy of its own for reconciling 
independence with political sympathy. This strategy distinguished it 
from its forerunner, the CGPT, and from other alleged satellite 
organizations of the PCF. It has already been seen that such a 
classification is inaccurate in MODEF's case, but it is interesting to 
consider the differences between MODEF and the CGT.
Unlike the CGT, MODEF took care to avoid identification with the PCF.
At the most elementary level, there was the absence of MODEF leaders in 
public roles in the national party apparatus. At most, MODEF leaders 
confined their activities to the party's Agricultural Commission and to 
membership of Federal Committees. Secondly, care was taken to avoid 
being seen to line up with the PCF on issues which divided the Left.
The only case of explicit identification with the PCF, rather than with 
the Left as a whole, the intervention of Frederic Lindenstaedt in the 
1981 Presidential election campaign, was striking, precisely because of 
its exceptional nature. Thirdly, the political ambitions of members of 
other parties were encouraged and facilitated. Fourthly, there was 
little evidence that the members of the various parties within MODEF 
organized themselves as factions. To the limited extent that this took 
place, the guilty party was more often than not the PS rather than the 
PCF. Most distinctive of all was, however, the refusal of MODEF to 
subordinate its own internal and external concerns to those of the PCF 
during electoral campaigns.
The emphasis on unity rather than discipline and homogeneity not only 
assisted MODEF in its growth and ensured its survival, but also provided 
a trend-setting example for the Left as a whole. MODEF's foundation in 
1959 was an indicator of the first tentative steps towards the Union of 
the Left. Its peak electoral performance of 1974-76 coincided with the 
high points of the Union of the Left whilst its ability to weather the 
storm of 1977-81 also demonstrated the possibility of continuing 
co-operation between the fragments of the divided Left. In this 
respect, MODEF was a pathfinder for the ostensibly more advanced urban 
Left.
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MODEF's small but significant role in the eventual downfall of the Right 
in 1981 was not limited to propaganda by example. Though the FFA may 
have undermined MODEF in western France, the presence of MODEF prevented 
the Poujadist-style approach of the FFA from succeeding in the south. 
MODEF's achievement was to prevent anti-capitalist resistance from 
taking on anti-working class forms. By doing so, MODEF made a certain 
electoral contribution to the fortunes of the Left. In the first phase, 
the loyalty of a certain section of the farm population was maintained, 
to the benefit of the parties of the Left. Later, a new layer of support 
was secured, both groups contributing to the fragile mathematics of May 
1981.
Nevertheless, MODEF's most significant contribution was the way in which 
it helped to cement the alliance of the rural and urban Left. MODEF's 
capacity to produce and train leaders who were eventually able to, not 
only secure the support which MODEF required, but also personify the 
cross-class alliance implied by the Union of the Left. The election of 
such leaders to political office, particularly in semi-urban cantons and
communes, was highly effective in this respect. Though agriculture may 
not have been a high priority for the parties of the Left, such actions 
spoke louder than their indifference. At a low cost, these parties 
could rely on MODEF to produce the activists needed to establish the 
former's right and capacity to govern.
Though this might appear to be a positive balance sheet to the external 
observer, as it does to this one, the post-1981 MODEF finds itself in a 
difficult position. The problem is that MODEF's commitment to the 
family farm, unlike that of past organizations, is entirely genuine.
Although it stresses the need for political change as a pre-condition 
for the successful defence of the family farm, this remains simply a 
pre-condition of success and is not an end in itself. Since 1981, MODEF 
has been in the uncomfortable position of not knowing whether the 
fulfillment of the pre-condition of political change in fact makes any 
difference to the future of the family farm. Given the evolution of 
socialist policy, MODEF has yet to see its hopes realized. Though the 
positive benefit of official recognition has been secured, the 
implications of the PS state for the future of the family farm are far 
from clear. Added to the fear that political change may not be the 
panacea it was expected to be is the knowledge that any alternative, in 
the shape of a re-invigorated Right, would be even worse. MODEF's 
changed status since 1981 therefore presents MODEF with many dangers, 
not the least of which is disillusionment.
Ironically, the presence of the Left in government creates a threat to 
the continued existence of MODEF, just as it poses a threat for the Left 
as a whole. The major advantage of the 1981 elections is not so the 
change of policy, but the fact that the alibis of the parties of the
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Left have been destroyed. Confronting the problems of government, 
instead of striking poses in opposition, the politics of "la 
revendication" are no longer possible. Whatever the outcome of the 
present experiment, the Union of the Left and Mitterrandism will have 
made a major contribution if such politics are replaced by a more 
coherent strategy based on the twin principles of securing power and 
establishing clarity on the objects of the exercise of power. This is 
the challenge which now confronts MODEF. Its capacity to produce new 
answers to these questions will determine whether it will be able to 
perform the entirely creditable and essential role in the future which 
it has carried out with such vigour and determination in the past.
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